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ABSTRACT
The main issu es on which the  p re sen t study is  focused a re  the  
foundation  of the New Democracy p a r ty  (ND) in  1974; i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
personnel, leadership, o rgan isation , ideology, e le c to ra l s tra tegy  and 
overa ll performance from 1974 u n til  1990 a t  both the national and the 
local leve l; as well as the extent to  which ND resembled and/or d iffe red  
from the trad itio n a l p rac tices  of i t s  predecessor, the National Radical 
Union (ERE).
The a n a ly s is  and in te rp r e ta t io n  of ND not only comprises new 
em pirica l inform ation ob ta ined  from our re se a rc h  in  Greece, but a lso  
takes in to  account the sp e c ific  c h a ra c te r is tic s  and nature of the post- 
1974 so c io -p o litic a l system w ithin which a l l  the p o l i t ic a l  p a rtie s  have 
operated. Moreover, comparisons between ND and ERE go beyond the party  
le v e l. In o rder to  o b ta in  r a th e r  more comprehensive and sa tis fa c to ry  
explanations concerning the nature and exact p o l i t ic a l  id en tity  of ND 
(and, secondarily, of ERE), we expanded our an a ly tica l scope to  include 
the broader so c io -p o litic a l c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the two systems w ithin 
which ERE and ND were c reated , functioned and in te rre la te d . In o ther 
words, in our attempt to  analyse ND, we used not only the explanatory 
v a r ia b le s  of the p a r ty 's  h i s to r ic a l  background, p o l i t i c a l  personnel, 
o rgan isation , leadership and ideology, but a lso  the sp ec ific  fea tu res of 
the p o l i t ic a l  systems w ithin which ND and i t s  predecessor ERE were se t 
up, as well as the extent to  which both p a r t ie s  were influenced by and 
themselves affected  and shaped the broader so c io -p o litic a l environment.
Taking in to  consideration a l l  of the new em pirical information and 
comparing ND w ith ERE, w ith  the  o th e r  m ajor post-1974 Greek p a r t ie s  
(p a rticu la rly  the Panhellenic S o c ia lis t Movement PASOK), as well as with 
many West European conservative p a r t ie s , i t  is  argued tha t ND should not 
be seen as simply a mere continuation of ERE, nor as a completely new 
and modem p o l i t ic a l  form ation . Although throughout the pe riod  under 
examination ND presented elements of con tinu ity  with i t s  predecessor, i t  
a ls o  gave evidence of change and m odern isa tion , and demonstrated the 
c h a ra c te r is tic s  of both a c l i e n te l i s t  and a mass party  of the Western 
European kind. Notwithstanding the coexistence and sp ec ific  a r tic u la tio n  
among t r a d i t io n a l  and modern elem ents w ith in  i t s  ranks —a t times 
complementary, a t o ther times not— ND today is  s t i l l  going through a 
t r a n s i t i o n a l  p e r io d . W hether o r no t t h i s  w i l l  lead  to  i t s  f u l l  
transform ation in to  a modern mass p a r ty  and an in te g ra t iv e  p o l i t i c a l  
force of the Right, depends on a wide range of fac to rs (operating from 
both within and outside the p a rty ), and remains to  be seen.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The complete absence o f a d e ta i l e d  and com prehensive a n a ly s i s  
concerning the  r e c o n s t i tu t io n  of the  rig h t-w in g  p o l i t i c a l  fo rces  in  
Greece since the re s to ra tio n  of democracy in 1974, and the formation and 
overa ll performance of the conservative New Democracy (ND) party  se t up 
a t  th a t time, was the major m otivation /fo r  the present study. Such an 
analysis  has been overdue fo r seme time, given the fac t th a t i t  was the 
ND p a rty , under the leadership of i t s  founder C. Karamanlis, th a t polled  
an unprecedented 54.37 per cent of the popular vote in 1974, and took 
the lead in not only represen ting  the conservative p o l i t ic a l  fo rces, but 
a lso  in carry ing  out the d i f f ic u l t  task  of changing to  and consolidating  
what must be acknowledged as th e  most open, co m p e titiv e , and fu l ly  
democratic regime the country has ever experienced.
A lthough s e v e ra l a r t i c l e s  have been p u b lish e d  concerning ND's 
c h a ra c te r is tic  fea tu res and p o l i t ic a l  id e n tity , they were not the re s u lt  
of s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  im p a r tia l  e n q u ire s .  On th e  c o n tr a ry ,  they  were 
b la te n t ly  b iased  e i th e r  fo r  o r a g a in s t ND, and openly served p a r ty -  
p o l i t ic a l  propaganda purposes. Most of them d e a l t  alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  
w ith  the qu estio n  of whether ND was indeed a t o t a l ly  new p o l i t i c a l  
formation, as claimed by the party  i t s e l f ,  or a simple regrouping of the 
same p o l i t ic a l  forces that had been represented by the National Radical 
Union (ERE) during  most of the  pre-coup p e rio d , as a s se r te d  by i t s  
p o l i t ic a l  opponents.( 1’
The i n t e r - p a r t y  c o n t r o v e r s y  h a s  n o t  ad d ed  much to  th e  
id e n tif ic a tio n , analy sis , and explanation of ND's c h a ra c te r is tic s  since,
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depending on the personal p o l i t ic a l  stance of each "analyst" v is -a -v is  
the party  and i t s  founder, the respective  views ranged frcm complete
accordance with ND claims —th a t the p a rty  was not only a to ta l ly  new
p o l i t ic a l  formation, e n tire ly  d issoc ia ted  frcm past p o l i t ic a l  p rac tices , 
but a lso  a national p a rty , which was alone in serving so le ly  the true  
in te r e s ts  of the  people and so stood q u ite  o u ts id e  the  "m isleading, 
a rb i t r a r y  and absurd R ig h t-C en tre-L eft c la s s i f i c a t io n " — to  in tense  
polem ics, a s s e r t in g  th a t  i t  was no th ing  but the  o ld  ERE under a new 
name. In the  end, i t  was the  l a t t e r  view th a t came to  predom inate,
p a rtly  because ND, having fa ile d  to  e laborate  a concrete and coherent
ideology of i t s  own, lo s t power to  the opposition, which then stepped up 
i t s  a ttack  on ND as a mere continuation of ERE and denigrated i t  fo r not 
only  i t s  own p a s t reco rd  but ju s t  as much fo r  th a t  of the ERE. As a 
r e s u l t ,  issues concerning p a r tic u la r  party  c h a ra c te r is tic s , especially  
the system atic establishm ent and the functioning of ND’s organisation 
and the bela ted  e laboration  of i t s  ideological p rin c ip le s , were almost 
to ta l ly  ignored .<2)
All in a l l ,  then, in the post-1974 p o l i t ic a l  d iscourse, ND received 
no more a tten tio n  than the above ill-documented, narrow and sim p lis tic  
polem ic, confined to  the  issu e  of whether the  p a rty  had or had not 
departed  from p ast p r a c t ic e s ,  and whether or not i t  had d is so c ia te d  
i t s e l f  from i t s  predecessor’s p o l i t ic s .  I f  i t  is  a lso  taken in to  account 
that in the early  years a f te r  1974 i t  was a n ti-d ic ta to rsh ip , anti-R ight 
and ra d ic a l l ib e ra l  and l e f t i s t  a t t i tu d e s  and ideas that emerged and 
became dominant, i t  w ill  be more re a d i ly  understood th a t ND as "the 
bearer of reactionary and a u th o rita rian  right-w ing p o lit ic a l  trad ition"  
was condemned and dismissed a lto g e th e r . ( 31
Instead, the bulk of p o l i t ic a l  analysis and examination during the 
e a r ly  post-1974 years c en tred  on the  P anhe llen ic  S o c ia l is t  Movement 
(PASOK) and i t s  leader Andreas Papandreou. I t s  ra d ic a l and coherent
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ideology, i t s  e ffe c tiv e ly  m ilita n t mass o rgan isation , i t s  introduction 
of an unprecedented number of newcomers to  p o l i t ic s  and i t s  outstanding 
e le c to ra l  perform ance, as w ell as the  c h arism atic  pe rsonality  of i t s  
leader have re su lte d  in numerous s tud ies  of PASOK i t s e l f ,  i t s  re la tio n  
to  pre-coup p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s , the extent to  which is  a departure frcm 
past p o l i t ic a l  p rac tic e s  and, since 1981 when i t  came to power, in how 
fa r i t  has managed to  enforce i t s  p ro jec ted  p o lic ie s  and what kind of 
overa ll governmental record i t  can show.( 4 * In the meantime, although ND 
had already begun i t s  bela ted  and slow process towards the elaboration 
of a centre-R ight (and la te r  neo-conservative) ideology and the creation  
and development o f a g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n is a tio n , very  l i t t l e  i f  any 
a t te n t io n  was pa id  to  the  p a r ty , which continued  to  be considered  a 
continuation of ERE and as such was heavily  stigm atised  by the l a t t e r 's  
pre-coup au th o rita rian  and rep ressive  legacy.
A ll in  a l l ,  a p a r t  from harangues e x ce ss iv e ly  fo r  o r a g a in s t ND, 
l i t t l e  more was w ritten  about the p arty  c h a ra c te r is tic s  in Greek, and 
alm ost no th ing  in  E ng lish ; moreover, th e re  i s  a complete lack of 
en p irica l da ta  on the p a r ty 's  h is to ry , p o l i t ic a l  personnel, g rass-roo ts 
organisation and e le c to ra l s tra teg y . The present study aims to  f i l l  th is  
gap, by presenting , analysing and evaluating en p irica l information about 
ND a t  both national and the local lev e l. Our analysis of the party  w ill 
be ca rried  out in a h is to r ic a l  and th eo re tica l context th a t w ill allow 
an in p a r t ia l ,  fac tually -based  and cogent explanation of the nature of 
the party , i t s  p rec ise  p o l i t ic a l  id e n tity , and i t s  re la tio n sh ip  not only 
to  ERE but a lso  to PASOK as the o ther major p o s t-1974 party , as well as 
other West European conservative p a r t ie s . In o ther words, i t  seeks to 
show th a t ,  f i r s t ,  the  c re a tio n  and n a tu re  of ND in 1974 cannot be 
s in p l is t ic a l ly  considered as e ith e r  a rejuvenation of ERE, or as some 
spectacular new p o l i t ic a l  s t a r t .  A system atic and d e ta iled  examination 
of ND's h is to r ic a l background w ill give us a b e tte r  understanding of the
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sp e c if ic  c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the post-1949 dominant p o l i t ic a l  system and 
allow  comparisons w ith  ERE to  see in  how f a r  ND continued  and/or 
d iverted  frcm the p o l i t ic a l  p rac tices  of i t s  predecessor. I t  w ill also  
show th a t ,  a lthough  w ith in  the  open and dem ocratic p o l i t i c a l  system 
a f te r  1974 ND co n stitu ted  a reformed and more moderate rep resen ta tiv e  of 
the conservative p o l i t ic a l  forces, i t s  fu ll  transform ation in to  a  modem 
party  of the Western European kind remained incomplete, given th a t i t  
has f a i l e d  to  a r t i c u l a t e  a co h e ren t and d i s t i n c t i v e  id e o lo g ic a l  
id e n tity , and did  not c rea te  an e ffe c tiv e  mass organ isation  th a t could 
free  the party  from having to  re ly  on i t s  tra d itio n a l p e rso n a lis tic  and 
c l i e n te l i s t  p rac tic e s .
The research fo r th is  work was conducted in two separate  phases. I t  
began a t  p a r ty  h eadquarte rs  in Athens in  October 1987, and u n t i l  
September 1988 consisted  mainly of a study of the p a r ty 's  publications 
since the year of i t s  foundation, and of various o ther documents on ND's 
id e o lo g ic a l  p r in c ip le s  and g r a s s - r o o t s  o r g a n is a t io n .  (With few 
ex cep tio n s, most of th e  documents I  asked fo r  were given to  me). As 
th e re  were no d a ta  concerning  ND's p red ecesso r (ERE), prominent ND 
members were interviewed who had been e lec ted  as ERE members in the pre­
coup period, and who continued th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  careers in the ND ranks 
fo r some time a f te r  1974. ND deputies who f i r s t  came to  p o l i t ic s  in 1974 
were a lso  interviewed, as well as leading members of ONNED, ND's youth 
o rg an isa tio n .( 5’
The second phase s ta r te d  in September 1988 and la s te d  u n t i l  Ju ly  
1989. I t  took p lace  in  the  Department of L a ris s a , in the  reg ion  of 
Thessaly in cen tra l Greece. The aim of the research was to  study the ND 
organisation  and the rank and f i l e  a t  the local leve l; the Department of 
L a ris sa  was chosen because, w ith  i t s  so c ia l  and p o l i t ic a l  s t a t i s t i c s  
(the  com position of i t s  p o p u la tio n , labour d is t r ib u t io n ,  e le c tio n  
re s u lts )  largely  re f le c tin g  the national ones, we expected to acquire a
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more comprehensive and o b je c tiv e  im pression concerning ND's s p e c if ic  
fea tu res. The fieldwork research consisted  of interviews w ith local MPs, 
h ig h e r  p a r ty  members, and v a r io u s  p rom inent ND sy m p a th ise rs  and 
s u p p o r te rs ,  as w ell as  o f in te rv ie w s  based  on a p r e - s t r u c tu r e d  
questionnaire to  be answered by ordinary pa rty  members.t6)
A 5 per cent simple random sample from the party  membership in the 
c ity  of L arissa was se lec ted , p lus a l l  of the party  members in  the small 
v illa g e  of Kalohori. Although i t  had i n i t i a l l y  been agreed to conduct 
these  in terv iew s fa c e - to - fa c e , in  the  end th i s  proved impossible? in 
L a r is s a  and K alohori i t  was ND's lo c a l-c o m m itte e  p r e s id e n ts  who 
themselves d is tr ib u te d  the questionnaires to  the party  members, and not 
a l l  of them were re tu rn e d  a fte rw ard s . In  the meantime, I  managed to  
interview  18 party  members personally  (out of the 63 o r ig in a lly  se lec ted  
frcm the local conmittee of the c i ty  c en tre ); as e lec tio n  day (18 June 
1989) was coming c lo se r, the local party  headquarters did  not allow me 
to  complete my research , on the grounds th a t party  members should be 
l e f t  to  c a rry  out p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  propaganda work, and to  do th e i r  
utmost to help ND resume o ff ic e .
Despite these d i f f ic u l t ie s ,  the to ta l  number of those who answered 
the questionnaires (158 party  members) is  qu ite  s ig n ific an t and provided 
c o n s id e r a b le  and i n t e r e s t i n g  d a ta  c o n c e rn in g  th e  p a r ty  b a s e . 
Nevertheless, th is  information should be evaluated with due caution and 
reservation  —f i r s t ,  because the study remained incomplete and, second, 
because the representativeness of our sample is  uncertain . For a l l  th a t, 
the answers given by the rank and f i l e  on a broad range of party  issues, 
coupled w ith inform ation ob tained  through both formal interview s and 
informal discussions w ith local MPs, higher party  members as well as ex­
p a rty  members and prominent ND su p p o rte rs  not d i r e c t ly  involved in 
p o l i t ic s  a t the time, s ig n if ic a n tly  complemented our knowledge of the
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party , and in the end provided a much more comprehensive p ic tu re  of i t s  
nature and p a r tic u la r  c h a r a c te r is t ic s .(7}
The present study is  divided in to  seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents 
a  d e ta i l e d  accoun t o f th e  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n te x t w ith in  which ND's 
p re d e c e s s o r , ERE, was c re a te d  and a ls o  i t s  g e n e ra l perfo rm ance . 
Moreover, the sp e c ific  fea tu res of what came to  be ca lled  "repressive 
parliam entarism " a re  analysed  —not only  in  o rder to  understand  the 
h is to r ic  roo ts of ND, but a lso  to  obtain  a more complete p ic tu re  of both 
the  so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  a t  the  tim e, and to  determ ine the 
in te r re la tio n  and sp ec ific  linkages between the dominant so c io -p o litic a l 
system and the p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  in general.
Chapter 2 deals exclusively  with the creation  of ND in 1974 rig h t 
a f te r  the co llapse  of the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip , and the establishm ent 
of th e  p o s t - ju n ta  open d em o cra tic  reg im e. More s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  the 
analysis focuses on the specia l circumstances p reva iling  a t the time ND 
was founded, as well as on the tra n s itio n a l process th a t u ltim ate ly  led 
to the consolidation of democracy in the country as a whole, a process 
that —a t le a s t in the beggining— was ca rried  out and supervised by ND, 
and p a r tic u la r ly  by i t s  founder and f i r s t  leader, C. Karamanlis.
ND's p a r t ic u la r  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  concerning p o l i t i c a l  personnel, 
o rg a n is a t io n  and id eo lo g y  a re  a n a ly se d  in  c h a p te rs  3, 4 and 5
respec tive ly . The analysis covers a six teen-year period (1974-1990), and 
a l l  changes in the party  leadership and ideology, as well as the major 
developments concerning ND's o rg a n isa tio n a l expansion and i t s  o v e ra ll 
performance, a re  taken in to  account.
Chapter 6 deals with ND in action . I t  includes a local case-study of 
ND in  th e  D epartm ent o f L a r is s a ,  which p ro v id e s  new e m p ir ic a l 
inform ation concerning the  p a r ty 's  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s ,  fu n c tio n in g  and 
p o l i t i c s  a t  th e  lo c a l le v e l ;  m oreover, th e  a n a ly s is  in c lu d e s  an 
examination of ND's behaviour and performance sho rtly  before and during
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the June 1989elections, which brought PASOK's f a l l  frcm power and ND's 
re tu rn  to  o f f ic e  a f t e r  e ig h t years in  o p p o sitio n . Chapters 3 to  6 
inclusive use information obtained from our research  in Greece, together 
with data drawn frcm the Greek and foreign  p ress.
Chapter 7 p resents our concluding remarks. A system atic comparison 
between ERE and ND is  followed by another comparison of the sp ec ific  
c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the  two dominant s o c io - p o l i t ic a l  systems ( th a t  of 
between 1949 and 1967 and the post-1974 one resp ec tiv e ly ). The re s u lts  
of these two analyses are  the basis fo r our f in a l assessment of ND's 
sp ec ific  nature and exact p o l i t ic a l  id e n tity .
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CHAPTER ONE: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE GREEK RIGHT 
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE 1967 DICTATORSHIP
1. Introduction
A. A fte r the  end of the  c iv i l  war (which was fought, in te rm it te n t ly  
from 1944 u n t i l  1949), Greece e n te red  a pe riod  of rap id  economic 
development and r e l a t iv e  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  which ended w ith the  
Colonels' coup on 21 April 1967. In th is  chapter we shall try  to  give an 
overall account of the major so c ia l, p o l i t ic a l  and economic fea tu res of 
tha t period; th is  w ill f a c i l i t a t e  a  b e tte r  understanding of the post- 
d ic t a to r i a l  form ation (1974 onwards) o f the  new dem ocratic regim e. 
F i r s t ,  however, i t  w ill  be u se fu l , to  take  a b r ie f  look a t  c e r ta in  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  th a t had developed in  G reece 's  p o l i t i c s  and economy 
since the country acquired i t s  independence (1832), in order to have a 
fu l le r  p ic tu re  of the socio-economic and p o l i t ic a l  background.
A fter the War of Independence, Greece emerged as a "...predom inantly  
a g ra rian  so c ie ty  w ith  very  low so c ia l overhead c a p ita l  and a non­
e x is te n t  in d u s try "  ( in  E n g lish  o r i g in a l l y )  . ( 1 } At the  r i s k  of 
o v e rg e n e ra lisa tio n , one may argue th a t  th i s  p r e - c a p i ta l i s t  s t a te  of 
a f f a i r s  la s te d  fo r about f i f t y  years  (1830-1880). T h e re a fte r , the 
country 's economy entered a tra n s it io n a l period leading to i t s  large- 
sc a le  in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n ,  which f in a l ly  began in 1922 when, a f te r  the 
Asia Minor debacle, more than one m illion  Greek refugees swarmed in to  a 
country with a five-m illion  population. On the one hand, th is  massive 
in f lu x  of peop le  c re a te d  s e v e re  d i s r u p t i o n s ,  w ith  fun d am en ta l
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consequences for the Greek social s t r u c tu r e .12> But, on the o ther, i t  
acted as an "imported p r o le ta r ia t" 1 3} th a t accelerated  the processes of 
u rb a n isa tio n  and in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n  a lread y  shaped in the  1880-1922 
tra n s it io n  p e rio d .14> I t  should seem, then, th a t from 1922 onwards the 
country entered a new phase of development in which the c a p i ta l is t  mode 
of production can be said  to  have become dominant. What is  inarguable is  
th a t the Greek c a p i ta l is t  model did not develop according to  the West 
European one but followed a route of i t s  own, often  characterised  as 
"uneven developm ent" and com prising  f e a tu r e s  o f p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  
underdevelopment. We sh a ll re tu rn  to the examination of these fea tu res, 
and to  the reasons for th e ir  emergence, la te r  in th is  chapter.
All c a p i ta l is t  in s t i tu t io n s  being lacking in the young Greek s ta te , 
p o l i t i c a l ,  and more g e n e ra l ly  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  were im ported , 
themselves the products of Western c a p i ta l is t  development. As might have 
been expected, they could not be adapted and function properly w ithin a 
socio -econom ic environm ent th a t  had n e i th e r  th e  c a p a c ity  nor the  
c ap ab ility  to  assim ila te  and in teg ra te  them. While in the West European 
s ta te s  in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n  had preceded the  a d ap ta tio n  of dem ocratic 
parliam entarian p o l i t ic a l  in s t itu t io n s , in the Greek case the opposite 
was true: inported p o l i t ic a l  in s t itu t io n s  presaged the development of 
c a p ita lism  p ro p e r .<5) Consequently, one can id e n t i fy  from the very 
beginning a m al-in tegration  o r, as another scholar has put i t ,  a "tense 
and s t e r i l e  sy m b io s is " ( 6 } betw een s t a t e  and s o c ie ty .  Autonomous 
voluntary associations were almost to ta l ly  absent, and the c iv il  society  
was ex trem ely  weak and h e a v ily  dependent upon an e x p a n s io n is t ,  
p a te rn a lis t ic , and om nipotent s t a t e . 1 7) I t  h a rd ly  managed to  curb or 
propose lim its  to  the  l a t t e r ' s  ever expanding a c t iv i ty ;  instead, the 
shoe was on the o ther foo t. Consequently, p o l i t ic a l  struggle  centred on 
the issue of con tro llin g  the s ta te  apparatus which, l i t t l e  by l i t t l e ,  
acquired d isp roportionally  big dimensions. So i t  was the s ta te  tha t took
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the lead in carry ing  out the task of the coun try 's  in d u s tr ia lis a tio n , 
instead of playing the moderating a r b i t e r 's  ro le  as had been the case in 
th e  West European d e m o c rac ie s . ( 8 * T h is c ircu m stan ce  was of g rea t 
importance fo r the coun try 's  overall process of c a p i ta l is t  development, 
a  process which deviated from the Western p a tte rn  and comprised —and 
s t i l l  does— featu res of underdevelopment. ( 9}
Greek p o li t ic a l  l i f e  meanwhile was dominated for almost a century 
(1832-1922) by the  so -c a lle d  Meqali Id e a , the  Dream of a G reater 
H e l l a s . ‘ 10} A lthough th e  c o u n try , a f t e r  th e  end of th e  War of 
Independence, was economically ruined, physically  deso late , and highly 
dependent on the foreign Great Powers, the main everyday issue was the 
re -e s tab lish m en t of the  f i f te e n th -c e n tu ry  H elleno-B yzantine empire. 
Greek i r  redent ism was omnipresent, as i f  i t  were the country 's one and 
only problem.
One can b a re ly  speak about p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  a t  th a t tim e. The 
country 's p o l i t ic a l  destiny  was in the hands of the so -called  tzak ia , a 
handful of notable fam ilies th a t had played a dominant ro le  during the 
War of Independence and continued to do so afterw ards, u n til  the reforms 
in s titu te d  by E. Venizelos in 1910.( 11’ P o lit ic a l  p a r tie s , a t the time, 
were "simple co te rie s  of p e rso n a litie s , heading extensive c l ie n te l i s t ic  
networks". {12} As one h is to r ia n  remarked, " . . . p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  were 
p e rso n al; p o l i t i c a l  s tru g g le  revolved around persons and not ideas; 
nucle i of o rg a n is a tio n  were formed around p e rso n s  and not around 
p a r t ie s " . ( 13 * This p o l i t ic a l  s trugg le , moreover, did not concern issues 
emerging out of c la s s  d if fe re n c e s , but c en tred  on q u a rre ls  over the 
d is tr ib u tio n  of s p o i l s . ‘ 14} Add to th is  p ic tu re  the growing royal and 
army in te r f e r e n c e  in  p o l i t i c s  ( th e  King was th e  nominal head of 
s ta te * 15’ and the nucleus for the tzak ia  establishm ent) , ( 16 * as well as 
the foreign in te rference  in the coun try 's  in te rnal a f fa irs  (which u n til 
1947 was predom inantly B r i t is h ,  th e r e a f te r  American), and i t  becomes
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obvious what a m u ltitu d e  of s t r u c tu r a l  d isc rep a n c ie s  and drawbacks 
heavily  influenced the coun try 's  socio-economic and p o l i t ic a l  processes 
and are  highly answerable fo r the course th a t was f in a lly  adopted. The 
so -called  "uneven development" is  to a great extent an outcome of these 
discrepancies.
The year 1910 was a turning point in Greek h is to ry , both because i t  
signa lled  the r is e  of the middle c l a s s e s / 17’ and with regard to  the 
p o l i t i c a l  p rocess . The l a t t e r  showed the  beginning of some kind of 
ra tio n a lis a tio n , due to  the reforms of E. V enizelos.( 18 * At the same 
time, patronage p o l i t ic s  and c l i e n te l i s t i c  networks did  not disappear 
a lthough , as new c la s s e s  en te red  the  p o l i t i c a l  a rena , th e  tz a k ia  
fam ilie s  began to  weaken w ith  the  general broadening of p o l i t i c a l  
p a rtic ip a tio n  and in te g ra tio n .* 19’
I t  is  a t  th is  tim e, namely in  December 1911, when some prominent 
p o l i t i c a l  p e r s o n a l i t ie s * 20 * met a t  Gastouni in  the  Peloponnese, and 
under the leadership of D. Gounaris formed themselves in to  a  p o l i t ic a l  
team ra th e r than a party . This p o l i t ic a l  team, together with sane of the 
rep resen ta tives of the old regim e,*21 ’ acted as the main opposition to 
V enizelos. L a ter, in  February 1915, when V en ize lo s’ government had 
resigned ,*22’ and the King appointed D. Gounaris to the prem iership, the 
l a t t e r  became th e  r a l l y in g  p o in t fo r  a good number o f MPs and 
p o li t ic ia n s .* 23’ The re s u lt  was the formation, under the leadership of 
Gounaris and the "G astouni m eeting" p o l i t i c i a n s ,  o f th e  P a r ty  of 
Nationally-M inded People, which in October 1920 changed i t s  name to  
People's Party.
Generally speaking, the "Right"*24’ during th is  period (1910-1922) 
has been p re s e n te d  as a g a th e r in g  of h ide-bound  and r e a c t io n a ry  
o ligarch ic  forces, refusing  renewal and reform, opposing even changes 
that would favour the preservation  of the s ta tus quo.iZ^} Indeed,
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" . . .o p p o s i t io n  to  V en ize los ' p o l i t i c a l  message, ac tions, 
and even h is  p e rso n a lity  as such, was the primary founding 
element of the conservative camp, in combination perhaps 
w ith a vague ideology of p re se rv in g  the  s o c io -p o li t ic a l  
s t a t u s  quo . Very soon, though , V e n iz e lo s ' p o l i t i c a l  
opponents sought fo r a carmon id e n tity  under the banner of 
the crown, which h e re a fte r  operated as the unifying force 
of th e i r  camp, th e i r  e s s e n t ia l  cam p-leader, and th e i r  
a lte rn a tiv e  to  the V en izelist legend". ( 26}
This tra n s itio n a l period came to an end in 1922 with the Asia Minor 
debacle, which d isc red ited  the in s t i tu t io n  of the monarchy, shattered  
the Meqali Id e a , and in troduced  a new major d iv id in g  l in e  w ith in  
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ;  namely th a t o f the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  q u e s t io n .( 27} The 
nation s p l i t  in to  two. The supporters of Venizelos and the republican 
idea l r a l l i e d  to  V en izelos ' L ib era l P a rty , and those who were a n t i -  
V en ize lists and supporters of the monarchy, chose the People's Party of 
D. Gounaris. The issu e  torm ented and harmed the  country  u n t i l  the 
inposition  of the Metaxas d ic ta to rsh ip  in August 1936, and served again 
to d is tra c t  the peop le 's  a tte n tio n  frcm aggravating social issues and 
d i f f e r e n c e s ;  i t  d isc o u ra g e d  h o r iz o n ta l  o rg an isa tio n  and p reserved  
patronage p o l i t ic s ;  and i t  u ltim ately  divided the nation so deeply th a t, 
even a f t e r  the  end of the  c iv i l  war, the  wounds s t i l l  fe s te re d . The 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  issu e  was the  c o u n try 's  f i r s t  se rio u s  s p l i t .  I t s  main 
outcome was the c rea tion  and p o la risa tio n  of two major groupings/canps 
w ith in  Greek so c ie ty : on one s id e  were the  L ib e ra ls , who opted fo r 
m o d e rn isa tio n , re fo rm , d ise n ta n g le m en t from the  p a s t ,  and fo r  
pa rliam en tary  democracy w ithout a king but w ith  a p re s id en t as the 
figure-head of s ta te ;  and on the o ther was the People's Party, which 
opted for the establishm ent of the monarchy and the preservation of the 
sta tus quo. (Z8) in  the end, a q u a s i- to ta l i ta r ia n * 2 9 * form of the la t te r  
prevailed  ( i .e .  the Metaxas d ic ta to rsh ip ) , and se t the foundations for 
what la te r ,  a f te r  the end of the c iv i l  war in 1949, came to dominate 
Greek s o c ie ty  c o n tin u o u s ly  u n t i l  1967: th e  use o f a m ix tu re  of
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exclu sion is t/inco rpo ra tive  inodes of p o l i t ic a l  c o n tro l,* 30 * exercised by 
a q u a s i - a u th o r i t a r i a n ,  a l b e i t  p a rlia m e n ta ry , r ig h t-w in g  p o l i t i c a l  
regime.
B. To e x p la in  how and why th e  M etaxas d i c t a to r s h ip  came to  be 
estab lished  f a l l s  outside the scope of th is  s tu d y .*31 * We sha ll r e s t r i c t  
ourselves to  a b r ie f  examination of the developments in the p o l it ic a l  
process from a f te r  the d isso lu tion  of democracy in 1936 u n til  the end of 
the c iv i l  war in la te  1949.
When G eneral M etaxas imposed h is  d i c t a to r s h ip ,  he suspended 
p o li t ic a l  freedoms and put the country under m ilita ry  ru le . P o litic a l 
organisations were d isso lv ed  and the  p o l i t i c a l  w orld, la rg e ly  stayed  
a lo o f , d is l ik in g  perhaps what was happening, but not r e s i s t in g  i t  
dynam ically.( 32 * Metaxas then colonised the s ta te  bureaucracy with h is  
own fo llo w ers , purged the  army of i t s  L ibera l elem ents and s e t  up 
c o rp o r a te  b o d ie s  ( l i k e  f o r  exam ple EON, th e  N a tio n a l  Youth 
O rgan iza tion ), th a t were imbued w ith  n a t io n a l i s t i c  ideologies, being 
organised lik e  th e ir  nazi and fa s c is t  counterparts in Germany and I ta ly . 
As A. Papandreou observed,
" ...la c k in g  a massive social base of any kind, Metaxas was 
l e f t  w ith only one a l te r n a t iv e :  heavy re lia n c e  on the 
rep ressive aspects of fascism. In th is  he proved a master, 
and he l e f t  a permanent in p r in t  on the p u b lic  l i f e  of 
Greece. Metaxas was the f i r s t  to  introduce the concept of 
a modern t o t a l i t a r i a n  s t a t e ,  com plete  w ith  o f f i c i a l  
guidance of the p ress, censorship of a r t i s t i c  creation  and 
a conpulsory National Youth Organisation of pa ra-m ilita ry  
c h arac te r" . ( 3 3}
His regim e's q u a s i- to ta l i ta r ia n  p ro f i le  is  more fu lly  mapped i f  one adds 
the system atic  p e rsecu tio n  of h is  opponents, e sp e c ia l ly  l e f t i s t s ,  
th rough  a p p ro p r ia te  l e g i s l a t i o n  and the num erically  unprecedented 
deportation of h is  p o l it ic a l  opponents to  concentration camps.*34‘ The 
d ic ta to r 's  death coincided with the outbreak of World War I I ,  and h is
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regime d id  not imm ediately c o lla p se . On the  c o n tra ry , many of h is  
m in is te rs  and co lleag u es were c o lla b o ra tin g  w ith the  Germans who had 
occupied the country. The bulk of the Greek population, meanwhile, was 
on th e  s id e  of EAM (N a tio n a l L ib e ra t io n  F ro n t) ,  a  com m unist-led  
organ isation , th a t managed to  take the lead in the struggle  against the 
coun try 's  invaders.
With the  end of World War I I ,  EAM was the  only re a l  power in  the  
country, the National Government and the King having been in e x ile  in 
the Middle East. Due to  various reasons and circumstances, which again 
cannot be analysed h e r e , ( 35} EAM d id  not se iz e  power but opted fo r 
co llabora tion  with the National Government under c e r ta in  conditions to  
be agreed upon.136 * Instead , the country was ren t by c iv i l  war, which 
ended in 1949 in favour of the right-w ing (and lib e ra l)  forces, a f te r  
co n sid erab le  economic and m il i ta ry  a id  from the  Americans, who had 
meanwhile undertaken the  duty of p ro te c tin g  Greece (soon a f t e r  the  
proclam ation of the  Truman D octrine on 12 March 1947). I t  should be 
stressed  here, however, th a t the c iv i l  war put an in d e lib le  stamp on the 
d iv ision  and p o la risa tio n  of Greek soc ie ty ; o f f ic ia l ly  i t  ended in 1949, 
but in fac t i t  d id not do so u n til  1974,137 * and in some respects i t s  
impact can s t i l l  be f e l t  in Greek socie ty  today.
2. The Post-War S itua tion
2.1 The regime level
2.1.1 The economy
As i t  was mentioned already, the Right emerged v ic to rious from the 
c iv il  war. This was followed by a new national s p l i t ,  th a t was to remain 
a feature  of right-w ing government troughout i t s  p o l i t ic a l  domination,
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and even u n t i l  the  r e s to ra t io n  of democracy in  1974: th is  was the  
separation of Greeks in to  "nationally  minded" or ethnikofrones on the 
one hand, and on the o ther in to  "non-ethnikofrones" , who would e ith e r  be 
a c tu a l comrtunists o r a t  le a s t  f e l lo w - tr a v e l le r s .  Anti-communism, in 
o ther words, became the banner of the Right and, in combination with 
o th e r  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  f e a tu r e s  of th e  p o s t  c i v i l  war Greek s o c ia l  
f o r m a t io n /38’ the dominant id eo lo g ica l sy s tem .( 39 * The R ight, as 
mentioned above, was already c losely  associated  with the monarchy, and 
h e r e a f t e r  was to  e s t a b l i s h  a f irm  and c lo s e  r e l a t io n s h ip  w ith  
"A tlanticism ", i .e .  with the USA and the NATO a l l i a n c e / 40’
The analysis of th is  period w ill begin with an o u tlin e  of the Greek 
economy. World War I I  and the c iv il  war had devastated the  c o u n try /41’ 
and esp ec ia lly  the c iv i l  war brought the economic s itu a tio n  to a  new 
low. I t  was only in the mid-1950s th a t Greek cap ita lism  managed to  get 
back to  i t s  pre-war leve ls of output, and th e re a fte r  the economy began 
to  grow a t  a f a s t  r a te  (6 per cen t per year on a v e r a g e ) / 42’ I f  the  
apparent p o l it ic a l  s t a b i l i t y  of the post-w ar years and u n t i l  1965 is  
a lso  taken in to  account, i t  seems lo g ic a l to  assume th a t  the  Greek 
economy would, a t some p o in t, have managed to  overcome i t s  pre-w ar 
f e a tu r e s  o f underdevelopm ent and e n te re d  in to  th e  s ta g e  of f u l l  
c a p i ta l is t  development, of cap ita lism  proper.
N evertheless, th is  proved not to  be the  case . F i r s t  of a l l ,  the 
Greek bourgeoisie was then, and is  s t i l l ,  of a predominantly conmercial 
c h a r a c t e r / 43’ one could p la u s ib ly  argue th a t ,  even w ith  a l l  o th e r 
fa c to rs  necessary  fo r rap id  in d u s t r ia l is a t io n  p re se n t, th is  merchant 
c lass would hardly transfo rm  i t s e l f  in to  an in d u s tr ia l  e l i t e .  Second 
—and th is  complements the p revious argument— reg a rd less  of various 
s ta te  in i t ia t iv e s ,  Greek cap ita l refused to  d ire c t i t s e l f  in to  those key 
manufacturing sectors (metallurgy and chemicals, in other words sectors 
which co n s titu te  a so rt of in d u stria l s u b s tru c tu r e ) /44’ where growth
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has g rea t transform ative power and important m ultiplying e ffe c ts  on the 
re s t  of the economy. ‘ 4 5 ’ Third, as K. Vergopoulos n o te d , '46' a f te r  World 
War I I  the  s t a te  became re sp o n s ib le  fo r  the  c re a tio n  of ano ther, 
peripheral bourgeoisie, one th a t would ensure the coun try 's  in sertion  
in to  the  in te rn a tio n a l  economy w ithout any o b s tru c tio n s . As Spyros 
M arkesin is, the  "economic b ra in "  of rig h t-w in g  economic p o lic y  in 
general and of the 1953 s ta b il is a t io n  of the drachma, has sa id  in one of 
h is  speeches, " ...b ecause  i t  finds i t s e l f  between two social extremes, 
the  m iddle c la s s  always a c ts  as a guard ian  of the regim e. I t  always 
c o n s titu te s  a  precious element of s t a b i l i ty  and balance upholding the 
bourgeois regim e".4 47 * Needless to  say th a t the vanguard of th is  newly 
formed b o u rg eo is ie  c o n s is ted  of a m otley assortm ent of people w ith 
dubious e th ic a l  backgrounds, and i t s  very  c re a tio n  was, to  a la rg e  
ex ten t, due to economic co llabora tion  w ith the Germans during the four 
years of the coun try 's occupation. (For example, during these four years 
6,500 p riv a te  en te rp rises  were c re a te d ) . ‘ 48 *
A fter 1944, and e s p e c ia l ly  a f t e r  the  proclam ation of the  Truman 
Doctrine on 12 March 1947, American in tervention  in Greece took over 
from the B ritish  in  encouraging the  form ation of the  new bourgeo isie  
and, whether d e lib e ra te ly  or not, t r ie d  to  consolidate na tional, so c ia l, 
and economic in teg ra tion  through reinforcement of the re la tiv e  strength  
of the  s t a te  a p p a ra tu s . ( 49 * The s t a t e ,  fo r i t s  p a r t ,  d id  not t ry  to 
suppress these new middle c lasses or c iv i l  society  generally , but was 
mainly in te res ted  in p ro f itin g  from th e ir  enrichment, a sse rtin g  i t s e l f ,  
and b e in g  acknowledged as th e  r u l in g  power of th e  system  in  i t s  
e n t i r e ty .( 50 * ( I t  is  not su rp rising  th a t many Greek Marxist economists 
speak of s ta t  e-monopoly cap ita lism  in post-war Greece, or of a s ta te -  
bourgeois c la s s .)  In consequence, c a p i ta l is t  development in Greece did 
not take the form encountered in the West European so c ie tie s . Given also  
the  commercial o r i e n t a t i o n  o f th e  Greek b o u rg e o is ie , the sim ple-
32
comnodity p ro d u c tio n  s e c to r  was no t r e s t r i c t e d  o r m odernised bu t 
continued to coexist side by side  with the in d u stria l c a p i ta l is t  sec to r, 
so g iv ing  to  the l a t t e r  an enclave form. In  a d d itio n , then , to  the  
in eq u a litie s  between labour and cap ita l th a t could normally be expected, 
came v a s t in e q u a li t ie s  between the te c h n o lo g ic a lly  advanced and the 
backward secto rs of the economy. Suffice i t  to  mention here th a t, a t 
tha t time, one thousand fam ilies (0.5 per cent of the population) earned 
more than h a lf of a l l  p riv a te  income.*51}
I t  was on ly  in  1950 th a t  th e  Greek economy a t ta in e d  i t s  1938 
production levels again. Two years la te r ,  Marshal Papagos inaugurated a 
period tha t was marked, f i r s t ,  by the p o l i t ic a l  domination of the Right 
and, therefo re , by re la tiv e  p o l i t ic a l  s ta b i l i ty * 52 * la s tin g  u n til  1963; 
and, second, by the achievement of a spectacular economic growth. During 
these  twelve years —and e sp e c ia l ly  during  the  e ig h t years o f h is  
su c c e sso r 's  p rem iersh ip , from 1955 to  1963— the s itu a tio n  in Greece 
changed dram atically .
The reconstruction  e ffo r t  s ta r te d  in 1953 when the prominent member 
of Papagos' Greek Rally party , S. M arkesinis, devaluated the coun try 's 
currency by 50 per cent and thus became the a rc h i te c t  of monetary 
s ta b il is a tio n . From th a t time onwards, and p a rtic u la rly  a f te r  1955, the 
annual ra te  of growth was 5.9 per cent (as compared to an average of 4.6 
per cent in the EEC co u n tries), while the gross national product kept 
increasing by 6.4 per cent per y ear.* 53 * The average national pe r-cap ita  
income was U.S. d o l la r s  305 in 1955, and by 1963 i t  h a d .r is e n  to  
$565,*54 ’ so leading to  a substan tia l improvement in the popu lation 's 
liv ing  standard. This spectacular economic growth was due to a broad 
investment programme tha t was rea lized , mainly, during the C. Karamanlis 
premiership (1955-1963); these  years a re  o ften  c a lle d  as the "golden 
eight year pe riod".*55 *
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N e v e r th e le s s , t h i s  economic grow th d id  no t manage to  boost 
in d u s t r ia l is a t io n  p ro p er. As A. N ik o la id is , the  ex -rep resen ta tiv e  of 
Greece in the OECD, has argued:
" . . . in d u s t r ia l is a t io n  met with in f in i te  reactions, due to 
the  consequences which i t  would probably cause to  the 
export catmerce of the in te re s ted  coun tries, and a lso  due 
to  the economic autarchy which would be created in a  few 
years fo r Greece. So, cortmercial, economic and p o li t ic a l  
in te re s ts  d ic ta ted  to  these countries [ i . e . ,  the countries 
which were o f fe r in g  economic a id ] an unpretended enmity 
towards the plans fo r Greece's in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n " /56’
Furthermore, the p riv a te  sec to r was h e s ita n t to  invest in in d u s t r y /57’ 
and when the  s ta te  f in a l ly  took on th is  ta sk , m ainly through p ub lic  
revenue, i t  d id  so u n s y s te m a tic a lly  and w ith o u t any lo n g -te rm  
p e rs p e c t iv e . So fo r  in s ta n c e  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  which was undoub ted ly  
m odern ised /58’ remained the biggest productive secto r of the economy 
u n til 1960, when, and only then did in d u s tria l output fo r the f i r s t  time 
exceed tha t of a g r i c u l t u r e / 59’
The above is  r e f le c te d  in and co rro b o ra te s  the  s i tu a t io n  w ith 
respect to the coun try 's  workforce. Greece a t tha t time experienced a 
d isproportionate increase of the urban population due to  b e tte r  working 
o p p o rtu n itie s  in the  t e r t i a r y  se c to r  (or in small fam ily u n its  in 
a r t i s a n a l  e n te r p r i s e s  c o e x is t in g  s id e  by s id e  w ith  th e  few b ig  
en terp rises) and, secondly, considerable emigration abroad.
As P. Bakoyiannis has po in ted  o u t / 60’ the  foundation and the 
expansion of many B r i t i s h  c i t i e s  was b a s ic a l ly  due to  in d u s t r i a l  
development and the p ro le ta ria n isa tio n  of the ru ra l population, which 
was channelled, as an in d u stria l labour force, to the trade union-free 
c i t ie s .  In con trast, the Greek c i t i e s  (and mainly Athens) in i t i a l l y  grew 
bigger due to  the expansion of the serv ice  sec to r, namely th a t of the 
adm inistration. Indeed, in 1961 the Greater Athens area absorbed more 
than h a lf  of the in d u s tr ia l  work fo rc e , consumed 80 per cen t of the
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import trade , paid 75 per cent of d ire c t and 65 per cent of in d irec t 
taxes, the average personal income of i t s  population was 40 per cent 
higher than national average (which means th a t, desp ite  economic growth 
and the increase in national per cap ita  income, the la t t e r  was unequally 
d is tr ib u te d ) , and i t  housed the bulk of enployees engaged in the various 
public serv ices*61> —yet i t  was not an in d u s tria l c ity . Less than a 
th ird  of i t s  reg is te red  ac tiv e  population was employed in industry. Of 
th is  one th ird , h a lf  were employed in small a rtisa n a l u n its  of less than 
ten  w orkers, which were u su a lly  sim ple fam ily b u sin esses. Over two 
th i r d s  o f th e  r e g i s te r e d  a c t iv e  p o p u la tio n  were absorbed  by th e  
o v e r i n f l a t e d  t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r ,  m ost u s u a l ly  th ro u g h  v e r t i c a l  
c l i e n te l i s t i c  networks.* 62’ I t  has been estim ated that during the 1951- 
1961 period, 600,000 people migrated in te rn a lly , and that in the 1956- 
1961 period, 220,000 people swarmed in to  Athens;* 63 * 55 per cent of the 
l a t te r  were absorbed by the te r t ia ry  sec to r of the economy.
As m entioned  a lre a d y , th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c to r  was the b ig g est 
productive secto r u n til  1960. Despite —or indeed exactly  because of — 
i t s  lim ited  m odernisation, *64} i t  was s t i l l  plagued by low productiv ity , 
underem ploym en t, low w ages, sm a ll la n d -o w n e rsh ip , s in g le -c ro p  
c u ltiv a tio n , lack of f e r t i l i z e r s ,  and ex p lo ita tio n  of the c u ltiv a to rs  by 
the  w h o le s a le r s ,  who u s u a l ly  o f f e r e d  v e ry  low p r i c e s  f o r  th e  
produce.*65} The government took c e rta in  steps to combat these problems 
(investm ents in a g r ic u ltu re  accounted fo r  more than h a lf  of p u b lic  
spending), but again haphazardly and without a long-term perspective. To 
quote M. S e ra fe t in id is :*661
" .. .o n  the one hand the presence of small holdings meant 
the fragmentation of the land and a lack of mechanisation 
which rendered the peasants' ownership of land a source of 
economic hardship and in secu rity  ra th e r than of prosperity  
and growth. On the o th e r hand, the  com m ercialisation of 
a g ric u ltu ra l production made the peasant dependent on and 
e x p lo ited  by merchant and finance  c a p ita l  and gave him 
l i t t l e  oppo rtun ity  to  compete in the market and e x p lo it
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i t s  im personal dynam ics in  i t s  favour" ( in  E n g lish  
o r ig in a lly ) .
The re s u lt  was a massive exodus to  the c i t i e s ,  to  begin w ith, and the 
c rea tion  of unemployment tha t rap id ly  gained momentum, espec ia lly  a f te r  
1955. At th a t time, when Europe was prospering and short of an adequate 
labour force, the developed countries looked for labour power in the 
c o u n tr ie s  of the South. W ithin ten  y e a rs , 7 per cen t of the  Greek 
population had emigrated, the vast m ajority  of the m igrants being young 
p e o p le d 67 * This means th a t the  most troublesom e of the  masses of 
unemployed in the c i t ie s  were gone, sending back generous rem ittances 
that covered the tra d e -d e f ic it  of the economy. Moreover, the workers in 
the small e n te rp r is e s  were more e a s i ly  c o n tro lle d . In the  long run, 
these developments spelled  danger to  the socio-econcmic e d if ice , but in 
the meantime the social base of the Right was rein forced . *68}
The R igh t's  claim tha t i t  had achieved a Greek "economic m iracle" is  
p a r t ly  ju s t i f i e d .  When ev en tu a lly  i t  lo s t  the  1963 e le c t io n s ,  the 
average national p e r-c a p ita  income exceeded $550. Although not r ic h , 
Greece was no longer a poor country. But th is  does not mean that i t  had 
entered the phase of economic development. Aside from the fac t tha t the 
Right had created a more unequal and u n fa ir  socie ty , i t s  economic policy  
was inadequate for a lso  purely economic reasons: i t  did not succeed in 
c reating  the full-employment opportun ities tha t would have perm itted the 
Greeks to remain in th e ir  own country. P. Bakoyiannis w rites:
" . . .  in d u s tr ia lisa tio n  is  rea lized  to the extent tha t the 
f in a n c ia l  c a p ita l  o b ta in s  p re ro g a tiv e s  from the s ta te  to 
the detrim ent of in te rn a l and ex te rn a l a n ta g o n is ts . The 
phase of 'p ro d u c tiv e  a n ta g o n is tic  c a p ita lism ' in Greece 
has been skipped". ( 6 9}
In general, during th is  period (1952-1963) the foundations were la id  
fo r the c re a tio n  of an economic in f r a s t ru c tu re  in the  se c to rs  of 
tra n s p o rta tio n , e l e c t r i c i t y ,  te leco m m u n ica tio n s , a g r i c u l tu r e ,  and
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finance/merchant c a p ita l . S ta te  investments in these sectors aimed a t 
c re a tin g  cond itions th a t  would a t t r a c t  p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e  in to  the 
d ire c tly  productive sec to rs , but fa ile d  in th e ir  ob jective. The Greek 
econcmy did not change i t s  tra d itio n a l charac ter. Until as la te  as the 
la te  f i f t i e s ,  the Greek economy managed to  rebuild  the damage of the 
1940-1950 decade and to  reproduce, on a quantitavely  broader b a sis , the 
s tru c tu re s  and r e la t io n s  of p roduction  th a t had c h a ra c te r ise d  the 
econcmy before the war. No su b stan tia l q u a lita tiv e  transform ation took 
place in i t s  productive s t ru c tu re .1701
To conclude then, the main fea tu re  of the country 's economy in the 
f i r s t  decade a f te r  the c iv i l  war was s t i l l  i t s  sa lie n t underdevelopment: 
an overin fla ted , rap id ly  expanding te r t ia r y  secto r; a badly organised 
and in e ff ic ie n t ag ric u ltu ra l secto r employing more than one-half of the 
labour fo rce ; and a weak, s ta g n a tin g  m anufacturing s e c t o r .171' As a 
re s u lt ,  although the Greek econcmy could no longer be characterised  as 
underdeveloped, th e  c la im  th a t  i t s  co u rse  (and p re s e n t  s t a t e )  of 
developm ent took an "uneven" form , o r th a t  bo th  developm ent and 
underdevelopment c h a ra c te r is tic s  coex ist side by s id e 172' —th is  is ,  we 
think, fu lly  ju s t if ie d .
2.1.2 The p o lity
I t  should have became c le a r  from the preceding analysis that (a) the 
task of the co u n try 's  in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n  was mainly undertaken by the 
s ta te  i t s e l f ,  and (b ) , th a t th is ,  coming a f te r  the devastating e ffe c ts  
of World War I I  and the c iv i l  war, led to the formation from above of a 
corresponding social c l a s s .1731 In e f fe c t ,  Greek capitalism  had acquired 
i t s  d is tin c tiv e  form, the features of which we have delineated above.
With respect to  the p o l i t ic a l  sphere now a f te r  1949, i t  should be 
remembered th a t ( i)  i t  was the R ig h t174' th a t had emerged v ic to r io u s  
from the c iv il  war, and ( i i )  i t  was the s ta te  on which (and not w ithin
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which) the p o l i t ic a l  s tru g g le  c e n t r e d .1 75 > We in tend  to  show in th is  
p a r t  of the  chap ter how, from the  e a r ly  1950s onwards, the  Right 
e s ta b lis h e d  a "guided" o r lim ite d  democracy, based on a f a n a t ic a l ly  
anti-com m unist and re p re ss iv e  s t a t e .  As w ill  be seen, th is  kind of
regime was to  la s t  u n til  1967, with only a short in te rval of Liberal
government under the Centre Union from 1963 to  1965.
The foundations of the regime th a t was to  ru le  Greece a f te r  the war
were se t soon a f te r  the withdrawal of the occupation fo rces .* 76 * This 
was done f i r s t ,  by means of the national e lec tio n s  of 31 March 1946, 
when most of the  repub lican  fo rce s  and the  KKE (Comnunist P arty  of 
Greece) a b s ta in e d , and th e  m o n arch is t r ig h t-w in g  fo rc e s  won an 
overwhelming m ajority (65 per cent of the vote and 67 per cent of the 
seats in parliam ent); and secondly, by means of the p le b isc ite  (on 1 
September 1946) on the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  issu e  ( i . e .  monarchy versus 
r e p u b l ic ) ,  when th e  " .. .c o m b in e d  e f f e c t s  o f t e r r o r  and ex tensive  
fa ls if ic a t io n  gave the Monarchy an overwhelming 68 per cent as opposed 
to  32 per cent fo r the R ep u b lic" .* 77’ As Mavrogordatos argues, the 
e lec tio n  and the p le b isc ite  provided
" . . . t h e  much needed and long delayed cloak of ’popu lar ' 
leg itim a tio n  to  the  regime e s ta b lis h e d  by the  B r i t is h  
a u th o r i t i e s  a f t e r  l i b e r a t i o n  and, above a l l ,  to  th e  
monarchy, which the B ritish  regarded as the regim e's key­
s to n e ...  Monarchical r e s to ra t io n  a lso  provided an avenue 
of national re h a b ili ta tio n  to the motley group of corrmon 
crim inals, Metaxas' henchmen and occupation co llabora to rs 
who were quick to  o f f e r  th e i r  s e rv ic e s , and became the
foremost agents of 'White T erro r' in the King's name" (in
English o r ig in a lly ) .* 78’
These two events —the e lec tio n  and the p le b isc ite — played an irrportant 
ro le  in what followed, namely the so -ca lled  " th ird  round" of the c iv il  
war.
12 March 1947 saw the promulgation of the Truman D octrine ,* 79’ by
which America took on the task of p ro tec ting  Greece,*80’ a task which
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was previously exercised by the B r i t i s h .( 81} The Americans were to  play 
a prominent ro le  in helping the right-w ing forces to win the c iv i l  war, 
in try in g  to  support and e s ta b l is h  L ibera l governments iirm ediately 
afterw ards (tha t i s ,  in the national e lec tio n s of 5 March 1950, and of 9 
September 1951) and, when the la t t e r  a tten p t fa ile d , in giving th e ir  
fu ll support to the right-w ing forces which, under d iffe re n t names and 
leaders, were to  remain in government fo r eleven consecutive years (from 
16 November 1952, u n til  3 November 1963).<82)
The post-war basis  of ideological s trugg le  of the p o l it ic a l  forces 
was, as already mentioned, nationalism  versus communism. Anti-communism, 
which in the in te r-w ar years s ta r te d  slow ly to  f i l l  the id eo lo g ica l 
vacuum le f t  by the collapse of irredentism  and the Greater Hellas dream, 
now became the o f f ic ia l  s ta te  ideology. The right-w ing forces, which had 
enjoyed a firm  control over the s ta te  apparatus and the army ever since 
the Metaxas d i c t a to r s h ip ,  o p p ressed  and p e rs e c u te d  th e  le f t -w in g  
adherents, through both legal and i lle g a l  means. The remainder of th is  
chap ter w ill  show th a t through the  ex ten siv e  use of a u th o r i ta r ia n  
methods, the Right managed to exclude i t s  opponents —i .e .  mainly the 
communists but a lso  the "fe llo w -trav e lle r"  L iberals— from any kind of 
p a rtic ip a tio n  and contest in the so c io -p o litic a l arena.
F i r s t  of a l l ,  the  reg im e 's  "enemies" were faced w ith a deeply 
re a c tio n a ry  and a u th o r i ta r ia n  le g is la t io n ,  which c o n sis ted  of the 
perpetuation of the c iv il-w ar emergency measures on the one hand and, on 
the o ther, of sp e c if ic a lly  anti-communist laws, some of them dating  as 
f a r  back as 1936, i . e .  to  M etaxas1 l e g i s l a t i o n  ( fo r  example h is  
Espionage Law 375/1936, according to which being a communist was more or 
less equivalent to being a spy); or even to 1929, Law 4229 of 25 July 
1929, enacted by Venizelos, the so -ca lled  Idionymo law, which
" . . . i n t r o d u c e d  th e  c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n  o f com m unist 
id eo lo g y ..., i t  p roh ib ited  not only ce rta in  deeds but a lso  
and p a rtic u la rly  those ideas considered  dangerous to  the
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r u l e r s . . .  Named idionymo because  i t  in tro d u c e d  a new 
crime, the 'thought crim e', Law 4229 legalized  s ta te  a n ti­
communist terro rism  from th a t time onwards and became the 
lega l co rnerstone  of Greek o f f i c i a l  anti-carmunism u n til  
1974" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .* 83’
Nevertheless, the most important c iv il-w ar legal measure was Emergency 
Law 509/1947, which outlaw ed th e  Communist P a r ty  and in tro d u c ed  
punishments much more severe than any provided fo r in the Idionymo law, 
including the death penalty . This law remained in use u n til  1974.
The two most s ig n if ic a n t  new concep ts, however, of the  post-w ar 
period were, to use N. A liv iza tos ' terminology, (a) penalisa tion  for 
in te n tio n s  p r im a rily , and fo r concre te  a c ts  seco n d arily , and ( b ) , 
c o l l e c t iv e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  a l l  r e l a t i v e s  w hether by b lood o r 
marriage, and the c lose friends of the accused.*84 * I t  was a t  th a t time 
th a t the  c e r t i f i c a t e s  of "civic-m indedness" (Diamandouros) —o r of 
"so c ia l opinion" (A liv iz a to s ) , o r "n a tio n a l p rob ity "  o r " lo y a lty "  
(T soukalas), o r " c iv ic  r e l i a b i l i t y "  (R ou fos), o r " s o c ia l  b e l i e f "  
(W ittner)— were f i r s t  i n s t i tu t io n a l i s e d .  They were issued  by the 
po lice, based on the c i t iz e n 's  personal f i l e ,  and were indispensable for 
g e tt in g  a d riv in g  lic e n se  fo r  in s tan c e , o r a loan, a p a ssp o rt, fo r  
reg is te rin g  in the u n iv ers ity  o r, p a r tic u la r ly , for employment in the 
c iv i l  s e rv ic e .* 85’ In th is  way the r u le r s  ensured th a t u n d esirab le  
elem ents, such as communists and f e l lo w - t r a v e l le r s ,  were safe ly  kept 
out, and that they were excluded from any form of p a rtic ip a tio n .
Long a f t e r  August 1949 then, when the c iv i l  war had ended, the 
c iv il-w ar emergency measures survived and were perpetuated, not by an 
open d ic ta to r s h ip , but by a crowned parliam en ta ry  democracy as the 
facade fo r an a u th o r i ta r ia n , anti-com m unist and re p re ss iv e  s t a te .  
Although m artia l law ended on 11 February 1950, the civ il- war was 
le g a l ly  p ro longed  u n t i l  1962. T his was ach iev ed  through a shrewd 
ju rid ica l construction based on the "theory of the permanent c iv i l  war".
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On 27 April 1952, sho rtly  a f te r  the enactment of the 1952 c o n stitu tio n , 
parliam ent passed a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  re s o lu tio n  th a t made i t  le g a lly  
possib le  for the c iv il-w ar emergency measures to remain in force, even 
i f  they should con trad ic t the co n s titu tio n , as long as they could be 
abolished a t  some la te r  date  by an ordinary  law. Besides, a l l  courts 
u n til  1962 accepted th a t the c iv i l  war, or ra th e r the "rebellion" as 
they ca lled  i t  (the "bandid war") was not ended " . . .s in c e  term ination 
had not been formally proclaimed by an o f f ic ia l  a c t " . ‘ 86) In th is  way, 
p o s t-c iv il  war Greece experienced " c o n s t itu t io n a l  dualism ", i . e .  the 
coexistence of the 1952 c o n stitu tio n  w ith the v a lid  emergency measures 
as a "p a ra -co n s titu tio n ." ‘ 87} As A. Manessis has put i t :
" . . . t h e  e x i s te n c e  o f t h i s  ’p a r a l l e l  c o n s t i t u t  i o n ’ 
c o n s id e ra b ly  l im ite d  th e  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s  which were, 
t y p ic a l ly ,  g u a ra n tee d  by th e  1952 C o n s t i tu t io n  and 
c o n se q u e n tly , l e g a l i t y  c o u ld  on ly  fu n c tio n  w ith  th e  
proviso of loyalty  (to  the regim e)" . ‘88»
The right-w ing forces, in order to  control the s ta te  as well as to 
remain in power, a lso  used the e le c to ra l process i t s e l f  as a means to 
m anipulate the  p e o p le 's  v o te . F i r s t  of a l l ,  they transform ed the 
e le c to ra l  law*89> in to  a h ig h ly  e f f i c ie n t  weapon fo r winning a t  the 
p o l l s :  c o n s id e ra b le  gerrym andering  and c o n tin u a l changes in  the  
e lec to ra l law ju st before each e lec tio n  helped them to re tu rn  to o ffice  
qu ite  e a s ily . Secondly, when the above means were not enough, they did 
not h e s ita te  to reso rt to e le c to ra l fraud, by e ith e r  intim idating the 
people, mainly in the ru ra l areas ( th is  happened during almost a l l  the 
p o s t-w a r  e l e c t i o n s ) ,  o r  by r i g g in g  th e  c o u n t. One exam ple of 
m anipulating  the e le c to ra l  law concerns the n a tio n a l e le c tio n  of 19 
February 1956, when the ERE of Karamanlis, with 47.88 per cent of the 
vote took 165 seats (in  the 300-seat parliam ent), whereas the Democratic 
Union of the Liberal forces, with 48.15 per cent of the vote took only 
132 s e a t s .* 90’ As regards e le c to ra l  fraud , on the o th er hand, th is
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reached i t s  peak in the e lec tions of 29 October 1961, when i t  was only 
through the extreme use of violence and fraud th a t the ERE managed to 
remain in power.*91}
Dominating parliam ent, the  Right a ls o  e x erc ised  i t s  power through 
the monarchy and the army. At the end of World War I I ,  Winston Churchill 
and the Foreign O ffice believed tha t B r i ta in 's  supremacy in Greece could 
best be secured by working through the Greek monarchy, an in s t i tu t io n  to  
which they a lso  f e l t  a strong sentim ental attachm ent.*92} A fter 1947 the 
Americans followed the same line :
"American p o lic y  re s te d  on the  assum ption th a t  the  king 
was th e  u l t im a te  g u a ra n to r  o f p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  
m ilita ry  preparedness and loyalty  to  the Western Alliance" 
(in  English o r ig in a lly ) . 193 *
And as another author argues,
" ...w h e n  Papagos d ie d  in  o f f i c e  in  1955, Ambassador 
Peurifoy did not wait fo r the G eneral's party  to  place a 
successor but went d ire c tly  to  the King and arranged for 
him to  ask young C. Karamanlis to form a government". *94 *
This was the same king who, in 1963, forced Karamanlis to  resign , and i t  
was King P au l's  son Constantine (and successor a f te r  h is  fa th e r 's  death 
in 1964) who contributed seriously  to the July 1965 p o lit ic a l  c r i s is  by 
v ir tu a lly  ousting Premier G. Papandreou from power.
I t  is  true  that the w illingness of the crown —as tha t of the army, 
which w ill  be examined below— to  in te r f e r e  in p o l i t i c s  was o ften  
encouraged by p o lit ic ia n s  who hoped to  gain royal favour.*95’ To quote 
R. Macrides,
"From the time of Greek Independence, th a t had been the 
r o l e  o f th e  G reek e l i t e s .  They p u rsu e d  and sought 
in te rv e n tio n ; they r e l ie d  on i t ,  and g rad u a lly  came to 
consider the premised p ro tec tion  as fac t. A whole nexus of 
m e n ta l i t ie s  and e x p e c ta tio n s  d eve loped , r e s u l t i n g  in 
something resembling in s t itu t io n a l  bonds with the foreign 
powers. Within th is  process, the a tten tio n  of these e l i te s  
revolved around th e i r  r e la t io n s h ip  with th e ir  p ro tec to r. 
Through the crown, or more often  through the embassies of 
the foreign powers that were playing the leading ro le  a t 
the time, they put forward th e ir  requests and accepted the
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guide lines th a t ou tlined  and lim ited  th e ir  ac tions . The 
m ost s e r io u s  d e c i s io n s  ta k e n  w ere th e  r e s u l t  o f 
i n t e r a c t io n  be tw een  a f o r e ig n  power and th e  G reek 
government. The government's stance fluc tuated , according 
to  circum stances, between f u l l  subm ission and s e r v i l i t y  
and sorrowful disobedience” .* 96 *
I t  should, of course , be remembered th a t  the  th ro n e 's  in fluence  and 
position  w ithin the power s tru c tu re  —parliam ent /army/throne— was not 
always the same. During the inter-w ar period i t  had followed a gradual 
d e c l in e  b ecau se , a lth o u g h  no modern m a s s -p a r t ie s  emerged under 
Venizelos' prem iership, national party  organisations were considerably 
developed and strengthened, so giving the p o li t ic a l  leaders more control 
over th e i r  members and more b arga in ing  power v is - a -v is  the  king. As 
party  d isc ip lin e  increased, the k in g 's  a b i l i ty  to  manipulate p o lit ic ia n s  
and e lec tions waned. I t  had not been e n tire ly  eclipsed  even by 1965- 
1967, but i t  was ce rta in ly  less easy to e ffe c t: "...w hereas King George 
in 1868 had e as ily  been able to  dism iss Prime M inister Koumoundouros, 
King Constantine in 1915 found i t  co nsiderab ly  more d i f f i c u l t  to  r id  
himself of V enizelos," 197} and when the la s t king attempted a sim ilar 
thing in 1965, he triggered  a se r ie s  of reactions tha t ended with the 
seven-year m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  and h is  f in a l dethronement in 1974 (by 
popular referendum).
I t  remains a f a c t ,  th a t the  im p a r tia l i ty  of the  crown has alm ost 
never been a c h a ra c te r is tic  fea tu re  in Greek c o n stitu tio n a l h is to ry ,* 98’ 
and tha t a f te r  the end of the c iv il  war, the king became the symbol of 
anti-comnunism as well as the nominal head of s ta te  and the p ro tec to r of 
constitu tiona l s ta b i l i ty .  As King Constantine (1964-1967) said ,
"Coirmunism is  a miasma, g e n e ra te d  o u ts id e  G reece and 
d irec ted  from abroad. I t s  e th ic  is  lying and treachery. I t  
co rru p ts  and tu rn s  in to  an u n fo rg iv a b le  enemy of th e  
fatherland , everyone who comes in to  contact with i t"  (in 
English o r ig in a lly ) . ( 99}
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I t  does not seem u n fa ir  to  conclude th a t  during  the  pe riod  under 
examination the monarchy, d ire c tly  or in d ire c tly , was playing in to  the 
hands of the Right, conplorienting the l a t t e r 's  task  of suppression and 
exclusion of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  opponents.
The army was another in s t i tu t io n  which, due to manipulation by the 
R igh t, was made to  serve  the same fu n c tio n s , and i t  took one s tep  
fu rth er by inposing a seven-year m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  (1967-1974) when 
m atters reached a deadlock.( 100 * During the inter-w ar years the armed 
forces had served a d iffe re n t purpose. Their in terventions concerned the 
co n stitu tio n a l issue, which i t s e l f  was an in tra-bourgeois c o n f l i c t . ( 101 * 
In the post-war period, when the dominant issue became the "containment 
of the masses" —due to  c a p i ta l is t  accumulation and the gradual entrance 
of th e  m asses in to  p o l i t i c s — th e  r o le  o f th e  m i l i t a r y  changed 
acco rd ing ly . I t  g rad u a lly , acqu ired  the  dominant p o sitio n  w ithin the 
post-war power s tru c tu re  (monarchy/army/pariiament), assuming the mantle 
of guardian of the sta tus  quo .‘ 1021
One important development concerning the Greek m ilita ry  should a lso  
be mentioned: from 1945 onwards, and under the then Liberal Sophoulis 
government, the control of the army was the p riv ileg e  and re sp o n sib ility  
of a  Supreme Committee of N ational Defence (ASEA) , c o n sis ted  of the 
m in is te rs  of war (army, navy and a i r  fo rce  re s p e c t iv e ly ) , the  army 
ch iefs of s ta f f ,  and the commander of the B ritish  Mission. A fter January 
1949, when General Papagos was appointed Marshal, he a lso  took absolute 
control over army a f f a i r s . ( 103 * The fin a l outcome of th is  change was the 
creation  of a kind of in s t itu t io n a lis e d  autonomy for the army. I t  was to 
bear f ru i t  in 1967 when, desp ite  the agreement between the Conservatives 
of P. Kanellopoulos and the  L ib e ra ls  of G. Papandreou to  lead the 
country to e l e c t i o n s / 104’ the army took the decisive  step alone, and 
imposed m il i ta ry  d ic ta to r s h ip . N evertheless, th is  post-w ar r e la t iv e  
autonomy of the army proved no hindrance a t a l l ,  when the right-w ing
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forces wished to m obilise army corps a t  th e ir  d isc re tio n  during national 
e lec tions in order to  in tim idate and counterbalance the Left and Liberal 
vote in the ru ra l a re a s . ‘ 10 51
For a fu ll  understanding of the Greek army and the ro le  i t  played, 
one must not ignore the importance of the un o ffic ia l and secre t army 
o rg a n isa tio n s , th a t e x is te d  w ith in  i t  s in ce  1941, when Nazi Germany 
invaded Greece. Here we sh a ll d iscuss only IDEA,4106} which played a 
prominent ro le  during the early  p o s t-c iv il  war years and, a f te r  a  period 
of acquiescence during  rig h t-w in g  r u le ,  emerged again  to  p lay  i t s  
d e c is iv e  p a r t  in  th e  tu rb u le n t  post-1 9 6 1  p e r io d  and u n t i l  th e  
establishm ent of the ju n ta 's  d ic ta to rsh ip .
IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek O ff ic e rs )  was a group of righ t-w ing  
o ff ic e rs  who had played a prominent ro le  alongside the B ritish  during 
the  B a tt le  of Athens in  December 1944, and prevented  the Greek army 
being purged of a l l  those who had co llaborated  with the nazis during the 
occupation —a condition th a t was p a rt of the Varkiza Agreement signed 
between the national government and EAM.4107 * Instead, IDEA managed, on 
the one hand, to purge the army of a l l  L iberal, "unhealthy" elements, 
and on th e  o th e r ,  to  have i t s  members a p p o in ted  to  m i l i t a r y  key 
positions. I t s  f i r s t  appearance and in terven tion  in the p o lit ic a l  arena 
took place on 29 May 1950, when i t  attempted a coup d' 6 ta t  in order to 
appoint Marshal Papagos to the prem iership. They would have succeeded, 
had the l a t t e r  not disapproved and to ld  the o ff ic e rs  to re tu rn  to th e ir  
baracks. 4108 * During the post-war, right-w ing p o li t ic a l  domination IDEA 
did  not reappear, u n t i l  an alarm ing event re a c tiv a te d  i t  again and 
th e rea fte r  kept i t  in fu ll swing. This event was the e lec to ra l success 
of EDA4109} in the 11 May 1958 national e lec tio n s , when i t  became the 
o f f ic ia l  opposition party , po llin g  almost 25 per cent of the v o te .4110> 
The r e s u l t  of the IDEA o f f i c e r s ' r e a c t iv a t io n  became ev ident in the 
subsequent e lections (1961), when they elaborated and se t in motion the
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so -called  P eric les contingency plan (which was devised, in co llaboration  
with NATO, fo r the purpose of n e u tra lis in g  the ccmrainists in case of 
w ar),(111) and succeeded through rigged e lec tio n s in keeping the ERE in 
power.
This s e c re t army o rg a n isa tio n  (and o th e rs  l ik e  i t ) ,  is  only one 
a sp e c t o f a whole p a r a - s t a t e  nexus th a t  had been e la b o ra te d  and 
estab lished  by the Right to  help i t  keep the Liberal and p a rtic u la rly  
th e  l e f t - w in g  p o p u la c e  e x c lu d e d  from  any k in d  o f p o l i t i c a l  
p a rtic ip a tio n . According to  W ittner, " . . . a  secre t network of m ilita ry , 
p o lic e , and in te l l ig e n c e  personnel ex e rc ised  e x trao rd in a ry  power in 
every a rea  of the n a t io n 's  l i f e " . <112) Indeed, the local gendarmerie 
corps and the National Defence B a tta llio n s  (TEA)(113) carried  out th e ir  
task  of oppressing  the  l e f t i s t s  and the  l ib e r a l s  by adopting various 
methods of d iscrim ination  and p e rsec u tio n .{114 * F ina lly , i t  should ju st 
be mentioned here (we sha ll re tu rn  to  the subject in more d e ta il  below), 
th a t  th e re  was a ls o  a  h o s t o f ex trem e r ig h t-w in g  o r g a n is a t io n s ,  
operating between 1957 and 1967. These complemented the a c t iv i t ie s  of 
th e  TEA b a t t a l l i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  th e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  and a t  
demonstrations taking place in the big  c i t ie s  of Athens and Salonica. 
The most notorious among them was the National Social Organisation of 
Students (EKOF).(115) The a c t iv i t ie s  of these p a ra -s ta te  organisations 
reached th e i r  peak in May 1963, when members of th e i r  underworld in 
Salonica murdered the le f t-w in g , but not commmist EDA's MP G regoris 
Lambrakis a f te r  he had given a speech there .
The beginning of th is  chapter mentioned the dominance of the Greek 
s ta te  over c iv il  society , and i t  was argued that the reason for th is  lay 
in the fac t that s ta te - in s t i  tu t ions, elaborated for the West European 
socio-economic co n tex t, had been imposed on Greece where the soc io ­
economic conditions were to ta l ly  d if fe re n t. I t  was a lso  shown how the 
Right took control of the s ta te  and i t s  in s titu tio n s  a f te r  the c iv il
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war, and how i t  used the s ta te  apparatus to  exclude a l l  of l e f t i s t  and 
l ib e ra l  elem ents —o r, in  o th e r  words, a l l  d is s id e n ts — from the 
p o l i t i c a l  a re n a . T his r e s u l te d  in  what came to  be c a l le d  ’’power 
dualism", in which the government was, a t  times a major, a t  o ther times 
a minor p a r t n e r .1116’ In p ra c t ic e ,  the  country  was governed by a 
"p ara lle l power", which consisted  mainly of high-ranking army o ff ic e rs , 
the throne, powerful economic groups, and the " a ll ie d  fac tio n " . ( 117} I f  
they did  not c rea te  i t ,  the right-w ing forces a t lea s t to le ra te d  and 
took extensive advantage of th is  power s tru c tu re , and i t  is  here that 
th e ir  main re sp o n sib ility  l i e s .* 1181 The present analysis would remain 
incanplete, however, without a c lo ser look a t  the post-war conservative 
p a r t ie s ' p o l i t ic a l  personnel, o rgan isation , and ideology —elements that 
a lso  played th e ir  part concerning both the exclusion of the Left and the 
"containment of the masses" in a v e r t ic a l ,  c l i e n te l i s t i c  and oppressive 
manner.
2.2 The party  level
2.2.1 R econstitution of the conservative camp: the Greek Rally party
As already discussed, i t  was in 1920 when, under the leadership of 
D. G o u n a r is ,* 119’ th e  P e o p le 's  P a r ty  was c r e a t e d .  A p a r ty  of 
p e rso n a litie s  and local barons ra th e r than an organised m ass-party, i t  
was characterised  by being staunchly an ti-V en ize lis t/repub lican  and pro­
monarchy. A fte r 1941, however, a n ti-V en ize l ism as an ideology was 
fin ished. The old schism of 1915 had to  make way for a new one: tha t of 
the nationally -m inded  (V en ize lis t as well as a n t i - V e n iz e l i s t ), the 
v ic to rs in the c iv il  war against the carrmunists.
In the  f i r s t  post-w ar n a tio n a l e le c tio n s  (31 March 1946), the 
People's Party under the leadership of C. T saldaris p a rtic ip a ted  in a
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rig h t-w in g  c o a l i t io n  which p o lle d  55.12 per cen t of the  v o te , and 
occupied 213 se a ts  (of the  354-seat p a rliam e n t); the  P eo p le 's  P arty  
a lone e le c te d  163 MPs. But due to  the  ex tra o rd in a ry  circum stances 
p re v a ilin g  then (th e  le f t-w in g  and most o f the  repub lican  p a r t ie s  
abstained, and in the following month the so -ca lled  th ird  round of the 
c iv i l  war began), and a lso  due to  b lu n t American in te rv e n t io n ,( 12 0 * 
Liberal leader Sophoulis was appointed to  the prem iership, undertaking 
a t the same time the task  to  win the war against the EAM forces. In the 
subsequent e lec tions (5 March 1950), the People 's Party polled  a poor 
18.8 per cen t. I t  i s  in te r e s t in g  in  th is  con tex t to  note th a t  the  
"cormunist th rea t"  had already been averted and the " a llie d  fac tion", 
fo r reasons of i t s  own, favoured the so -ca lled  " lib e ra l experiment of 
1950-1952",( 121} —a policy  i t  followed a lso  between 1946 and 1950 by 
su p p o rtin g  th e  L ib e ra l  S ophou lis  r a th e r  than  th e  w inner o f th e  
e le c t io n s ,  C. T sa ld a r is . The i n i t i a l  a ttem pt a t  r e c o n s t i tu t in g  the 
conservative forces to  reappear dynamically on the p o lit ic a l  scene was 
taken by Marshal Papagos.
Alexander Papagos was Armed Forces' Chief of S ta ff during the war in 
Albania (1941-1942), Commander in Chief during  the c iv i l  war, and 
f in a lly  became Marshal in 1950. In May 1951, he resigned from a l l  h is  
m ilita ry  appointments, and two months la te r  announced that he intended 
to  co n te s t the  forthcom ing e le c tio n s  w ith  a new n a tio n a l p a rty , the  
Greek R a lly .( 122’ Most of the deputies and p o lit ic ia n s  of the already 
d isin teg ra ted  People 's Party joined the Greek Rally, together with some 
prominent members from the L ibera l camp ( e .g . ,  P. Kanellopoulos) and 
seme equally prominent members of the Metaxas d ic ta to rsh ip  (for example,
C. Maniadakis, M inister of Public Security  under Metaxas). ( 123’ Table
1.1 below shows the composition of the Greek R a lly 's  parliam entary group 
as i t  emerged from the 1951 national e lec tio n s:
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Table 1.1: Greek Rally Parliam entary Group: 9 September 1951 National 
E lection
MPs'previous party  a f f i l ia t io n number %
People's Party 35 30.70
P o lit ic a l  Independent Camp 
National R econstitution Front 
National Camp of Working People
10
12
1
Riaht-wina p a rtie s : 37 32.46
National Rural Party of -X- 
New Party
National Party of Greece
1
9
4
Liberal Party 1
Centre p a r t ie s :  16 14.03
George Papandreou Party 15
Independent 3 02.63
Newcomers 23 20.18
Total 114 100.00
[Sources: 31 March 1956, 5 March 1950 and 9 September 1951 Parliamentary 
E lec tio n  R e s u lts , M in istry  of the  I n te r io r ,  Dept of E le c tio n s , pp. 
365-88, 717-62 and 511-38 respec tive ly  (my com putations).]
Table 1.1 makes i t  q u ite  c lea r th a t the Greek Rally represented a 
u n ifica tio n  of the conservative forces of th a t time, whose cen tre  of 
gravity  had been the People 's Party. Indeed, 35 out of the 114 Greek 
R ally  d ep u ties  were MPs o r p o l i t i c ia n s  of the  P e o p le 's  P a rty , 37 
belonged to  va rious o th e r  rig h t-w in g  p a r t ie s  and 16 came from the 
L iberal camp. Also included were 23 newly e le c te d  MPs, who had not 
p a rtic ip a ted  in p o l i t ic s  previously.
The Greek Rally was not an organised m ass-party. Under the strong 
and a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  i t s  l e a d e r  th e r e  was o n ly  a 
parliam entary  group, o f te n  c a lle d  the  lochos (an in fa n try  company) 
because of the s t r i c t  arm y-like d isc ip lin e  imposed on i t . (1Z4) There was 
ce rta in ly  no l ib e r a l i s a t io n  of the p a rty  s t ru c tu re ,  and the le a d e r 's  
powers went unchecked. P a tron -c lien t re la tio n sh ip s p e rs is ted , and the 
p a r ty 's  ideology was s i m p l i s t i c a l l y  a n ti-co m m u n is t; fu rth e rm o re , 
p a te rna lism  and s ta tism  were the re g u la r  rem edies fo r most so c ia l
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problems. The mixture was sa tis fa c to ry  and, pepped up with a dose of the 
co rrec t ta c t ic s ,  in the next national e lec tio n s  (16 November 1952) the 
Greek Rally polled  a spectacular 49.22 per cent of the vote and occupied 
247 sea ts  in  the 300-seat national assembly; i t  remained in o ff ice  u n til  
the death of i t s  leader in la te  1955.
During th is  period, the Greek Rally succeeded in estab lish ing  a new 
p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y ,  th e  s o - c a l le d  p o lice -d em o cracy  reg im e, and a 
s t a b i l i t y  which la s te d  fo r  e le v en  c o n se c u tiv e  y e a rs . I t  la id  the  
foundations fo r economic growth, opting fo r an investment policy  with 
fu ll  support to  the big  finance and merchant c a p ita l . On the deb it side , 
i t  fa ile d  to  heal the wounds of the c iv i l  w a r,(lz5) and furthermore i t  
adopted a r ig id ly  anti-comnunist ideology. I t  a lso  did not abolish  the 
emergency measures th a t  had been enforced  du ring  the  c iv i l  war, and 
thousands of people continued s t i l l  to  be kept in iso la ted  concentration 
cam ps.1126’ F in a lly , i t  re in fo rc e d  the  armed fo rc e s , the  s e c u r i ty  
b a t t a l l i o n s ,  th e  lo c a l  g e n d a rm e rie  and  th e  o th e r  p a r a - s t a t e  
o rganisations, so con tribu ting  to the reinforcement and entrenchment of 
the power dualism. I t  estab lished  the so -ca lled  S ta te  of the R ig h t,1127’ 
which su p p re ssed  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o n en ts , m ain ly  a l l  those whose 
ideology was " le f t"  of i t s  own, and excluded them from any p o lit ic a l  
p a rtic ip a tio n  whatsoever.
2.2.2 The National Radical Union (ERE)
On 4 October 1955, Marshal Papagos d ied  from a se rio u s  i l l n e s s ,  
a f te r  appointing one of h is  v ice -p residen ts , namely S. Stephanopoulos 
(the o ther was P. Kanellopoulos) to succeed him. Nevertheless, the very 
next day the King ca lled  48 year-old lawyer C. Karamanlis, then M inister 
of Public  Works, to  the  p rem iersh ip , and a ls o  gave him the r ig h t  to  
d is s o lv e  p a rlia m e n t and a rra n g e  fo r  new n a tio n a l  e le c t io n s . On 6 
October, two days a f te r  Papagos1 death, the new government was formed,
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and th a t same day the Greek R a lly 's  parliam entary group decided to  give 
i t  i t s  support. F in a lly , on 12 October, th is  newly formed government was 
approved by a parliam entary m ajority , receiv ing  200 votes (197 out of 
the  then 205 Greek R ally  d e p u tie s , p lu s  3 Independents; 77 d ep u ties  
voted against i t ,  2 abstained and 19 were absen t). Once again the Greek 
k ing , by appo in ting  the  prem ier a ls o  imposed a new leader on the  
conservative camp. The p a rliam en ta ry  m a jo rity  approved of the K ing 's 
in tervention  and the conservative camp's deputies acknowledged h is  r ig h t 
to  appoint th e ir  lea d e r.* 128 *
Although Karamanlis had gained the  parliam entary  m ajority , he did 
not remain in o ff ic e  u n til  new e lec tio n s  were due. Instead , he opted fo r 
going to  the p o lls  iirmediately, in order to  confirm the governmental 
change, to  leg itim ise  h is  leadership , and to re in fo rce  h is  own position  
v i s - c i - v i s  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  
opponents.* 129} Early in December 1955 he put before parliam ent a new 
e lec to ra l law favouring  the  c o n se rv a tiv e  camp,*130 * and on 4 January 
1956 he announced the founding of a new p arty , which he named National 
Radical Union (ERE). M. Evert*131 * says th a t Karamanlis chose to c a ll  i t  
National to  denote the new movement's broad o rien ta tio n  (storming from 
i t s  f a i th  in the  b a s ic  va lues of the  Greek p e o p le 's  i d e n t i ty ) ;* 132 * 
Radical, to  express i t s  progressive outlook; and Union to denote i t s  
founder's  in te n tio n  to  a t t r a c t  sound elem ents from a l l  the p o l it ic a l  
world, no m atter to  which camp they may have belonged in the p ast. Most 
of the Greek R a lly 's  MPs (160) joined the new party . A few days la te r , 
came a few more Greek Rally deputies, some Independents, one Liberal and 
one MP from the P a rty  of P rog ress ive  People, as well as th re e  ex- 
m inisters who had been prominent members of the V enizelist-L iberal cairp 
(E. Averoff, G. Kassim atis, and C. T satsos). The party  backbone was, 
however, almost iden tica l with th a t of the People 's Party and the Greek 
Rally. As J . Loulis noted:
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"ERE ind icated  i t s  w illingness to  d iscard  the V en ize lis t/ 
a n t i -V e n iz e l is t  feuds of the  p a s t ,  and a ls o  p ro jec te d  a 
more technocratic  and youthful image than Papagos' party .
But o v e ra l l  th e re  were few d i f f e r e n c e s  between th e
outlooks of the two p a rtie s"  (in  English o r ig in a lly ) . ( 133 y
The N ational R adical Union (ERE) was, then , the  th ird  a ttem pt a t  
reco n stitu tin g  a contemporary conservative camp (the o ther two having 
been the People 's Party  and the Greek R ally ). Perhaps the new element 
th a t ERE brought with i t ,  aside  from the re la tiv e  youth and energy of 
the Prime M inister and i t s  leader, was i t s  determ ination to  acce lera te  
the development of the Greek economy and, to  some ex ten t, to  modernise 
the s ta te  apparatus. I t s  economic outlook corresponded with the trends 
and in te re s ts  of the most dynamic and developing economic elements, who 
now began to  p lay  a major ro le  in  the  c o u n try 's  in d u s t r ia l is a t io n .  
Meanwhile, and throughout K aram anlis’ e ig h t-y e a r  term in o ff ic e , the 
p a ra - s ta te  o rg a n is a tio n s  o f every kind opera ted  in  f u l l  fo rce . The 
reason fo r th i s  was, as we s h a ll  see , th a t  the  co n serv a tiv e  cairp no 
longer enjoyed the confidence of the peop le 's  m ajority  but, fo r reasons 
of G reece 's lin k s  w ith  Western Europe, the  ERE needed to  p reserve  a 
parliam entary fro n t. In e f fe c t ,  the p a ra -s ta te  acted independently but 
side by side  w ith the government. ( 134 *
We shall now turn  our a tte n tio n  to  a c lo ser examination of the ERE's
p o l i t i c a l  p e rso n n e l, s t ru c tu re ,  and o rg a n isa tio n , i t s  ideology and 
programme, i t s  s tra te g ie s  and ta c tic s ,  and f in a lly  look a t the p a r ty 's  
e lec to ra l perform ance.( 135}
2 .2 .2 .(a) The p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  personnel
We have a lready seen th a t the newly-formed party  absorbed the bulk 
o f  th e  G reek  R a l ly  d e p u t i e s  t o g e t h e r  w i th  a few p ro m in e n t 
rep resen ta tives of the V en izelist-L iberal camp. We shall now turn our 
a tten tio n  to the composition of both the p a r ty 's  e lec tio n  candidates and
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i t s  subsequent parliam entary group with reference to the e lec tio n  of 19 
February 1956.
The ERE contested the 1956 e lec tio n  with 299 candidates for the 300- 
seat parliam ent. Table 1.2 below analyses the composition of the group 
of the p a r ty 's  candidates.
Table 1.2: ERE Candidates fo r the 19 February 1956 E lection
Candidates' previous party  a f f i l . number %
Greek Rally 189 63.21
People's Party
National R econstitu tion Front 
New Party
National Canp of Working People 
P o litic a l Independent Camp 
National Party of Greece
22
2
1
1
2
3
Ridht-wing p a rtie s : 31 10.37
National Progressive Centre Union 
George Papandreou Party 
Liberal Party
13
1
10
Centre p a rtie s : 24 08.03
Independent 8 02.68
Newcomers 47 15.71
Total 299 100.00
[Sources: 31 March 1946, 5 March 1950, 9 September 1951, 16 November 
1952 and 19 February 1956 Parliam entary E lection R esu lts, M inistry of 
the In te r io r , Dept of E lections, pp. 365-88, 717-62, 511-38, 325-41 and 
251-62 respec tive ly  (my computations).]
As is  c le a rly  seen from Table 1 .2 , the great bulk (63.21 per cent) 
of the ERE's candidates came from the Greek Rally, while 10.37 per cent 
belonged to o ther small right-w ing p a r t ie s ;  these two groups together 
constitu ted  73.58 per cent of the candidates. Another 24 candidates came 
from the Liberal camp, seme of then prominent members of i t ,  as already 
mentioned above. F in a lly , 2.68 per cen t of the cand idates had not 
p rev iously  belonged to  any p a rty  but had stood as independents, and 
15.71 per cent were newcomers to p o l i t ic s  a ltogether.
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In the 1956 e lec tio n  the ERE polled  47.38 per cent and e lected  165 
deputies. Table 1.3 shows the a n a ly tica l make-up of ERE's parliam entary 
group.
Table 1.3: ERE MPs a f te r  the 19 February 1956 National E lection
MPs' previous party  a f f i l ia t io n number %
Greek Rally 117 70.11
People's Party 
New Party
13
1
Right-wing p a rtie s : 16 09.70
P o litic a l Independent Camp 
National R econstitu tion Front
1
1
National Progressive Centre Union 
Liberal Party
8
5 Centre p a rtie s :  14 08.48
Georae Papandreou Party 1
Independent 3 02.63
Newcomers 15 09.09
Total 165 100.00
[Sources: 31 March 1946, 5 March 1950, 9 September 1951, 16 November 
1952 and 19 February 1956 Parliam entary E lection R esu lts, M inistry of 
the In te r io r , Dept of E lections, pp. 365-88, 717-62, 511-38, 325-41 and 
251-62 respec tive ly  (my com putations).]
I t  i s  c le a r  th a t  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  of e le c te d  ERE MPs who were 
p rev iously  a f f i l i a t e d  to  the  Greek R ally  p a rty  amounts to  70.11 per 
cen t. (To put i t  d i f f e r e n t ly ,  out of the  189 Greek R a l ly - a f f i l ia te d  
candidates, 117 or 62 per cent managed to  get e lec ted .) Another 9.7 per 
cen t o f ERE's d e p u tie s  came from sm a lle r  r ig h t-w in g  p a r t ie s  and, 
together w ith  the  form er, amount to  alm ost 80 per cent of the ERE 
parliam entary group. Fourteen deputies have a Centre o rig in  (8.48 per 
c e n t) , whereas only 3 independents and 15 newcomers managed to  get 
elected .
T a b le s  1 .2  and 1 .3  le a v e  no doub t t h a t  th e r e  was a c lo s e  
re la tionsh ip  between the Greek R ally  and the N ational Radical Union, 
with regard to th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  personnel. I f  one a lso  bears in mind the 
data from Table 1.1 above, i t  is  f a i r  to conclude th a t, in terms of the
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c o n se rv a tiv e  cam p's p o l i t i c a l  p e rs o n n e l, th e re  was c o n s id e ra b le  
c o n tin u ity  from the  P e o p le 's  P arty  to  the  Greek R a lly , and from the 
la t t e r  to the National Radical Union. The re la tio n sh ip  between the Greek 
Rally and the ERE is  so c lose th a t i t  might be argued th a t Karamanlis 
did not c rea te  a new party  a t  a l l ,  but simply renamed Papagos1 Greek 
Rally the National Radical Union.*136}
Before proceeding to  an analysis of ERE c h a ra c te r is tic s , i t  must be 
pointed out th a t two pecu lia r fea tu res render th is  somewhat d i f f ic u l t .  
The f i r s t  is  th a t the p a r ty 's  s ta tu te s  remained a t a l l  times (1956-1967) 
a dead l e t t e r .  Although the ERE had a fu lly  developed adm inistrative 
s tru c tu re , i t  seems th a t during th is  period the party  was ru led  without 
any delegation of power so le ly  by i t s  leader, C. Karamanlis. The second 
feature is  th a t since the ERE a c t iv i t ie s  intermeshed with governmental 
a c t iv i t i e s  g e n e ra lly , they can h a rd ly  be sa id  to  be fundam entally 
d i f f e r e n t .*137 *
2 .2 .2 .(b) S tructure  and adm inistration
(i)  Central party  adm inistration  
A ccord ing  to  th e  ERE s t a t u t e s ,  th e  p a r ty  had n in e  c e n t r a l  
adm inistrative organs. The General Assembly, held every two years, was 
considered the highest and most important party  organ: i t  was designated 
to c rea te , approve, and modify the p a rty  s ta tu te s , and to  decide the 
p a rty 's  ideology and p o li t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s .  I t  was made up of the party  
leader, the members of the General Council (see below), the party  MPs, 
the non -e lec ted  cand idates of the  p rev ious n a tio n a l e le c t io n , the 
various managers of the General S e c re ta ria t (see below), the members of 
the S tud ies Committees (see below) and of the  Supreme D isc ip lin a ry  
Council (see below), regional party  rep resen ta tives and represen ta tives 
of the p a r ty 's  youth organ isation . The number of the la s t  two groups was 
re s tr ic te d  and se t by the General Council. The General Assembly, ra the r
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than being a rep resen ta tive  organ, had therefo re  a c le a r ly  o ligarch ic  
c h a r a c te r .  In  e f f e c t ,  no q u e s t io n  was e v e r r a i s e d  by any o f th e  
Assembly's rep resen ta tives, because th is  organ was never convoked during 
the e n tire  1955-1967 period.
Second came the party  leader, responsib le  fo r the ideological and 
p o lit ic a l  programme, and the p a r ty 's  au then tic  rep resen ta tiv e . He led 
the pa rliam en tary  group and d ire c te d , in sp ec ted , and c o n tro lle d  a l l  
other party  organs. Not su rp ris in g ly , the party  s ta tu te s  sa id  nothing 
about how the Leader was to  be e lec ted . As we have seen, Karamanlis was 
f i r s t  se lec ted*138’ by the king; when he resigned and le f t  the country 
in 1963, nominating P. Kanellopoulos to  succeed him, the parliam entary 
group of the ERE confirmed th a t choise. This means th a t in both cases 
the leader of the party  was appointed from above, and the parliam entary 
group simply confirm ed the  d e c is io n s  th a t  had been taken elsew here. 
Furtherm ore, the  p a rty  s ta tu te s  shed very  l i t t l e  l ig h t  on where the  
party  lead e r 's  powers begin and end, o r how re sp o n s ib ility  was to be 
shared out between him and the General Assembly and the parliam entary 
group ( th e  o th e r  p a r ty  o rg an s coming under th e  l e a d e r 's  d i r e c t  
supervision). In p rac tic e , the General Assembly was never convoked, and 
the leader inposed himself on the parliam entary group.
Other ERE cen tral adm in istra tive  organs were (i)  the General Council 
(headed by the leader, i t  comprised ten  members e lec ted  by the Assembly, 
and determined the p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  lin e  w ithin the lim its  se t by the 
Assembly's d i r e c t iv e s ) ;  ( i i )  the  E xecutive Committee (headed by the 
leader and consisting  of the p a r ty 's  Secretary-General and three members 
of the General Council, i t  was responsib le  fo r ERE adm inistration and 
o rg an isa tio n  and d ire c te d  e le c to ra l  cam paigns); ( i i i )  the S tud ies 
Committees (appointed by the Executive Committee and meant to a s s is t  the 
various m in is te r s ) ;  (iv ) the  Economic Committee (of f iv e  to  seven 
members, appointed by the Executive Committee and responsible fo r the
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p a r ty 's  budget); and (v) the Supreme D iscip linary  Council (nine members 
e le c te d  by th e  G eneral Assembly and r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  d is c ip l in a ry  
m a tte rs) . All of these f iv e  organs a lso  renained a dead le t t e r ;  they 
were never even se t up.
Of the  two rem aining c e n tra l  a d m in is tra tiv e  organs, one was the 
General S e c re ta ria t. I t  a s s is te d  the Executive Committee in m atters of 
p a rty  adm inistration  and implemented i t s  orders. I t  was a lso  responsible 
fo r  p a r ty  o rg a n isa tio n  and propaganda, and p rep a ra tio n  of e le c to ra l  
campaigns. The General S e c re ta r ia t, under a Secretary-General e lected  by 
the General Council, was subdivided in to  departments of organ isation , 
the p o l i t ic a l  bureau, s tu d ies , and youth. The party  o f f ic ia ls  in charge 
of each department were e lec ted  by the Executive Committee. Since i t  is  
v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  betw een p a r ty  and governm ental 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  i t  becomes a lm ost im p o ss ib le  to  a p p ra is e  th e  G eneral 
S e c r e ta r i a t ’s reco rd . I t  seems not unreasonable to  assume, however, 
th a t ,  a s id e  from the  p e rio d s  b e fo re  e le c t io n s ,  most of the  General 
S e c re ta r ia t 's  du ties were ca rried  out by the c iv i l  s e rv ic e .‘ 139’
F i n a l l y ,  th e  n in th  c e n t r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o rg an  was th e  
parliam entary group, com prising the  p a r ty 's  depu ties who were e i th e r  
e lec ted  under the p a r ty 's  banner o r, a f te r  defecting th e ir  own party , 
they joined i t  in parliam ent. I t  was headed by the party  leader and i t  
d id meet as s tip u la ted  in the s ta tu te s  (once a m onth).(140}
A s p e c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f th e  ERE was th e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
omnipotence of Karamanlis over h is  deputies. In con trast to what had 
been happening in the inter-w ar period , when i t  was the parliam entary 
nuclei of notables tha t founded or s p l i t  most of the p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s , 
the ERE's parliam entary group 's meetings —which became more and more 
infrequent— were merely required to  confirm decisions already taken by 
the p a rty -lead er, not to e laborate  party  p o lic ie s . This au th o rita rian  
behaviour was the cause of considerable c o n flic t during the f i r s t  years
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of the  p a r ty 's  l i f e ,  be fo re  Karam anlis had managed to  impose h is  
au th o rity . MPs le f t  the party  because they disagreed over m atters of 
foreign policy* or concerning the e le c to ra l law, e tc . One of the most 
prominent ERE members (and la te r  of New Democracy as w e ll) , said  among 
o ther things when he resigned frcm the pa rty  and frcm h is  government 
p o s t ,  th a t  th e  C ouncil o f M in is te r s  was n o t a llow ed  to  o p e ra te ;  
Karamanlis sinply  d ic ta ted  h is  decisions. *1411
A ll in  a l l ,  of the  n ine  c e n tra l  a d m in is tra tiv e  organs only th ree  
ac tu a lly  functioned: the party  leader, the parliam entary group, and the 
General S ec re ta ria t (the l a t t e r  was an executive organ, the o ther two 
were decision-making cen tres). The leader was in  e ffe c t the one and only 
source of power, d ep riv ing  the  pairliam entary group of any kind of 
autonomous a c t iv i ty ;  and a  la rg e  p a r t  o f the  General S e c r e ta r i a t 's  
d u t ie s  were u n d ertak en  and c a r r i e d  o u t by th e  c i v i l  s e r v ic e .  In  
conclusion, we see th a t the o f f ic ia l  adm in istra tive  party  s tru c tu re  was 
ju s t a facade, concealing the absolu te  domination over the party  by one 
sing le  man.
( i i )  Organisational s tru c tu re
The party  s ta tu te s  s tip u la ted  th a t " p o litic a l centres" should be se t 
up in a l l  e lec to ra l d i s t r i c t s ,  th a t i s ,  in almost every p refectu re  of 
th e  c o u n try . These p o l i t i c a l  c e n t r e s ,  in  tu rn ,  were supposed to  
g radua lly  e s ta b l i s h  p r o v in c ia l ,  communal, lo c a l  o r neighbourhood 
comm ittees. The p o l i t i c a l  c e n tre s  and the  committees came under the 
control of the p a r ty 's  cen tra l adm inistration , which issued them with 
formal d irec tiv e s  for th e ir  operation; they were perm itted to organise 
th e i r  own a d m in is tra tio n  on the  p a t te rn  a t  the  c e n tre . That was the  
plan. In r e a l i ty ,  only in a few large urban cen tres was there  any e ffo r t  
to  se t  up such p o l i t i c a l  c e n tre s  and com m ittees. In the  r e s t  of the  
country , the p a rty  o rg an isa tio n  remained in the  hands of the  ERE
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deputies. I t  is  hardly su rp ris ing , then, th a t the tra d itio n a l patron- 
c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s  k e p t p r e v a i l i n g  o v e r th e  new o r g a n i s a t i o n 's  
re g u la tio n s . In most c a se s , people voted  fo r  o r jo ined  the  ERE only 
because of personal t ie s  and favours. ‘ 142*
The party  s ta tu te s  a lso  provided fo r a women's club (which, needless 
to  say , came to  naugh t) and fo r  a  youth  o rg a n is a t io n  (EREN). In  
p rac tice , youth-organisation departments were estab lished  in Athens and 
Salonica only. Their most important a c t iv i t ie s  occurred during e lec tion  
campaigns, a t  demonstrations, and w ithin the u n iv ers ity . I t  should be 
mentioned here th a t from la te  1959 onwards there  was a lso  another youth 
organisation , the National Social Organisation of Students (EKOF) which, 
without being an o f f ic ia l  organ of the ERE p arty , was c le a r ly  inspired 
by i t .  Many lead ing  members of EKOF were a lso  members of EREN's top 
organs. EKOF was f a n a t ic a l ly  an ti-com m unist, and i t s  main a c t iv i t i e s  
consisted of te r r o r i s t  a ttacks against students and th e ir  councils, and 
close co llabora tion  with o ther p a ra -s ta te  o rganisations. Suffice i t  to 
say that members of EKOF in Salonica took p art in the murder of the EDA 
deputy G. Lambrakis in May 1963.( 143}
Another youth organ isation , se t up in 1957, was the Hopeful Youth 
Corps (SEN), organised on fa s c is t  l in e s . I t  nevertheless had the moral 
support of the  ERE, and th e re  a re  in d ic a tio n s  th a t i t  a ls o  received  
financial con tribu tions frcm tha t p a r ty .1144 ’ Moreover, a host of para- 
s ta te  organisations were supported in d iffe re n t ways by ERE m inisters 
and members, and were in close co llabora tion  with the local secu rity - 
police departm ents.( 145’
As w ith  th e  c e n t r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f th e  ERE, so w ith  th e  
o rg an isa tio n a l s t ru c tu re :  most of th e  organs s t ip u la te d  by the party  
s ta tu te s  never operated. A fter a l l ,  as the party  s ta tu te s  mentioned, a l l  
power lay  in the le a d e r 's  hands " u n til  the  p a r ty 's  o rg a n isa tio n  is  
completed". Continuing th is  "temporary" s ta te  of a f f a i r s  fo r more than
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eight years helped to  re in fo rce  the lead er’s power-position, since he 
was v ir tu a lly  the p a r ty 's  only adm inistrative  and decision-making organ. 
As Karamanlis himself sa id ,
" I t  is  only when we cease to  govern th a t w e 'll manage to  
organise the party . As long as w e're in o ff ic e , the cen tre  
o f  g r a v i t y  l i e s  in  g o v e r n m e n t ,  n o t  in  p a r t y  
o rgan isa tion" . 114 6 *
As we sha ll see below, however, the party  was not organised during the 
1964-1967 period when i t  found i t s e l f  in opposition. The d ifference  then 
was tha t the new leader, P. Kanellopoulos, by no means enjoyed the power 
position  and omnipotence of Karamanlis.
N everthe less, a l l  r h e to r ic  a s id e , i t  i s  of course u n r e a l i s t i c  to  
propose tha t one person alone, whatever h is  q u a li t ie s , was responsible  
for a l l  of the planning and decision-making during the ERE's e igh t years 
in government. According to  Meynaud, i t  seems th a t  suggestions fo r  
action came frcm elements outside the party  and the government, and they 
mainly concerned the ordinary, day-to-day running of the country. This 
emphasis on every-day needs and problems is  a ty p ic a l r e s u l t  of the  
absence of long-term  programming, w ith in  e i t h e r  th e  p a r ty  o r  th e  
government. As regards the decision-making, one can (again according to 
Meynaud) discern  th ree  d iffe re n t categories: ( i)  a  more or le ss  o f f ic ia l  
"think-tank" (s p e c ia lis ts ) ;  ( i i )  a small number of p o lit ic ia n s  deeply 
loyal to the leader; and ( i i i )  a few prominent ERE deputies who exerted 
some in flu en ce  over sm a lle r  s e c t io n s  o f th e  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  group . 
Depending on the s itu a tio n , Karamanlis would ask these people for th e ir  
opinion e i th e r  as a group or p e rso n a lly , befo re  making h is  f in a l  
d e c is io n .( 147’ Generally speaking, as J . Loulis has said:
"The p a r t y 's  s t r u c t u r e  rem a in ed  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  and 
a r c h a ic . . .  W ithin ERE, not s u rp r is in g ly , a 'p e rs o n a li ty  
c u l t ' was bred which of course encouraged the leadersh ip ’s 
p a te rn a lism  both w ith in  the p a r ty  and towards so c ie ty . 
Furtherm ore, th i s  'c u l t '  s u b s ti tu te d  fo r a soph istica ted
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ideology and became an obstacle  in any attempt to  search 
fo r new ideas" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) . ‘ 148 *
2 .2 .2 .(c) The party  leader
P rio r to  Marshal Papagos' death, when Karamanlis was asked by the 
king to  form a government, he had been M inister of Public Works (Meynaud 
says th a t even w ithin the Greek Rally he was considered a second-class 
technocra t), and h is  sudden accession to  the premiership caused a great 
deal of debate and d ispu te . I t  is  generally  agreed tha t th is  preferment 
was due to  royal as well as U.S. fav o u r.<1491 To th is  must be added that 
Karamanlis undoubtedly had considerable charism a.( 150 * In C. M itso tak is1 
opinion,
" . . . h e  was c h o se n  m a in ly  by th e  A m e ric a n s  a n d , 
s e c o n d a r i ly ,  by th e  P a la c e . I t  i s  t r u e  th a t  Queen 
Frederika supported h im ... I  believe the Americans wanted 
him , bu t d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d , o b je c t iv e ly  sp eak in g , 
Karamanlis was d is tin g u ish e d ... C erta in ly  he was favoured, 
but he a lso  had the  s k i l l s ,  w ithout which he would not 
have been. . . " . ‘ 1511
Whatever the rea l reasons, the fac t remains th a t Karamanlis se t out to 
leg itim ise  h is  leadership by using every means a t  h is  disposal through 
control of the s ta t  e-propaganda. During h is  period in o ff ic e  the s ta te -  
run ra d io , the  governmental o r f r ie n d ly  p re s s , the  s t a te  se rv ic e s  in 
Greece and abroad  made a c o n s id e ra b le  e f f o r t  to  c r e a te  fo r  bo th  
in te rnational and Greek in te rn a l  consumption the  p ic tu re  of a young, 
dynamic, and c rea tiv e  leader, a fa ith fu l defender of "Western values", a 
self-made man of the p eo p le .{152}
Moreover, Karamanlis d id  h is  b e s t to  p resen t h im self as the  only 
true  guarantor of the w ell-estab lished  and highly desireab le  values of 
the bourgeois middle c la sses , values such as the country 's p ro tec tion  
from cbmminist i n f i l t r a t i o n  and i t s  r e v o lu t io n a ry  re p e rc u s s io n s ;  
preservation  of the a l l i e s '  friendsh ip  and p a rtic u la r ly  of U.S. support 
which, by p r o te c t in g  th e  n a tio n  a g a in s t  fo re ig n  in t r u s io n ,  was
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considered to  uphold the  s ta tu s  quo; secu ring  the  t r u s t  of fo re ig n  
bankers, in d u s tr ia l  groups, t o u r i s t s ,  e tc .  s ince  i t  is  they  who a re  
expected to  bring the much-needed c ap ita l to keep the people going and 
to  en rich  favoured so c ia l groups. Over and above th i s ,  Karamanlis 
appropriated fo r him self the governmental mechanisms to an unprecedented 
extent. Let us not forget th a t a p rem ier's  (any prem ier's) domination 
over the governmental mechanisms is  the stronger, the less adequate the 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  h i s  p a r ty  ( i . e . ,  t r u s tw o r th y  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  
organisational procedures) or the le ss  i t  is  w illin g  to  se t lim its  to  
the le a d e r 's  power. The Greek h ig h er bureaucracy , fo r  i t s  p a r t ,  was 
q u ite  unable to r e s i s t  the p o l i t ic ia n s , being g rea tly  enfeebled and much 
dependent on c l i e n te l i s t i c  p ro te c tio n . Enjoying ab so lu te  c o n tro l over 
both the governmental mechanisms and c l ie n te l i s t i c  p ro tec tion  —or, to 
put i t  d if fe re n tly , over the d is tr ib u tio n  of sp o ils— Karamanlis imnaged 
to  subordinate h is  deputies. The l a t t e r ,  try ing  to  secure fo r themselves 
and th e ir  co n stitu en c ies  some p a r t  o f th ese  advantages, p re fe r re d  to  
accept th e i r  le a d e r 's  p o l ic ie s  q u ie t ly  in s tead  of strugg ling  against 
him. With few exceptions only, the bulk of them opted for obedience.
On 11 June 1963, Karamanlis resigned, espec ia lly  over a disagreement 
with the king about the expediency of a royal s ta te  v i s i t  to  London. 
This was not the rea l reason, however. The resignation  was b a s ic a lly  due 
to  dram atic changes s in ce  1961 w ith in  both the p o l i t i c a l  and so c ia l 
sphere. We shall discuss the p o l i t ic a l  aspects here, and consider the 
social developments a t the end of th is  chapter.
F i r s t  of a l l ,  on the  29 October 1961 n a tio n a l e le c t io n , the  ERE 
received 50.80 per cent of the vote as opposed to 33.65 per cent of the 
Centre Union. These e le c tio n s  came to  be known as the  e le c t io n s  of 
"violence and f ra u d " .* 153 * The lead e r of the  Centre Union, George 
Papandreou, then proclaimed h is  famous anendotos (re le n tle ss  struggle) 
against Karamanlis’ ERE, a strugg le  th a t aimed a t new, f a i r  e lec tio n s .
62
The Centre Union leader even went to  the palace and asked the king to  
oust Karamanlis and arrange  fo r  new e l e c t i o n s . ( 154 * The p o l i t i c a l  
clim ate was d e te rio ra tin g  rap id ly , to  the poin t when, in May 1963, EDA. 
d e p u ty  G. L am brak is was m u rd ered  in  S a lo n ic a  by p a r a - s t a t e  
elem ents.*155* Shortly afterw ards Karamanlis announced th a t, in order to 
govern th e  co u n try  p ro p e r ly ,  he needed some amendments to  th e  
co n stitu tio n . He suhmitted h is  proposals to  parliam ent*156* (where the 
ERE had 176 MPs out of 300), but met w ith strong opposition from both 
the Centre Union and the EDA, accusing him of a u th o rita rian  tendencies, 
as well as from the  p a lace  (which re sen te d  h is  p ro jec te d  curbing of 
royal in terventions in p o l i t ic s ) .  As he him self la te r  put i t ,
" . . . i f  I had s tay ed , we would have ended up w ith  a new 
national schism, or maybe a  c iv i l  w a r... Apart frcm th a t,
I would have been worn o u t w ith  th e  tu rm o il of th a t  
p e rio d 's  passions and I would not have been in a  position  
to re tu rn  as the p a rak lito s  [Greek fo r saviour, Messiah] 
a t the c r i t ic a l  time of 1974 —  " . ‘ 157)
In view of the s itu a tio n , he f in a l ly  opted fo r withdrawal a ltogether 
from the p o li t ic a l  scene.
In wider terms, Karamanlis' departure was brought about by the same 
fo rces as had arranged  fo r  h is  access io n . The th ro n e 's  favour was 
withdrawn when the king saw h is  powers threatened, and the army followed 
s u i t .* 158 * The ERE leader returned to  contest the 1963 e lec tio n s , and 
when ERE lo s t , he d e f in ite ly  withdrew from both the p o lit ic a l  arena and 
the country. As he la te r  acknowledged,
" . . . p l a y i n g  th e  o p p o s it io n  r o le  does no t go w ith  my 
character, both because I am a man of ac tion , and because 
acting  in opposition is  no good unless i t  is  accompanied 
by a good dose of demagogy".* 15 9 *
When the ERE leader l e f t  the  coun try , he sen t a l e t t e r  to  h is  
parliam entary  group, in which he in d ic a te d  P. K anellopoulos as h is  
successor fo r the p a rty  le a d e rsh ip . Now K anellopoulos, co n tra ry  to
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Karamanlis, was not a t  a l l  an a u th o rita r ian  personality ; he was b e tte r  
known as an in te lle c tu a l than a p o l i t ic ia n , and so posed no th rea t to 
the o ther leading members of ERE. He was an old hand a t  the p o l it ic a l  
game, however, an ex-Prime M inister (in  1945), sober and moderate, and 
indeed was the best so lu tion  to  lead the party  and keep i t s  deputies and 
members u n i te d . The p a r l ia m e n ta ry  group approved and confirm ed  
Karamanlis1 se lec tion . Kanellopoulos ta sk  was somewhat d i f f e r e n t  from 
tha t of Karamanlis, however. He did  not enjoy h is  p redecessor's power 
over the  ERE d e p u tie s , and had to  take  the  op in ions and tendencies 
p revailing  w ithin the party  in to  serious consideration, before making a 
p u b lic  s ta tem en t. He was f re q u e n tly  charged w ith  being too le n ie n t 
v is -a -v is  George Papandreou, and was obliged a t times to  take, a  tough 
and in fle x ib le  public stance, in order to  secure h is  own position  w ithin 
the p a r ty .( 160}
To conclude th is  section , i t  may be useful to note the tendencies 
and p e rso n a litie s  w ithin the ERE's parliam entary group, which conprised 
elements from various o rig in s . F i r s t ,  there  were the MPs who came from 
old p o lit ic a l  fam ilies; seme of them had a lso  served in the parliam ents 
of the in te r-w ar p e r io d , o th e r s  were younger d escen d an ts  o f such 
fa m ilie s . Secondly, th e re  were the  d ep u tie s  who had come from the 
Liberal camp, and had e ith e r  joined the Greek Rally f i r s t  or had come 
s tra ig h t to  the ERE. Thirdly, there were some extrem ists of the u l t r a -  
R ig h t, who had been members of M etaxas governm ents o r ,  w orse, 
co llab o ra ted  w ith  the German occupation  fo r c e s .* 161} Fourthly, there 
were some who would la te r  co llabora te  w ith the co lonels ' junta. Most of 
the depu ties  were not p a r t i c u la r ly  concerned w ith the co n stitu tio n a l 
question, but not a l l  of them were fervent ro y a lis ts .  F ina lly , as was 
true  a lso  for the Centre Union, some ERE MPs had considerable p o l it ic a l  
power and enjoyed g rea t in flu en ce  w ith in  th e i r  c o n s titu e n c ie s , and 
others who were more notable fo r th e ir  w ealth .*162 *
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2-2.3 Ideology and procrrairme
During a l l  the time the ERE party  held government o ff ic e , from i t s  
foundation  in 1956 u n t i l  1963, no p a r ty  p u b lic a tio n  was ever issued  
concerning i t s  ideological stance. Since p a rty  and government a c t iv i t ie s  
were not d iffe re n tia te d , the only ind ica tion  of the form er's ideology is  
the p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  progranme —and, of course, i t s  a c t iv i t ie s .
In the sphere of foreign re la tio n s , the most serious question the 
government had to deal with was the Cyprus issue , which concluded (for 
th e  tim e be ing ) w ith  th e  C onvention  o f Z u rich  and L ondon.*163’ 
Concerning re la tio n s  with the coun tries of the Eastern bloc, the ERE 
expressed i t s  wish to  en ter in to  mutual arrangements, but a t  the same 
time i t  accused these  c o u n tr ie s  o f lack  of understand ing  v is - a -v is  
Greece (Greece a t the time was form ally a t  war w ith A lbania). The party  
a lso  announced th a t i t  would seek to  improve G reece 's r e la t io n s  w ith 
Y ugoslavia and Turkey, but d id  not make any s u b s ta n t ia l  p rog ress  in 
th i s .  In  o v e ra ll term s, the  co rn e rs to n e  of ERE fo re ig n  p o lic y  was 
loyalty  to  the A tlan tic  A lliance (NATO), and more sp e c if ic a lly  to  i t s  
American a l l i e s .* 164’
An inportant event fo r Europe took place in Rome in March 1957, with 
the founding of the European Economic Ccmnunity. Frcm 1959 onwards, the 
ultim ate  ta rg e t of Karamanlis1 p o lic ie s  fo r the country was i t s  eventual 
EEC membership. A fte r long drawn-out n e g o tia t io n s , the  A ssoc ia tion  
Agreement was signed on 9 Ju ly  1961 (to  come in to  force on 1 November
1962). Greece in fac t was the f i r s t  country to ask fo r membership of the 
EEC in i t s  o rig ina l form. However, fu l l  membership s ta tu s  was delayed 
fo r ten  y ea rs , w hile the  Greek economy attem pted  to  reach  a level 
accep tab le  by EEC stan d ard s. In the  end i t  was m ainly fo r p o l i t i c a l  
reasons, due to the f a l l  of the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  tha t Greece became 
a fu ll  EEC member on 1 January 1981. *165 *
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With respect to  the m ilita ry , ERE policy  was to  subsid ise  only i t s  
most indispensable needs. To help the government meet i t s  cornutments to 
the armed forces, the ERE sought the continuation of foreign economic 
a id  and proposed tha t the NATO countries should se t up an in s t itu t io n  
for financ ia l a ssistance  from i t s  r ic h e r  to  i t s  poorer members.
The ERE's g rea tes t e f fo r ts  were deployed in the economic sec to r. As 
Karamanlis put i t :
"Like a l l  peoples the Greeks have th e ir  own defects: envy, 
s ly n e s s ,  i n c l i n a t i o n  to  i n t r i g u e .  R e g r e t t a b le  and 
u n p le a s a n t  in  e v e ry d ay  l i f e ,  th e s e  d e f e c t s  become 
d i s a s t r o u s  in  p o l i t i c s  and  d e s t r o y  e x a c t ly  th o s e  
c h a ra c te r is tic s  tha t need promotion: in te l lig e n t  conduct, 
a  sen se  o f honour, co u rag e . The s o i l  in  which th o se  
d e fe c ts  in e v i ta b ly  grow and p ro sp e r  i s  p o v e rty . In  
consequence i t  was necessary, before doing anything e lse , 
to  improve our peoples' standard of liv ing . This may sound 
an o v e rs im p lif ic a tio n , but i t  i s  only common sense . To 
increase the national income would not only mean securing 
the peoples' r e l ie f  and our national independence, which 
i s  in co m p a tib le  w ith  th e  b e g g a r 's  cup; i t  would a lso  
con tribu te  decisively  to  curbing our character fa u lts  and 
developing our v i r tu e s .  That is  why I so p a ss io n a te ly  
devoted myself to  my coun try 's economic development". *166*
The b asic  o b je c tiv e s  of the ERE government were, (a) the  f a s te s t  
possib le  increase of the national and per cap ita  income, (b) securing 
employment fo r  th e  g r e a te s t  p o s s ib le  number of p e o p le , (c) f a s t  
improvement of the liv in g  and educational standards of the Greeks, and 
(d) reducing as fa r  as possib le  Greece's dependence on foreign a id . The 
government a lso  t r ie d  to  promote a c c e le ra te d  development of those 
regions of the country which lagged g rea tly  behind the urban centres in 
terms of the  standard  of liv in g .*  167 * In the  end, the  p a rty  f e l t  
e n ti t le d  to claim tha t during i t s  period in o ff ic e  i t  had succeeded in 
le a d in g  th e  co u n try  from underdevelopm ent to  developm ent. More 
s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  the  average p e r-c a p ita  income had gone up from U.S. 
d o lla rs  305 in 1955 to $565 in 1963 —a 85.2 per cent increase, o r 8 per 
cent per year. At fixed p rice s , the gross national product had increased
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by 64 per c e n t, added value  in in d u stry  by 80.7 per c e n t, and gross 
investments of fixed c ap ita l by 125.8 per cen t. Revenue frcm m igrants' 
renm ittances and tourism had grown 194.8 per cent; p riv a te  bank deposits 
by 858.9 per c e n t; and the  economy's o v e ra ll  f in an c in g  by 290.3 per 
cen t. Last but not l e a s t ,  the  p ric e -in d e x  throughout the  1955-1963 
period went up by only 16.9 per cen t, o r 2 per cent annually. The re s u lt  
of th is  very su b s tan tia l progress was the spectacu lar inprovement of the 
Greek people’s standard of l iv in g .* 168 *
The ERE's lea d e rsh ip  dec lared  i t s e l f  coirm itted to  a free-m arket 
economy, in s i s t in g  on the advantages of p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e  and f re e  
carpet i t  ion. For a l l  th a t, in r e a l i ty  i t  was the s ta te  th a t provided the 
bulk of a l l  the basic  financing needed fo r the coun try 's  development, 
and the f re e  en trep ren eu rs  who made a l l  the  p r o f i t .  In  o th e r  words, 
p riva te  indiv iduals enriched themselves on the proceeds frcm the public 
s e c to r 's  su b s id ie s . This being so , the  M in is te r  of Co-ordination and 
prominent ERE member, P. Papaligouras, addressed to  Greek merchants and 
in d u s tr ia l is ts  the following appeal:
"Gentlemen, th is  country needs in d u s tr ia l is ts ,  merchants, 
a r t is a n s , p ro fessionals, farmers and workers who must have 
in i t ia t iv e  and be aware of th e ir  r ig h ts  and ob liga tions. I 
must t e l l  you th a t ,  as the  Prime M in iste r has sa id  in 
p a r l i a m e n t ,  th e  c o u n t r y ’ s le a d in g  b u s in e s s e s  have 
u n f o r tu n a te ly  n o t a lw ays come up to  th e  c o u n t r y 's  
expectations and, reg re ttab ly , did none of the things they 
might have done on th e ir  own before our assoc iation  with 
the  EEC. This is  why they must now be persuaded to  do 
th e ir  d u tie s , and i f  they cannot be persuaded, they must 
be carpel led. The government, through i t s  prime m in iste r, 
has presented these fac ts  in parliam ent and s tressed  that 
th e  c o u n tr y 's  le a d in g  b u s in e s se s  must t r y  to  a t t r a c t  
fo re ign  c a p i ta l ,  which then w ill  e i th e r  co -opera te  w ith 
the  indigenous c a p i ta l ,  i . e .  w ith  the  Greek e n te rp r is e s  
(and th is  is  what we p re fe r) , or i t  w ill act autonomously, 
by se ttin g  up G reek-staffed production u n its " . ( 1691
And a few days la te r  he added:
"I wonder, Gentlemen, whether you above a l l  —you, who 
must be the  b ea re rs  of p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e — whether you 
re a liz e  th a t seme of the recent suggestions [made by the 
Greek Merchant and In d u s tr ia l is t  Chamber concerning export 
t r a d e  p o l ic y  m a t te r s ]  a r e  v i r t u a l l y  e q u iv a le n t  to
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'p u b lic isa tio n ' of the export commerce. Because, you see, 
i f  the s ta te  is  expected to  subsid ise  export trade , and i f  
various measures on subsid ies are  to  be introduced, how is  
i t  possib le  fo r anyone to  believe th a t the conditions are  
r ig h t fo r Greece to  be ab le  to  en te r the EEC? You however, 
a re  responsible businessmen and nobody can re liev e  you of 
your r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t  —ex cep t fo r  a 
s o c ia l is t  regime, and I assume you do not want th a t. Yet 
i t  is  im possib le, Gentlemen, fo r  somebody to  enjoy the 
a d v a n ta g e s  o f  a c a p i t a l i s t  a s  w e ll a s  a s o c i a l i s t  
regime". ‘ 17 0 *
To sum up: the ERE's ideology was as sketchy and unclear as th a t of 
i t s  main r iv a l ,  the Centre Union, the main d ifference  being th e ir  stance 
towards communism: fo r  the  ERE anti-communism reigned  supreme. As D. 
Katsoudas comments,
" ...K a ram an lis  h im self was u l t im a te ly  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  
t h i s ;  fo r  he never a ttem pted  any se rio u s  form ulation  of 
ideology, ra th e r  he was content with h is  own powerful and 
modem technocratic  image". ‘ 171*
And f in a l ly ,  as we have seen , the  ERE ideology was c h a ra c te r is e d  by 
paternalism  and sta tism , since, while
" . . . t h e  s ta te  attem pts to  rep la ce  p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e . . . ,  
ignoring  and even p a ss io n a te ly  opposing i t .  The Prime 
M i n i s t e r . . . ,  w h i ls t  d e c la r in g  h i s  f a i t h  in  p r iv a te  
e n te r p r is e . . . ,  a lso  s ta te s :  'Greece, as becomes c le a r on
th e  b a s is  of the  below mentioned n a t io n a l i s a t i o n s . . . ,  
tends s o c ia l ly  and g rad u a lly  towards a so c ia l economic 
democracy and has adopted p lann ing  as a means to  th is  
e n d .. . ' " . ( 1721
2.2.4 S trategy and ta c tic s
(a). In government 
Having been in o ff ice  since i t s  very beginning, the ERE used every 
means a t  i t s  disposal to preserve the advantages of power. I t  used the 
m ethods p r e v io u s ly  d e v e lo p e d  by o th e r  g o v e rn m e n ts , b u t w ith  
un p reced en ted  r u th le s s n e s s  and m a n ife s tin g  an a lm ost i n s a t i a b l e  
g re e d .(173) As a lread y  m entioned, the  ERE id e n t i f ie d  i t s e l f  with the 
s ta te , and th is  lo g ica lly  resu lted  in the to ta l  submission of the s ta te
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machinery to the party . The EKE managed to  c le a r  the s ta te  apparatus not 
only of a l l  elem ents connected w ith  th e  L e f t , but a lso  from a l l  and 
everyone not to ta l ly  on i t s  side . This was equally true  fo r the armed 
forces, the s ta te  po lice  and the constabulary, as for public  en te rp rises  
su c h  a s  b a n k s ,  th e  r a i l w a y s ,  an d  th e  e l e c t r i c  pow er and  
telecommunications corporations. These machinations brought in various 
advantages. F i r s t ,  they allowed a se le c tiv e  d is tr ib u tio n  of sp o ils , i .e .  
what i s  c a l le d  " c l i e n t e l i s t i c  p r o t e c t i o n " . ( 174 * S ta te  money was 
abudantly  given to  the  p a r ty 's  c l i e n t e l e ,  and so helped the  ERE to  
secure, and to  some extent increase, i t s  social base. I t  was a lso  used 
to subsid ise and subvert a section  of the p ress, which, then, was fu lly  
submissive to the p a r ty 's  —and government's— orders and wishes.
A second advan tage  acc ru ed  to  th e  f in a n c in g  o f th e  p a r t y 's  
a c t i v i t i e s .  The ERE's lack of an e f f i c ie n t  g ra s s -ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  
meant th a t i t  could not be financed frcm party-members' con tribu tions 
only. With the du ties of the non-ex isting  party  organs in fac t carried  
out by v a r io u s  governm ent s e r v ic e s ,  th e  p a r ty  i n d i r e c t l y  saved 
considerable money, while d ire c tly  financing i t s  propaganda and national 
e lec tion  campaigns with s ta te  funds. The EKE also  received contribu tions 
frcm members of the higher social s t r a ta  (rich  shipowners, merchants, 
m anufacturers, e tc .)  since, i t s  to ta l  control over a l l  s ta te  decision­
making made i t  possib le  to do important favours to i t s  benefactors.
F ina lly , there was an in d irec t advantage in the a b i l i ty  to  deploy 
c e r t a in  s t a t e  o rgans and s e rv ic e s  a g a in s t  th e  o p p o sitio n . So the  
Security Corps, under the p re tex t of combatting the ccmnunist e v il ,  had 
p r a c t ic a l ly  become transform ed in to  a q u a s i-p ra e to r ia n  guard of the  
party . In o ther words, simple executive organs could be given unlim ited 
power and f in a l ly  turned  in to  s te rn  re p re s s iv e  mechanisms. The para- 
s ta te  organisations must, again, be l e f t  out of the consideration here. 
A good example of s ta te  oppression were the a c t iv i t ie s  of the National
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Defence B a tta llio n s  (TEA.) in the ru ra l a reas , where i t  te rro rise d  the 
populace (p a r t ic u la r ly  during  e le c t io n  cam paigns); and the  C entral 
In te llig en ce  Agency (KYP), which helped the po lice  to  id en tify  and deal 
appropria te ly  w ith l e f t i s t s  and fe llo w -tra v e lle rs . ( 175>
(b ). In opposition 
The ERE moved to  the opposition benches from 3 November 1963, a f te r  
loosing  the  e le c t io n , u n t i l  the  p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  of 15 Ju ly  1965. 
Although Karamanlis had withdrawn from p o l i t i c s  and gone abroad, the 
party  remained united  under P. Kanel lopoulos' leadership and fie rc e ly  
opposed the  C entre Union governments concerning both i t s  economic, 
so c ia l, and foreign p o lic ie s .
The o p p o s it io n  accused  th e  George Papandreou governm ents o f 
endangering the  c o u n try 's  currency  s t a b i l i t y  because, in  o rder to  
p o p u la rise  i t s  image and win v o te s , i t  was g ran tin g  su b s id ie s  to  
education, the farmers, wage labour and the low income social c lasses 
g en e ra lly . I t  a lso  charged the  C entre Union w ith  being too le n ie n t 
v is-A -vis the L eft, and perm itting  comnunist in f i l t r a t io n  of the armed 
fo rc e s . At the  same time the  ERE accused the  Prime M in is te r 's  son, 
Andreas Papandreou, of try ing  to se t up a personal faction  of h is  own 
w ith in  the army, and of encouraging the  c re a tio n  of a "para-army" 
organisation . This a lleg a tio n  caused a great furore a t the time, but 
f in a lly  proved mere calumny.( 176 >
In terms of i t s  opposition to  the Centre Union's handling of foreign 
a f f a i r s ,  th e  ERE argued  th a t  George Papandreou had weakened th e  
country 's bonds with i t s  a l l i e s  with h is  policy  on the Cypriot issue. 
The ERE p e rs is te d  a t  every p o ss ib le  o p p o rtu n ity  in  demonstrating i t s  
re le n tle ss  anti-communism, and managed to  d iscern  the "communist th reat" 
almost everywhere. F ina lly , on 15 Ju ly  1965, the ERE helped the King to 
get r id  of George Papandreou (a reversa l of the circumstances two years
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e a r l ie r )  by approving the l a t t e r ' s  o f f e r  of re s ig n a tio n  (see se c tio n  
3.1) and supporting the "aposta tes ' government" in parliam ent.
2 .2 .5  E lectoral performance
During the eleven years of i t s  l i f e  the  ERE p a r t ic ip a te d  in f iv e  
national e lec tio n s . A p a r t ic u la r i ty  of th a t period is  tha t ERE never 
completed i t s  s ta tu to ry  four years in o ff ic e  but, due to  various reasons 
which shall be e lucidated  below, i t  opted fo r e lec tio n s long before the 
end of i t s  term in  o f f i c e .4177’ As we have seen, the  f i r s t  n a tio n a l 
e le c t io n  came soon a f t e r  Marshal Papagos' d ea th , when Karamanlis had 
created  the ERE and wished to  le g i t im is e  the governmental change and 
secure h is  leadership w ithin the p arty . Two months before the e lec tio n s, 
the parliam ent voted in a new e le c to ra l law, described as "a m jo r i ty  
system with lim ited m inority rep resen ta tion"; i t  was an e lec to ra l law 
th a t  g re a tly  favoured the ERE.(178> Furtherm ore, the  a llo tm en t of 
parliam entary sea ts  to each e le c to ra l d i s t r i c t  was arranged according to 
the (ERE more favourable) 1940 population census, although the census of 
1951 had in the meantime become a v a i la b le .4179 * Since the e lec tio n  was 
to  take place under an ERE government, th is  a lso  included four m inisters 
who were not " p o l i t ic a l  p e rs o n a l i t ie s "  ( i . e .  the M in iste rs  of the 
In te r io r , Defence, Ju s tic e , and Northern Greece). The p a rtie s  of the 
opposition, on the other hand, including EDA, decided to contest the 
e lec tio n  in a very broad c o a litio n  (the Democratic Union DE), mainly 
because they saw the new e le c to ra l  law as a se rio u s  th re a t  to  th e i r  
su rv iva l. However, the leaders of the L iberal p a rtie s  le t  i t  be known 
without a doubt tha t th e ir  co-operation with EDA was only for e lec to ra l 
purposes and that any such governmental c o a litio n  was unthinkable.
In i t s  e lec tio n  canpaign, the EE® presented i t s e l f  as a new party , 
com pletely d is so c ia te d  from e i th e r  o f the  in te r-w ar p o l i t i c a l  camps
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(V enizelists and a n ti-V e n iz e lis ts ) . I t  described the Greek Rally as a 
tra n s it io n a l movement, and claimed th a t the EE® would
“ . . .c r e a te  a new p o l i t ic a l  and moral clim ate, the clim ate 
of tru e  democracy, w ith in  which the  n a tio n , d is c ip lin e d  
and o p tim is t ic , w ill  assume th e  tough s tru g g le  fo r  the 
conquest of a new way of l i f e . . . ,  i t  w ill  r e a l iz e ,  in 
o ther words, the change, th a t has so long been the general 
and intense request of our people".* 1601
N evertheless, immediately a f te r  the formation of the Democratic Union, 
Karamanlis began to  r e i te r a te  the time-worn slogans and sa id  in a pre- 
e le c to ra l speech: "Communism is  num erica lly  harm less. I t  does become 
dangerous though, when th e re  a re  p a r t i e s  w ith  l im ite d  n a tio n a l  
conciousness, eager to  c o -o p e ra te  w ith  i t " ;  and two days befo re  the  
e lec tio n s he warned: "Every vote th a t is  not given to us, i s  e ffe c tiv e ly  
given to  Communism". ( 181 * The r e s u l t s  of th e  ERE's f i r s t  n a tio n a l 
e lec tio n  (19 February 1956) a re  presented in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: 19 February 1956 Parliam entary E lection
P artie s/C o alitio n s number of votes % sea ts  in parliament %
EE® 1,594,112 47.38 165 55.00
Democratic Union 1,620,007 48.15 132 44.00
Party of Prog. People 74,545 02.22 — -----
Independent 31,022 .92 3 01.00
Social People's Party 29,375 .88 — —
Other 15.139 .45 — -----
[Sources: R egister of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 
1977, p. 93.]
I t  is  immediately obvious th a t, as an e ffe c t of the new e lec to ra l 
law, the  El® managed to  gain  the  a b so lu te  im ajority in  p arliam en t, 
although i t  had received fewer votes than the Democratic Union. (The EE® 
obtained 55 per cent of the se a ts , having received 47.38 per cent of the 
vote; whereas the Democratic Union, with 48.15 per cent of the vote, had
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only 44 per cent of the se a ts .)  I f ,  moreover, we leave out of account 
the army and c iv i l  serv ice vo te, the EKE is  seen to  have enjoyed even 
le s s  popular s u p p o r t . ( 182} T able  1 . 4a shows a com parison between 
c iv i l ia n  e le c to ra l  s ta t io n s  and those  of the  army and c iv i l  se rv ice  
employees, fo r Athens, P iraeus, and the country as a whole.
Table I-4a: Comparison Between C iv ilian  and Army /C iv il Service Votes
Athens
Piraeus
All Greece
[Sources: For Athens and Piraeus see Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , vo l. I l l ,  
p. 78; fo r the country as a whole see Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , p. 
471.]
As a f in a l point i t  should be mentioned th a t the EKE vote was not 
equally d is tr ib u te d  over the various e le c to ra l d i s t r ic t s .  In the ru ra l 
a reas the  ERE obtained  an a b so lu te  m a jo rity , p o llin g  52.8 per cen t, 
whereas in the urban cen tres i t  received only 42 per cent; v ir tu a lly  
nowhere, however, did the EKE vote f a l l  below 30 per c e n t .‘ 183 *
Two years l a t e r ,  ERE lo s t  i t s  a b so lu te  m ajo rity  in parliam ent 
because f if te e n  of i t s  deputies le f t  the party  due to th e ir  disagreement 
with yet another new e lec to ra l law. Karamanlis resigned, and a caretaker 
government took over the task of organising fresh  e lec tio n s . F inally , 
the la te s t  e le c to ra l law, described as ensuring "reinforced proportional 
rep resen ta tion", was voted for in parliam ent by both the EKE and the 
Liberal Party of George Papandreou. The la t t e r  hoped i t  would work in 
favour of h is  party  and, p a r tic u la r ly , to the detriment of the United
19 February 1956 E lection
Name of Party C iv ilian  Vote Army/Civil Service Vote
Number of Votes Number of Votes
EKE 153,300 4,126
DE 193,983 1,359
EKE 64,768 2,113
DE 106,528 691
EKE 1,467,436 126,676
DE 1,588,859 31,148
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Democratic L eft, EDA, which was to  con test the e lec tio n s by i t s e l f .  The 
1940 population census was again used to  a l lo t  parliam entary se a ts , and 
the e lec tio n  took place on 11 May 1958. The re s u lts  a re  presented in 
Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: 11 May 1958 Parliam entary E lection
Part ies/C oali t  ions number of votes % sea ts  in parliament %
ERE 1,583,885 41.16 171 57.00
EDA 939,902 24.42 79 26.33
Liberal Party 795,445 20.67 36 12.00
PADE( a 1 408,787 10.62 10 03.33
ELK(h} 113,358 02.94 4 01.33
Other 7,562 .19 — -----
Notes: (a) Progressive Rural Democratic Union, c o a litio n  of small Centre 
and Centre-Right p a r t ie s .
(b) Union of Peoples' P a rtie s , c o a litio n  of right-w ing p a r t ie s .
[Sources: R egister of Senators (1921-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 
1977, p. 94.]
Although the ERE had lo s t seme of i t s  support, i t  s t i l l  received the 
largest number of votes, i .e .  41.16 per cent and the e lec to ra l law gave 
i t  57 per cent of the sea ts  in parliam ent. The Liberal p o lit ic a l  fo rces, 
having contested the e lec tions separa te ly  under the Liberal Party and 
the Progressive Rural Democratic Union, po lled  20.67 per cent and 10.62 
per cent respec tive ly . The main su rp rise  of th is  e lec tion  concerned the 
United Democratic Left (EDA), which po lled  an unprecedented 24.42 per 
cent and so moved to the o f f ic ia l  opposition benches in parliam ent. ( 184}
This spectacular success of EDA alarmed and re -ac tiv a ted  the S ta te  
of the Right. From 1958 onwards, in s t i tu t io n a lis e d  s ta te  repression was 
fu rther bo lstered  by several anti-carm unist cen tres , m obilisation of the 
p a ra -s ta te  o rgan isations, and the general c o n s t i tu t io n  of re a c tio n a ry  
forces. I t  is  these forces tha t were to bring about the e lec to ra l coup
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of 1961, and would la te r  s ta f f  the co lone ls ' m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip . In 
the Centre, meanwhile, serious e f fo r ts  were made to  bring  the various 
p a r tie s  together, so as to  e s tab lish  a strong and c red itab le  opponent to 
the ERE, capable of succeeding the l a t t e r  in government o r , a t the very 
le a s t ,  take the bulk of the opposition votes away from EDA.
T h ese  e f f o r t s  b o re  f r u i t  in  1961 , a s s i s t e d  by A m erican 
in te rv e n tio n .( 185> A few months p r io r  to  the  form ation o f the Centre 
Union (EK), the p a r tie s  of the Centre agreed with ERE on a  fu rther new 
e le c to ra l law (a m odification of the previous "reinforced proportional 
re p re s e n ta t io n " ) , and voted fo r i t  in  p a rliam en t. New e lec tions were 
proclaimed a f te r  the Centre Union was f in a lly  se t up on 19 September 
1961. The very next day Karamanlis resigned and a caretaker government 
was sworn in to  o ff ic e  to  organise and supervise the e le c tio n s . *186} The 
1940 census was again the basis fo r a llo t in g  parliam entary seats in 13 
of the e le c to ra l d i s t r ic t s ;  fo r the remaining 42, the 1951 census was 
used. The Centre Union (EK) contested the e lec tions in c o a litio n  with 
M arkesinis1 Party of Progressive People (KP), and EDA formed a co a litio n  
—the Pan-Democratic Rural Front of Greece (PAME)— with the National 
Rural Party (EAK).
D uring th e  p r e - e le c to r a l  p e r io d  th e  s t a t e  a p p ara tu s , in  c lo se  
co llabora tion  with the p a ra -s ta te  o rgan isations, se t in motion the so- 
c a lle d  P e r ic le s  contingency p lan , which aimed a t  the  minimisation of 
EDA's s t r e n g th  by e x e r t in g  s y s te m a t ic  v io le n c e  and f r a u d u le n t  
a l t e r a t io n s  of the  e le c tio n  r e s u l t s .  I t  seems th a t the  Centre Union 
leadership knew of th is  p lan , but remained o p p o r tu n is tic a l ly  s i l e n t ,  
hoping th a t i t  would bring EDA votes to  the Centre Union;*187’ in fac t, 
they m ostly  went to  the  ERE. The 1961 e le c tio n  r e s u l ts  a re  shown in 
Table 1.6.
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Table 1 .6 :  29 October 1961 P arliam entary E le c t io n
Party /C oalition number of votes % sea ts  in parliam ent %
EE® 2,347,824 50.80 176 58.67
EK/KP 1,555,442 33.65 100 33.33
EDA/EAK 675,867 14.62 24 08.00
Others 43,399 .93 — -----
[Sources: R egister of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974). Athens 
1977, p. 96.]
As th is  shows, enforcement of the P e ric les  contingency plan proved 
p a rtly  successful: EDA’s e le c to ra l s tren g th  f e l l  by 40 per cen t, i .e .  
from 24.42 per cen t in  1958 to  14.62 per cen t th ree  years l a t e r .  
However, the plan did  not work so well fo r the two major p a r tie s :  the 
Centre Union, to g e th e r w ith  M arkesin is ' p a r ty , remained r e l a t iv e ly  
s ta b le ,  and p o lle d  33.65 p er cen t (as compared to  31.29 per cen t in 
1958), whereas the ERE's streng th  —a f te r  five  years in o ffice — grew by 
almost 23 per cent and reached a spectacu lar 50.80 per cent (as compared 
to 41.16 per cent in the p a r ty ’s second, 1958 national e le c tio n ).
Two weeks a f te r  the e le c tio n , Centre Union leader George Papandreou 
proclaim ed h is  " r e le n t le s s  s tru g g le "  a g a in s t th e , as he d ec la red , 
i l l e g a l  ERE governm ent, and d id  n o t h e s i t a t e  to  c a l l  fo r  ro y a l 
in tervention  by asking the king to dism iss Karamanlis and to arrange for 
new e le c tio n s  fo r th w ith .’ 188’ Prominent members of the C entre Union 
v is i te d  alm ost every p a r t  of the  coun try , denouncing the  e le c to ra l  
v io lence  and fraud th a t  had taken p la c e , and demanding new and f a i r  
e lec tio n s . As popular unrest grew, so did  the a c t iv i t ie s  of the para- 
s ta te  organisations. As already mentioned, the te r ro r isa tio n  culminated 
in May 1963, when EDA deputy G. Lambrakis was murdered in Salonica a f te r  
a speaking engagement. Public disagreement between Karamanlis and the 
King followed’ 189} and led to the Prem ier's res igna tion . The king then 
appointed P. P ip in e llis , a non-parliam entary member of the EE®, to the
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prem iership, and h is  new government voted in a new e le c to ra l law (again 
a m odification of "reinforced proportional rep resen ta tion"). Neither the 
ERE nor the C entre Union d ep u tie s  dem onstrated a g a in s t the  k in g 's  
i n te r v e n t io n ,  th e  l a t t e r  b e in g  c o n te n t  t h a t  t h e i r  m ajo r goa l 
—Karamanlis' d ism issal— had f in a lly  been rea lized . New e lec tions were 
announced for 3 November 1963. This time the 1961 population census was 
used to  d i s t r i b u t e  th e  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  s e a ts  among th e  e le c to r a l  
d i s t r ic t s .  Table 1.7 presen ts the e le c to ra l re s u lts .
Table 1.7: 3 November 1963 Pariiam entary E lection
Party/Coali t  ion number of votes % sea ts  in parliament %
ERE 1,837,377 39.37 132 44.00
EK 1,962,079 42.04 138 46.00
EDA 669,267 14.34 28 09.33
KP 173,981 03.73 2 .67
Others 24,760 .52 — -----
[Sources: R egister of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 
1977, p. 97.]
As we can see, the Centre Union's claim  th a t i t  would have been the 
winner of the previous e lec tio n  had i t  not been for the e lec to ra l fraud 
and v io lence  is  not f u l ly  ju s t i f i e d .  The ERE managed to  r e ta in  a 
substan tia l p a rt of the popular vote and to  e le c t 132 deputies, only six  
less than i t s  ch ief r iv a l .  N evertheless, the e ssen tia l message of these 
e lec to ra l re s u lts  was tha t the ERE, although in government for eight 
consecutive  y e a rs , was no t in v in c ib le .  The p o l i t i c a l  c lim a te  was 
beginning to favour the Centre Union, and i t s  leader decided to make the 
most of th is  s h i f t .  He refused to form a government with the support of 
EDA d e p u t i e s ,  and o p te d  f o r  im m edia te  r e s i g n a t i o n  and f r e s h  
e le c t  io n s . ( 190’ Once again  a c a re ta k e r  government took over and the 
e lec tio n s, held under the same conditions as the previous ones, took
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place on 16 February 1964. In the meantime, Karamanlis had appointed h is  
close co llabora to r P. Kanellopoulos to  the party -leadersh ip  and le f t  the 
country. Table 1.8 shows the February 1964 re s u l ts  (with ERE contesting  
the e lec tio n  in co a litio n  with M arkesinis' Party  of Progressive People).
Table 1.8: 16 February 1964 Parliam entary E lection
Partv/Coali t  ion number of votes % sea ts  in parliament %
ERE/KP 1,621,546 35.26 107 35.67
EK 2,424,477 52.72 171 57.00
EDA 542,865 11.80 22 07.33
Others 9,951 .22 — -----
[Sources: R egister of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 
1977, p. 98.]
I t  is  obvious tha t the Centre Union p ro fite d  fu lly  from favourable 
p o l i t ic a l  clim ate and po lled  a spectacu lar 52.72 per cent, so increasing 
i t s  e le c to ra l  strengh  s in ce  two e le c t io n s  ago by 25 per c e n t, and 
obtaining an absolute m ajority  in parliam ent. The ERE's popular support 
f e l l  fu rth e r, and the party  polled  i t s  lowest vote since i t s  foundation, 
e le c t in g  107 MPs (or a c tu a l ly  99, the  o th e r  e ig h t being members of 
M arkesinis' p a rty ). The vote fo r EDA dropped accordingly, though not as 
badly;*191 * The party  received 11.80 per cent of the vote (a decrease of 
17.7 per cen t), and managed to  e le c t 22 deputies.
The trium phant assum ption of power by the  Centre Union and i t s  
leader, George Papandreou, was not destined  to  la s t  long. For various 
reasons, which we sha ll deal with in the la s t  p a rt of th is  chapter, the 
Prime M inister was forced to resign  a f te r  only f if te e n  months in o ff ic e . 
The p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  of Ju ly  1965 s e t  the  country  on a road of no­
re tu rn , which ended abruptly  almost two years la te r  with the inposition  
of the co lonels ' m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip .
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2 . 2 . 6  An o v e r a ll  c r i t iq u e  o f  the N ation a l R adical Union (ERE)
F i r s t  o f a l l  th e re  can be no doubt t h a t ,  fo r  a l l  th e  ERE’s 
p re te n tio n s  as a new p a rty  com pletely d is so c ia te d  from the  p a s t ,  i t  
c e r ta in ly  was n o t. In f a c t ,  as shown above, i t  had ga thered  up and 
expressed a l l  those tha t were previously  under the banner of the Greek 
Rally. Along the way, some prominent figures from the old  V enizelist 
camp a lso  joined i t s  ranks, ju s t as they had done in the case of i t s  
predecessor. There can be l i t t l e  doubt, then, th a t the formation of the 
EKE aimed p a r tic u la r ly  a t rec o n stitu tin g  the right-w ing p o l i t ic a l  forces 
under the leadership of i t s  founder, C. Karamanlis.
Concerning i t s  o rg a n isa tio n a l s t r u c tu r e ,  the  ERE was c e rta in ly  no 
m ass-party . Although i t  d id  p u b lish  a  c h a r te r ,  which provided fo r 
several party-organs (e .g .,  a  General Assembly, a S e c re ta r ia t, regional 
p a r ty  o r g a n is a t io n s ,  e t c . ) ,  th ey  rem ained p io u s  th e o ry  o n ly . In  
consequence of th is ,  the local party  notables were unchallenged; patron- 
c lie n t re la tio n s  continued to  p re v a il, p a r t ic u la r ly  in the ru ra l areas, 
and i t  was through these re la tio n s  th a t the local party-barons secured 
the popular vote both fo r themselves and for the party . On the other 
hand, a l l  power res ted  in the hands of the ERE leader who, given both 
the  R ig h t 's  su p p o rt and h is  c h a r is m a tic  p e r s o n a l i ty ,  proved an 
omnipotent fa th e r-fig u re  and the only insurance of p a rty -un ity . In 1958, 
when f if te e n  of h is  MPs le f t  the p arty , he did not h e s ita te  to step  down 
and c a l l  fo r  new e le c t io n s , a lthough  he might well have remained in 
o ff ic e , seeing that two o ther deputies were to  jo in  ERE (one from the 
L iberal, and one frcm the People's Party) and two of those who had le f t  
f in a lly  re tu rned . ‘ 192 > When he resigned and even le f t  the country, the 
ERE remained united mainly because he had appointed h is  successor, and 
a lso  because there always was the p o s s ib i l i ty  he might change h is  mind 
and ccxne back to  resume the ERE lea d e rsh ip .c 193 ’
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The ERE, lik e  i t s  predecessor, su ffered  from lack of a consisten t 
ideology. The p a r ty 's  appeal centred on i t s  le a d e r 's  pe rsonality  and, 
according to  J . Loulis,
"Lacking a coherent p h ilo so p h ic a l outlook  ERE was bound 
e i th e r  to  be evasive  (We a re  n e ith e r  r ig h t  nor l e f t  nor 
cen tre ), or to  rev e rt to  the use of empty slogans (we are 
a ' r a d i c a l '  and 'p r o g r e s s i v e '  p a r ty "  ( in  E n g lis h  
o r ig in a lly ) .* 194}
S t i l l ,  the ERE's o u ts ta n d in g  f e a tu r e  and th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  th a t  
d iffe re n tia te d  i t  above a l l  e lse  frcm the Centre Union, was i t s  f ie rc e  
and p ass io n a te  anti-communism. On the  b a s is  of th is  e th ic  the  ERE 
estab lished  a police-democracy regime; i t  kept enforcing the c iv il-w ar 
emergency m easures, i t  kept d iv id in g  the  Greeks in to  e thn iko frones 
(nationally-minded) and non-ethn ikofrones, and f in a lly  i t  repressed and 
excluded the la t t e r  —sometimes l ib e ra ls  as well as l e f t i s t s — from any 
form of p o l it ic a l  p a rtic ip a tio n .
In the economic sphere, the ERE exhib ited  s t a t i s t  and p a te rn a lis t ic  
tendencies. I t  a ttem pted , m ainly by using  pub lic -revenue  funds, to  
reform and modernise the Greek economy and, to  a  considerable ex ten t, i t  
did succeed. By the end of 1963 Greece was no longer a poor country. 
Furthermore, the foundations were la id  fo r fu rth e r economic development. 
Nevertheless, the economic growth and the concomitant wealth were not 
equally  d is t r ib u te d .  Moreover, the  ERE d id  not base i t s  economic 
p o lic ies on long-term plans and perspectives; i t  more or less responded 
ad hoc to everyday needs. The Greek economy/ therefo re , never re a lly  
took off to en ter a phase of independent development, nor was i t  ever 
transformed in to  a properly in d u s tria l one.
The ERE took p a rt in a l l  five  parliam entary e lec tions following i t s  
foundation in  1956. Table 1 .9  below p re se n ts  the  p a r ty 's  e le c to ra l  
re su lts .
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Table 1 . 9 :  The N ation al R adical U nion 's (ERE) E le c to r a l Performance
Election
(year)
number 
of votes
number 
of sea ts
%
of votes
%
of sea ts
1956 1.594.112 165 47.38 55.00
1958 1.583.885 171 41.16 57.00
1961 2.347.541 176 50.80 58.67
1963 1.837.377 132 39.37 44.00
1964 1.621.546 107 35.26 35.67
With th e  exception  of 1964 (when the  p a rty  en te red  the  co n te s t in 
c o a l i t io n  w ith  M arkesinis* p a r ty ) ,  th e  ERE co n tested  the  e le c tio n s  
alone. Due to  the p reva iling  e le c to ra l law (usually  tailored-m ade to  i t s  
needs), the  p a r ty  always e le c te d  more MPs than corresponded to  the  
p e rc e n ta g e  o f th e  v o te  in  i t s  fav o u r . ERE's e le c to r a l  s t r e n g th  
fluc tuated  frcm i t s  lowest a t  35.26 per cent in 1964, to  50.80 per cent 
in  1961 (although th is  f ig u re  i s  deba teab le  due to  the  v io len ce  and 
fraud  which marked th is  e le c t io n ) .  N ev erth e less , s in ce  the ERE vo te  
never f e l l  below 30 per cent in any of the e lec to ra l d i s t r i c t s / 195’ i t  
follows th a t the party  had the support of a strong socia l base. This 
mass support fo r the ERE (and the Greek Rally before i t )  was derived 
p a r tic u la r ly  from the ru ra l population, the m ajority of which voted for 
the  ERE during the  whole p e rio d  under exam ination. By c o n tra s t ,  the 
urban population fo r the most p a rt voted fo r the left-w ing and lib e ra l 
p a r tie s  and, a f te r  1961, fo r the Centre Union.
Concerning f in a lly  the degree of the p a r ty 's  in s t i tu t io n a lis a t io n , 
K. Ja n d a 's  m athem atical form ula ap p lied  to  the ERE shows th a t  the 
p a r ty 's  degree of s t a b i l i t y  o r i n s t i tu t io n a l i s a t io n  amounted to  0.12 
— w h ic h  m eans t h a t  i t  w as o n e  o f  t h e  m o st s t a b l e  an d  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d / 196’ I f  th e  Greek R a lly  is  in c lu d ed  in  th e  
ca lcu la tio n  ( i . e . ,  i f  the ERE is  considered as a continuation of the
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Greek Rally in a l l  re sp ec ts) , then the above degree of s ta b i l i ty  becomes 
0.13 and ind icates again high in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n .
Generally speaking, the most s t r ik in g  fea tu re  th a t emerges frcm an 
examination of the party  is  the ERE's remarkable unity  and con tinu ity , 
from i t s  foundation u n til  the imposition of the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip . 
The case of EDA. was sim ila r, whereas the Centre Union was created  only 
in 1961, having been devided from 1946 u n til  then. The ERE (lik e  i t s  
d ire c t predecessors) was a lso  a  ro y a l is t  p a rty , in the sense th a t i t  
lo y a lly  supported  the  in s t i tu t io n  of th e  monarchy. (By c o n tra s t  the  
Centre Union, while including some staunch ro y a lis ts ,  clashed with the 
throne in 1965). Aside from anti-ccmnunism therefo re , royalism  was the 
second c h a ra c te r is tic  th a t d if fe re n tia te d  the ERE from the Centre Union.
A la s t  but not less important remark should be made a t  th is  po in t, 
concerning another fea tu re  th a t charac terised  not only the ERE and the 
Centre Union, but a lso  the whole period  under consideration here, that 
is  post-w ar p a rty  p o l i t i c s  in Greece. As i t  w ill  be shown in the  
fo llow ing c h ap te rs , when p o s t- ju n ta  p o l i t i c s  in  general and the  New 
Dermocracy p a rty  in  p a r t ic u la r  w ill  be d iscu ssed , imany of the  above- 
mentioned fe a tu re s  d isappeared  a lto g e th e r ,  o th e rs  came fo r the f i r s t  
time to the foreground, while there  were qu ite  a few which continued to 
e x is t, a lb e it  in a more sub tle  manner and to  a lesse r extent than in the 
p ast; the most important, we th ink , among the la t t e r  was the so -ca lled  
phenomenon of pa 1 eokonmatismos which, more or le ss , means tra d itio n a l 
party  p o l i t ic s .
More s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  th e re  is  a number of p o l i t ic a l  c h a ra c te r is tic s  
and p ra c t ic e s  th a t should a l l  be taken in to  account and ca teg o rized  
under the above la b e l. Most of these we have already come across and 
discussed so fa r , so su ffice  i t  to  re c a ll  them in b r ie f  here: patron- 
c lie n t re la tio n s  and personal contacts between voters and p o lit ic ia n s  
instead of bureaucratic mass s tru c tu re s ; the predominance of the local
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d e p u tie s  and p o l i t i c i a n s  over t h e i r  p a r t i e s  and t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  
independence v is -a -v is  the l a t t e r  and the leadership —came to  be known 
as deputocracy (v o u le fto k ra tia )— and which, in tu rn , accounted for the 
depu ties ' easy change of p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  a t  no r i s k  of loosing  
th e ir  parliam entary sea t; the inheritance and/or bequeathing of one 's 
personal c lie n te le  and parliam entary seat from fa ther to  son; and la s t 
but not le a s t ,  the exchange of peop le 's  vote fo r same personal favour 
e ith e r  fo r themselves or fo r th e ir  re la tiv e s  and friends, the so-called  
ro u s fe t i , which was due to but a t the same time in ten sified  c lien te lism . 
O v e ra ll, then , pal eokoirmatismos comprised but a lso  became synonymous 
with deputocracy, c lien te lism , r o u s f e t i , p e r s o n a l is t ic  and h e re d ita ry  
p o l i t i c s ,  and as i t  w ill  be dem onstrated in  the  fo llow ing ch ap te rs , 
these fea tu res and p ra c t ic e s  surv ived  the  break-up w ith the  m il i ta ry  
regime and the re s to ra tio n  of democracy in 1974; the newly created New 
Democracy party  comprised a good many p o lit ic ia n s  who never ceased to 
exercise such p ra c tic e s , so i t  d id  not manage to  r id  i t s e l f  completely 
from these fea tu res; in consequence, paleokonmatismos constitu ted  the 
major obstacle  to any attem pts made towards a r tic u la tio n  of bureaucratic 
and mass organ isational s tru c tu re s , and the transform ation of ND in to  a 
re a lly  modem party , s im ila r to i t s  West European counterparts.
3. Developments in the 1960s
3.1 The r i s e  and f a l l  of the Centre Union
As we have already seen, the 1950-1960 decade was characterised  by 
the coun try 's  e ffo r t  to  heal the wounds of the c iv il  war and to en ter a 
phase of economic development. This process gained momentum p a rtic u la rly  
from the mid-1950s onwards, when K aram anlis1 ERE provided, i f  by 
questionable means, the much-needed p o li t ic a l  and governmental s ta b i l i ty
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and la id  th e  fo u n d a tio n s , f i r s t ,  fo r  th e  s t a r t  of th e  c o u n try 's  
development, and secondly, fo r the more rad ica l changes th a t took place 
in the course of the next decade. We sha ll not repeat the d e ta ils  of the 
EKE record in the economic sphere. Suffice i t  to  mention th a t Greece in 
the ea rly  1960s was no longer a poor country, i t s  mean annual growth 
ra te  being 5.9 per cen t, the gross national product increases anmounting 
to  6.4 per cent per year and an average national p e r-cap ita  income by 
1963 of U.S.$ 565 (carpared to $305 in 1955). Chiefly through public  
investment in almost a l l  economic sec to rs , the popu lation 's standard of 
liv in g  was considerably higher than before.
N e v e r th e le s s , th e re  was much d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  The unbalanced  
p rosperity  was conspicuously evident in the c i t i e s ,  with lav ish  disp lays 
of imported goods th a t the  m a jo rity  could  not a f fo rd .* 197* There was 
urban unemployment, and seme branches of industry paid very low wage- 
r a te s .  In the  co u n try sid e , d e sp ite  improvements in p roduction  and 
income, the la t t e r  s t i l l  lagged behind average incomes in the c i t i e s  and 
the gap continued to  w iden .*198’ This was one of the  f a c to r s ,  th a t 
speeded up m igration frcm the countryside to  the towns which, in  i t s  
tu rn , c rea ted  problem s of d e p re ss io n  in  a re a s  th a t  were becoming 
severe ly  depopulated , and housing and employment d i f f ic u l t i e s  in the 
c i t i e s . *199 *
Furthermore, given tha t the ERE had no economic policy  with long­
term fu tu re  p e rsp e c tiv e s , the  s e c to rs  o f trad e  and the construction / 
build ing industry were both more a t t r a c t iv e  and more p ro f i ta b lle , and 
c re a te d  a b e t te r  sense of s a fe ty . So a huge number of people s e t  up 
small a rtisa n a l businesses, r e ta i l  shops, and personal services of a l l  
kinds (mainly to  make up fo r the  o v e r in f la te d  and in e f f ic ie n t  c iv i l  
se rv ice ), so c rea ting  a big middle c la ss  of a p a ra s i t ic , para-economic 
character. I t  was not u n til  the early  1960s that rapid  economic progress 
allowed fo r a new stra tum  of te c h n ic ia n s , h igher employees, f re e
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e n tre p re n e u rs , a d m in is t r a t iv e  o f f i c i a l s  and i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  T h e ir 
appearance as a new so c ia l  fo rce  co incided  w ith the popular movement 
which brought the Centre Union to  power in 1963.( 200 *
These modern businessm en , s c i e n t i s t s ,  and s tu d e n ts  were not 
s a t is f ie d  with the reforms and modernisations th a t the ERE governments 
h ad  u n q u e s t io n a b ly  r e a l i z e d  in  th e  s p h e r e s  o f  i n d u s t r y ,  
teleccnrnuni cat ions, and the technical substructure. They a lso  demanded 
changes in the p o l i t ic a l  in s t i tu t io n s , the ab o litio n  of the one-party 
s t a t e ,  the  king rem aining w ith in  h is  c o n s t itu t io n a l  ob liga tions, the 
a b o litio n  of the c iv il-w ar legacy ( i .e .  of the emergency measures, laws, 
of deporta tions, d iscrim ination  against and exclusion of l e f t i s t s  and 
l ib e ra ls ) ,  more modem education, e tc . I t  was the reforms made by the 
ERE already but mostly those th a t s t i l l  remained unrealized, as well as 
th e  c o u n tr y 's  economic p ro c e s s ,  which le d  to  th e  condemnation of 
conservatism  and of the one-party s ta te  th a t had been estab lished  a f te r  
the c iv i l  w ar.‘ 201 >
The e x is tin g  popular unrest was aggravated by the violence and fraud 
e x e rc ised  du ring  th e  1961 e l e c t i o n .  The d i s s a t i s f i e d  p o p u la tio n , 
to g e th e r w ith  the new so c ia l  s t r a t a ,  were given p e rfe c t p o l i t i c a l  
expression by the Centre Union of George Papandreou, and mobilised by 
h is  proclamation of " re le n tle ss  struggle" to  remove the ERE frcm power. 
K aram anlis' disagreem ent and c la sh  w ith  the  king, and G. Lambrakis' 
murder in Salonica only inflam ed the  p o l i t i c a l  c lim ate  fu r th e r  and 
contribu ted  to the f in a l ouste r of the ERE in the 1963 e lec tio n . The 
Centre Union e lected  138 MPs in the 300-seat parliament but i t  refused 
to remain in o ff ic e , although EDA. (with 28 MPs) offered i t  an almost 
unconditional parliam entary support; so i t  opted for a fresh  e lec tion  
which was held three months la te r ,  in February 1964, when the Centre 
Union po lled  a spectacular 52.72 per cent, gained an absolute m ajoriry 
in parliam ent and took o ff ic e .
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The Centre Union had no in ten tion  of overthrowing the sta tu s quo in 
order to in s ta l l  a s o c ia l is t  or communist regime. I t  only attempted, 
—and abortively  a t  th a t, since i t  had l i t t l e  control over the s ta te  
machinery and sim ila r in s t i tu t io n s  (and when i t  t r ie d  to  put the la t te r  
under control i t  was removed from o f f ic e )— to "humanise" cap ita lism  as 
i t  ex isted  in Greece, th a t is ,  to  d is tr ib u te  the national income more 
e q u a lly , and so to  reduce unaccep tab le  in ju s t ic e s .  I t  must not be 
overlooked th a t, as long as the Centre Union was in o ff ic e , i t  re a lly  
tr ie d , and to  a lim ited  degree managed, to  c rea te  a "wind of freedom and 
liberalism ". Although the  Communist P a rty  remained outlawed (and the 
c iv il-w ar emergency le g is la tio n  was not fu lly  abolished), i t s  followers 
and suppo rte rs  were no longer p e rsecu ted , most concentration-cam p 
detainees and p o l i t ic a l  p risoners were sent heme, important reforms in 
education were in i t ia te d , and the  c e r t i f i c a t e s  of "civ ic-m indedness", 
although not completely abolished, were no longer required fo r c e rta in  
jobs or o f f ic ia l  businesses. As one author put i t ,  "For the f i r s t  time 
in  tw e n ty -e ig h t y e a r s ,  a l l  G reeks cou ld  a g a in  b re a th e  and speak 
f r e e ly " .<202’
In the economic s e c to r , the  C entre Union follow ed a keynesian 
policy . As i t s  leader sa id  in parliam ent:
"The s t a t e ' s  in v e s tm e n t p o l i c y  w i l l  be l im i te d  to  
su b s tru c tu re  e n te rp r is e s ,  and to  those economic s e c to rs  
w here  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t  c a n n o t  r e s p o n d , o r  w here 
exp lo ita tion  may acquire a monopoly c h arac te r" . ( 2 0 3 ’
In general, the Centre Union pursued a programme for modernising and 
Europeanising the country. I t  t r ie d  to  bring  about economic development 
by a d o p tin g  methods d i f f e r e n t  from th o se  a lre a d y  u sed , i . e .  by 
educational and adm in istrational reforms, and by pu tting  more emphasis 
on the  human fa c to r .  At the  same tim e, i t  se t about to v i r tu a l ly  
democratise the whole p o l i t ic a l  system, so th a t the country would sooner
86
or la te r  a t ta in  West European standards. But even these ra th e r  timid 
attem pts a t reform met with determined reac tions frcm the estab lished  
in te re s ts  of the monarchy and the army esp ec ia lly , but a lso  from the 
p a ra - s ta te  and the  f o r e ig n -a l l ie s  fa c t io n . As was to  be expected, 
K anellopou los' ERE opposed and f ie r c e ly  a tta c k ed  the  C entre Union 
p o lic ie s . The l a t t e r 's  reforms, however feeb le , were declared to  be a 
serious th rea t to  the power-position of the above-mentioned estab lished  
in te re s ts .  In the words of a prominent member of the ERE:
"The r o le s  a re  re v e rs e d . W hile u n t i l  now i t  was th e  
com m unists who d id  n o t d a re  to  a p p e a r  and e x p re ss  
themselves, today i t  is  the nationally-m inded people who 
are  obliged to  hide th e ir  b e lie f s . George Papandreou does 
not, of course belong, to  the u ltra -L e f t. N evertheless, he 
has d e liv e re d  such a s tro n g  blow against anti-connunism, 
tha t we are  ju s t if ie d  in considering him a Kremlin agent 
in Greece” . 12 0 4 *
A fte r the  C entre U nion's f i r s t  few months in  o f f ic e ,  the  popular 
ju b ila tio n  died down to  le t  the problems and demands be f e l t  th a t had 
a c tu a l ly  b rough t th e  p a r ty  to  power. The l im ite d  re fo rm s George 
Papandreou began to put through parliam ent were much needed, but not 
enough; the people were expecting fa s te r  and more rad ical change. The 
Centre Union leader prepared to meet th is  demand by f i r s t  re in fo rc ing  
and securing h is  own and h is  p a r ty 's  power-position v is -a -v is  the king 
and the  army: in o th e r  words, he t r ie d  to  curb th e i r  p r o c l iv i ty  to  
intervene in p o l i t ic s .  M atters came to  a head in the sunmer of 1965, 
when he asked h is  M in is te r of Defence to  re s ig n  so he could appoin t 
ano ther. ( 205’ The m in iste r refused, and so did the King when the Premier 
approached him for help. In Ju ly  George Papandreou, having fa ile d  to 
dissuade the King, public ly  denounced the l a t t e r 's  stance and submitted 
h is  r e s ig n a t io n ; ( 2 0 6 * the  wishes of the  throne had, (as in 1956 and
1963) proved once more s tro n g e r  and more d e c is iv e  than  th o se  of
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parliam ent and the leader and rep resen ta tiv e  of 52 per cent of the Greek 
people.
3.2 The "aposta tes” governments and the imposition of the co lonels ' 
m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
A fte r  G. Papandreou's re s ig n a tio n , th e  King c a lle d  on prominent 
members of the Centre Union party  to  form a government. When the th ird  
attem pt was p resen ted  to  the  parliam en t fo r  a m ajo rity  v o te  i t  was 
accep ted ; the  ERE MPs and 45 Centre Union d e fe c to rs  gave a vo te  of 
confidence to  S. Stephanopoulos and h is  government on 24 September 
1965.( 207 } Had the Centre Union been organised properly, and had i t  not 
been a simple parliam entary group of p o l i t ic a l  p e rso n a litie s  with l i t t l e  
co h esio n  among them, th e  c o n se c u tiv e  a tte m p ts  a t  s p l i t t i n g  and 
sp lin te rin g  i t  would most probably not have taken p la c e .* 208 } As i t  was, 
a considerable number of i t s  MPs defected  (the so -ca lled  apostates or 
renegades) and managed to susta in  a narrow parliam entary m ajority  with 
the help of the ERE. What is  remarkable is  th a t from July  u n til  December 
1965, as many as 48 deputies abandoned the Centre Union party . According 
to  most accoun ts , they were in fluenced  by b rib es  and the  o f f e r  of 
government appointments. Suffice i t  to  quote P. Kanellopoulos, the then 
leader of the ERE:
"But how d id  the government secu re  152 vo tes?  . . . t h i s  
happened by buying o f f  c o n sc ie n c e s , by governm ental 
app o in tm en ts  o f p eo p le  who would have never become 
m in is te r s  under o th e r  c o n d i t io n s ,  and even by o th e r  
unaccep tab le  means, as I was la t e r  informed. I f  I had 
known tha t such means had been used, which I p refe r not to 
name, I would have le f t  p a rliam en t... Rotten consciences 
cannot support regim es, they cannot save n a tio n s , they 
cannot reform s t a te s . . . " . ( 2 0 9 }
However, th is  so lu tion  too did not la s t  long. Popular unrest reached 
unprecedented h e ig h ts , and George Papandreou proclaim ed h is  second 
" re le n tle ss  s trugg le" , th is  one d irec ted  not so much against the ERE but
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against the king him self. F in a lly  the leaders of the two major p a r t ie s  
(K anellopoulos and Papandreou) agreed to  overthrow S tephanopoulos' 
government and contest new e le c tio n s . These were to be held on 28 May 
1967, o rgan ised  and superv ised  by an ERE c a re ta k e r  government under 
K anellopoulos. They never took p lac e . A group of medium-rank army 
o ff ic e rs  —most of them members of the IDEA organisation— intervened 
and, on 21 April 1967 estab lished  a m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  th a t was to  
la s t  for seven years u n til  Ju ly  1974.
There is  s t i l l  much d ispu te  over the rea l reasons which u ltim ate ly  
led to the inposition  of the m ilita ry  coup. We shall not deal in depth 
w ith  t h i s  m a t te r ,  which f a l l s  beyond th e  scope o f th e  p re s e n t  
s tu d y .1210 } B r ie f ly ,  i t  can be argued  th a t  th e  C en tre  U n io n 's  
r a d ic a l i s a t io n  and m o b ilisa tio n  req u ired  socia l and p o l i t ic a l  change. 
This was demanded by the Greek masses who had never had a say in the 
p reva iling  exclusion ist p o l i t ic a l  system and who, under the increasing  
in eq u a litie s  due to  c a p i ta l  accum ulation s in ce  the  e a r ly  1950s, made 
worse by the  s p e c if ic  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  o f the  Greek model o f uneven 
development, had become ac tiv a ted  and m obilised. A ten ta tiv e  entrance of 
these masses in to  the p o l i t ic a l  arena would, most probably, have rocked 
the very foundations of the regime, espec ia lly  of the monarchy and the 
m ilita ry . I t  is  not su rp ris ing , therefo re , th a t the army (with American 
h e lp )(211} an tic ip a ted  m atters and took the decisive step  to  preserve 
i t s  own in d e p e n d e n t and dom inan t p o s i t i o n  w i th in  th e  pow er 
s tru c tu re 1212* by imposing a d ic ta to r ia l  regime.
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4. C onclusion
The above analysis has t r ie d  to  show th a t, a f te r  the c iv i l  war, the
v ic to rio u s  Right*213 * (w ith the  he lp  of the  Americans) e s ta b lis h e d  a
quasi-parliam entary  regime, a  regime of "guided democracy" th a t outlawed 
th e  Communist P a r ty  and, th rough  a v a r i e ty  o f le g a l  and i l l e g a l  
mechanisms, system atically  persecuted the defeated L eft. To re in fo rce  
i t s  dominant p o s it io n  w ith in  the  s t a t e ,  i t  c a r r ie d  out an e x ten siv e  
purge —beginning w ith the army and th e re a f te r  not excluding any p a rt of 
the s ta te  apparatus— of a l l  "subversive" (communist, and sometimes a lso  
lib e ra l)  elements. A fter the post-war re la t iv e  decline in the streng th  
of the throne as p a rt of the monarchy/anmy/parliament pow er-structure, 
the m ilita ry  which had acquired a considerable degree of autonomy a f te r  
General Papagos became Marshal, occupied the dominant p o sitio n , being 
responsib le  for the smooth functioning of rep ressive  parliam entarism .
In the post-war re la tio n sh ip  between the s ta te  and society  in terms
of right-w ing p a r t ie s , the la t t e r  were p a te rn a lis t ic  as fa r  as th e ir
s tru c tu re  and functioning was concerned. ‘ 214y Their main c h a ra c te r is tic s  
were (a) dependence on a strong leader, a fa th e r-fig u re  who d irec ted  the 
"d estin ies  of the conservative movement" in more or less au th o rita rian  
manner; (b) lim ited to le ra tio n  of d iss id en ts  and very l i t t l e  patience 
fo r constructive  debate; and (c) expansion of the s ta te  and i t s  sphere 
o f in te r f e r e n c e  w ith in  c i v i l  s o c ie ty .  F u rtherm ore , the in te r-w a r 
persona lisa tion  of ideology ( "V enizelists versus a n ti-V e n iz e lis ts " ) was 
never replaced by a more constructive  stance except in negative terms: 
namely, anti-carmunism (which, of course, proved the easy so lu tio n ). But 
such an ideology d id  not encourage e la b o ra tio n  and development of a 
s tro n g  p a rty  s t ru c tu re ,  because the anti-com m unist crusade was not 
c a r r i e d  ou t by a p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  o r g a n is a t io n  bu t by th e  s t a t e  
apparatus.
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Under th is  banner of anti-com nunism  the  Right took a s e r ie s  of 
a u th o rita r ian  measures which were d ire c te d  a g a in s t both l e f t i s t s  and 
l i b e r a l s .  As we have se en , i t  began by em ploying an ti-com m unist 
le g is la tio n  (some dating  back to  1929) and by means of a co n stitu tio n a l 
re s o lu tio n  prolonged the  c iv il-w a r  emergency measures in d e f in i te ly .  
Under the  bogy of an imminent communist th r e a t ,  i t  persecu ted  i t s  
r iv a ls ,  a rre s ted  many of them and sent them to  prisons and concentration 
camps a f t e r  summary c o u r t - m a r t ia l  p ro c e d u re s ;  d e s p i te  th e  1952 
co n s titu tio n , a p a ra -co n stitu tio n a l r e a l i ty  coexisted with, i f  i t  d id 
not p revail over, the lawful one.
The Right a lso  used the  s t a te  appara tu s to  e x e rt p ressu re  on i t s  
r iv a ls  by colonising i t s  bureaucracy (always beset by favouritism  and 
c o r r u p t io n )  w ith  i t s  own s u p p o r t e r s ,  c o n s c r ip te d  by v e r t i c a l ,  
c l i e n te l i s t i c  methods. Gradually, i t  acquired a firm  control over the 
s ta te  machinery and i t s  in s t i tu t io n s , and complemented the exclusion of 
"d issiden ts" by in d isc rim in a te ly  g ra n tin g  the  famous c e r t i f i c a t e s  of 
civic-mindedness to i t s  supporters (leaving the re s t  of the people in 
d e sp a ir  when try in g  to  get a loan , a  perm it fo r  opening a p r iv a te  
b u s in e ss , a d r iv in g  licen ce  o r , more im p o rtan tly , employment in the  
s ta te  bureaucracy).
When the  a u th o r i ta r ia n , anti-com m unist le g is la t io n  and the  s t a te  
in s t i tu t io n s  were inadequate to  the  ta sk  of rep re ss io n  and p o li t ic a l  
exclusion, i t  was performed by the p a ra -s ta te  organisations which the 
Right, allowed to i l le g a l ly  develop and operate i f  i t  did not c rea te  
than. These p a ra -s ta te  organisations comprised the secret groups tha t 
appeared within the m ilita ry , as well as the crim inal elements tha t did 
the actual in tim idating of the populace, p a r tic u la r ly  in d is tan t ru ra l 
a reas. Such groups were, fo r example, the National Defence B atallions 
(TEA), or the "spontaneous" a n t i - l e f t i s t  coun ter-dem onstration  groups 
which, in the case of Lambrakis1 murder, proved somewhat over-zealous.
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For a  firm  continuation of the p o l i t ic a l  exclusion of the L eft, the 
Right had to  remain in power. This was an ob jec tive  to be achieved by 
any means w hatsoever. The most prom inent among them were e le c to ra l  
gerrym andering, fo rg ery  of the e le c to ra l  l i s t s ,  m anipulation  of the 
e l e c t o r a l  law a c c o rd in g  to  th e  c o n d it io n s  p r e v a i l in g  during  each 
e le c tio n , m obilisa tion  of army corps for purposes both of intim idation 
and co u n te r-b a lan c in g  the  l ib e r a l  and l e f t i s t  v o te , and, f in a l ly ,  
r ig g in g  o f th e  e le c t io n  r e s u l t s  when a l l  o th e r  means had proved 
in su ff ic ie n t.
In accomplishing i t s  task , the Right was a t  a l l  times supervised i f  
no t in s t r u c te d  by bo th  th e  m i l i t a r y ,  th a t  was th e  g u a ra n to r  o f 
rep ressive  parliam entarism , and by the palace, which mainly acted as the 
symbol o f s t r i c t  and a b s o lu te  anti-com m unism . F in a l ly ,  w ith o u t 
overestim ating i t s  influence, one should a lso  give due consideration to  
the  fo re ig n  in te rv e n tio n s  ( f i r s t  B r i t i s h  and then Am erican), th a t 
supported the right-w ing forces and o ffered  then considerable economic 
a id  and p o l i t i c a l  adv ice . R epressive anti-com nunism , r e s t r i c te d  and 
e x c lu s io n is t  p a r l ia m e n ta r is m , combined w ith  s t a t e  and p a r a - s t a t e  
violence against the non-ethnikofrones (and in p a ra lle l lav ish  support 
fo r  e th n ik o f r o n e s ) c o n s t i tu te d  th e  r ig h t-w in g  a u th o r i t a r i a n  and 
e x c lu s io n is t  modes of p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro l . They a lso  accounted for the 
right-w ing p o l i t ic a l  dominance tha t las ted  formally u n til  1964, when the 
Centre Union f i r s t  took o ff ic e , but e s se n tia lly  u n til  1967.
Furthermore, as regards the period under consideration , the Greek 
R ally  and the ERE, both lack ing  an e f f i c ie n t  h o rizo n ta l g ra s s -ro o ts  
o rganisation  (the same holds true  for th e ir  r iv a ls ,  EDA excepted), had 
to r e ly  com pletely on c l i e n t e l i s t i c  methods fo r  securing the popular 
vo te . Thus the people were brought in to  the  p o l i t i c a l  arena in a 
dependent, incorporative manner. As was the case during the inter-w ar 
period, c lien te lism  continued to be a sa lie n t c h a ra c te r is tic  of the
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Greek so c ie ty  and p a r t i e s ,  only now was much more c e n tr a l is e d .  The 
o rig ina l n ineteenth  century loose c lien te lism  of the local barons became 
even more cen tra lised  under Venizelos in the interwar period, and nore 
so s t i l l  under the  ERE of K aram anlis. However, the ERE p a rty  was 
charac terised  more by i t s  au tho rita rian ism  than i t s  c lien te lism , by i t s  
anti-conm unism  than i t s  p a te rn a lism , and by exclusion  r a th e r  than 
incorporation. In the same way, the post-war p o l it ic a l  regime was more 
m onolithic than democratic, and more repressive  than parliam entary.
During the seven-year m il i ta r y  d ic ta to r s h ip , the parliam en ta ry  
in s t i tu t io n s  were abolished a lto g e th e r and a f te r  e ight months, following 
th e  co u n te r-co u p  o f King C o n s ta n tin e , th e  same happened to  th e  
in s t i tu t io n  of the monarchy. (In formal terms the monarchy was abolished 
much la te r ,  when d ic ta to r  George Papadopoulos declared Greece a  Republic 
a f t e r  a p u b lic  referendum  in  1973.) This l e f t  the  army as the  so le  
remaining sovereign body.
Anti-conmunism was a lso  the ju n ta  reg im e 's  prominent ideology. 
Cannunist ideas and dogmas had no p lace in the "Greece of the C hristian  
Greeks". A new and important d ifference  was tha t the regime would not 
to le ra te  n e u tra li ty . As R. Roufos observed,
" . . . i t  was possib le , and even proper, fo r c iv il  servants 
to  keep o u t o f  p o l i t i c s ,  a s  long  a s  governm en ts 
re p re se n te d  a mere p a r ty ;  to d ay , when th e  governm ent 
represen ts the 't o t a l i t y  of the nation ' i t  is  unacceptable 
to  remain a lo o f . Government employees, g rea t and sm all, 
a re  forced to compromise more w ith the regime" (in English 
o r ig in a lly ) . ( 215 *
We see th a t w ith regard  to  the  modes of p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro l , a 
q u a lita tiv e  change took place between the pre-coup period and the junta: 
in the e a r l ie r  instance there  was a "lim ited  and re s tr ic te d "  democratic 
regime where the parliam entary in s t i tu t io n s  —the weakest partner in the 
p o st-w ar t r i a r c h y — se rv ed  as a facad e  behind  which r ig h t-w in g  
au th o rita rian  and exclu sion is t modes of p o lit ic a l  control could operate 
f re e ly ;  in  the l a t t e r  case , dem ocratic in s t i tu t io n s  were abo lished
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a lto g e th e r ,  and the  regime became f u l ly  a u th o r i ta r ia n . I t s  tolerance 
v i s - a - v i s  d is s id e n ts  was as good as zero  and the p e rsecu tio n  of i t s  
r i v a l s  was in te n d ed  to  end in  e i t h e r  com plete s u b ju g a tio n , o r 
liq u id a tio n .
The p arty  of ERE, although i t  ccnprised in i t s  ranks seme o f f ic ia ls  
who la te r  joined and served the d ic ta to r ia l  regime, never supported the 
d ic ta to rsh ip . The same is  tru e  fo r the Greek people, whose res is tan ce  
was ra th e r  passive. The f i r s t  serious rev o lt against i t  came from the 
studen ts , who in February 1973 occupied the School of Law in Athens and 
la te r ,  in  November, the Polytechnic School: the p e rfe c tly  non-violent 
occupation ended in a massacre when a tank demolished the School's gate 
to  the Polytechnic compound and po lice  and members of the army attacked 
the s tu d e n ts . In  the  wake of th ese  even ts d ic ta to r  Papadopoulos was 
overthrown by the  then se c re t-a rm y -p o lice  ch ie f, B rigadier Ioannidis, 
who took over and e ig h t months l a t e r  attem pted  to  impose a coup in 
Cyprus. The a ttem pt ended in  f ia s c o , th e  T urkish troops invaded and 
occupied almost h a lf  of the is land , and Greece was in g rea t danger of 
war w ith  Turkey. Then h ig h - ra n k in g  army o f f i c e r s  in te rv en ed , and 
tra n s fe r re d  th e i r  powers to  p o l i t i c i a n s  (prom inent among them C. 
Karamanlis who was ca lled  back frcm abroad), iro n ic a lly  fo r the same 
reasons they had imposed the m ilita ry  coup seven years e a r l ie r :  namely, 
in order to preserve the pow er-position of the army in ta c t . ( 216}
A fter seven years of d ic ta to rsh ip , democratic in s titu t io n s  were once 
again re -e s tab lish ed  in the country. The fac t tha t the junta was not 
overthrown ( e .g . ,  by a popu lar r e v o l t ) ,  but a c tu a lly  tran sfe rred  i t s  
powers to  the  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  l e f t  i t s  im print on the p o s t - d ic ta to r ia l  
regime. The re-emergence of the right-w ing forces under C. Karamanlis, 
with regard to  the d if fe re n t so c ia l, p o l i t ic a l ,  and economic conditions 
p reva iling  a t  th a t time, as well as the changing post-1974 character of 
the modes of p o l i t ic a l  co n tro l, c o n s titu te  the main issues tha t w ill be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND PARLIAMENTARISM:
RECONSTITUTION OF THE CONSERVATIVE CAMP AND 
THE CREATION OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY
1. Introduction
Having stayed more than seven years in  power, the d ic ta to r ia l  regime 
c o lla p s e d  a f t e r  h av in g  s ta g e d  an a b o r t iv e  coup in  C yprus. T his 
deplorable piece of s ta te c ra f t  furnished Turkey with an excuse to  se ize  
much of the island , and confronted the m ilita ry  junta with a painful 
dileirma: they e ith e r  had to  r isk  a fu ll- s c a le  war against Turkey, which 
they were doomed to  loose ( i t  became c le a r  la te r  th a t the Greek armed 
forces had never been in such m iserable and sorrowful d isa rra y ) , ( 1 ’ or 
they had to accept a hum iliating  r e t r e a t  from Cyprus. Since i t  seemed 
that both courses would end in deadlock, they rea lized  they would have 
to c ap itu la te  before the fac ts  and hand over power to  the p o lit ic ia n s . 
The same m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  who had s u p in e ly  a c q u ie s c e d  in  th e  
establishm ent of the jun ta  and then collaborated  with i t ,  returned the 
government to  p o lit ic ia n s  during a m ilita ry  c r i s is  created  by the junta 
regim e.{2}
On 23 Ju ly , the figurehead of the s ta te ,  President of the Republic 
L ieutenant-G eneral Phaedon G h iz ik is , sunctioned the  p o l i t i c ia n s  to  
discuss the tra n s fe r  of power.(3) In view of the fac t th a t the country 
was finding i t s e l f  in serious trouble , he urged them to form a n a tio n a l- 
unity  government, and he a c tu a lly  in s is ted  on them remaining in the 
room u n til  such a government was formed and sworn in. Several hours
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la te r ,  and a f te r  having denounced the army c h ie fs ' b lunt re fu sa l to hand 
over to  c iv il ia n  control a lso  the m in is tr ie s  of Defence, In te r io r , and 
S e c u r i ty /4’ the p o lit ic ia n s  agreed to  form a  government under the jo in t 
leadership  of P. Kanellopoulos and G. Mavros, the rep resen ta tives of the 
two major pre-1967 p o l i t ic a l  p a r tie s  —the ERE (National Radical Union), 
and the EK (Centre Union) resp ec tiv e ly . The meeting adjourned to allow 
th e s e  two men to  n e g o t ia te  th e  fo rm a tio n  of a b road  c o a l i t i o n  
government.
However, one of the  c iv i l ia n  p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  prominent ERE member, 
staunch Karamanlis lieu tenan t and former Foreign M inister E. Averoff- 
T o s i ts a s ,  who en joyed  th e  m i l i t a r y 's  c o n fid e n c e , re tu rn ed  to  the 
conference room where P res id en t G h iz ik is  was s t i l l  ta lk in g  w ith  the 
army ch ie fs and eventually  managed to  persuade him to arrange fo r C. 
Karamanlis' re tu rn  to  head the n a tio n a l-u n ity  governm ent/51 Early next 
morning, on the 24th of Ju ly , Karamanlis a rriv ed  a t  Athens A irport on a 
plane tha t had been placed a t  h is  d isposal by French President Giscard 
d ' Estaign. Thousands of people were there  to  greet him, and i t  took him 
almost an hour to  reach the P re s id e n t's  o f f ic e  where the m ilita ry  and 
the c iv il ia n  leaders were w aiting.
As mentioned in ch. 1, Karamanlis had withdrawn from the p o li t ic a l  
arena as e a r ly  as 1963 and ever s in ce  had re s id ed  s e l f - e x i le d  in  
P a r is .<6) In the eyes of the vast m ajority  of the Greek people he had 
nothing or almost nothing to do with the fac ts  and circumstances th a t, 
a f t e r  th e  J u ly  1965 p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  had le d  to  th e  dem ise and 
d is s o lu tio n  of democracy and the  in p o s itio n  of the m il i ta ry  regime. 
Wei 1-d is ta n c e d  and r e l a t iv e ly  u n su llie d  as he was, he was the most 
q u a lified  of the availab le  p o lit ic ia n s  to answer the unanimous demand 
fo r dem ocratic i n s t i t u t i o n s  and a  d ise n ta n g le m en t from th e  p a s t .  
Moreover, Karamanlis had been the  lead er of the  anti-conm unist Right
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and, with h is  strong  and ch a rism a tic  p e rs o n a li ty  had dominated Greek 
p o l i t ic s  u n til  the early  1960s. For a l l  these reasons, he
" ...a p p e a re d  to  possess th e  id ea l c re d e n tia ls  fo r  being 
e n tru s te d  w ith  the  d e l ic a te  ro le  of t r a n s i t io n  manager, 
and fo r  o v e rse e in g  th e  whole p ro c e ss  o f dem o cra tic  
re s to ra tio n . Acceptable to  the m ilita ry  on account of h is  
p ast anti-com m unist tra c k  rec o rd , he could a lso  command 
the support and confidence of the non-royalist r ig h t” (in  
English o r ig in a lly ) .* 7 *
G enerally  speaking, Karam anlis a f t e r  h is  re tu rn  was given c a r te  
blanche to  cope w ith  the  very  se r io u s  s i tu a t io n  the  ju n ta  had l e f t  
behind. Faced with an imminent war against Turkey on the one hand and, 
on the  o th e r , w ith  the  unanimous popu lar w ill  fo r democrat i s a t  ion, 
de jun ta isa tion  of the s ta te  and the armed forces, and severe punishment 
of the ch ief junta o ff ic e rs , he embarked upon a thorough, slow and w ell- 
balanced procedure aimed, f i r s t  of a l l ,  a t  securing and consolidating 
democracy. His second step  was to  re c o n s titu te  the conservative camp by 
c rea ting  the New Democracy p arty , and to  lead the country to  the most 
genuinely free  and f a i r  parliam entary e lec tio n s  known in Greek h is to ry . 
The present chapter, w ill f i r s t  analyse the steps tha t were taken fo r
m
the  re s to ra t io n  of democracy, and a ttem pt an o u tlin e  of the  o v e ra ll 
f e a tu r e s  of th e  new reg im e. I t  w i l l  th en  p roceed  to  a d e ta i l e d  
examination of the rejuvenation of the conservative camp, and of both 
the creation  and performance of the New Democracy party .
2. The Restoration of Democracy
2.1 The tra n s itio n  period: Formation of a na tional-un ity  government
and f i r s t  steps towards dem ocratisation
E arly in the morning of 24 Ju ly  1974, the  f i r s t  group of the
na tional-un ity  government was sworn in. Under the pressure of both the
97
m ilita ry  ch iefs  and the gathered p o li t ic ia n s ,  C. Karamanlis f i r s t  and 
a lone a t  04:00 a .m ., had a lre ad y  taken h is  oa th  of o f f ic e  as Prime 
M in is te r , w ith  G. Mavros as Deputy Prem ier and Foreign M in is te r . A 
second group being sworn in the next day completed the government which, 
the  prem ier a p a r t ,  comprised e ig h teen  m in is te rs  and f i f te e n  deputy 
m in iste rs . Of these th ir ty - th re e  c iv i l ia n s ,  twelve were ex-ERE members, 
seven came frcm the pre-coup Centre Union party , another twelve were 
p o l i t ic a l ly  n eu tra l te c h n o c ra ts , and f iv e  were newcomers to  p o l i t i c s  
a ltoge ther. Fourteen had already served as m in isters in the p ast, with 
the remaining nineteen en trusted  with m in is te r ia l o ff ic e  for the f i r s t  
tim e.*8* I t  should be pointed out th a t the newly-sworn cabinet consisted  
of prominent p o l i t ic a l  figu res assoc iated  with the post-war Right and 
the Centre-Right years; no C e n tre -le f t, le t  alone Left rep resen ta tives 
were included . The p a r t ic ip a t io n  of some prominent f ig u re s  of the 
lib e ra l Centre, well-known fo r  th e i r  staunch a n t i - d ic t a to r ia l  stance  
(some of them had been ja i l e d  and b r u ta l ly  to r tu re d  by the  ju n ta 's  
secu rity  corps) d id , however, make an appreciable d ifference  to  pre-coup 
p o lit ic a l  r e a l i ty .  As one scholar put i t ,  th is  fac t
" ...w a s  th e  f i r s t  o b liq u e  —and a t  th e  tim e unseen— 
in d ic a t io n  o f K a ram an lis1 d e s ig n  to  b reak  w ith  th e  
r e c a lc i t r a n t  anti-corrm unist r i g h t ,  and to  s t r iv e  fo r  a 
d i f f e r e n t  ba lance in the  new p o l i t i c a l  system, in which 
the cen tre  of g rav ity  would be located more towards the 
centre  than the rig h t"  (in  English o r ig in a lly ) . ( 9>
Operating w ithin a p o l i t ic a l  vacuum, Karamanlis and h is  government 
were faced w ith  a h o st of mounting problem s, concerning both the 
in te rn a tio n a l and the  n a tio n a l a ren a . On the one hand, they had to  
handle the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish re la tio n s  in general, as well 
as to re s to re  the coun try 's  c re d ib il i ty  w ithin the various in te rnational 
o rg an isa tio n s  and te rm in a te  i t s  i s o la t io n .  On the o th e r , they were 
try ing  to embark on a democratic process, to  s a tis fy  the popular demands
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fo r speedy and ru th le ss  punishment of a l l  and everyone who collaborated 
w ith  the  ju n ta , and to  deal w ith  the  s t i l l  untamed m il i ta ry  which, 
although i t  had tran sfe rred  p o l i t ic a l  power, s t i l l  kept i t s  men in key- 
posts and had no in ten tion  to  le t  them be harmed. As regards foreign 
po licy , the government did w ell, i f  only because war with Turkey was 
f in a l ly  averted<10) and procedures leading to  Greece's EEC membership 
(which had been suspended due to  the d ic ta to rsh ip ) and acceptance re ­
ac tiv a ted . I t  was on the domestic fro n t, however, where Karamanlis had 
to  f ig h t hardest to  inpose h is  au th o rity  and re s to re  democracy.
Inmediately a f te r  the na tio n a l-u n ity  government had taken o ff ic e , i t  
issued a se rie s  of decrees aimed a t  liq u id a tin g  the d isastrous p o lic ie s  
o f the  d ic ta to r s h ip . A ll p o l i t i c a l  p r iso n e rs  were re le a se d  and the 
c o n c e n tra t io n  camp on th e  i s la n d  o f Y iaros was c lo se d  down. A ll 
p o l i t i c a l  o ffen ces , except fo r  the  crim es of the  d ic ta to r s h ip ,  were 
amnestied. Freedom of the mass media was res to red , and the procedures 
were s e t  in  motion to  r e s to re  c i t iz e n s h ip  to  persons who had been 
d i s f r a n c h i s e d  by th e  d i c t a t o r s h i p .  A ll h ig h e r  c i v i l  s e rv a n ts ,  
m in is tr ie s ' sec re ta ry -g en era ls , u n iv e rs ity  p ro fe s so rs , and p re fe c tu re  
governors appointed by the junta were dism issed; conversely, a l l  those 
dismissed or otherw ise d isc rim in a ted  a g a in s t by the  ju n ta  because of 
th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  b e lie fs  and a tt i tu d e s  were r e in s ta te d .( 11} In add ition , 
on 1 August 1974, the  1952 c o n s t i tu t io n  was tem porarily  r e in s ta te d ,  
except fo r the clauses re fe rr in g  to  the nature of the p o l i t ic a l  regime 
i t s e l f ;  Karamanlis promised a national referendum in due course fo r the 
p e o p le  to  d e c id e  w h e th e r  o r  n o t G reece  sh o u ld  be a crow ned 
democracy.( 12 * Furthermore, a l l  p o l i t ic a l  p a r tie s  w illing  to  conform to 
the democratic process were recognised, including the Conrminist Party of 
Greece (KKE), which had been outlawed since 1947.( 13 *
According to  C. Woodhouse, ( 14 * K aram anlis' th re e  main o b je c tiv e s  
w ere: to  lead  th e  co u n try  in to  th e  European fam ily , to  s e t  th e
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foundations of a  sound democratic regime, and to prove to the Greeks
tha t they could, a f te r  a l l ,  stand on th e i r  own fe e t. I t  was mainly the
f i r s t  of these ob jec tives th a t the le g a lisa tio n  on the KKE was intended 
to  serve; by th is  measure Karamanlis brought the national schism to  an 
en d , even i f  he d id  n o t a t  th e  same tim e  r e a l i z e  n a t io n a l  
reco n c ilia tio n . This, along with some o th er remnants of pre-coup a n ti­
communist and re a c tio n a ry  l e g i s la t io n ,  was l e f t  to  the  s o c i a l i s t s ,  
almost ten years la te r .  *15}
The most serious and se n s itiv e  issue  the Karamanlis government had 
to  cope w i th ,  how ever, c o n c e rn e d  th e  arm ed f o r c e s .  The whole
democrat i sa t ion process was in jeopardy u n til  the m ilita ry  was tamed,
s tr ip p e d  of a l l  i t s  r e c a lc i t r a n t  j u n t i s t s ,  and put under c iv i l ia n  
command. This was not a t  a l l  easy . S ince the  ju n ta  had not been 
overthrown but had merely tran sfe rred  power, i t  s t i l l  loomed heavily  as 
a p o ten tia l a rb i te r  of the n a tio n a l-u n ity  government's a c tio n s .* 16} The 
la t t e r  had no control whatsoever over the armed forces, and another coup 
was seen as possib ly  inminent —a fea r th a t, as we shall see la te r  in 
th is  chapter, was fu lly  ju s t if ie d .
Well aware of the  u n stab le  s i tu a t io n ,  Karamanlis took pa in s to  
rea ssu re  the  m il i ta ry .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  he chose not to  c lo se  down the 
arm ed-forces ra d io  and te le v is io n  s t a t io n ,  a la s t in g  reminder of the 
in s titu tio n a l autonomy the m ilita ry  had acquired during and a f te r  the 
c iv il  war. Neither did h is  government launch an ou trigh t purge of the 
m ilita ry  o ff ic e rs , but to s ta r t  w ith replaced only the highest echelon 
of i t s  leadership . He met with the l a t t e r 's  d iscontent when he tr ie d  to 
r e in s ta te  some e ig h ty  navy o f f ic e r s  who had been dism issed by the  
d ic ta to rsh ip , and he f in a lly  shored up h is  government's shaky position  
somewhat when he demanded th a t  th e  m i l i t a r y  le a d e rs h ip  shou ld  
immediately remove i t s  ta n k -u n its  from Athens to  the n o rth ea s te rn  
b o rd ers  w ith  T u rk e y .* 17’ A few days a f t e r  t h i s  o rd e r  had been
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su c c e ss fu lly  executed , Karam anlis s tru ck  the m ilita ry  another serious 
blow by r e t i r in g  both the Army and the Armed Forces Chiefs of S ta ff , and 
replacing  them with two more trustw orthy o f f ic e r s . ( 18 *
All during th is  time Karamanlis was under considerable pressure from 
o th e r  ra d ic a l p o l i t i c a l  groups to  purge the armed fo rces of ju n ta  
su p p o rte rs  (a p o h o u n to p iis is ) and to  put the  lead e rs  of the  m il i ta ry  
regim e on t r i a l .  As a lre a d y  m entioned o n ly  th e  topm ost m i l i t a r y  
leadership  was replaced, and i t  should be added tha t the five  top junta 
o f f ic e rs , including d ic ta to r  George Papadopoulos, were l e f t  a t l ib e r ty  
u n til  th e ir  a r re s t  and deportation  to the island  of Kea on 23 October 
1974. The so -called  " inv is ib le"  d ic ta to r  B rigadier Ioannides could not 
be found a t  th a t tim e; he was f in a l ly  a r re s te d  and imprisoned on 14 
January of next y ear. The reason  fo r  th i s  meagre as w ell as b e la te d  
action  was, according to  Karamanlis, th a t
" . . . t h e  qu estio n  of ap o h o u n to p iis is  in  the  armed fo rces 
and o th e r  a re a s  of p u b lic  l i f e  would have to  aw ait a 
government le g itim ise d  th rough  e le c t io n s "  ( in  E n g lish  
o r ig in a lly ) . ‘ 19 >
In view of th is  policy  lin e , no immediate legal action  was taken against 
the  ju n t i s t s  by the  s t a te .  The only crim inal p rosecu tion  proceedings 
tha t were in i t ia te d  p r io r  to  the 1974 e lec tio n  against p ro tagon ists of 
the colonels ' regime were the re s u lt  of a p riv a te  s u i t ,  and d id  not 
involve the government. This was in September 1974, when a p r iv a te  
lawyer sued members of the o r ig in a l  ju n ta  fo r consp iring  against and 
fo rc e fu lly  overthrow ing the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o rder by a m il i ta ry  coup 
against the coun try 's lawful government. The case was not tr ie d  u n til  
alm ost n ine months l a t e r .  In  the  meantime, Karamanlis and h is  newly 
created New Democracy party  had won an unprecedented v ic to ry  as well as 
an overwhelming m ajority  of both the vote and the sea ts  in parliam ent.
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N evertheless, even a f te r  th is  e le c to ra l triurrph, Karamanlis d id  not feel 
strong enough to dispose of the ju n t is ts ;
" i t  was only a f te r  a fo ile d  m ili ta ry  coup in February 1975 
th a t  he was given the  long-aw aited  o p p o rtu n ity  to  move 
d e c is iv e ly  a g a in s t  a d h e re n ts  and sy m p a th ise rs  o f th e  
p re v io u s  reg im e, and to  e l im in a te  a so u rce  o f m ajor 
p o te n t ia l  re s is ta n c e  to  fu r th e r  change w ithout r is k in g  
se rio u s  e rosion  of h is  p o l i t i c a l  support" ( in  E nglish  
o r ig in a lly ) . ( 20}
The t r i a l s ,  which sought to  apportion re sp o n s ib ility  fo r the 1967 
coup, fo r  the  February 1975 fo i le d  coup, and fo r  the  a c tio n s  of the 
major figures in the suppression of the Polytechnic uprising  as well as 
the to rtu re  of p o l i t ic a l  p risoners during the seven-year regime, were 
held through July and August 1975. The sentences ranged from the death 
p e n a l ty  fo r  th e  th re e  le a d e rs  o f th e  p re v io u s  reg im e, to  l i f e  
imprisonment for the major fig u res , and le sse r  p rison  terms fo r o thers. 
The p re v io u s ly  slow pace o f d e a l in g  w ith  th e  a f te rm a th  o f th e  
d ic ta to r s h ip ,  now gave way to  a p o lic y  of sw if t ,  d e c is iv e , but a lso  
contained and circumscribed re tr ib u tio n . In less than six  months a f te r  
the fo iled  February coup, a l l  cases re levan t to the previous regime were 
t r ie d  and c losed  fo r good. Those who had served  as members of the 
v a rio u s c iv i l ia n  puppet-governm ents of the  ju n ta  were not t r ie d  fo r 
com plicity, although some of them did appear as defendants in t r i a l s  
a lleg ing  corruption. The same held tru e  fo r those responsible for the 
Cyprus debacle; on the  grounds th a t  a p u b lic  t r i a l  might harm the 
country’s long-term foreign policy  in te re s ts ,  the case was never brought 
befo re  the  c o u rts . Moreover, Prem ier Karam anlis, w ithout even taking 
time to consult h is  cabinet, immediately decided to commute the junta 
leaders ' death sentences to l i f e  imprisonment. ( 21 * In consequence of a l l  
of the  above th e re  was co n sid erab le  d isc o n te n t w ith the  way the 
government was handling  the s i tu a t io n .  For a l l  th a t ,  given th a t the
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d ic ta to rsh ip  was not ac tu a lly  overthrown but had bequeathed i t s  power to 
the c iv i l ia n s , Karamanlis
" . . .h a d  gone a f a i r  d is ta n c e  in  m eeting the  w idespread 
d esire  fo r a public national purge and fo r the punishment 
of th e  w orst c rim in a ls  of the  d ic ta to rs h ip "  (in  E nglish 
o r ig in a lly ) . 122 *
2.2 The Period of consolidation: Parliam entary e le c tio n s , the referendum 
on the monarchy, and the formation of the June 1975 co n stitu tio n  
Despite —and perhaps because of— the complexity of the s itu a tio n  
th a t  c o n fro n te d  him, in  th e  p r e s s in g  need to  d i f f u s e  a h ig h ly  
threatening  confrontation with Turkey, and to  subordinate an army that 
had fo r seven years ex erc ised  a t ig h t  g r ip  on power, Karamanlis was 
concerned w ith  le g itim is in g  h is  power. C a p i t i l i s in g  on h is  immense 
p res tig e  as the man who stood between democracy and the ta n k s ,( 23} he 
arranged for general e lec tio n s to  be held w ithin four months of h is  
re tu rn  to the country.
Karamanlis had made excellen t use of the carte  blanche he had been 
given to handle the s itu a tio n  in p o s t-d ic ta to r ia l  Greece. Indeed, the 
remarkably smooth and successful tra n s itio n  would have been unthinkable 
w ith o u t h i s  c h a r is m a tic  a u th o r i ty  and consummate s ta te sm a n sh ip . 
N everthe less, every s tep  and measure towards d em o cra tisa tio n , and 
whatever progress might be rea lized  would be in d e fin ite ly  a t stake u n til  
h i s  governm ent, as w ell as th e  new reg im e, was le g i t im is e d  and 
in s titu tio n a lis e d  through national e le c tio n s . Therefore, as early  as 18 
September 1974, the na tional-un ity  government unanimously voted in a new 
e le c to ra l  law (fo r  re in fo rc e d  p ro p o rtio n a l re p re se n ta tio n ) , and on 2 
October i t  decided, again unanimously, th a t the f i r s t  p o st-d ic ta to rsh ip  
parliam entary e lec tions would be held on 17 November 1974. I t  was a lso  
agreed that w ithin 45 days of the e lec tio n s a referendum would follow 
concerning the question of the monarchy. The above decisions taken, the
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n a tiona l-un ity  government resigned, and a caretaker government, again 
under K aram anlis' p rem iersh ip , was sworn in  to  m onitor the e le c to ra l 
procedures.
In  l a t e  Septem ber 1974, K aram anlis announced th a t  he would 
p a rtic ip a te  in the forthcoming parliam entary e lec tio n s as the leader of 
a newly created  party , namely New Democracy (see below in th is  chap ter), 
which was a somewhat more l ib e r a l  v e rs io n  of h is  pre-coup N ational 
Radical Union (ERE). The Centre Union of George Papandreou (who had died 
in 1968, during the d ic ta to rsh ip ) , was now led by the n a tio n a l-u n ity  
government's v ice-p residen t G. Mavros, and contested the e lec tio n s  in 
co-operation with some prominent lib e ra l a n ti- ju n ta  figures under the 
name of C entre Union/New Forces (EK/ND) . More to  the  l e f t  o f the  
p o l it ic a l  spectrum stood the Panhellenic S o c ia lis t  Movement (PASOK), a 
p e rso n a l and , in  term s o f p o l i t i c a l  p e rs o n n e l, o rg a n is a t io n  and 
ideology, com pletely new form ation of G. Papandreou' s son Andreas. 
F in a lly , on the  L eft th e re  was a c o a l i t io n  of th re e  p a r t i e s ,  namely 
those of the pre-coup EDA, the now lega lised  Communist Party of Greece 
(KKE), and the small Communist Party of the In te r io r  (KKE eso terikou ) , 
which had s p l in te re d  o f f  the  l a t t e r  a f t e r  an in tr a -p a r ty  d isp u te  in 
1968. The u ltra -R igh t was represented by the National Democratic Union 
(EDE), which was led  by a renowned j u n t i s t  and h a rb o red  a l l  th e  
re c a lc itra n t elements th a t longed for the sta tu s  quo an te . A ltogether 
then, four major p o l i t i c a l  bodies o r p a r ty -c o a l i t io n s  co n te s ted  the  
e le c tio n s  and, except fo r  the  u ltra -R ig h t EDE, a l l  managed to  gain 
parliam entary rep resen ta tion .
In terms of personal con tests the November 1974 e lec to ra l campaign 
was v i r tu a l ly  s i l e n t .  I t  p r im a rily  focused on the  d e s i r e a b i l i ty  of 
giving a personal mandate to Karamanlis, as the one person tha t could be 
re lie d  on to stand between the preservation  of the country 's newly won 
freedom and the re tu rn  of the m ilita ry . The New Democracy p a rty  made
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much c a p i ta l  of th i s ,  and p ro je c te d  i t s  lead e r as the  only  person 
capable of ensuring the surv ival of democracy in Greece. Furthermore, 
the bloodless and calm tra n s it io n  from d ic ta to rsh ip  to  democracy never
ceased to  be e x a lte d ; what had been su c c e ss fu lly  done between the
c o lla p se  of the  ju n ta  and the  p roclam ation  of e le c tio n s  was noth ing  
short of a " p o litic a l m iracle” . As Karamanlis sa id  in the la s t  n a tio n a l- 
unity  government's cabinet meeting on 2 October 1974:
"D uring th e se  se v en ty  days a  'p o l i t i c a l  m ira c le ' has
happened in Greece —so a t le a s t the foreigners claim, who
have an experience of in te rn a tio n a l l i f e .  Indeed, we gave 
a l l  G reeks t h e i r  freed o m ; we f u l l y  d is m a n tle d  th e  
mechanisms of tyranny; we averted an economic breakdown; 
we res to red  Greece's au th o rity  and p re s tig e  as regards i t s  
foreign re la tio n s ; and f in a l ly , we a re  pa in lessly  leading 
the country towards free  e le c tio n s" . ( 24 *
The 17 November 1974 p a rliam en ta ry  e le c t io n s  took p lace  in  an 
u n p rec ed e n ted ly  o rd e r ly  m anner, and were th e  f r e e s t  and f a i r e s t  
e lec tions ever held in Greece. Their outcome was an overwhelming vote of 
confidence in Karamanlis personally , since he had been pro jected  as the 
sole guarantor of the newly founded democracy. In fa c t, the e lec tio n  was 
more l i k e  a re fe re n d u m  on th e  v e ry  e x i s t e n c e ,  v i a b i l i t y ,  and 
in s t i tu t io n a lis a t io n  of the democratic regime as such. Karamanlis had 
managed to take a  fu ll  advantage of the carte  blanche handled to him and 
he did not try  to  pretend otherw ise. I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t he 
himself looks upon h is  ro le  in re tu rn ing  to Greece in 1974 as th a t of a 
saviour. As he said  in an e le c t ion-speech to  the people of Athens,
"You ca lled  me here on July  24 to  save the country when i t  
was in danger. But i f  you are  not going to  give me the big 
m ajority  that I need in order to  f u l f i l l  my mission, then 
why did you bring me here in the f i r s t  p lace?". ( 25 *
The e le c tio n  r e s u l t s  proved a la n d s lid e  fo r Karamanlis and New 
Democracy. Polling  almost 55 per cent of the vo te, h is  party  secured 220
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of the 300 sea ts  in parliam ent. Table I I . 1 below presents the e le c to ra l 
re s u lts .
Table I I .  1; 17 November 1974 Parliam entary E lection
Registered vo ters: 6,241,066 
Votes Cast : 4,963,558
Abstention ra te :  20.47%
Partv/Coali t  ion number of votes % seats in parliament %
New Democracy 2,669,133 54.37 220 73.33
EK/ND 1,002,559 20.42 60 20.00
PASOK 666,413 13.58 12 04.00
United Left 464,787 09.47 8 02.66
EDE 52,768 01.08 — -----
[Sources: 17 November 1974 Parliam entary E lections R esu lts , M inistry of 
th e  I n t e r i o r ,  G eneral D ire c t io n  o f A d m in is tra tio n , D ire c t io n  o f 
E lections, Section of E lections, Athens 1976, Tables I I I  and IV, pp. 
12-5.]
At f i r s t  glance, i t  seems th a t there  has been a considerable s h if t  
of the e le c to ra te  to the Right, although the opposite might have been 
expected. ( 26> While the overa ll ag e-d is trib u tio n  of the e le c to ra te  was 
about the same, a sm aller percen tage  remembered the anti-com nunism  
canpaign and the years a f te r  the c iv i l  war. Moreover, in te rnal m igration 
fig u re s  fo r the p rev ious ten  years showed th a t as many as a m illio n  
people had swarmed from the countryside in to  urban cen tres. Last but not 
le a s t, i t  must be remembered th a t these were f a i r  and free  e lec tio n s , 
with no pressure exerted whatsoever, no in tim idation from the po lice , 
no rigging of the e lec tio n  r e s u l t s . ( 27 y I f  there was no s h if t  to  the 
L eft, n e ither was there  re a lly  a s h if t  to  the Right.
In our opinion the e lec tio n  re s u lts  re f le c t  the fac t that the Greek 
people, who had not revo lted  against but only passively  re s is te d  the 
d ic ta to rsh ip , would not have wanted a dynamic clash; the vast m ajority
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were very much in favour of a  "change without r i s k ” —and th a t exactly  
is  what Karamanlis sensed and offered . To quote H. Pscmiades,
" . . . t h e  G reek  p e o p le  had  o b v io u s ly  d e s id e d  t h a t  
m oderation, s t a b i l i t y  and o rd e r ly  p ro cess , in s tead  of 
ra p id  change and the  p o ss ib le  p o la r iz a t io n  of so c ie ty , 
were p a r t ic u la r ly  d e s ire a b le  in  th e  d i f f i c u l t  p e rio d  of 
t r a n s i t io n  from d ic ta to r s h ip  to  democracy. Domestic and 
external th rea ts  d id  not permit p o l i t ic a l  experimentation"
(in  English o r ig in a lly ) . {28}
The p le b i s c i t e  on the  issu e  of the  monarchy was scheduled fo r  8 
December 1974, and the p a r t ie s  s ta r te d  th e ir  campaigns on i t  inmediately 
a f te r  the e lec tio n s . Ex-King Constantine was not perm itted to re tu rn  to  
the country to  defend h is  in te re s ts  in person, but he was given time on 
both radio  and te lev is io n  to present h is  arguments; equal time was duly 
a l l o t t e d  to  th e  a d v e r s a r ie s  o f th e  m onarchy. A ll p a r t i e s  o f th e  
o p p o sitio n , except the  u ltra -R ig h t EDE, stood m an ifes tly  against the 
monarchy, while Karamanlis1 New Democracy kept a neutral s ta n c e .( 29 ‘ The 
referendum , l ik e  the  e le c t io n s ,  took p lac e  in  an impeccably o rd e rly  
manner; the re s u lts  a re  presented in Table I I . 2.
Table I I . 2: Results of the 8 December 1974 Referendum on the Monarchy
Registered vo ters : 6,244,539 
Votes Cast : 4,719,787
Abstention ra te  : 24.40%
Vote number of votes %
For the Monarchy 1,445,875 30.80
Against the Monarchy 3,245,111 69.20
[Sources: M acridis R. C ., "E lec tio n s  and P o l i t ic a l  M odernization in 
Greece", in Penniman H. R. ( e d ) , Greece a t  the P o lls : The N ational 
E lections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American E nterprise 
In s t i tu te  fo r Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 15.]
The overwhelming m a jo rity  of alm ost 70 per cent fo r an uncrowned 
democracy could be taken to  s e t t l e  the c o n stitu tio n a l issue once and for
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a l l .  I t  was the s ix th  such referendum held in the country (the o thers 
had taken place in 1920, 1924, 1935, 1946 and 1973),<30) but i t  was the 
most f a i r ly  conducted, and the only one in which the m ilita ry  was not 
d i r e c t ly  involved. W ithin ten  days a f t e r  the  p le b is c i te ,  the  f i r s t  
temporary P resid en t of the  Republic (a New Democracy MP, and the  
personal choice of Karamanlis) was e le c te d  by a m ajo rity  of the  New 
Democracy party .
I t  should be noted h ere  th a t  K aram anlis1 handling  of the  is su e , 
—that is ,  the adoption of a neu tra l stance as fa r  as he himself and h is  
p a r ty  w ere c o n c e rn e d —  was d e s ig n e d  to  e n s u re  th e  perm anen t 
in s t itu tio n a lis a t io n  of the e le c to ra te 's  decision , whatever tha t might 
be. In the fu tu re , nobody would be able to bring  up the co n stitu tio n a l 
issue again on the grounds th a t the 1974 referendum on i t  had been se t 
up w ith a p a r ty - p o l i t ic a l  b ia s ,  ju s t  l ik e  the  e a r l i e r  referendum s. 
Moreover, th is  time the issue of the monarchy was resolved d ire c tly  by 
the people themselves, and not by some ephemeral parliam entary m ajority 
v o te . Aside from c lo s in g  the  issu e  once and fo r a l l ,  K aram anlis1 
d ec is io n  fo r h is  p a rty  to  remain n e u tra l in  the  m a tte r , although i t  
comprised many p ro -ro y a lis ts  in i t s  ranks (as we shall try  to document 
in the next c h a p te r) , a ls o , of cou rse , helped to  prevent a p o ss ib le  
s p l i t  w ithin New Democracy.
Having la id  the foundations of a parliam entary republic, and with 
the co n stitu tio n a l question resolved in favour of a democracy headed by 
a president ra th e r than a king, Karamanlis now moved decisively  towards 
th e  t h i r d  s te p  o f th e  r e g im e 's  c o n s o l id a t io n :  t h a t  o f a new
co n stitu tio n . This was a concern he had had in mind ever since 1962 and
one which, among other th ings, had led to  h is  c lash  with the Crown. As
he himself formulated in many speeches:
" I t  i s  to d ay , more than  e v e r , a m a tte r  o f n a tio n a l 
n e c e ss ity , —and I do want to  emphasise th a t— for the
country  to  o b ta in  a Greek c o n s t i t u t io n .  T his means a
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co n stitu tio n  which, without copying foreign p a tte rn s , w ill 
c o r r e s p o n d  to  o u r  c o u n t r y 's  s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e s ,  a 
co n stitu tio n  th a t w ill be tru ly  democratic, and which a t  
the same time w ill allow the government to ac t sw iftly  and 
e ffe c tiv e ly . In o ther words, Greece needs a co n stitu tio n  
proper to  a p a rliam en ta ry  democracy, and one which w ill  
re in fo rce  the Executive without a t  the same time lim iting  
the l a t t e r ’s re sp o n s ib ility  v is -a -v is  the parliam ent".* 31 *
The enhancement of execu tive  power was b e liev ed  by Karamanlis to  be 
absolu tely  e ssen tia l to prevent the kind of breakdown in parliam entary 
government tha t had occurred in the 1960s and ushered in the co lonels ' 
coup.
The e laboration  of and voting fo r the new co n stitu tio n  was the work 
e x c lu s iv e ly  o f th e  New Dem ocracy p a r t y .  W ith i t s  s p e c ta c u la r  
parliam en tary  m a jo rity , the  ru l in g  p a r ty  allowed the  o p p o sitio n  no 
q u a r te r ,  and t h i s ,  caused  th e  f i r s t  s e r io u s  sq u ab b les  in s id e  
parliam en t. F u rtherm ore , th e  broad  powers v e s te d  by th e  proposed  
c o n s t i tu t io n  in  th e  p r e s id e n t  ( in c lu d in g  th e  r i g h t  to  d is s o lv e  
parliam ent i f  he f e l t  i t  no longer r e f le c te d  the  tru e  mood of the 
people) constitu ted  a major area of d ispu te  and brought the accusation 
th a t the prime m in is te r  was try in g  to  t a i l o r  the  c o n s t i tu t io n  fo r 
h im self. Karamanlis r e p lie d  th a t  he considered  such powers congruent 
with "Greek re a lity "  —an e l l ip t i c a l  reference to past troubles*32 *— 
and conducive to ensuring the s ta b i l i ty  and smooth operation of the new 
p o l i t i c a l  sy s tem .‘ 33} F in a lly , and no tw ith stand ing  the  o p p o s itio n 's  
o b je c tio n s , the new c o n s t i tu t io n  was voted  in  by ND's pa rliam en ta ry  
m ajority on 7 June 1975.
The e le c tio n  of the  P res id en t of the Republic was immediately 
scheduled for 19 June 1975. The p a r tie s  represented in parliam ent did 
not manage to reach unanimous agreement concerning the candidate for the 
o ffice . F ina lly , one day before the p re s id en tia l e lec tio n , Karamanlis 
announced h is  personal choice to h is  parliam entary group, namely tha t
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the party  should vote fo r i t s  MP Constantine Tsatsos; next day the ND's 
parliam entary m ajority  duly e lec ted  the l a t t e r  to  the presidency.
We have already seen how, a f te r  the f a l l  of the d ic ta to rsh ip  and in 
a re la tiv e ly  short period of time, the country entered a  new period of 
dem ocratic government. What remained to  be seen was, of cou rse , the  
smooth and unimpeded fu n c t io n in g  o f th e  reg im e ’s i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
C on tinu ity  and change, w ith in  the  l im its  and by the  ru le s  of the  
c o n s t i tu t io n  and dem ocracy, would c o n s t i t u t e  th e  b a s ic  f a c to r s  
determining the san ity  and w elfare of the regime. In overall terms, only 
time could be the u ltim ate  judge of the consolidation of democracy in 
Greece.
Today, in 1993, we can say th a t ,  ever s in ce  1974 Greece has been 
enjoying a democratic regime such as never before functioned in so free  
and o rd e r ly  a m anner. P o l i t i c a l  and c i v i l  r i g h t s  a re  a b s o lu te ly  
guaranteed and protected? the army has gradually  passed in to  c iv il ia n  
control ? freedom of the p ress , of opinion, of the trade unions is  duly 
respected? e lec tions are  f a i r ,  and a l l  p a rtie s  a re  free  to  e x is t in the 
open, to  canvass support and to  f ig h t fo r power? and, most im portantly, 
a f te r  seven years in o ff ic e , New Democracy duly stepped down when PASOK 
won the 1981 e lec tio n s . I t  was the f i r s t  time in the coun try 's h is to ry  
th a t p o l i t i c a l  power was handed from a co n serv a tiv e  government to  a 
so c ia lis t-m arx is t party  (as PASOK described i t s e l f ) ,  and th is  gave the 
f in a l  stamp to  the  le g itim a tio n  and co n so lid a tio n  of G reece 's  p o s t­
d ic ta to rsh ip  regim e.*34 *
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3. The R econstitu tion of the Conservative Camp: The Creation of the
New Democracy Party
As s ta te d  above, the  ERE p a rty  had not been d isso lv ed  du ring  the  
seven-year m il i ta ry  d ic ta to r s h ip .  A ll du ring  th a t p e rio d  i t  simply 
rem ained q u ie s c e n t ,  and on 24 J u ly  1974, th e  eve of c o lo n e ls ’ 
a b d ic a tio n , i t  form ally  s t i l l  e x is te d , under the  lead e rsh ip  of P. 
Kanellopoulos. When Karamanlis f i r s t  returned to  the country, he was so 
to ta l ly  taken up by h is  work fo r the tra n s it io n  to  and consolidation of 
democracy, he was hardly concerned with h is  old party . All of a  sudden 
on 28 September, and without reference to  K anellopoulos,*35 * Karamanlis 
s e t  up a new, c a tc h -a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty , which he a p tly  named Nea 
Dimokratia (ND). In  h is  p roclam ation  on the foundation of the  New 
Democracy p o li t ic a l  fro n t, Karamanlis presented i t s  p o l i t ic a l  id en tity  
and gave an o u tl in e  of the id eo lo g ica l param eters of what, as he 
i n s i s t e d ,  was n o t a mere p a r ty  b u t "a b road  and v i t a l  p o l i t i c a l  
f ro n t" . ( 3 6}
A fte r a b r ie f  in tro d u c tio n  e x a ltin g  the  v ir tu e s  of democracy, he 
goes on to  argue th a t democracy has not functioned smoothly in Greece 
" . . .d u e  to  the fa c t th a t the  p reco n d itio n s  fo r  i t s  e x is te n ce  were 
missing or could not be c rea ted " . *37 1 Claiming th a t "What has happened 
in Greece with the help of the people over the past two months tru ly  
borders on a p o l i t ic a l  m iracle",*38’ for i t  had been achieved p a in less ly  
w ithout the bloodshed and in te rn e c in e  s t r i f e  th a t might have been 
expected, he a s s e r ts  th a t the  r e s o lu tio n  of the problem of Greek 
democracy in a secure and permanent fashion, as well as i t s  p ro tec tion  
from both communism and fascism , through the  c re a tio n  of powerful 
p o lit ic a l  formations, con stitu ted  a strong national ob jec tive , in view 
of which he c o n s id e re d  i t  h i s  du ty  to  c r e a te  "a broad and v i t a l  
p o lit ic a l  f ro n t" .* 39>
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The Nea Dimokratia fron t was to  be composed of not only experienced 
and sound, but a lso  p ro g ress iv e  and ra d ic a l p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s . ND 
i d e n t i f i e d  th e  n a tio n  w ith  th e  p e o p le , th e  m otherland  w ith  i t s  
in h ab itan ts , the s t a te  w ith  i t s  c i t i z e n s ,  n a tio n a l independence w ith  
popular sovereignty, progress with the cannon good, p o l i t ic a l  freedom 
with the ru le  of law and socia l ju s tic e . I t  was dedicated to  serving the 
"true" in te re s ts  of the nation , which could not be categorised in terms 
of " . . . t h e  m isleading labels of Right, Centre and L eft" .* 40’ While i t s  
o b je c tiv e  was rap id  economic development, ND d id  not consider i t s  
carnnitment to  economic freedom to  be incompatible with an expanded s ta te  
sec to r. Moreover, " .. .in d iv id u a l in i t ia t iv e  cannot be ju s t if ie d  without 
the  p a r a l le l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of th e  b ro ad e r p o p u la r c la s s e s  in  th e  
d is tr ib u tio n  of the national p roduct".*41’ ND would invest heavily  in 
educa tion , t r a in in g  and s c i e n t i f i c  re se a rc h , and seek to  a ssu re  the  
independence of Greece through the m odernisation of her armed forces. In 
o rd e r  to  sa fe g u a rd  p o p u la r  s o v e re ig n ty , i t  would aim " . . . a t  th e  
harmonisation of the governmental system with the conditions of Greek 
r e a l i ty " .* 42’
What is  most s tr ik in g  in th is  proclamation a t f i r s t  glance is  the 
fac t tha t ND is  nowhere ca lled  a p o l i t ic a l  party . On the contrary , six  
tim es i t  is  c a l le d  "a p o l i t i c a l  f ro n t" ,  once "a movement", once a 
"concept" and once "a system ". Adhering to  th is  l in e ,  Karamanlis 
continued to  r e f e r  to  h is  p a rty  as e i th e r  "a p o l i t i c a l  fo rce" o r "a 
national f ro n t" .* 43’ Since, there fo re , New Democracy was never ca lled  a 
party  in the f i r s t  p lace, nobody took the trouble to c la r ify  whether i t s  
platform  was conservative, l ib e ra l ,  Right or Centre. Karamanlis himself 
c a lled  i t  an uncommitted, national fron t beyond "the misleading labels 
of Right, Centre or L eft", which would face the country 's problems by 
using as i t s  only c r i te r io n  the n a tio n 's  and the people 's in te re s ts .* 44’
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Furthermore, special emphasis was given to  the fac t th a t ND was a 
new p o li t ic a l  formation and not the old ERE under another name. *451 As 
i t  became c lea r la te r ,  when the pa rty  put up i t s  e lec to ra l l i s t s  fo r the 
forthcom ing e le c t io n  of November 1974, the  core of ND in terms of 
p o l i t i c a l  p e rso n n e l came d i s t i n c t l y  from th e  o ld  ERE. M oreover, 
prominent Karamanlis lieu ten an ts , lik e  P. Kanellopoulos, openly resented 
th is  "change of name" as they  saw i t , <46) and so c o n tr ib u te d  to  the 
fu rth e r obscuring of the p a r ty 's  rea l id en tity . O verall, though, one 
should bear in mind th a t a t  the  tim e, the im portant q uestion  fo r  
everybody was the safeguarding of the newly resto red  democracy and, in 
th is  sense , ND " . . .w a s , a t  le a s t  in i t s  in cep tio n , a r e p l ic a  of the  
Union for the New Republic founded by Charles de Gaulle when he returned 
to  French p o l i t ic s  in 1958".( 47>
We sh a ll  concern o u rse lv es in much d e ta i l  w ith ND’s p a r t ic u la r  
c h a ra c te r is tic s  in the following th ree  chapters. Suffice i t  to  mention 
a t th is  point th a t, a f te r  h is  re tu rn , Karamanlis managed to  rec o n s titu te  
th e  c o n s e rv a tiv e  camp by g a th e r in g  most o f h i s  c o lle a g u e s  and 
lieu tenan ts of the pre-coup ERE, together with a considerable number of 
new p o lit ic a l  forces of the Right as well as of the Centre. Unlike the 
PASOK movement of Andreas Papandreou, ND did not include in i t s  ranks 
ind iv idua l p o l i t i c a l  f ig u re s  o r fo rces  th a t had openly r e s i s te d  the 
m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip , whereas such elem ents c o n s titu te d  the  core of 
PASOK alongside  some prom inent p o l i t i c ia n s  of the  pre-coup Centre 
Union.( 48 ’
As we sh a ll  t ry  to  document in  the  follow ing ch ap te rs , the New 
Democracy party  was from i t s  very inception a personal c rea tion  of C. 
Karamanlis, and so mirrored to  a considerable extent the c h a ra c te r is tic s  
of i t s  leader —a t le a s t  u n t i l  1980, when the l a t t e r  was e le c te d  
President of the Republic. N evertheless, i t  would be a great mistake to 
conclude th a t for the above reasons, ND was nothing more than the pre­
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coup ERE under a new name,149 * i f  only because Karamanlis himself by 
1974 was a  very d if fe re n t man from h is  1955-1963 s e lf .  As one of h is  
biographers w r i te s : ( 50}
"While in  e x i le ,  he had so ftened  and he had conceived a 
new v is io n  fo r  G reece 's  p o s i t io n  w ith in  the w orld. He 
admitted th a t he had become more to le ra n t, mainly though 
because circumstances had changed in the meantime".
Indeed, circumstances had changed dram atically . For one th ing, King 
and Court had ceased to  e x is t ,  and no longer constitu ted  a separate and 
unchecked d e c i s io n - c e n t r e ;  th e  armed fo rc e s  had been purged to  a 
co n sid erab le  e x te n t  o f t h e i r  most r e c a l c i t r a n t  e lem en ts and were 
confined to  barracks; carmunism was no longer viewed as a th rea t to the 
n a tio n  bu t on ly  to  dem ocracy, and th e  Communist P a r ty  cou ld  now 
peacefully  e x is t and act w ithin the lim its  of a democratic regime? and 
i t  was p rec ise ly  th is  democratic regime which, above anything e lse , had 
to  be p ro tec ted , and a l l  the psychoses and schisms that in the past had 
u ltim ately  undermined democracy must never be allowed to  happen again. A 
renew al and m o d e rn isa tio n  o f th e  c o u n tr y 's  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  was, 
therefore , imperative, and a reappearance of the old ERE would by no 
means have been ab le  to  serve th is  end. The new ND appealed to  the 
forces tha t had tra d itio n a lly  supported the Right, but they saw i t  to 
be, ju s t lik e  i t s  founder, a renewed, reform ist Right. F ina lly , even i f  
ND was simply ERE under a new name —which i t  was not, as we sha ll try  
to show below— the fac t th a t i t s  founder opted for tha t name and not 
fo r  a r e n a is s a n c e  o f ERE, by i t s e l f  c o n tr ib u te d  to  a f u r th e r  
s ta b il is a tio n  and in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n  of the new regime, and must be 
lis te d  among a l l  the o ther fac ts  and deeds which aimed a t and f in a lly  
led to the consolidation of democracy in Greece.
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4. C onclusion
A fter seven years of d ic ta to r ia l  ru le , the m ilita ry  regime collapsed 
and tran sfe rred  i t s  power to  the p o lit ic ia n s , mainly due to  the Cyprus 
debacle. Karananlis, having lived  fo r eleven consecutive years in s e l f ­
inposed e x ile  in P a ris , returned to the country and undertook the two­
fo ld  task of, on the one hand, to  re s to re  democracy and found the new 
regime on a more s ta b le , sound, and permanent base and, on the o ther, to 
rec o n s titu te  the conservative camp by c rea tin g  a new p o li t ic a l  formation 
which would have no re la tio n  with the pre-coup p o li t ic a l  p a r t ie s  and so 
play a d iffe re n t ro le  w ithin the new regime, congruent with the popular 
a sp ira tions and needs p reva iling  a t the time.
In try ing  to  cope successfu lly  with h is  f i r s t  ob jec tive , he embarked 
upon a c a u tio u s  and m oderate  p ro c e s s .  Having managed to  a v e r t  a 
d isastrous war against Turkey, he moved with slow d e lib era tio n  towards 
dejun taisa tion  in both the m ilita ry  and the c iv il ia n  sec to rs. Between 
the Scylla of the re c a lc itra n t  ju n tis ts  and th e ir  sympathisers who hoped 
to  su rv ive  in ta c t  w ith in  the  new regim e, and the Charybdis of the  
rad ical groups who c ried  fo r m erciless and ou trigh t punishment, i f  not 
revenge, of a l l  and everyone who had collaborated  with the d ic ta to rsh ip , 
he opted for a middle course.
In o rder to  in v es t the  regime w ith  leg itim acy  and to  co n so lid a te  
democracy, he decided to  hold  n a tio n a l e le c tio n s  w ith in  four months 
a f te r  h is  re tu rn . For tha t purpose and without consultation  with any of 
h is  lie u te n a n ts  he founded a new p o l i t i c a l  p a rty  which he named Nea 
Dimokratia (New Democracy), and ran for o ff ic e . Since the re tu rn  of the 
country to democratic ru le  had been id en tif ie d  with Karamanlis, —given 
that the Greek people had only passively  re s is te d  the d ic ta to rsh ip , not 
overthrown i t  in favour of something d if fe re n t— the e lec tions v ir tu a lly  
turned in to  a referendum fo r the l a t t e r ;  h is  newly formed New Democracy 
party  won a landslide v ic to ry , and an absolute  m ajority  of almost 55 per
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cent of the vote. The e le c to ra te  had c le a r ly  opted for the safeguarding 
of democracy ra th e r  than fo r p o l i t ic a l  experimentation in any form.
W ithin twenty days a f t e r  h is  e le c to r a l  trium ph, he o rgan ised  the  
referendum on the monarchy question in a peaceful and orderly  manner. He 
himself kept a neu tra l stance and in stru c ted  h is  party  to  do the same. 
In th is  way he both d e p o litic ised  the m atter and managed to  hold h is  
newly-created party  together. A fter the people had overwhelmingly voted 
fo r  a re p u b lic , he formed a new c o n s t i tu t io n  which, a f t e r  a p a r t i a l  
reform  made by the  s o c i a l i s t s  in  1986, has remained in  e f f e c t  u n t i l  
today. F ina lly , in la te  August 1975, and a f te r  the ju n ta 's  court t r i a l s  
were f in a lly  concluded, he was ab le  to  devote himself to  solving the 
country 's o ther problems.
Karamanlis ignored h is  old party , the ERE, a lto g e th er, both because 
the la t t e r  had been worn out in the p o l i t ic a l  turbulence of the years 
1964-67, and because h is  aims and v isions fo r p o s t-d ic ta to r ia l  Greece 
had now changed. In  the  open and f u l ly  com petitive  p o l i t i c a l  system 
inaugurated in 1974 there was no place fo r remnants of the p a s t. So he 
created New Democracy, rec ru itin g  h is  p o l i t ic a l  personnel not only from 
among the old , p ro -ro y a lis t ERE cadres, but a lso  among forces of the 
Centre and the Centre-Right, as well as bringing in many newcomers.
New Democracy remained in  o f f ic e  u n t i l  1981, when i t  lo s t  the  
e lections and became the o f f ic ia l  opposition party  for eight consecutive 
years; in 1990, a f te r  th ree  e le c to ra l f ig h ts , i t  managed to re tu rn  to 
power. The n a tu re  of the  p a r ty  and i t s  p o s it io n  in the  Greek p a rty  
system are  among the basic questions to  be explored below, as well as 
i t s  e v o lu tio n  and p e rfo rm ance , b o th  w h ile  in government and in  
opposition, u n til  i t  resumed o ff ic e  in 1990. In the following chapter we 
shall examine the p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  personnel; in chapter 4, we sha ll 
turn our a tte n tio n  to i t s  o rganisation  and leadership; and in chapter 5 
we sh a ll focus our a n a ly s is  on the p a r ty 's  ideology, s t r a te g y , and 
ta c tic s .
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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL PERSONNEL
1. Introduction
We sha ll now embark upon a d e ta iled  examination of the New Democracy 
party  that w ill , among o ther th ings, compare i t  with both the pre-1967 
ERE as well as the other post-1974 p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s . To begin w ith, the 
analysis w ill focus on the p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  personnel ra th e r than on 
i t s  ideology o r o rg a n isa tio n  s in c e , as a lread y  mentioned, i t  was 
Karamanlis himself who made the decision to ignore h is  old party  and opt 
fo r c rea ting  an e n tire ly  new one, as he claimed New Democracy to be. 
Indeed, in th ese  tu rb u le n t years o f m e ta p o ltte fs i  ( t r a n s i t io n  from 
d ic ta to r s h ip  to  democracy) th e re  was very  l i t t l e  room fo r any re a l 
organisation or new ideology to  develop —the coimunist p a r tie s  aside, 
and to a lesse r extent a lso  PASOK, which two may be considered the only 
organised p o li t ic a l  formations a t the time.
F i r s t  of a l l ,  we sh a ll  t r y  to  see whether th e re  was a renewal of 
p o l i t ic a l  personnel o r, in o ther words, whether New Democracy re a lly  did 
co n s titu te  a new p o lit ic a l  formation or was simply a revamping of the 
National Radical Union, and i f  so, to  what ex ten t. Secondly, we shall 
examine the  New Democracy p e rso n n e l in  term s of p o l i t i c a l  and 
occupational background, in o rd er to  id e n tify  what social forces the 
p a rty  rep resen ted . T h ird ly , we sh a ll p resen t the a t t i tu d e s  of the 
p a r ty 's  leading members, and how they themselves regarded the party  they 
belonged to . To give the approach a wider perspective we shall b r ie f ly  
p resen t the o th e r p a r t i e s ' c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  w ith regard  to  the  above
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issues, so rounding o ff the analysis  of New Democracy in re la tio n  to the 
p o s t-d ic ta to r ia l Greek party  system.
The in v e s t ig a t io n  as  o u t l in e d  above i s  based  m ain ly  on ND's 
parliam entary group, because only in th is  way is  i t  possib le  to make 
v a lid  comparisons with ERE. (As mentioned in ch. 1, ERE never se t up 
organs such as a c e n tra l  o r departm ental com m ittees, a lthough  i t s  
s ta tu te s  d e fin ite ly  provided fo r such adm in istrative  bodies). However, 
ND's c e n tra l and departm ental committees have a lso  been examined, 
e sp e c ia lly  in comparison w ith  PASOK's re sp e c tiv e  organs, in order to 
ind icate  the p a r ty 's  position  in the newly anerged Greek party  system 
generally . F ina lly , we shall b r ie f ly  presen t, among o ther fea tu res , the 
a tt i tu d e s  as well as the p o l i t ic a l  and occupational background of rank- 
a n d - f i le  p a rty  members in th e  Department of L a ris sa . (This issu e  is  
trea ted  a t g rea ter length in ch. 6.)
The New Democracy party  having been created  on 4 October 1974, the 
analysis spans a period of more than f if te e n  years. During th is  time the 
party  was in government for seven years, occupied the main opposition 
benches fo r ano ther e ig h t , and s in ce  A pril 1990 has been in o f f ic e  
again. While covering the e n tire  period, we sha ll not omit to  take in to  
account the various changes th a t have occurred in the course of i t ,  as 
well as th e ir  impact and influence on the p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  id en tity .
2. The Parliamentary Group
2.1 P o litic a l background
The s e v e n -y e a r  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r l u d e  had d is s o lv e d  d em o cra tic  
in s titu tio n s  a ltogether and brought the coun try 's  p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  to an 
abrupt end. Even so, fo r the  November 1974 e le c tio n  the  c o n te s tin g  
p a r t i e s  d id  no t emerge ou t o f a p o l i t i c a l  vacuum, b u t had been
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reco n stitu ted  from both pre-coup social elements as well as new forces, 
which had e ith e r  ac tiv e ly  re s is te d  the colonels (as was espec ia lly  the 
c a se  of f u tu re  PASOK members) o r  become p o l i t i c i s e d  d u rin g  th e  
d ic ta to rsh ip . When C. Karamanlis created  New Democracy he in s is ted  from 
the very beginning tha t i t  was a new party , ccnpletely  d issoc ia ted  from 
ERE and i t s  p a s t p ra c t ic e s ,  and th a t  i t  was to  p lay  a d i s t in c t iv e ly  
d iffe re n t ro le  w ithin the newly formed p o l i t ic a l  se ttin g  of the country.
New Democracy c o n te s te d  t h i s  f i r s t  n a tio n a l  e le c tio n  w ith 300 
candidates for the 300-seat parliam ent. Table I I I . l  below presents the 
p o l i t ic a l  background of the p a r ty 's  candidates.
Table I I I . l :  ND Candidates' P o li t ic a l  Background 
fo r the 17 Nov. 1974 E lection
Pre-coup p o li t ic a l  a f f i l ia t io n number %
ERE 100 33.33
Right-wing p a rtie s 2 .67
Centre p a rtie s 12 04.00
Independent 3 01.00
Newcomers 183 61.00
Total 300 100.00
[Sources: 17 November 1974 E lection R esu lts , M inistry of the In te r io r , 
Dept of E lections, Athens 1976, pp. 17-41 and 633-40; a lso  Oi 300 t i s  
Voulis ton E llinon , Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 2nd Edition, 1976, 
(my computations).]
As the above ta b le  shows q u ite  s t r ik in g ly ,  183 out of the 300 
c a n d id a te s  o f th e  p a r ty ,  th a t  i s  61 p e r c e n t , were s ta n d in g  fo r  
e lec tio n s for the f i r s t  time. Another 100, or one-th ird  of the p a r ty 's  
c a n d id a te s , were v e te ra n s  o f p re -co u p  ERE e le c t io n s ,  and 17 had 
previously been members of o ther p a rtie s .*  L) Consequently, i t  does seen 
tha t the data presented above corroborate the claim that New Democracy, 
in terms of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  personnel, had l i t t l e  re la tio n  to ERE, since 
fa r  more than h a lf  of i t s  candidates were new to p o l i t ic s . Nevertheless,
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th is  is  not a ltoge ther true . Suffice i t  to  mention here th a t 38 out of 
those 183 newcomers were close re la tiv e s  of more or less renowned pre­
coup p o lit ic ia n s  (most of then a f f i l ia te d  with ERE), who had inherited  
th e ir  predecessors1 e lec to ra l c l i e n te le ,121 and most of them managed to  
get e lected  (as we sha ll see below, when examining the composition of 
the p a r ty 's  parliam entary group). To obtain  a more complete p ic tu re  of 
the  New Democracy c an d id a tes , we should r e c a l l  how the ERE had been 
c re a te d  in i t s  day and the  p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  of i t s  can d id a tes . 
Table I I I . 2 below, where d a ta  concerning ERE and ND a re  compiled 
respec tive ly  from Table 1.2 in ch. 1 and from Table I I I . l  above, shows 
the d ifferences qu ite  c lea rly .
Table I I I . 2; ERE-1956 and ND-1974 Candidates' P o lit ic a l Background
National Radical Union-1956 New Democracy-1974
Cand. ool. a f f i l . number % Cand. nol. a f f i l . number %
Greek Rally 189 63.21 ERE 100 33.33
Other 63 21.08 Other 17 05.67
Newcomers 47 15.71 Newcomers 183 61.00
Total 299 100.00 Total 300 100.00
As we can see, whereas ERE depended h eav ily  upon i t s  p re d e c e sso r 's  
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  such c a n d id a te s  c o n s t i tu te d  on ly  o n e - th i r d  o f New 
Democracy's l i s t .  On the  o th e r hand, only 15.71 per cent of ERE's 
p o l i t ic ia n s  were com pletely new to  p o l i t i c s ,  w hile for New Democracy 
they amounted to  a spectacular 61 per cent.
The com position of New Democracy's pa rliam en tary  group shows a 
sim ilar p ic tu re , as given in Table I I I . 3. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the party  won an unprecedented m ajority  in the November 1974 
e lec tion  and 220 of i t s  candidates were e le c te d .* 3) The data presented 
in  Table I I I . 3 in d ic a te  th a t  th e  c o n s e rv a tiv e  p a r ty  underw ent 
considerable renewal. Although the newcomers are underrepresented in
120
T able I I I . 3; ND MPs1 P o l i t i c a l  Background a f t e r
the 17 Nov. 1974 E lection
MPs' previous party  a f f i l ia t io n number %
ERE 84 38.89
Other* * * 12 05.55
Newcomers 120 55.56
Total 216 100.00
Pre-coup p o lit ic ia n s 96 44.44
Note (a): Eight had been a f f i l ia te d  with the pre-coup Centre Union, two 
had run independently in the 1964 e lec tio n , and one each came 
from the Party of Progressive People and from EPEK (National 
Progressive Centre Union, 1952).
[Sources: 17 Nov. 1974 E lection R esu lts , M inistry of the In te r io r , Dept 
of E lections, Athens 1976, pp. 17-41, 605-30 and 633-40; a lso  Oi 300 t i s  
Voulis ton E llinon , Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 2nd E dition, 1976, 
(my ccmputat ions).]
parliam ent —compared to  th e ir  percentage on the l i s t  of candidates— 
they s t i l l  make up 55.56 pe r c e n t, th a t  i s ,  more than h a lf  of the  
p a r ty 's  parliam entary group. Ju s t as fo r the candidates (see footnote 
2 ), th is  is  again  only p a r t ly  tru e . The v a s t m ajo rity  of those who 
contested the e lec tio n s as the h e irs  of an e lec to ra l c lie n te le  managed 
to get e lected , whereas a r e la tiv e ly  sm aller percentage of those who 
were newcomers a ltoge ther succeeded in securing a seat in parliam ent. ‘ 4 > 
On the other hand, while MPs who had in the past been a f f i l ia te d  with 
ERE were s lig h tly  overrepresented, overa ll and for the f i r s t  time in the 
camp's h is to ry , they co n stitu ted  a m in o rity .(5) Furthermore, there is  a 
re la tiv e ly  high re p re se n ta tio n  (44.44 per cen t) of p o l i t ic ia n s  whose 
careers had s ta r te d  before the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip .
Nevertheless, there  can be no denying tha t a considerable renewal of 
the p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  personnel did take p la c e .(6) I t  is  in te re s tin g  to 
see the extent of th is  renewal in re la tio n  to the other major p a rtie s  
tha t contested the 1974 e lec tio n s . Table I I I . 4 shows how many times New 
Democracy, EK/ND and PASOK MPs were e lected  to parliam ent; the sample is
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Table I I I . 4: Renewal in New Democracy and EK/ND in 1974 
and PASOK in 1977
New Democracy EK/ND PASOK 1977
Times e lected number % number % number %
F irs t 137 63.43 35 57.38 75 79.79
Second-fourth 37 17.13 16 26.23 18 19.15
F ifth -e leven th 42 19.44 10 16.39 1 01.06
Total 216 100.00 61 100.00 94 100.00
[Sources: For ND and EK/ND, Qi 300 t i s  V oulis ton E ll in o n , Athens: 
K athim erini P u b lic a tio n s , 2nd E d itio n , 1976; fo r PASOK, Oi 300 t i s  
V o u lis  ton  E l l in o n , A thens: K a th im erin i P u b l ic a t io n s ,  1978 (my 
com putations).]
taken from the parliam entary personnel of 1974 for ND and EK/ND, and 
tha t of 1977 for PASOK, since the 15 deputies of the l a t t e r  tha t were 
e lected  in 1974 are  too few fo r re l ia b le  conclusions. ND’s percentage of 
deputies e lec ted  for the f i r s t  time is  the highest ever achieved by a 
party  of the Right, and the highest of any of the major 1974 p a r tie s .
Although over h a lf of a l l  three p a r t ie s ' parliam entary personnel was 
beeing renewed, PASOK's percentage (in 1977) is  the highest with 
79.79, compared to 63.43 and 57.38 fo r ND and EK/ND respec tive ly . On the 
other hand, almost o n e -f if th  of ND MPs had been elected  over five  tim es, 
which means they s ta r te d  th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c a re e r  before  1960 (some of 
them had been e lected  MPs fo r as many as eleven times —th a t is ,  they 
continued in parliam ent without a break from 1935 onwards), whereas a 
considerable p art of EK/ND parliam entary group came s tra ig h t from the 
Centre Union of the early  1960s.<7>
Before we proceed to examine the ND parliam entary group as i t  has 
appeared in a l l  e lec tions a f te r  1974, we present a fina l comparison in 
terms of age, which i l lu s t r a te s  from a d iffe re n t perspective the renewal 
achieved in the p a r ty 's  parliam en ta ry  personnel in 1974. Table I I I .  5
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below shows the  ND MPs1 age com position, compared to  th a t of th e i r  
colleagues in EK/ND and PASOK.
Table I I I . 5: Age Composition of the ND, EK/ND and PASOK 
Parliam entary Groups
New Democracy EK/ND PASOK 1977
Age number % number % number %
Under 35 19 08.80 4 06.56 9 09.89
35-44 51 23.61 12 19.67 37 40.66
45-54 57 26.39 12 19.67 26 28.57
55-64 59 27.31 20 32.79 14 15.38
65-over 30 13.89 13 21.31 5 05.50
Total 216 100.00 61 100.00 91 100.00
Average age 51 00 53 50 46 23
Note: There are  no data fo r 3 of the PASOK MPs in 1977.
[Sources: For ND and EK/ND, Oi 300 t i s  V oulis ton E llin o n , Athens: 
Kathim erini P u b lic a tio n s , 2nd E d itio n , 1976; fo r PASOK, Oi 300 t i s  
V ou lis ton  E l l in o n , A thens: K a th im erin i P u b l ic a t io n s ,  1978 (my 
computations).]
Although the la rg est ND group is  of MPs aged between 55 and 64, h a lf 
of the p a r ty 's  MPs are between 35 and 54. O verall, MPs under 55 years 
predominate w ithin the ND parliam entary group, making up almost 59 per 
cent of the t o t a l . ( 8 } Conversely, more than 54 per cent of EK/ND MPs are 
aged over 55, more than o n e -f if th  of whom would already have gone in to  
re tirem en t had they been employed in  any o th e r  pu b lic  s e c to r . Not 
surp rising ly  then, the EK/ND MPs'age average is  the highest, namely 53.5 
years, compared to 46 years fo r PASOK (in 1977) and 51 years for New 
Democracy.
O verall, the above analysis  shows th a t, in terms of the p o l i t ic a l  
background of i t s  parliam entary personnel, New Democracy managed to a 
considerable extent to d if fe re n t ia te  i t s e l f  from i t s  predecessor, and to
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p resen t a new aind re ju v en ated  image. I t s  lin k s  w ith ERE were s t i l l  
d isce rn ib le , but do not ju s t ify  the charge th a t ND was merely ERE under 
ano ther name; the  p a r ty 's  1974 e le c to ra l  l i s t s  —co n tra ry  to  p a s t 
usage— comprised a  good number of newcomers, many of whcm were e lected . 
Last but not le a s t (compared to  EK/ND, i t s  main r iv a l a t the tim e), ND 
bore much less resemblance to  ERE than did EK/ND to the pre-coup Centre 
Union.( 9}
I t  could be said  tha t Karamanlis, ju s t as he had resto red  democracy 
in p o st-ju n ta  Greece —th a t i s ,  painstak ing ly , cautiously , and step  by 
s te p — adopted a s im ila r  procedure w ith regard  to  New Democracy's 
renewal and i t s  d is s o c ia t io n  from p a s t p o l i t i c a l  p e rs o n a l i t ie s  and 
p r a c t i c e s .  The somewhat tim id  p ro g re s s  tow ards th i s  end, a lready  
d iscern ib le  when the party  was created , gained momentum and, by and by 
achieved dominance, r e s u l t in g  in a very  d if f e r e n t  c o n s titu tio n  and 
u ltim ate  outlook of the conservative party . In what follows we shall try  
to su b s tan tia te  th is  statement by showing the c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the ND 
parliam en ta ry  group as they appeared a f t e r  every e le c tio n  from 1974 
u n t i l  to d ay .* 10’ Table I I I . 6 below shows the ND d e p u tie s ' previous 
p o li t ic a l  a f f i l ia t io n  a f te r  a l l  the intervening e lec tio n s.
Table I I I . 6: ND MPs' P o lit ic a l  A ff il ia tio n  a f te r  a l l  National E lections 
since 1974
1977 1981 1985 1989A 1989B 1990
MPs no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
ND 136 79.53 81 70.44 103 81.75 102 70.34 137 92.57 135 88.82
New 24 14.04 16 13.91 12 09.52 41 28.28 10 06.76 16 10.52
Other 11 06.43 18 15.65 11 08.73 2 01.38 1 .67 1 .66
Total 171 100.00 115 100.00 126 100.00 145 100.00 148 100.00 152 100.00
Pre­
coup 57 33.33 32 27.82 21 16.67 14 09.66 14 09.46 10 06.58
[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1985 e lec tio n s , Oi 300 t i s  Voulis ton
E l l in o n , A thens: K a th im erin i P u b l ic a t io n s ,  1978, 1982 and 1986 
respec tive ly ; fo r the 1989A and 1989B e lec tio n s , Gnoriste tous Vouleftes 
ke Evrovouleftes, Athens: E lefthero typ ia  Publications, 1989; and for the 
1990 e lec tio n s , see the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 20 April 1990, (a ll 
corputations are  mine).]
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As i t  is  c le a rly  shown in the above Table, the parliam entary group's 
overwhelming m ajority , varying between 70 and 92 per cen t, has always 
consisted  of p o lit ic ia n s  w ith previous party  assoc ia tion ; even so, there 
has been a considerable percentage of newcomers each time, ranging from 
6.76 to 28.28 per c e n t .(11) P o litic ia n s  who joined ND from other p a rtie s  
were always in a m inority, and fade out a ltogether a f te r  the June 1989 
e l e c t  io n ; ( 12‘ th e  same tre n d  a p p l ie s  to  p re-co u p  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  
generally , represented by the percentage of p o lit ic ia n s  whose careers 
began befo re  1967. As seen a lread y  (Table I I I . 3 above), th is  group 
constitu ted  44.44 per cent of ND deputies in  1974, but th e re a f te r  kept 
decreasing, to f a l l  to  a mere 6.58 per cent in 1990. Sim ilar p ic tu re  
emerges from an examination of how o ften  deputies were e lec ted . Table 
I I I .  7 shows how many tim es New Democracy MPs have been e le c te d  to  
parliam ent, and covers a l l  the e lec tio n s from 1977 u n til  1990.
Table I I I .  7: Renewal/Consolidation w ithin ND from 1977 u n til  1990
1977 1981 1985 1989A 1989B 1990
Times no % no % no % no. % no. % no %
1st 33 19.30 29 25.22 20 15.87 68 46.90 18 12.16 16 10.59
2nd 81 47.37 24 20.87 32 25.40 14 09.66 56 37.84 30 19.87
3rd 8 04.68 30 26.08 30 23.81 18 12.41 18 12.16 43 28.48
4 th 8 04.68 7 06.09 23 18.25 16 11.03 17 11.49 12 07.75
5th 7 04.09 3 02.61 6 04.76 16 11.03 14 09.46 16 10.59
6th 2 01.17 4 03.48 4 03.18 3 02.07 13 08.78 13 08.61
7 th 7 04.09 2 01.74 2 01.59 3 02.07 3 02.03 12 07.15
8th/
more 25 14.62 16 13.91 9 07.14 7 04.83 9 06.08 9 05.96
Total 171 100.00 115 100.00 126 100.00 145 100.00 148 100.00 151 100.00
Note: the 1990 e lec tion  gave ND 151 deputies of i t s  own. A 152nd was
elected  with Democratic Renewal (DIANA), a New Democracy sp lin te r  
group created in 1985; he joined ND a f te r  the e lec tion .
[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1985 e lec tio n s , Oi 300 t i s  Voulis ton
El 1in o n , A thens: K a th im erin i P u b l ic a t io n s ,  1978, 1982 and 1986 
respectively ; for the 1989A and 1989B e le c tio n s , Gnoriste tous Vouleftes 
ke Evrovouleftes, Athens: E lefthero typ ia  Publications, 1989; and fo r the 
1990 e lec tions, see the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 20 April 1990, (a ll  
computations are  mine).]
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The comments already made on the data in  Table I I I . 6, a re  fu rther 
elucidated  by the more d e ta ile d  p ic tu re  presented in Table I I I . 7 above. 
The high percentages of both newcomers and pre-coup p o lit ic a l  figures in 
the p a r ty 's  1974 ccnposition (see Table I I I . 3) have diminished, and the 
gap between older and newer deputies —in terms of how often  they have 
been e lec ted— is  fading out. Whereas the p a r ty ’s parliam entary group 
had a constant influx  of newcomers a f te r  each e lec tio n , a t the same 
time i t s  o lder deputies who, as we have already seen, co n stitu ted  the 
co re  of th e  p a r ty  when i t  was f i r s t  c re a te d ,*  13 * a re  g ra d u a lly  
abandoning p o l i t i c s .  This means th a t  a new core has been form ing, 
including many deputies who began th e ir  p o l it ic a l  careers in or sho rtly  
a f te r  1974 and have been re -e lec ted  since. Consequently then, with the 
exception  of the June 1989 e le c t io n  when the newly e le c te d  d ep u ties  
con stitu ted  a spectacular 47 per cent of the p a r ty 's  parliam entary group 
(see foo tno te  11 to  th is  c h a p te r) , th e re  is  a tendency w ith in  New 
Democracy towards a more balanced represen ta tion  between newer and older 
deputies —in other words, between rejuvenation and consolidation.
When New Democracy took o ff ic e  in 1974, the average age of 51 years 
in i t s  parliam en ta ry  group was, as we have seen a lread y , the lowest 
compared to that of EK/ND and PASOK. Table I I I . 8 below presents the age 
composition of the p a r ty 's  parliam entary personnel a f te r  a l l  e lec tio n s .
The most obvious change between 1974 and 1977 (see Table I I I . 5 
above) is  the s h if t  of the cen tre  of g rav ity  from the 55-64 to the 45-54 
year age group, which has remained predominant ever since. On the other 
hand, w hile the youngest group has remained r e la t iv e ly  s ta b le ,  the 
o ldest has decreased continuously: from 15.89 per cent in 1977, i t  now 
accounts for only 5.37 per cen t. Conversely, the group of those aged 
between 35 and 44 became the second largest in 1990, and accounts for 
about a th ird  of the t o t a l .  Speaking g e n e ra lly , and d e sp ite  minor 
v a ria tio n s , the average age of ND MPs has been decreasing and reached 
i t s  a ll- tim e  low in 1990.*14 *
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Table I I I .8 : Age Com position o f  th e ND Parliam entary Group
a f t e r  a l l  E le c t io n s
1977 1981 1985 1989A 1989B 1990
Age no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Under
35 10 05.88 7 06.09 3 02.38 7 04.83 9 06.08 7 04.70
35-44 44 25.88 27 23.48 26 20.64 31 21.38 37 25.00 45 30.20
45-54 51 30.00 41 35.65 47 37.30 61 42.07 57 38.51 56 37.58
55-64 38 22.35 22 19.13 33 26.19 36 24.83 36 24.33 33 22.15
Over
65 27 15.89 18 15.65 17 13.49 10 06.89 9 06.08 8 05.37
Total 170 100.00 115 100.00 126 100.00 145 100.00 148 100.00 149 100.00
Ave­
rage 51 .38 50 .97 52 .40 50 .52 49 .47 48.76
Note: No data  a re  ava ilab le  for one MP in 1977, and for three in 1990.
[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1985 e lec tio n s , Qi 300 t i s  Voulis ton
E l1in o n , A thens: K a th im erin i P u b l ic a t io n s ,  1978, 1982 and 1986 
respec tive ly ; fo r the 1989A and 1989B e lec tio n s , Gnoriste tous Vouleftes 
ke Evrovouleftes, Athens: E lefthero typ ia  Publications, 1989; and for the 
1990 e lec tio n s , see the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 20 April 1990, (a ll  
corrputations are  m ine).]
A few words should be a lso  said  about the p a r ty 's  Euro-MPs. {15} In 
1981, 1984 and June 1989, the party  e lected  e ig h t, nine, and ten Euro- 
MPs respec tive ly , p o llin g  31.53, 38.05 and 40.45 per cent of the vote 
( fo r  a t o t a l  o f 24 Greek d e p u t ie s ) .  T able I I I . 9 below shows th e  
p o lit ic a l  background of these MPs as well as th e ir  average age. As we 
can see, in 1981 three of the deputies had belonged to ERE in the past 
and th e re  was on ly  one newcomer, so th a t  the  average  age was 
unexpectedly high (61.4 years) when compared to the 50.97 years of the 
1981 parliam entary group. Conversely in 1984, when newcomers made up the 
m ajority, the average age f e l l  to 50.44 years. In June 1989, no e lected  
Euro-MP had previous a f f i l ia t io n s  with ERE, and seven of the to ta l  ten 
ND deputies had rise n  from the party  ranks —as was a lso  the case with 
respect to the p a r ty 's  June 1989 parliam entary group (see Table I I I . 6
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Table I I I . 9: ND Euro-MPs’ P o l i t i c a l  Background a f t e r  a l l  E u ro-E lection s
1981 1984 1989A
Pol. A ff i l . number % number % number %
ERE 3 37.50 1 11.11 — -----
ND 4 50.00 1 11.11 7 70.00
Newcomers 1 12.50 6 66.67 2 20.00
Other (a} __ ___ 1 11.11 1 10.00
Total 8 100.00 9 100.00 10 100.00
Average Age 61 40 50 44 55 20
Note (a): In 1984, one ND Euro-MP came from EK/ND, and one in 1989 from 
KODISO (Party of Democratic Socialism, a sp lin te r  of EDIK).
[Sources: For 1981 and 1984, see Oi 300 t i s  Voulis ton E llinon , Athens: 
K athim erini P u b lic a tio n s , 1982 and 1986 re s p e c tiv e ly ; fo r 1989, see 
G n o ris te  to u s  V o u le fte s  ke E vrovou lef t e s , A thens: E le f th e ro ty p ia  
Publications, 1989 (a ll  computations are  mine).]
above). We suggest that the data  concerning the New Democracy Euro-MPs' 
p o l i t ic a l  background does not only not co n trad ic t, but ra th e r supports 
the p ic tu re  th a t was obtained from examining the p a r ty 's  parliam entary 
group. ( 16}
Before proceeding to the examination of the occupational background 
of the ND p a r ty 's  personnel, add itional po in ts to  be examined concerning 
th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  an teceden ts a re  ( i)  how ND handled the p ro - ro y a l is ts  
w ithin i t s  ranks, ( i i )  the p a r ty 's  re la tio n s  towards the reactionary , 
a u th o r i ta t iv e  u ltra -R ig h t;  and ( i i i )  ND's s h i f t  fu r th e r  towards the 
Centre when (in  1977 and in 1981) i t  had absorbed p o l i t i c a l  fo rces 
previously p a rt of EK/ND and EDIK.
We noted e a r l ie r  tha t when the referendum for the monarchy issue was 
held in December 1974, Karamanlis had in structed  h is  party  to remain 
n eu tra l. He a lso  warned h is  assoc ia tes tha t any of then expressing h is  
opinion in public would autom atically  be expelled from the party . All 
other p a r t ie s , except fo r the u ltra-R igh t EDE, publicly  took an a n ti­
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r o y a l i s t  stance  and urged th e i r  su p p o rte rs  to  vote against a crowned 
democracy. The ND party  o f f ic ia ls  and deputies respected th e ir  le a d e r 's  
decision , although many of them la te r  admitted that th e ir  choice had 
la in  w ith, and they had therefo re  voted fo r, the K ing.( 171 I t  becomes 
evident then th a t New Democracy, esp ec ia lly  a t the time i t  was f i r s t  
created , comprised several staunch ro y a lis ts  w ithin i t s  r a n k s , '18} who 
nevertheless became fewer and fewer as time went by. Since, however, 
they never formed a separate  fac tion  w ithin the party , there a re  no data 
concerning th e ir  exact number. Due to the impeccable manner in which the 
referendum was conducted, the monarchy issue has ceased to be of popular 
concern ever since, and is  merely given an occasional a ir in g  by PASOK 
and the Left fo r purely demagogic-oppositional purposes. In r e a l i ty  i t  
has ceased to be of any in te re s t  whatsoever.
At the time of the referendum , however, in December 1974, the  
question could s t i l l  cause some turbulance w ithin the party , and f in a lly  
one ND deputy re s ig n ed . He and some o th e r  d i s s a t i s f ie d  p o l i t i c ia n s  
—some of whom had been co llabo ra ting  with the d ic ta to rsh ip — formed an 
u ltra -R ig h t r o y a l i s t  p a r ty  c a lle d  N ational Front (Ethniki P a ra ta x is ), 
which managed to po ll almost 7 per cent in the 1977 e lec tio n , securing 
five  seats in parliam ent. A fter Karamanlis' accession to the Presidency 
of the Republic in May 1980, and as the prospects of PASOK1 s v ic to ry  
increased on the eve of the forthcoming 1981 e lec tion , George Rail is  as 
the then prem ier and leader of the  New Democracy p a rty  was ready to 
accept the u l t r a - r ig h t i s t s  back in to  the ND ran k s ;( 191 a t the same time 
he was try ing  to a t t r a c t  p o l i t ic a l  forces of the Centre, hoping in th is  
way to prevent PASOK from winning the e lec tio n . Although New Democracy 
fought the e lec tio n  reinforced  on both i t s  r ig h t and le f t ,  the v ic to ry  
went overwhelmingly to PASOK. Table I I I . 10 below presents the re s u lts  of 
the 1974, 1977 and 1981 e lec tio n s .
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Table I I I . 10; 17 Nov. 1974, 20 Nov. 1977 and 18 Oct. 1981 
E lectoral Results
Partv/C oali t  ion
17 Nov. 1974 20 Nov. 1977 18 Oct. 1981
% seats % seats % seats
New Democracy 54.37 216 41.84 171 35.87 115
EK/ND <a) 20.42 61 11.95 15 01.10 -----
PASOK 13.58 15 25.34 94 48.07 172
Left (b * 09.47 8 12.08 13 12.27 13
U ltra  Right ‘ c * 01.08 ----- 06.82 5 01.68 -----
Other 01.08 ___ 01.97 2 01.01 -----
Total 100.00 300 100.00 300 100.00 300
Notes: (a) EK/ND was dissolved before the 1977 e lec tio n ; in 1977 i t  had 
become EDIK, and fo r 1981 the figures re fe r  to  the sum to ta l  
of EDIK and i t s  s p lin te r  party  KODISO.
(b) In 1974 th is  means the United Left party ; in 1977 i t  is  the 
sum to ta l  of the Conmunist Party (KKE) of Greece and the 
A lliance of Progressive Forces; and in 1981 the figures are  
fo r both the KKE and the KKE of the In te r io r , a sp lin te r  
group of the former.
(c) In 1974 th is  was represented by the EDE; in 1977 by the 
National Front; and in 1981 by the Party of Progressive 
People.
[Sources: fo r 1974, see 17 November 1974 E lection R esu lts , M inistry of 
the In te r io r , Dept of E lections, Athens 1976, pp. 14-5 and 577-604; fo r
1977 see 20 November 1977 E lec tio n  R e s u lts , v o l. 1, M in istry  of the
In te r io r , Dept of E lections, Athens 1979, pp. 16-7 and 19-55; and for
1981 see 18 October 1981 E lec tio n  R e s u lts , v o l. 1, M in istry  of the
In te r io r , Dept of E lections, Athens 1984, pp. 14-5 and 17-40.3
We can see th a t taking back the u l t r a - r ig h t i s t s  did not re a lly  help ND. 
On the contrary , i t  brought accusations and resentment from within the 
party , because i t  was believed to have kept away c e n tr is t  and moderate 
v o te rs . Like the r o y a l i s t s ,  the u ltra -R ig h t never had an o rgan ised  
faction  w ithin New Democracy, and whatever minor ro le  they may have been 
playing was fu rth er reduced a f te r  1986, when the party  —th eo re tic a lly , 
a t le a s t— moved c lo ser to the Centre and liberalism . S t i l l ,  iso la ted  
p o lit ic a l  figures remain in the ND ranks who, given the chance, do not
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h e s ita te  to voice provocative remainders of old schisms and the c iv il  
w ar.( 20 *
Aside from the u l tr a -R ig h t ,  New Democracy a lso  t r ie d  to  a t t r a c t  
p o l i t ic a l  forces from the Centre. When Karamanlis o r ig in a lly  created  ND, 
he tr ie d  to  give to h is  party  a more c e n tr is t  and lib e ra l outlook, and 
continued to do so as long as he was i t s  leader. A good chance presented 
i t s e l f  a f te r  the 1977 e le c tio n , when the Centre did very poorly, and 
resu lted  in the f i r s t  in flux  of c e n tr is t  p o lit ic ia n s  in to  ND.<21) A fter 
EDIK's e lec to ra l d isa s te r  in 1981, when i t  po lled  a mere 0.64 per cent 
of the vote, the absorption of c e n tr is t  p o lit ic ia n s  was completed, to 
the benefit of both major p a r t ie s , New Democracy and PASOK. The l a t t e r  
thus acquired a more moderate outlook, which played a crucia l ro le  in 
i t s  b a tt le  for o ff ice  in 1981. New Democracy for i t s  p a rt was helped by 
the c e n t r i s t  in flu x  to  d is a s s o c ia te  i t s e l f  from the u ltra -R ig h t, to  
adopt and p resen t a more l ib e r a l  and modern id e n t i ty  and, f in a l ly  
—also  for a number of o ther reasons, to  be examined in the following 
chapters— to re tu rn  to power a f te r  e igh t years in opposition.
2.2 Occupational background
As we have already mentioned in the f i r s t  chapter of th is  study, a l l  
Greek p o lit ic a l  p a rtie s  except the conmunists lacked both horizontal and 
v e rtic a l organisational s tru c tu re s . In fa c t, they never developed such 
adm inistrative organs, since the local p o l i t ic a l  barons kept con tro llin g  
and in c o rp o ra tin g  th e  v o te r s  w ith in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a ren a  th rough  
v e r t ic a l ,  dependent and p e rso n a lis tic  mechanisms. Although there are  no 
concrete  da ta  a v a i la b le , ( 22 * p o l i t i c ia n s  were u su a lly  lawyers and 
doctors who, due to th e ir  profession , could e a s ily  c rea te  and maintain a 
personal c lie n te le . In consequence, the m ajoriry of Greek p o lit ic ia n s  
have always been members of the lib e ra l professions ra th e r than sa la ried
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employees- This d i s t in c t iv e  fe a tu re  of Greek p o l i t i c s  seems h igh ly  
re c a lc itra n t  to change.
As is  shown in Table I I I . 11 below, lawyers, doctors and engineers 
co n stitu ted  the largest categories w ithin  ND's parliam entary personnel, 
making up 73 per cent in  1974. There was a lso  q u ite  a considerab le  
rep resen ta tion  of businessmen, u n iv ers ity  p ro fessors, re t i re d  m ilita ry  
o f f i c e r s  and eco n o m ists ; sh ipow ners and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  were a lso  
represented, a lb e it  more sparse ly . Moreover, there  was a s tr ik in g  
resem blance between the ND and EK/ND MPs' occupational backgrounds, 
e spec ia lly  as regards the legal and medical rep resen ta tion .
A lthough s im ila r  tre n d s  can be i d e n t i f i e d  w ith in  PASOK, i t s  
occupational composition has always d iffe red  considerably from th a t of 
the two o th e r  p a r t ie s .  PASOK com prises a s ig n if ic a n t  percen tage  of 
m id d le  and  lo w e r e m p lo y e e s , c a t e g o r i e s  t h a t  a r e  m a rk e d ly  
underrepresented in the parliam entary groups of both New Democracy and 
EK/ND. So, whereas PASOK MPs include a considerable number with a p e tty - 
bourgeois or lower-class occupational background, those of ND are  much 
more l ik e ly  to  be of bourgeois e x tra c t io n . This is  borne out by the 
numerical re la tio n  between the sa la ried  and lib e ra l professions in the 
two parliam entary groups: MPs from sa la ried  categories c o n s titu te  23.41 
per cent in PASOK, but only 13 per cent in ND. Conversely, the lib e ra l 
professions are  rep resen ted  by 75.53 and 85.65 per cent re sp e c tiv e ly  
—more heavily  accented for ND and so giving a more lopsided p ic tu re .
According to  these  f ig u re s , then , the  so c ia l and occupational 
composition of the ND MPs was not re a lly  so very d iffe ren t from what i t  
had been fo r i t s  predecessor in the pre-coup years, notw ithstanding the 
spectacular rejuvenation due to  the massive influx of newcomers w ithin 
the p a r ty 's  ranks. As Table I I I . 11 below shows, the predominant trends 
w ith in  ERE ranks (e s p e c ia lly  in  re sp ec t of the lega l and medical 
professions) reappeared in New Democracy in 1974, and were a lso  more or
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Table I I I . 11: ND-1974, EK/ND-1974, and PASOK-1977 MPs'
Occupational Background
ERE 1964(a) New Democracy EK/ND PASOK 1977
Profession number % number % number % number %
Lawyers 30 61.23 115 53.24 32 52.46 44 46.81
Doctors 8 16.33 29 13.42 8 13.11 11 11.71
Engineers 2 04.08 14 06.48 3 04.92 7 07.44
Ship1g /Industry — ----- 2 .93 1 01.64 — -----
Businessmen 1 02.04 10 04.63 1 01.64 1 01.06
Merchants — ----- 1 .46 1 01.64 — -----
Landowners 1 02.04 2 .93 — ----- 1 01.06
Farmers — ----- 1 .46 — ----- 3 03.19
High Rank Bnp. 1 02.04 3 01.39 — ----- 5 05.32
Middle/ 
Lower Bnp. — ----- 3 01.39 2 03.28 6 06.38
Workers — ----- — ----- — ----- — -----
Univ. Prof. — ----- 9 04.17 3 04.92 2 02.13
Teachers 2 04.08 4 01.85 1 01.64 4 04.26
Jo u rn a lis ts — ----- 2 .93 2 03.28 1 01.06
A rtis ts 1 02.04 2 .93 — ----- 1 01.06
Economists 1 02.04 8 03.70 4 06.56 2 02.13
Mi 1i tary 1 02.04 7 03.24 3 04.92 4 04.26
Miscellaneous — ----- 1 .93 — ----- 1 01.06
No data 1 02.04 3 01.39 __ ___ 1 01.06
Total 49 100.00 216 100.00 61 100.00 94 100.00
SALARIED PROF. 4 08.16 28 12.96 11 18.03 22 23.41
LIBERAL PROF. 44 89.80 185 85.65 48 78.69 71 75.53
NO DATA 1 02.04 3 01.39 2 03.28 1 01.06
Note (a): See footnote 22.
[Sources: For ND and EK/ND (and a lso  fo r the ERE-64 sample, see footnote 
22), Oi 300 t i s  Voulis ton E llinon , Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 
2nd Edition, 1976; for PASOK, Oi 300 t i s  Voulis ton E llinon , Athens: 
Kathimerini Publications, 1978 (my computations)].
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less id e n tif ia b le  in the o ther major p a r t ie s . However, even i f  lawyers 
and doctors constitu ted  the vast m ajority  of the p a r ty 's  parliam entary 
group in 1974, New Democracy managed a t  the time to p ro jec t " . . . a  more 
b ro a d m in d e d , t e c h n o c r a t i c ,  and  c e n t r i s t  o u t lo o k  th a n  i t s  
predecessors". ( 23} This, as we have already mentioned, was due mainly to 
those new p o lit ic ia n s  who joined and s ta ffe d  the party , 58.8 per cent of 
whom had absolved postgraduate stud ies abroad (compared to  31.5 per cent 
fo r ERE and the Greek R a lly ) . ( 24 *
In the years th e re a f te r , lawyers and doctors did not become fewer 
although th is  might have been expected . The coinminist p a r tie s  apart, 
th ese  two p ro fess io n s  continued  to  amount to  more than h a lf  of both 
PASOK's and ND's parliam entary groups. In the former, they were always 
fewer and by 1990 they amounted to  53 per c en t; in the  l a t t e r  they 
dropped from i t s  66.66 per cent or tw o-thirds of ND's MPs in 1974 to 
ju s t below 60 per cent in 1981 and ever since, as given in Table I I I .  12 
below. Almost everything sa id  about the ND MPs' occupational background 
in  1974 has c o n tin u ed  to  a p p ly . In  a d d i t io n ,  e n g in e e rs  ro se  to  
c o n s t i tu te  the th i r d - la r g e s t  group. Whereas middle and low er-rank 
employees were very poorely represented, and farmers and workers missing 
a ltogether frcm 1981 onwards, these categories fared b e tte r  in PASOK. 
Shipowners a n d /o r  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  to g e th e r  w ith  businessm en and 
merchants, are  more numerous in ND's ranks, and amounted to  7 per cent 
in 1990. (PASOK had and has none of the former and only a very few of 
the l a t t e r ) .  A new p ro fe ss io n , the  econom ists, appeared as e a r ly  as 
1974, and since 1985 have been neck-and-neck as the th ird - la rg e s t group 
in ND, alongside the eng ineers. ( 25 * All in a l l ,  the lib e ra l professions 
are in the m ajority , both in ND and PASOK. Although one cannot yet speak 
of a d e f in i te  tren d , i t  looks as i f  New Democracy is  moving to  a 
somewhat more balanced rep resen ta tion  of the sa la ried  professions in i t s  
parliam entary group; the l a t t e r  amounted to over 18 per cent in 1990,
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Table I I I .  12: New Democracy MPs1 Occupational Background a f te r  a l l  E
ND-1977
Profession no. %
Lawyers 94 54.97
Doctors 18 10.53
Engineers 12 07.02
Ship1g/Industry 3 01.76
Business 6 03.51
Merchants — -----
Landowners 1 .58
Farmers — ----
High Rank Bip. 5 02.93
Middle/Low Rank 4 02.34
Workers — ----
Univ. Prof. 4 02.34
Teachers 2 01.17
Journa lis ts 1 .58
A rtis ts 2 01.17
Economists 8 04.68
M ilitary 9 05.26
Miscellaneous 1 .58
No data 1 .58
Total 171 100.00
SALARIED PROF. 25 14.62
LIBERAL PROF. 145 84.80
NO DATA 1 .58
[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1
respectively; for the 1989A and 198 
the 1990 e lections, see the weekly
ND-1981 PASOK-1981
no. no.
48.69 48.84
11.30 11.63
08.70 08.72
01.74
01.74 .58
.87 .58
02.33
01.74 02.33
01.74 08.14
03.48 02.91
01.74 05.23
.5801.74
01.74 01.16
09.56 01.16
05.22 04.07
01.16
100.00100.00 172115
18.6014.78
81.4085.22 140
•85 e lections, Oi 300 t i s  Voulis tonE 
© e lections, Gnoriste tous Vouleftes Y, 
newspaper To Pondiki, 20 April 1990, (
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L E le c tio n s  (and PASOK's MPs in  1981 and 1990)
ND-1989A ND-1989BND-1985 ND-1990 PASOK-1990
no- no. no. no- no.
65 51.59 66 45.52 47.30 59 38.82 5270 41.53
17.9326 25 16.90 32 21.05 14 11.2909.52
10.32 06.20 10 06.76 07.23 15 1 2 . 1 013
.69.79 02.70 01.32
01.59 02.76 04.05 05.92
. 66 01.61.79
01.61
01.59 04.83 01.35 .81. 66
.79 . 68 01.32 08.0601.38
.81
02.38 02.07 02.70 02.63 03.23
01.59 01.38 01.35 03.95 04.84
02.76 01.35 01.97 01.61
01.59 02.07 02.70 01.61. 66
09.5212 06.20 06.76 07.23 05.65
07.15 04.83 04.05 03.29 02.42
01.6101.38 01.35 01.97
01.32
1 00 . 00126 1 0 0 . 0 0 145 1 0 0 . 0 0 148 1 0 0 . 0 0 152 1 0 0 . 0 0 124
19.3515.0819 25 17.24 12.84 28 18.42 24
79.8484.92 120 129 99107 82.76 87.16 80.26122
.8101.32
>n E l1inon , A thens: K ath im erin i P u b lic a tio n s , 1978, 1982 and 1986
>s ke E v ro v o u le fte s , A thens: E le f th e ro ty p ia  P u b lic a tio n s , 1989; and fo r  
i, ( a l l  com putations a re  m in e ).]
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compared to  a  mere 13 per cent in 1974. In general though, ND MPs keep 
p ro je c tin g  a more u p p e r-c la s s , b o u rg e o is  o c c u p a tio n a l background, 
whereas th e ir  PASOK colleagues seem on the average to have low er-class, 
pe tit-bourgeo is soc ia l o rig in s .
With respect to  the p a r ty 's  Euro-MPs the s itu a tio n  is  d if fe re n t, as 
the data in Table I I I .  13 below demonstrate. In 1981, out of the eigh t 
party  deputies, six  were lawyers and only two had done post-graduate 
stud ies abroad. In 1984, together w ith lawyers, doctors and economists, 
there were a lso  two higher-ranking employees and one jo u rn a lis t , and the 
p o s t-g rad u a te s ' percen tage  ro se  to  above 55. In June 1989, f in a l ly ,  
lawyers became again the la rg est group (but not dominant as they had 
been in 1981), and 60 per cen t o f the  to ta l  had done p o s t-g rad u a te  
w ork.426’ As regards both the  Euro-MPs' p o l i t i c a l  and occupational 
background there  is  a noteworthy d iffe rence  between the 1981 group and 
those of 1984 and 1989. In the f i r s t  e lec tio n  i t  would appear th a t the
Table I I I .  13; ND Euro-MPs* Occupational Background 
a f te r  a l l  Euro-Elections
1981 1984 1989
Profession number % number % number %
Lawyers 6 75.00 2 22.22 3 30.00
Doctors 1 12.50 2 22.22 1 10.00
Univ. Prof. — ----- — ----- 1 10.00
High Rank Bnp. — ----- 2 22.22 1 10.00
Journal is t s — ----- 1 11.11 2 20.00
Economists 1 12.50 2 22.22 2 20.00
Total 8 100.00 9 99.99 10 100.00
Post-graduates 2 25.00 5 55.55 6 60.00
[Sources: For 1981 and 1984, see Oi 300 t i s  Voulis ton E llinon , Athens: 
Kathim erini P u b lic a tio n s , 1982 and 1986 re sp e c tiv e ly ; fo r 1989, see 
G n o ris te  tous V o u le fte s  ke E v ro v o u le f te s , A thens: E le f th e ro ty p ia  
Publications, 1989 (a ll  computations are  m ine).]
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p a rty  neg lec ted  to  g ive much thought to  th is  is su e , sending to  the 
European Parliam ent r a th e r  o ld  and inadequately  educated d ep u ties  
compared to those of PASOK, probably because i t  was channelling a l l  i t s  
e f fo r ts  in to  winning the national e lec tio n  —which i t  f in a lly  lo s t .  The 
most s tr ik in g  aspect of the Euro-MPs' occupational background, is  tha t 
not one of them was or is  a merchant o t businessman. Since, as already 
mentioned, compiling the Euro-1 i s t s  has been the exclusive prerogative 
of the ND party  leadership , i t  remains to  be seen whether the absence of 
ce rta in  professional categories is  due to chance, or whether there  are  
s p e c ia l  rea so n s  fo r  t h i s  which i t  has no t y e t been p o s s ib le  to  
id e n tify .*27}
3. Central and Departmental Committees
As we sha ll see in g rea te r  d e ta il  in the next chapter, i t  took the 
New Democracy p a r ty  c o n s id e ra b le  tim e to  lay  i t s  o rg a n is a t io n a l  
foundations. In la te  1975 Karamanlis appointed —including him self— 21 
of h is  c losest colleagues as members of the then-called  adm inistrative 
committee.( 28> Four years la te r ,  when the f i r s t  party  congress was held, 
th e  f i r s t  e le c te d  a d m in is t r a t iv e  com m ittee was formed, but never 
functioned as i t  was supposed to , th a t is  as the highest party  organ; i t  
was convoked only to  approve d ec is io n s  a lread y  taken by the  p a rty  
leader and h is  c lo sest colleagues.
The party  cannot be said  to  have re a lly  developed i t s  o rganisational 
s t ru c tu re s  u n t i l  E. Averoff became i t s  lead er in December 1981, and 
espec ia lly  following ND's second congress in February 1986. The cen tral 
committee then e lected  included 50 non-parliam entarians (the re s t  were 
MPs e lected  by ND's pariiam entary group i t s e l f ) .  Table I I I . 14 shows the 
1986 cen tra1-committee members' p o l i t ic a l  background.
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Table I I I .  14: ND Central-C om m ittee Members' P o l i t i c a l  Background in  1986
Previous 
Pol. A ff il .
P a r i . members Non-par1 members Total
number % number % number %
ERE-1964 5 18.52 6 12.00 11 14.29
EK-1964 3 11.11 — — 3 03.90
ND 18 66.67 44 88.00 62 80.52
EDIK-1977 1 03.70 _____ ________ 1 01.29
Total 27 100.00 50 100.00 77 100.00
[Sources: see New Democracy: Second Congress, M inutes, T hessa lon ik i: 
14-16 F eb ruary  1986, ND p u b l ic a t io n  ( in  G reek), pp. 213-21 (my 
com putations). ]
Contrary to  the case of PASOK,129 ’ the 1986 composition of ND's cen tral 
committee shows a s t r ik in g  resem blance to  th a t of the p a r ty 's  1985 
parliam en tary  group. Indeed, i f  we take another look a t  the  da ta  
p re s e n te d  e a r l i e r  in  T able I I I . 6, we see  th a t  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  of 
p o l i t i c ia n s  who were a lread y  a c t iv e ly  a f f i l i a t e d  w ith ND is  alm ost 
id e n t ic a l  in  th e  1985 p a r l ia m e n ta ry  group and th e  1986 c e n t r a l  
corm ittee. On the o ther hand, pre-coup p o lit ic ia n s  account fo r over 18 
per cent of the cen tra l committee, compared to 16.67 per cent in the 
parliam entary group; a l i t t l e  over 5 per cent of the cen tra l committee 
consist of p o l it ic a l  figures of the Centre, compared to  almost 8 per 
cent of the parliam entary group (see footnote 12 above). In terms of 
th e ir  previous p o lit ic a l  a f f i l ia t io n ,  therefo re , the central-ccm rnittee 
members are  not n o ticeab ly  d i f f e r e n t  from the p a rty  d ep u tie s  a t  th a t 
time. Although there are  no ava ilab le  data , i t  seems that the trend we 
id en tifie d  in ND's parliam entary group can be discerned here as well: 
namely, th a t from the appoin ted  c e n tra l  committee of 1975 the p a rty  
moved towards renewal to  fu r th e r  d is ta n c e  i t s e l f  from i t s  pre-coup 
an ce s to r, and became s ta f fe d  m ostly  by p o l i t ic ia n s  who had en te red  
p o l i t ic s  a f te r  1974. This point can be fu rth er elucidated by a look a t
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the cen tra l committee's composition in la te  1991;<30) the data  are given 
in Table I I I . 15 below.
Table I I I .  15: ND Central-Commit tee  Members' P o litic a l Background in 1991
Pol. A ff il .
Pariiam entarians Non-par 1 i amen ta r  ians Total
number % number % number %
ERE 3 10.71 3 06.12 6 07.79
EK 1 03.58 — ----- 1 01.30
ND 21 75.00 46 93.88 67 87.01
EDIK-77 3 10.71 __ ----- 3 03.90
Total 28 100.00 49 100.00 77 100.00
[Sources: see New Democracy, Athens: December 1991, Special Edition of 
the d a ily  newspaper Apoqevmatini ( in  Greek); a l l  computations a re  
mine).]
Here again, the resemblance with the ND MPs' p o lit ic a l  background in 
1990 is  very obvious (compare Table I I I . 6 above). The percen tage of 
central-com m ittee members p rev io u s ly  a f f i l i a t e d  w ith ND amounts to  a 
l i t t l e  over 87 per cent, compared to  88.82 per cent of i t s  MPs in 1990. 
On the other hand, pre-coup p o lit ic ia n s  co n stitu te  6.58 per cent of the 
1990 parliam en tary  group, as a g a in s t 9.09 per cent on the c e n tra l 
committee in 1991. I t  is  a lso  noteworthy that there are no p o lit ic a l  
figures of the Centre among e ith e r  the 1986 or 1991 central-commit tee 
non -parliam en ta rian s. O verall then , more than 90 per cent of the 
central -commit tee members entered p o l i t ic s  a f te r  1974 when they joined 
the  p a r ty ,  hav ing  had no r e l a t i o n s  w hatsoever w ith  a n t i - ju n t a  
organisations (as was the case with PASOK) or other p o lit ic a l  forces. In 
terms of the p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  p r io r  to  th e i r  e le c tio n  to  the 
central committee, the members were no d iffe ren t from the party  MPs. In 
fac t, they portray  much the same c h a ra c te r is tic s , thus rein fo rcing  our 
e a r l ie r  argument (put forward w hile examining the ND MPs' p o l i t i c a l  
background) th a t New Deimocracy was a personal c rea tio n  of i t s  leader
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who, while including pre-coup ERE p o lit ic ia n s , a lso  brought in a good 
many newcomers who from the very beginning gave the party  a d iffe re n t 
outlook from i t s  p redecesso r and in tim e became the dominant element 
w ithin i t .
The p ic tu re  as ou tlined  above continues to  hold true  a lso  in regard 
to the cen tra l-co rm ittee  members' occupational background. What again  
f i r s t  s t r ik e s  one is  the  predominance of the  l ib e ra l  p ro fe ss io n s . 
According to  Table I I I . 16 below, the legal profession predominated on 
both PASOK's and ND's cen tra l committee, but was considerably higher on 
the la t te r .  Doctors and engineers were a lso  well represented on ND's 
cen tra l conmittee, and a l l  the lib e ra l professions together accounted 
fo r over 72 per cent (compared to  ju s t under 54 per cent in the case of 
PASOK). Although both p a rtie s  had a considerable represen tation  of high- 
ranking employees, the sa la r ied  jobs were b e tte r  represented on PASOK's 
cen tra l conm ittee. Furtherm ore, ND's c e n tra l  conm ittee included fiv e  
businessmen and one i n d u s t r i a l i s t ,  p ro fe ss io n s  of which PASOK's had 
none. Conversely, farmers, p ro fesso rs, teachers, students and a r t i s t s  
were absent from the ND 1979 cen tra l cormit tee . Therefore, as was the 
case w ith the  p a rty  MPs' occupational background, i t  seems th a t  New 
Democracy fa ile d  to a t t r a c t  members engaged in professions re la tiv e ly  
new to Greek p o l i t i c s  a t  the tim e. The p a r ty 's  c e n tra l conm ittee 
included a large number of members with a bourgeois social background, 
as opposed to  th e  p e tty -b o u rg e o is  o r lo w e r-c la s s  o c c u p a tio n a l 
background of i t s  PASOK counterpart.
At th e  second p a r ty  co n g ress  in  F eb ruary  1986, a new c e n t r a l  
conmittee was e lected . I t s  composition d iffe red  considerably from that 
of the f i r s t  one in 1979, in the sense th a t  th e re  was now a more 
balanced re p re se n ta tio n  of p ro fe ss io n s  th a t before  had been absent 
a ltogether. Even so, the percentage of the sa la ried  categories dropped 
dram atically —from 23.45 in 1979 to 16.88 in 1986— mainly due to  the
..........................................................................1 4 1 ................................................................................
T able I I I .16: O ccupational Background o f  ND and PASOK
Central Cotrmittees
PASOK 1977 ND 1979 ND 1986 ND-91A( a * ND-91B<b)
Profession no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Lawyers 16 20.00 30 37.04 32 41.56 22 28.57 7 10.00
Doctors 6 07.50 14 17.28 11 14.28 11 14.28 7 10.00
Engineers 8 10.00 6 07.41 6 07.79 9 11.69 2 02.86
Ship' g/Industry — ------------ 1 01.23 — ------------- 1 01.30 — -------------
Business — ------------ 5 06.17 7 09.09 8 10.39 13 18.57
Merchants 3 03.75 3 03.71 — ------------- 1 01.30 5 07.14
Fanners 4 05.00 — ------------- — ------------- — ------------- — -------------
High Rank Bnp. 15 18.75 15 18.52 1 01.30 2 02.60 11 15.71
Middle/Low Elip. 3 03.75 1 01.23 2 02.60 2 02.60 10 14.29
Workers 4 05.00 1 01.23 — ------------- — ------------- — -------------
Univ. Prof. 2 02.50 — ------------- 3 03.89 2 02.60 1 01.43
Teachers 1 01.25 — ------------- 1 01.30 1 01.30 6 08.57
Students 8 10.00 — ------------- — ------------- 3 03.89 — -------------
Jo u rn a lis ts — ------------ — ------------- 2 02.60 2 02.60 — -------------
A rtis ts 3 03.75 — ------------- 2 02.60 — ------------- — -------------
Economists — ------------ — ------------- 2 02.60 4 05.19 — -------------
Mi 1i tary 2 02.50 2 02.47 2 02.60 — ------------- — -------------
Miscellaneous 5 06.25 3 03.71 1 01.30 1 01.30 — -------------
No data _____ ________ _____ ________ 5 06.49 8 10.39 8 11.43
Total 80 100.00 81 100.00 77 100.00 77 100.00 70 100.00
SALARIED PROF. 27 33.75 19 23.45 13 16.88 10 12.99 28 40.00
LIBERAL PROF. 43 53.75 59 72.84 56 72.73 55 71.43 34 48.57
NO DATA 10 12.50 3 03.71 8 10.39 12 15.58 8 11.43
Notes (a) and (b ): See footnotes 31a and 31b.
[Sources: For the PASOK 1977 and ND 1979 c e n tra l  com m ittees, see
L y r in tz is  C. , Between S o c ia lism  and Populism : The R ise  o f th e  
P anhellen ic  S o c ia l is t  Movement, op . c i t ♦ , p. 273. For the  ND 1986
cen tra l conmittee, see New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, op. c i t .
For the ND-91A cen tra l conmittee, and for the 70 e lected  p residen ts of 
the p a r ty 's  departmental conmittees, see New Democracy, Athens: Special 
Edition of the da ily  newspaper Apoqevmatini, December 1991, (in Greek); 
a l l  conputations are  mine).]
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decrease in higher-ranking employees on the c en tra l conmittee. The legal 
and medical professions once more co n stitu ted  more than h a lf  of the 
to ta l  and by and large, the cen tra l conm ittee 's composition resembled 
th a t of the 1985 parliam entary group (see Table I I I . 11 above). Since the 
spate of consecutive national e lec tio n s during 1989 and 1990, and given 
th a t no party  congress has been held since 1986/ 32} the composition of 
the cen tra l conmittee has s l ig h tly  changed, as shown in Table I I I .  16 
above. The legal and medical professions have ceased to  c o n s titu te  the 
absolute m ajority ; th e ir  loss has been the gain ch ie fly  of businessmen, 
m erchants and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  who to g e th e r make up the th ird - la rg e s t 
group and account fo r 13 per cent. Lawyers and doctors s t i l l  make up the 
f i r s t -  and s e c o n d - la rg e s t  groups r e s p e c t iv e ly .  The r a t i o  between 
sa la ried  and lib e ra l categories has remained s ta b le , the la t t e r  always 
being the dominant group w ithin the p a r ty 's  c en tra l conmittee.
A completely d iffe re n t p ic tu re  emerges from the ccnparison of the 
o c c u p a tio n a l com position  o f th e  70 e le c te d  p r e s id e n ts  o f ND's 
departmental conmittees throughout the country. I t  is  businessmen who 
now c o n s titu te  the la rg est group, with 18.57 per cent (together with 
merchants, they account for almost 26 per cen t). Salaried  employees of 
higher and middle or lower rank are the n ex t-la rg est group, with l i t t l e  
d i f f e r e n c e  betw een  them : th e y  have 15 .71  and 1 4 .29  p e r  c e n t  
respec tive ly . Of course, lawyers and doctors a re  again represented, but
to a much lesse r extent (10 per cent each), and there are  a lso  q u ite  a
few teachers (8.57 per cen t). Not su rp rising ly  then, the ra t io  between 
lib e ra l and sa la ried  professions has changed markedly: the former s t i l l
make up the largest group, but now account fo r less than half of the
to ta l  (48.57 per cen t); the la t t e r  a re  not so very far behind, amounting 
for the f i r s t  time to as much as 40 per cent.
The p ic tu re  as presented above is  corroborated by a random sample of 
the occupations of 158 rank -and -file  party  members in the Department of
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Larissa*33’ in 1989. The tra d itio n a l professions of medicine and law are 
hardly represented (as w ill be discussed in more d e ta il  in ch. 6), 
and the la rg est occupational group, th a t of members running th e ir  
own shops and b u sin esse s , accounts fo r  le s s  than o n e -th ird  of the 
to ta l ,  as shown in Table I I I . 17 below. Party members employed in the 
public sec to r of the economy amount to  21.52 per cent, and another 24.68 
per cen t a re  s a la r ie d  in the  p r iv a te  s e c to r . These la s t  two groups 
to g e th e r , o r in o th e r words p a rty  members in s a la r ie d  jobs, make up
46.20 per cent of the rank -and-file ; another large group —14.56 per 
cent, and a l l  women— is  engaged in housekeeping.
Table I I I . 17: Occupational Background of 158 Party Members 
in Larissa in 1989
Occupation number %
Private  Sector/CX^ Business 48 30.38
Private  S ecto r/S alaried 39 24.68
Public Sector Employment 34 21.52
Housekeep i ncr/unemp 1 oyed (23/14) 37 (14.56/08.86) 23.42
Total 158 100.00
I t  can be seen, th e re fo re , th a t both the  occupational and so c ia l 
composition of the parliam entary and the central-conm ittee groups of the 
party  a re  q u ite  s im ila r. The lib e ra l professions predominate o v e ra ll, 
with lawyers and doctors s t i l l  forming the largest groups in both bodies 
(as they had in the pre-coup p a r t ie s ) ,  but slowly re tre a tin g  before a 
tre n d  tow ards more ba lan ced  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  of o th e r  and newer 
professions without a tra d itio n a l foothold in Greek p o l i t ic s .  Where the 
p a r ty 's  g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  is  concerned, the p ic tu re  is  very 
d iffe re n t. Salaried  jobs are  by far b e tte r  represented, and i t  is  people 
engaged in b u sin ess , la rg e  or sm all, who c o n s t i tu te  the  la rg e s t  
category. This would suggest that there  is  a ce rta in  imbalance between
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the g rass-roo ts and the top organisational bodies of the p arty , seeing 
tha t the l a t t e r ,  although they were e lected  by the former, have such 
d iffe re n t social and occupational backgrounds. We think tha t th is  i s ,  in 
fa c t, one of the d is t in c tiv e  fea tu res of the New Democracy party , and we 
sh a ll focus the analysis on i t  in depth when examining the organisation  
of the party  in the next c h a p te r . '34’
One more point must be made concerning women's p a rtic ip a tio n  in the 
p a r ty 's  parliam entary group as well as in the organ isation . Table I I I . 18 
below shows unequivocally  th a t in Greece p o l i t i c s  remains the alm ost 
exclusive domain of men, ju s t as p o lit ic ia n s  belong overwhelmingly to 
the lega l, medical and other lib e ra l p ro fessions. This sc a rc ity  of women 
in parliament is  not lim ited to  ND, as the re levan t figures fo r PASOK, 
given in parentheses, c le a rly  a t t e s t .
Table I I I .  18: ND Women in Parliament (PASOK data  in parentheses)
1974 1977 1981 1985 1989A 1989B 1990
Men 212 (14) 168 (88) 112 (165) 122 (154) 138 (121) 138 (121) 144 (119)
Women 4 (1) 3 (5) 3 (7) 4 (7) 7 (4) 10 (7) 7 (5)
Total 216 (15) 171 (93) 115 (172) 126 (161) 145 (125) 148 (128) 151 (124)
In both p a r t ie s  the presence of women is  m erely sym bolic. In  New 
Democracy they accounted for 1.75 per cent in 1977 (th e ir  lowest p o in t) , 
but even a t th e ir  most numerous, in November 1989 (1989B in the Table), 
they d id  not exceed 6.76 per c en t. The average fo r women in  ND's 
parliam entary group is  3.66 per cent (and 4.81 per cent for PASOK).
Women's re p re se n ta tio n  in the European Parliam ent is  s im ila r . As 
Table I I I . 19 below shows (PASOK data again in parentheses), there were 
no women a t a l l  among the 1981 New Democracy Euro-MPs, and only one each 
in 1984 and in 1989. Women have done r a th e r  b e t te r  on the  p a r ty 's  
cen tral committee, where from 8.64 per cent in 1979, they rose to a 
s ig n ifican t 13 per c e n t.in  la te  1991. Moreover, 48 of the 158 rank-and-
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Table I I I .  19: Warren in  th e EP, C entral and Departmental C qrm ittees
European Par1i ament Central Ccmnittee Deo. Com.
1981 1984 1989A 1979 1986 1991A 1991B
Men 8 (8) 8 (9) 9 (9) 74 (75) 69 67 68
Women — (2) 1 (1) 1 (-) 7 (5) 8 10 2
Total 8 (10) 9 (10) 10 (9) 81 (80) 77 77 70
f i l e  members of the  g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  in the  Department of 
L arissa, or 30.38 per cen t, a re  women. Although th is  is  a re la tiv e ly  
high female rep resen ta tion , i t  s t i l l  lags fa r  behind the r a t io  of women 
to  men in Greek society  generally , which is  s l ig h tly  over 50 per cent. 
Conversely, of the 70 e le c te d  p re s id e n ts  of the  p a r ty 's  departm ental 
commttees (1991B in the Table), only two are  women (2.86%).
The second New Democracy party  congress in 1986, however, decided-to 
se t up a separate women's o rganisation  to a t t r a c t  more women in to  i t s  
ranks. I t  a lso  t r ie d  to  involve women in  p a rty  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and d id  
indeed manage to  g e t more women MPs e le c te d  in  1989 and 1990. 
N evertheless, th e i r  involvement and rep resen ta tio n  remains re la tiv e ly  
low, and ND's women's organisation  has functioned only in p re-e lec tion  
p e rio d s , mainly by d is t r ib u t in g  party-propaganda le a f le ts  and helping 
(with much enthusiasm and even fanaticism , as we shall see in d e ta il  in 
the next chapter) to organise party  demonstrations, lec tu res , speeches, 
e tc .
Before closing th is  section , we should say a few words concerning 
the p a r ty 's  social base, so tha t we acquire a more complete p ic tu re  of 
ND v o te r s ’ s o c ia l ,  economic and occupational background. ( 35' Tables
I I I . 20 and 21 below present a p ic tu re  of the d is tr ib u tio n  of the ND vote 
over urban, semi-urban and ru ra l a reas, and the party  v o te rs ' socio­
economic background re sp e c tiv e ly .‘ 36 *
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In the 1974 e lec tio n , ND polled  54.83 per cent in the big  c i t i e s ,  
52.15 per cent in semi -urban cen tres and 56.62 per cent in ru ra l a reas, 
thus following i t s  predecessors' record in th is  respect (for the social 
base of ERE see section  2 .2 .5  in ch. 1). As shown in Table I I I . 20, ND 
continued to po ll s l ig h tly  b e tte r  in semi-urban and ru ra l areas in a l l  
following e lec tions —the 1977 one a p a rt, mainly due to  the spectacular
Table I I I . 20: Urban, Semi-urban and Rural Vote for ND in the 1977, 1981, 
1985, 1989A and 1989B National E lection 
(PASQK data in parentheses)
Area 1977 1981 1985 1989A 1989B
Urban 43.36 (25.25) 30.9 (48.2) 38.7 (44.9) 42.7 (36.4) 44.24 (39.19)
Semi-
urban 41.18 (26.27) 39.3 (46.7) 43.3 (44.9) 46.3 (39.5) 48.21 (40.39)
Rural 41.15 (24.59) 39.6 (48.4) 42.2 (47.0) 45.3 (41.7) 47.54 (42.24)
performance of the u l tr a - r ig h t  which fought th a t e lec tion  independently 
and absorbed the  bulk of i t s  vo te  in  these  a re a s . N evertheless, the  
party  enjoys a considerable p a rt of the urban vote as w ell, ranging from 
30.9 per cent in 1981 to  44.24 per cent in November 1989. The same can 
be said  a lso  fo r PASOK esp ec ia lly  a f te r  the June 1989 e lec tio n , while as 
regards i t s  record u n til  then, i t  seems tha t i t s  vote was s l ig h tly  more 
equally d is tr ib u te d  in a l l  the th ree  areas.
As regards the party  v o te rs ' socio-economic background, Table I I I . 21 
below gives a very illum inating  p ic tu re . I t  is  obvious tha t a t a l l  times 
ND appeals much more to  the upper and upper-middle social c la sses , and 
i t  re c e iv e s  a co n sid erab le  —but s t i l l  le s s e r  than PASQK's— support 
from the middle and lower-middle socia l groups (Ci and C2 in the Table). 
This trend is  fu r th e r  s treng thened  sh o r tly  befo re  the 1985 e le c t io n , 
when the  A/B group tends in te n se ly  to  vo te  fo r ND, the D/E one fo r 
PASOK, whereas both p a r tie s  appeal almost equally to the social groups 
in between. I t  should a lso  be added th a t during a l l  e lec tions a f te r
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Table I I I . 21: ND Voters* Socio-economic O rigins in the 1977, 1981 and 
1985 National and the 1984 Euro-Election 
(PASOK data  in parentheses)
Social
aroup* 1977 1981 1984 1985 b
A/B 46.9 (24.8) 25 (37) 43 .7 (27.8) 65.3 (19.9)
Ci 46.3 (26.9) 24 (39) 27. 9 (38.9) 39.8 (38.5)
Cz 46.5 (25.8) 28 (39 .5) 37.9 (38 .5) 39 . 9 (37.3)
D/E 36.8 (31 .9) 18 (39) 31.3 (39 .3) 32.1 (42.7)
Note (a): A/B re fe r  to  the upper and upper-middle c la sses , Ci to the 
middle c la sses , Cz to  the sk ille d  workers and D/E to  semi­
sk ille d  and unsk illed  workers.
(b ) : The data  fo r 1985 a re  based on an opinion po ll conducted by 
KPEE sho rtly  before the e le c tio n .
1974, younger and more educated vo ters  tend to  vote fo r PASOK, while 
ND's appeal is  stronger to  o lder and less  educated generations; and la s t 
th a t both p a rtie s  are  voted almost equally  by both men and women (the 
l a t t e r  being only s l ig h tly  more numerous in both cases).
By and la rg e , then , we may conclude th a t  ND's claim  th a t i t  is  a 
popular, c a tch -a ll pa rty , th a t does not id en tify  w ith n e ith e r represen ts 
the in te re s ts  of some p a r tic u la r  socia l c la ss  (fo r these po in ts see ch. 
5 below where the p a r ty 's  ideology is  d iscussed ) i s ,  to  an e x te n t, 
leg itim ate ; thus, a lleg a tio n s  of the opposition , namely th a t ND mainly 
rep resen ts and id e n t i f ie s  w ith  the in te r e s t s  o f the  h ig h er bourgeois 
c lasses and the big in d u stria l and merchant c a p ita l ,  cannot be taken for 
g ran ted . I t  should be remembered, however, th a t  the p a rty  perform s 
b e tte r  in the ru ra l and the semi-urban areas as i t  has tra d itio n a lly  
done, and that i t  appeals fa r  more to  the upper social s t r a ta  than i t  
does to  the lowest o n es .( 37 } This la s t  c h a ra c te r is t ic , i . e .  ND's poor 
performance among the working c la sses , although a t  a l l  times dismissed 
by the party  leadership, is  being acknowledged by a considerable p a rt of 
ND's rank and f i le  who, thus, themselves accept tha t th e ir  party  does 
not represent working-class in te re s ts  (see ch. 6 below).
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4. P o li t ic a l  Personnel and In terna l D ivisions
4.1 Absence of d is t in c tiv e  p o l i t ic a l  cu rren ts
When New Democracy announced i t s e l f  as a corrpletely new p o lit ic a l  
formation, d isassociated  from past p o l i t ic a l  figures and p rac tic e s , i t s  
proclamation on the p a r ty 's  foundation in 1974 declared, a lb e it  ra th e r 
vaguely, th a t i t  would be composed of not only experienced and sound, 
b u t a ls o  p ro g re s s iv e  and r a d ic a l  p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s .  None of these  
p o l i t ic a l  forces was mentioned by name, nor has the party  ever claimed 
to  be the continuation of any p a r tic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  c u rre n t .( 38* Instead, 
i t s  ch ief claim was th a t New Democracy was no mere party , but a broad 
and v i ta l  p o l i t ic a l  fro n t.
The data presented above on the p o l i t ic a l  background of ND's early  
parliam entary group and cen tra l ccnm ittees suggest tha t the core of the 
p a r t y 's  p o l i t i c i a n s  came from  th e  p re -c o u p  ERE. They d id  n o t 
predominate, however, since a  good many newcomers succeeding in g e ttin g  
e lec ted  and so were able to  give the party  a more youthful, modern, and 
technocratic  image. ND deputies previously  a f f i l ia te d  to  the pre-coup 
Centre Union were few in number. We have a lso  seen th a t, as time went 
by, MPs who had s ta r te d  out w ith  ERE o r o th e r  pre-coup p o l i t i c a l  
formations kept becoming fewer and fewer, and the 1974 and o ther, la te r  
newcomers came to predominate w ithin the party .
F i r s t  and forem ost though, what re p re s e n te d  and a ssu re d  bo th  
continuation and renewal in New Democracy was the p a te rn a l is t ic , a l l -  
powerful, and charism atic p e rso n ality  of Karamanlis' him self, a t lea st 
fo r as long as he led  the p a r ty . C ontinuously e le c te d  to  parliam ent 
s in ce  1935, having been prime m in is te r  fo r  e ig h t consecu tive  years 
(1955-1963) as the founder and leader of ERE, and then in self-inposed  
ex ile  in Paris fo r another eleven years, he returned in 1974 to govern 
for the next six  years. Not only h is  supporters but even h is  p o l i t ic a l
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opponents considered him to  be the most experienced, and perhaps the 
only p o lit ic ia n  capable of undertaking the d i f f ic u l t  task  of s teerin g  
Greece through the  t r a n s i t io n  from d ic ta to r s h ip  to  t r u ly  dem ocratic 
ru le . Whereas h is  1955 ERE had simply been a rec o n s titu tio n  of Marshal 
Papagos' Greek R ally , when he founded New Democracy in 1974 he re l ie d  on 
not only seme of h is  c lo ses t ERE-colleagues, but a lso  brought in to  the 
p a r ty  new p o l i t i c i a n s ,  who d id  not embody any p a r t ic u la r  p o l i t i c a l  
cu rren t but endowed ND with an up -to -date , modem and Europe-directed 
outlook, so fu rth er d istancing  i t  from the conservative camp's pre-coup 
image. I t  is  only reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  the  p a r ty  d id  indeed 
combine both continuation and renewal in  i t s  ranks.
Furthermore, one cannot speak of the ex istence of p o l i t ic a l  curren ts 
in side  ND, apart from th a t co n stitu ted  by ex-ERE p o l i t i c ia n s . ( 39} In any 
case, the ERE element was never strong le t  alone dominant, both because 
Karamanlis him self d id  not want ND to  be the h e ir  of ERE —he f ie rc e ly  
denounced such a l l e g a t io n s — and b ecau se  th a t  g ro u p 's  p o te n t i a l  
influence was d ilu te d  by the re la t iv e ly  high percentage of newcomers. 
The absence of p o l i t ic a l  cu rren ts w ith in  the p arty  is  corroborated by 
the answers given by rank -and-file  p a rty  members in the Department of 
L a r is sa  in  1989. The re le v a n t d a ta  a re  assembled in  Table I I I . 22 
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Table I I I .22: Influence/S trength  of P o li t ic a l  Currents w ithin ND (1989)
P o li t ic a l  Ideoloav number %
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal 122 77.22
National Radical Union 24 15.19
Greek Rally 11 06.96
Venizelism 10 06.33
Centre Union (pre-1967) 10 06.33
Popular Party 7 04.43
A n ti-d ic ta to rsh ip  res is tan ce 1 .63
Other 10 06.32
Total 195 (% out of 158) 123.41
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We can see th a t the overwhelming m ajority  (77.22 per cent) of the 
p a rty  members considered  K aram anlis' personal appeal the  main fo rce  
holding New Democracy together in 1974. A l i t t l e  over 15 per cent of 
them thought th a t  ND was a ls o  in fluenced  by ERE; very  few saw any 
ideological evidence of Marshal Papagos' Greek Rally, and even fewer of 
Venizelism and the Centre Union. One member only answered th a t a n ti-  
jun ta  res is tan ce  forces had played th e ir  p a rt in the c rea tion  of the 
party .
Table I I I . 23 below fu rth e r supports our argument. Party-members were 
asked whether they considered  ND the  h e ir  and descendant of ERE, o r 
whether they thought of i t  as a new p o l i t ic a l  fo rce .* 41> Almost 83 per 
cen t of them answered th a t  they  viewed ND as something new in  Greek 
p o l i t i c s  (as a g a in s t the  e a r l i e r  77 p er cen t who thought K arananlis' 
charism a d e c is iv e  fo r  ND's a p p e a l) , whereas only 22 members ( ju s t  
under 14 per cent) believed i t  to  be a continuation of the pre-coup 
ERE, compared to  a l i t t l e  over the 15 per cent of Table I I I . 22 who had 
a thought th a t ERE had ex e rted  some in flu en ce  on New Democracy. 
Considering the p ic tu re  as i t  emerges from these Tables, and taking in to  
account the  e a r l i e r  d a ta  on the  p o l i t i c a l  background of the  p a r ty 's  
parliam entary and non-parliam entary personnel as well as ND's rank- 
a n d -file  perceptions and a tt i tu d e s  towards i t ,  one may conclude th a t, 
a s id e  from a minor in flu en ce  e x e rted  by ERE, no e x te rn a l p o l i t i c a l  
current or force has played any s ig n if ic a n t ro le  in ND's c rea tion  and
Table I I I . 23: ND's Rank-and-File Members' Perception 
of th e ir  Party (1989)
number %
New Democracy is  the h e ir  and descendant of ERE 22 13.92
New Democracy is  a new p o li t ic a l  force 131 82.91
Other 5 03.17
Total 158 100.00
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fu n c tio n in g . From i t s  e a r l i e s t  beginnings the  p a rty  was a p o l i t i c a l  
in s t i tu t io n  in sp ire d  and c re a te d  so le ly  by K aram anlis*421 as a new 
p o li t ic a l  force in Greek p o l i t i c s .* 43 *
4.2 C lientelism
As mentioned already , during the ea rly  post-war years and under the 
ERE government, patronage networks and p a tro n -c lie n t  re la t io n s h ip s  
c o n tin u e d  to  p la y  a  dom inan t r o l e .  P a r ty  n o ta b le s  w ere l e f t  
unchallenged, and i t  was through personal re la tio n s  th a t the local party  
barons secured the popular vote both fo r themselves and fo r the party . 
In ERE p a r t ic u la r ly ,  (but a lso  in  th e  C entre Union, the  o th e r  major 
p a r ty  a t  th a t tim e), in tr a -p a r ty  o rg a n isa tio n  was n o n -e x is te n t; in 
consequence, party  candidates and deputies owed th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  careers 
to  the party  le a d e r 's  favour as well as to th e ir  estab lished  e lec to ra l 
c lie n te le .
This s i tu a t io n  cannot be sa id  to  have changed in the  immediate 
afterm ath of the junta , since New Democracy could n e ith e r re ly  on nor in 
the time develop some kind of separate  party  organisation . I t  is  not 
u n fa ir, then, to argue th a t in the e a rly  years a f te r  1974 ND MPs managed 
to  get e lected  e ith e r  by crea ting  and/or preserving a personal e lec to ra l 
c lie n te le , or by enjoying the support and help of the party  lead er.* 44} 
Circumstances began to  change when the party  endeavoured to  develop i t s  
g rass-roo ts  o rganisation , and the l a t t e r  s ta r te d  to  have a say in the 
parliam en tary  c a n d id a te s ' nom ination, a lthough  the f in a l decision is  
s t i l l  made by the  p a rty  le a d e r s h ip .( 45 * N evertheless, i t  is  worth 
m en tion ing  th a t  in  th e  June 1989 e le c t  io n ,* 46} ou t o f th e  68 ND 
newcomers, four were cen tra  1-ccnmittee members and another two had stood 
as candidates, two had been p residen ts of the p a r ty 's  youth organisation 
(ONNED) in  the  p a s t ,  s ix  were p r e s id e n ts  o f v a r io u s  d ep a rtm en ta l 
comm ittees, two had been general d i r e c to r s  of the  p a r ty , one was
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responsible fo r ND's re la tio n s  with the mass media, and one belonged to  
a sp e c ia l p ro fe s s io n a l p a rty  o rg an isa tio n  (EKO) —alto g e th e r eighteen 
deputies, o r 12.41 per cent of ND's parliam entary group, can be said  to  
have emerged and secured th e ir  sea ts  v ia  the party  organisation .
E sp ec ia lly  as regard s cen tra l-com m ittee  members, i t  can be argued 
tha t th e ir  r i s e  w ithin ND's hierarchy was c e rta in ly  not a product of 
c lie n te lis m . We have seen th a t  even the  appointed cen tra l-com m ittee  
members in 1975 owed th e ir  posts e n tire ly  to Karamanlis' d isc re tio n ; i t  
was the personal support of the p a rty  leader th a t brought than on to 
tha t f i r s t  cen tra l committee. Later, a f te r  the f i r s t  and p a r tic u la r ly  
the second party  congress, i t  was th e ir  estab lished  ro le  and presence in 
the party  organ isation , but a lso  to  a  considerable extent th e ir  loyal 
attachment to  the leader (or seme p a r tic u la r  leading member) th a t helped 
them g re a t ly  to  a cq u ire  a p lace  a t  the  c e n tra l  com m ittee .( 47 * I t  is  
noteworthy th a t  among the  1991 cen tra l-com m ittee  non-parliam entary  
members, on ly  th re e  (who had been form er ERE d e p u tie s )  can be 
considered as owing th e ir  accession to |p e r s o n a l  c r i t i c a l  c l i e n t e l e s .
I t  would be m islead ing , though, to  conclude th a t c l i e n t e l i s t i c  
p rac tices  and p a tro n -c lien t re la tio n s  have disappeared a lto g e th e r. Not 
su rp rising ly  i t  is  a t  the parliam entary level —tra d itio n a lly  the domain 
of c l i e n t e l i s t i c  r e l a t i o n s — where th e se  p r a c t ic e s  can s t i l l  be 
discerned today. A considerable number of ND d e p u tie s ,( 48 * espec ia lly  
w h ile  th e  p a r ty  i s  in  governm ent, make re q u e s ts  to  m in is te r s  o r 
endeavour themselves to  s a t i s f y  th e i r  v o te r s ' demands. These u su a lly  
revolve around g e tt in g  a job in the  c iv i l  se rv ice  ( th is  is  the  most 
common re q u e s t) ,  s o r t in g  o u t o r b y p ass in g  b u re a u c ra t ic  re d  ta p e , 
favourable p o s itio n in g  of a c iv i l  employee o r a m il i ta ry  o f f ic e r ,  
e t c . (49) The conclusion cannot be avoided that even today, a lb e it  to  a 
lesse r ex ten t, the coun try 's  p o l i t ic a l  system bears the imprint of the 
m entality  and p rac tices  of the 1950s and '60s, and th a t the so -ca lled
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ro u sfe ti system continues to  function as the determining fac to r in the 
careers of many prospective p o l i t i c ia n s . ( 50 *
A fin a l point should be made here, before we proceed to  examine the 
existence of tendencies and fac tions w ithin the party . The s itu a tio n  was 
very d iffe re n t between ND and PASOK, which by and large did not include 
MPs or cen tra l-ca im ittee  members from estab lished  p o lit ic a l  fam ilies in 
i t s  r a n k s .( 51 * In New Democracy th e re  were a ls o  prominent p o l i t i c a l  
p e rso n a litie s  —espec ia lly  among those who had been a f f i l ia te d  with the 
pre-coup EE®, or who had in h erited  th e ir  fam ily 's p o l it ic a l  c lie n te le — 
who enjoyed a r e la tiv e  independence v is-c i-v is the party  and the leader, 
and used th e i r  own personal mechanisms to  ensure th e i r  e le c t io n . I t  
should be reca lled  th a t, fo r example, the 1981 ND's parliam entary group 
included two former prime m in iste rs (P. Kanellopoulos and G. R a ll is ) , 
and many e x -m in is te r s  (E. A v e ro ff , A. K aram anlis th e  b ro th e r  o f 
Constantine, E. K efaloyiannis, C. M itso takis, J . Boutos, G. Stam atis, 
and A. T aliadouros, to  m ention bu t a  few), most of them e le c te d  to  
p a rlia m e n t c o n tin u o u s ly  s in c e  1946. They were head ing  e x te n s iv e  
p o l i t i c a l  c l i e n te le s ,  and A. K aram anlis, M itso tak is , and Boutos a re  
s t i l l  MPs,(52) while the r e s t  have bequeathed both th e ir  c lie n te le  and 
th e ir  parliam entary seat to  c lose r e l a t iv e s . ( 531 To sum up, seme of the 
ND MPs continue a kind of p o l i t ic a l  tra d itio n , which means th a t, unlike 
th e ir  PASOK colleagues, they enjoy a r e la tiv e  independence and autonomy 
towards th e ir  party  and the leader —p rec ise ly  because they come from 
e s ta b lish e d  and well-known p o l i t i c a l  fa m ilie s , have held  im portant 
governmental p o s ts  in  the  p a s t ,  and have c re a te d  and m aintained a 
p o lit ic a l  c lie n te le  by d is tr ib u tin g  sp o ils  and favours to  th e ir  vo ters , 
thus sa fe g u a rd in g  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  and h o ld in g  o r t r a n s fe r r in g  the 
parliam entary seat as a personal e le c to ra l f ie f .  Although these party  
notables by no means enjoy the autonomy of the so -called  tzak ia  fam ilies 
of the la te  nineteenth  and ea rly  tw entieth  century Greek p o li t ic a l
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o lig a rch y , th e i r  r e l a t iv e  independence v is -c i-v is  the  p a rty  and the 
leader is  s t i l l  d isc e rn ib le , and more so since Karamanlis' accession to  
the Presidency of the Republic in 1980, as we shall try  to  show in the 
next section .
4.3 Factions and tendencies w ithin New Democracy
We have already seen th a t what accounted most fo r New Democracy's 
c re a tio n  and in fluenced  th e  image p ro je c te d  by the  p a r ty  was the 
p e r s o n a l i ty  o f i t s  fo u n d er; no o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  c u rre n ts  o r major 
grouping of p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s , p layed a recogn iseab le  r o le ,  w ith  the  
exception of ex-ERE p o lit ic ia n s . N evertheless, such tendencies d id  e x is t 
from the moment the party  was created  and, a t  times, there  were fac tions 
as w ell. 154} But as long as the party  remained in o ff ic e , fac tions and 
tendencies were kept behind the scenes, overshadowed by both the day-to- 
day business of governing and the very presence of Karamanlis who, over 
and above h is  p o sitio n  as unquestionably the dominant p a r ty -p o lit ic a l 
figure , had become vested w ith immense au th o rity  as the man unanimously 
considered as having almost singlehandedly resto red  democracy in Greece. 
But when he withdrew from the party  leadership to  stand fo r e lec tio n  as 
P residen t of the  R epublic, and more so, when ND had lo s t  the  1981 
e lec tion  and PASOK took o ff ic e , in te rna l party  d iv isions could no longer 
be shut away. This section  w ill be concerned, f i r s t ,  with the th ree  main 
factions tha t arose inside a t  one time or another and, second, with the 
main in tra -p a rty  tendencies, which can be considered to have remained 
more or less the same since the foundation of New Democracy.
I t  was as e a r ly  as June 1976 when an autonomous p o l i t i c a l  group 
within the then fledg ling  p arty  o rganisation  appeared in public , under 
the name of the Volvi Movement. ( 55} This movement demanded g re a te r  
democracy in s id e  th e  p a r ty ,  more dem o cra tic  o rg a n is a t io n  and r e ­
o r ie n ta t io n  of the  p a r ty 's  p o l i t i c a l  ta rg e ts .  According to  a leading 
member of th is  group,
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" . . . t h e  Volvi Movement meant to  op e ra te  l ik e  an i n t r a ­
party  opposition and, to  a  c e r ta in  ex ten t, an opposition 
to  Karamanlis him self. The movement aimed a t the p a r ty 's  
o rg a n isa tio n  on a dem ocratic b a s is ,  a t  the d ism issa l of 
the  o ld  p o l i t i c a l  tz a k ia  f a m i l ie s ,  and th e  a d o p tio n , 
i n s t i tu t io n a l i s a t io n  of and f u l l  resp ec t fo r in tra -p a rty  
dem ocratic procedures — in o th e r  words a t  the  p a r ty 's  
E uropeanisation  and m odern isa tion , d isentanglem ent from 
the p e rs o n a li ty  of i t s  lead er (p resen t and fu tu re ) ,  and 
f in a l ly  a t  i t s  trams format ion from a personal i s t i c  party  
to  a party  based on se t p r in c ip le s" .* 561
The Volvi Movement was manned by young re fo rm is t amd r e la t iv e ly  
unknown party-members;* 571 no MPs of ND or upper-cadre party  o f f ic ia ls  
ever joined i t ,  and maybe th is  explains why the party  leadership  did 
noth ing  about i t ,  a t  le a s t  in  the  beginning . But when, th re e  years 
la te r ,  the movement held i t s  f i r s t  congress in L arissa ,* 58 * Karamanlis 
r e a c te d  s h a rp ly  and e x p e lle d  a l l  p a r ty  members who had a c t iv e ly  
p a r t ic ip a te d . The blow was s tro n g  and e f f e c t iv e :  most o f the  Volvi 
syirpathisers abandoned the movement to  re tu rn  to the party  ranks, so 
tha t the fac tion  f in a lly  d is in teg ra ted . Nevertheless, i t s  demands for 
in t r a - p a r ty  o rg a n is a t io n  and a d o p tio n  o f / r e s p e c t  fo r  d em o cra tic  
procedures remained fu l ly  a l iv e ,  e s p e c ia l ly  among the  p a r ty 's  g ra s s ­
ro o ts , thus fu n c tio n in g  as a tendency towards dem ocratisa t ion and 
modernisation. Moreover, as a tendency the Volvi Movement contributed  to 
the re a liz a tio n  of the f i r s t  party  congress four months la te r ,  and to 
the fu rther development of ND's democratic organisation .
I t  was a f te r  ND had lo st the 1981 e lec tio n , tha t MPs were forming 
major groupings around leading party  figures who were carpeting  for the 
l e a d e r s h ip .  A lth o u g h  th e s e  g ro u p in g s  w ere l e s s  f a c t i o n s  than  
tendencies,*59} i t  is  a p p o site  to  examine a t  th is  p o in t the  s p e c if ic  
case of C. S tephanopoulos1 p a rty  o f Democratic Renewal (DIANA).*60’ 
Stephanopoulos did not h e s ita te  to resign  from the party  in 1985, when 
i t s  leadersh ip  re fu sed  in te rn a l  d isc u ss io n s  of why ND had lo s t  the 
e le c t io n s  fo r  th e  second t im e ;* 61} a few days l a t e r ,  he founded
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Democratic Renewal, which was imm ediately jo ined  by ano ther n ine  ND 
MPs. < 6 2 >
DIANA.'s main c r itic ism  of ND was, f i r s t ly ,  th a t ND's 41 per cent of 
the  vo te  in the  1985 e le c t io n  by no means c o n s titu te d  a p o l i t i c a l  
v ic to ry  for the party ; and, secondly, th a t the ND-leadership claim  was 
fa lse  th a t the 1985 e lec tio n  had been marred by fraud and v io le n ce .‘ 63} 
DIANA suggested tha t the conservative camp should acquire and develop a 
more modern and innovative outlook; th a t i t  should acknowledge i t s  past 
m is tak es  and make a f r e s h  s t a r t ,  b a s in g  i t s e l f  on renew al and 
m eritocracy o r, in o ther words, on new persons, new methods, and new 
id e a s .* 64’ Furtherm ore, DIANA accused ND of abandoning the working 
people, g iv ing  the  im pression th a t  i t  m ainly rep re se n ts  u p p e r-c la ss  
bourgeois social s t r a ta ;  of d istancing  i t s e l f  frcm the basic  ideological 
p rinc ip les and social issues as recognised by the Chalkidiki Congress, 
and of having become transformed in to  a p e rso n a lis tic  party . F ina lly , i t  
declared th a t there was as yet no room fo r a conservative party  in Greek 
p o l i t i c s ,  s ince  th e re  was too much s t i l l  to  be done, m odified , and 
improved, and th a t  DIANA i t s e l f  was a n y th in g  bu t a c o n s e rv a tiv e  
p a r ty .*65 }
Before i t s  emergence as a p a r ty , DIANA had never opera ted  as a 
faction  w ithin ND ranks (and n e ith e r had the National Front founded in 
1977). Although Stephanopoulos d id  e x e rt some in fluence  on sev era l 
members of the p a r ty 's  parliam entary group,*66 } th is  was more due to  the 
fact tha t as a prominent p o l i t ic a l  figu re  of the party  he might r i s e  to 
the leadership one day when past lo y a ltie s  would be rewarded, than to 
any p o litic a l- id e o lo g ica l considerations w hatsoever.*67’ This, we th ink, 
is  the reason why those p o lit ic ia n s  who formed DIANA had not operated as 
a faction  w ithin ND: lacking p o l i t ic a l  and ideological coherence, they 
kept a low p ro file  as long as they remained in ND, w aiting fo r th e ir  
leader to make a move. When he d id , they speculated that a llia n c e  with
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Stephanopoulos and DIANA., would be advantageous fo r  th e i r  personal 
p o l i t ic a l  in te re s ts ;  the selfsame considerations prompted some of them 
la te r  to leave DIANA and re jo in  ND.
By and large then, DIANA was nothing more than a personal c lique  and 
something of a p o l i t ic a l  r is k  fo r i t s  leader when he openly disagreed 
with the ND leadership and i t s  p o lic ie s . Having le f t  ND, Stephanopoulos1 
fu tu re  p o l i t i c a l  e x is te n ce  was a t  s ta k e , but he d id  succeed to  the 
extent th a t DIANA has secured one parliam entary seat in every e lec tio n  
i t  has c o n te s ted .( 68} I f  we take in to  account tha t there has never been 
a s im ila r  case  in  PASOK, th e  o th e r  major p a r ty ,* 69} we may f a i r l y  
conclude tha t prominent p o l i t ic a l  figu res in ND enjoy a c e rta in  autonomy 
v is -A -v is  th e  p a r ty  le a d e r ,  and th a t  to  some e x te n t  i t  i s  s t i l l  
c lien te lism  and patronage networks, ra th e r  than party  organ isation  and 
ideology, that make a p o l it ic ia n  and secure a sea t in parliam ent.
As we sh a ll  see in  more d e ta i l  in  ch. 5 below where the p a r ty 's  
ideology is  examined, in February 1985 New Democracy veered away from 
i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a c c ep ted  id e o lo g ic a l  p r in c ip le s  tow ards more 
in d iv id u a lis tic  and neo-libera l/neo-conservative  ideas (much lik e  those 
of Mrs Thatcher and the  post-1979 B r i t i s h  C onservative p a r ty ) ,  by 
launching a c lea r-cu t and coherent d ec la ra tio n , named "A New Proposal 
fo r Freedom”.* 70* P rio r to  th is ,  a tendency w ithin the party  ranks was 
propagating  s im ila r  n e o - l ib e ra l  id e a s , which were focused m ainly on 
s ta te  non-interference in the secto r of the economy. I t  took though 
th is  tendency sev era l years  to  become a proper fa c tio n , and from 
February 1992 onwards i t  was the f i r s t  de fa c to  recognised  fa c tio n  
w ith in  ND, under th e  name of th e  L ib e ra l Forum (P h i le le f th e r o  
Forum) . ( 71>
Unlike the Volvi Movement and DIANA, both of which functioned  
u l t im a te ly  as a k ind  o f in te r n a l  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  p a r ty  le a d e r  
(Karamanlis and M itsotakis re sp ec tiv e ly ), the Liberal Forum was founded
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on wider ideological and po licy  issues, and i t  was by no means another 
a ttack  base against the leadership . As i t s  founder and fac tion  leader A. 
Andrianopoulos has s ta ted ,
"The L ibera l Forum c o n s is ts  of a group of s c i e n t i s t s ,  
tra d e  u n io n is ts  and cadres from the  business and youth 
secto r in general, and intends to  p ra ip t the government to  
co n sis ten tly  enforce th e  l ib e r a l  p o l ic ie s  i t  was e le c te d  
fo r in the f i r s t  p lace. In th is  sense I believe th a t the 
L ibera l Forum expresses a p o l i t i c a l  tendency, a lread y  
e s ta b lis h e d  w ith in  the  ND ranks . . .  a  tendency th a t  has 
been id en tifie d  and recognised in  parliam ent by the prime 
m in iste r h i m s e l f ( 72 >
And as another member has put i t ,
"We not only belong to  New Democracy b u t, through th e  
L ibera l Forum, we s tru g g le  fo r  the  p re se rv a tio n  of i t s  
l i b e r a l  id e a s  t h a t  have  l a t e l y  been  fa d in g  in  our 
camp". <73 >
Despite the de facto  recognition of the L iberal Forum fac tio n , i t  is  
not yet possib le  to  present a  complete p ic tu re  of i t ,  since there  is  no 
in form ation  concerning sev era l re le v a n t issu e s  —such as th e  exact 
number of MPs a f f i l ia te d  w ith i t ,  i t s  in te rn a l o rganisation  and how i t  
t r ie s  to  fu rther i t s  p o lic ie s . Nonetheless, i t  can be said  tha t a t  lea s t 
ten ND MPs belong to or a t  lea s t sympathise with the Liberal Forum;( 74} 
th a t  they seek m ainly to  en fo rce  and a c c e le ra te  p r iv a tis a tio n  of the 
public  secto r of the economy and l ib e ra lis a tio n  of the m rk e t from s ta te  
in terven tion ; and that they do not h e s ita te  to  question the government 
in parliam ent when they consider the  l a t t e r  to  be launching p o lic ie s  
adverse to the above-mentioned issues. Overall then, and a f te r  the early  
d is in te g ra tio n  of the Volvi Movement and the defection  of Stephanopoulos 
and the  DIANA p o l i t i c i a n s , the  L ibera l Forum c o n s t i tu te s  the  only 
organised group w ithin New Democracy. Tendencies, however, have ex isted  
in the party  ever since i t s  foundation, and i t  is  th is  point on which we 
sha ll focus our a tten tio n  in what follows.
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New Democracy as a pa rty  has never o f f ic ia l ly  accepted the existence 
of d issen ting  tendencies in i t s  ranks. ND’s leading members on the  other 
hand, have frequently  acknowledged one o r the o ther such, and have even 
taken sides. As one leading ND member has put i t ,
" . . . i n  every d e m o c ra tica lly  o rg a n ise d  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  
th e re  can and must e x is t  v a rio u s  d i f f e r e n t  ten d en c ies , 
although they should never aim a t  sp lin te rin g  the party .
There were tendencies w ithin ND even when Karamanlis was 
the party  leader and prime m in is te r ." ‘ 75}
Frcm i t s  foundation in 1974 u n til  today, New Democracy has comprised 
four d is t in c t  m jo r  tendencies which, although not c le a rly  co n ste lla ted  
frcm the o u tse t, can now be id e n tif ie d . They came in to  being m in ly  due 
to  d i f f e r e n t  p e rsp e c tiv e s  on id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s  which, however, 
frequently  served only as the p re tex t fo r temporary ta c tic a l  a llian c es  
among leading party  menbers to  safeguard or enhance th e ir  power position  
w ithin the pa rty , o r fo r purely personal attachments of ordinary  party  
members to  prominent ND figu res.
I t  must always be remembered th a t  i t  was Karamanlis* p e rs o n a lity  
tha t had played the dominant ro le  in ND's c rea tion , early  development, 
and adoption of an ideological id e n tity  no m atter how vague. Except for 
some minor influence exerted by the old ERE p o lit ic ia n s  —who, however, 
constitu ted  the p a r ty 's  backbone in the early  years of i t s  existence— 
th e re  were no o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  c u r r e n ts  w h a tso ev e r. So i t  i s  not 
s u rp r is in g  th a t  i t  was p re c is e ly  K aram anlis' charism atic  pe rsonality  
th a t became the focus of the  f i r s t  and, a t  the  time the  s tro n g e s t 
tendency w ithin New Democracy. A good many leading as well as rank-and- 
f i l e  party  members declared themselves to  be "K aram anliists":
"I consider myself a s te a d fa s tly  K aranan liist, because I 
believe he is  one of the most p res tig io u s p e rso n a litie s  of 
the century in Europe and the g rea te s t in our country, and 
b e c a u s e  I a b s o l u t e l y  a g r e e  w i th  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  
p h ilo so p h y ... I t  i s  un th inkab le  fo r  th e re  to  be a n t i -  
Karam anl i i s t s  in  ND. But i f  t h e r e  a r e ,  th e y  a r e  
fo o ls . . . " . ( 76’
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T his u n ifo rm  stam p o f  "K aram an liism " i d e n t i f i e d  a l l  th o s e  
p o l i t i c ia n s  and p a r ty  members who f e l t  a s tro n g  lo y a lty  to  th e i r  
le a d e r 's  p e rsonality , but i t  a lso  bore a d is t in c t  ideological in p rin t of 
i t s  own. As the f i r s t  pa rty  congress in Chalkidiki (1979) declared,
"New Democracy believes in free  democratic economy. . .  but 
economic freedom cannot be u n lim ited . I t  must combine 
personal w ith  so c ia l  i n te r e s t .  And i t  is  e x ac tly  th i s  
e q u ilib riu m  th a t  ND's economic philosophy is  s t r iv in g  
fo r" . ‘ 77 ’
O v e ra ll, then , the  "K aram anliist" tendency includes a l l  those who 
b e lie v e  th a t New Democracy's ideology is  one of so -c a lle d  ra d ic a l  
l ib e ra lism  o r , to  use an ND d e p u ty 's  term inology, " . . . i t  is  so c ia l 
libera lism , w ithin which the element of social ju s tic e  p re v a ils " .* 78’
The second tendency, f a i r l y  c le a r  even when the  p a rty  was f i r s t  
c reated , was th a t of the u ltra -R ig h t. I t  included a l l  those who favoured 
the re tu rn  of the King, those who had in various ways collaborated  with 
the d ic ta to rsh ip , and fan a tica l anti-ccm nunists longing for the re tu rn  
o f th e  p re -c o u p , p a t e r n a l i s t i c ,  e x c lu s io n is t  and a u th o r i t a t iv e  
conservative ru le . This tendency grew in to  the sp lin te r  party  of the 
N ational Front and, as mentioned a lread y  fought the  1977 e le c t io n  
separately  and secured five  sea ts  in parliam ent. In 1981, in view of 
PASOK's e lec to ra l v ic to ry , most of i t s  p o lit ic ia n s  returned to ND and, 
to g e th e r w ith  some of the  l a t t e r ' s  h a rd lin e rs , c o n s titu ted  an u l t r a -  
Right tendency in s id e  the  p a r ty . Although not numerous, th is  remains 
u n til  today. Especially  among ND candidates in the June and November 
1989 parliam entary e le c tio n s , one could find p o lit ic ia n s  who promised to 
work fo r  th e  j a i l e d  ju n ta  le a d e r s ' r e l e a s e ,  o th e r s  who had h e ld  
governmental and higher c iv i l  posts during the d ic ta to rsh ip , ex-National 
Front can d id a tes , and members of ro y a l is t  o rgan isa tions .*79’ Although 
they troubled and annoyed the party  organisation and the moderate party  
members, th e se  u l t r a - R ig h t  p o l i t i c i a n s  were no t d e le te d  from the
161
e le c to ra l l i s t s ,  and seme of them even succeeded in g e ttin g  e lected . 
Today, th is  tendency is  the weakest w ithin  the party  ranks, but i t  does 
s t i l l  e x is t and occasionally  attem pts to  make i t s  presence f e l t . * 80 *
The two tendencies above —of Karamanliism and the  u l tr a -R ig h t— 
predominated w ithin ND fo r almost ten years u n til  C. M itsotakis became 
the  fo u rth  p a rty  lead er in  1984. Under h is  d ire c tio n , New Democracy 
moved c lo s e r  to  neo-conservatism  and adopted n e o -lib e ra l ideas, thus 
s h i f t in g  i t s  id e o lo g ic a l  b a la n c e  from s o c ia l  j u s t i c e  to  p e rso n a l 
econcmic freedom. I t  d istanced i t s e l f  frcm s ta te  interventionism  in  the 
econcmy, denouncing the s ta te  as inept in  the ro le  of entrepreneur, and 
exalted  the v ir tu e s  of p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e .  During the e lec tio n  of 1985, 
the party  acquired the e p ith e t of " l ib e ra l" 181 * and the new ideological 
p rin c ip le s , vAiich to  seme extent amended the ones adopted in  1979, were 
sanctioned by the second party  congress in Salonica in  1986. Today, a 
so c ia l- lib e ra l tendency may be sa id  to  predominate in ND, since even a 
good many "Karamanliists" now acknowledge, whether openly o r no t, that 
the s ta te  should not intervene in the economy to the extent i t  has done 
in the p ast; nevertheless, i t s  ro le  and in tervention  is  s t i l l  considered 
e ssen tia l and i t  is  not dismissed a lto g e th re r.
A side e ffe c t of the l ib e ra ls ' r i s e  to  predominance w ithin ND has 
been the encouragement of a fourth  tendency, which had s t i r r e d  in the 
p a rty  ranks ever s in ce  1976.*82} This is  the  so -c a lle d  n e o -l ib e ra l  
tendency tha t advocates complete disentanglement of the s ta te  from the 
economy, roughly p ro jec ting  Mrs T hatcher's p o lic ie s  in Great B rita in  as 
i t s  model. This tendency has recen tly  become transformed in to  a fac tion , 
the already mentioned L ibera l Forum headed by A. A ndrianopoulos. The 
neo -libera l p o lit ic ia n s  in the L iberal Forum co n stitu te  a small m inority 
in the party . They do not exert s ig n if ic a n t influence on shaping ND's 
governmental p o lic ie s ; on the contrary , they concentrate on safeguarding 
t h e i r  p o s i t io n  so as to  av o id  b e in g  c r i t i c i s e d  fo r  id e o lo g ic a l
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defection, fo r scaring the e le c to ra te  by advocating u l tr a - l ib e ra l  ideas, 
and for covertly  harboring an in c lin a tio n  to  sp lin te r  ND.<83>
I t  must no t be though t th a t  th e  te n d e n c ie s  p re s e n te d  above 
c o n s t i tu te  s o l id  blocks in the  p a r ty  ran k s. Even when they id e n tify  
themselves with some p a r tic u la r  tendency, ND p o litic ia n s  do not feel 
tie d  to  i t ,  n e ith e r do they always behave p o l i t ic a l ly  as the tendency 
they id e n tify  w ith would imply. A s t r ik in g  example i l lu s t r a t in g  th is  
point is  the party  e lec tions fo r the leader. As we sha ll see in the 
following chapters, while examining ND's organisation , leadership , and 
ideology, except fo r  the  f i r s t  le a d e rsh ip  co n te s t between R ail i s  and 
Averoff, the o ther two (between Averoff, Stephanopoulos and Boutos, and 
between M itso tak is  and Stephanopoulos) were not a t  a l l  fought over 
ideological issues as might be expected. So the reasons th a t decided 
the ND deputies to  vote fo r the one or the other candidate had more to 
do with ta c tic a l  a llian c es  fo r safeguarding and strengthening th e ir  own 
personal power p osition  w ithin the p a rty , than with th e ir  ideological 
following of a p a r tic u la r  candidate.
Nevertheless, there a re  w ithin ND ideological d ifferences among i t s  
leading members as w ell as among the  ra n k -a n d -f ile , and have played 
th e ir  part in the creation  of tendencies. P a rtic u la rly  since Karamanlis' 
accession  to  the  P residency , however, i t  has ra th e r  been personal 
antagonisms th a t, d isguised as ideological d ifferences, have led to the 
creation of various groups. The ccnpet i t  ion between these groups, and 
between lead ing  members fo r  g re a te r  in flu en ce  over the party  and for 
winning substan tia l support (e ith e r  in preparation  for future leadership 
contests, or for imposing th e i r  pe rsonal in te r e s ts  and p o lic ie s )  has 
often cut across purely ideological d iv is ions and d ifferences. Also, as 
p e rso n a l an tagonism s and t a c t i c a l  a l l i a n c e s  changed w ith  tim e , 
ideological d iv isions and id e n tif ic a tio n s  changed likew ise .( 84’
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5. C onclusion
Ever since the early  days of New Democracy, i t s  leader has in s is ted  
th a t i t  was a com pletely new p o l i t i c a l  form ation and a new fo rce  in 
Greek p o l i t ic s ,  denying the loud claims of h is  opponents —and even of 
some of h is  supporters— th a t New Democracy was simply the old ERE under 
a new name. Our examination of ND's p o l i t ic a l  personnel has shown, we 
b e lie v e , th a t  the  p a rty  was no t a  mere revamping of the  pre-coup 
National Radical Union. I t  has c a rried  a q u ite  d is t in c t  inp rin t of i t s  
own, com prising w ith in  i t s  ranks elem ents of both c o n tin u a tio n  and 
renewal, so p re sen tin g  a very  d i f f e r e n t  outlook  from both EK/ND and 
PASOK, of whom the  former continued  the  p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t io n  of i t s  
predecessor, and the l a t t e r  in s t i tu te d  a dramatic renewal of personnel 
a t both the parliam entary and the o rgan isational level.
Our a n a ly s is  of ND's can d id a tes  fo r  and d ep u ties  a f t e r  the  1974 
e lec tion  has shown, however, th a t Karamanlis' urgent e f fo r ts  to present 
New Democracy as pure and unadulterated were questionable: one th ird  of 
i t s  candidates, and even more of i t s  e lec ted  MPs had been a f f i l ia te d  
with ERE. They owed th e ir  inclusion on the party  l i s t s  to Karamanlis 
him self, and in fac t co n stitu ted  the p a r ty 's  backbone during i t s  early  
days. Although in time th e ir  rep resen ta tion  in ND's parliam entary group 
kept shrinking (to  a mere 6.58 per cent by 1990), i t  was mainly th e ir  
early  presence and c o n tr ib u tio n  to  ND's form ation th a t expressed the  
element of p a rty -p o litic a l continuation.
Former ERE p o lit ic ia n s  did not, however, co n s titu te  the m ajority  in 
the ND parliam en tary  group a t  any tim e. On the co n tra ry , what is  
immediately s tr ik in g  is  the unprecedentedly large number of newcomers 
among the p a r ty 's  MPs: more than 63 per cent entered parliament fo r the 
f i r s t  time in 1974, and over 55 per cent had never before been ac tiv e  in 
p o l i t ic s .  I t  is  exactly  th is  massive influx  of new p o lit ic ia n s  which
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endowed the  p a r ty  w ith  a more modern, te c h n o c ra tic , and u p -to -d a te  
image, and a ls o  s e t  th e  co u rse  fo r  ND's fu tu re  p ro c e ss  tow ards 
ideological renewal and liberalism . N either the Greek Rally party  when 
i t  succeeded the P eople 's Party in 1951, nor ERE i t s e l f  in 1955 had ever 
looked l ik e  th is  when they were formed; they  simply served as th e i r  
re sp e c tiv e  le a d e r s ' v e h ic le s  fo r  r e c o n s t i t u t i n g  th e  c o n se rv a tiv e  
p o li t ic a l  forces under a new name. By c o n tra s t, and for the f i r s t  time 
in  the co n serv a tiv e  cam p's h is to ry , New Democracy p ro je c te d  a very 
d if f e r e n t  a t t i tu d e  — in  o th e r  words, i t  was the in c lu s io n  of those 
newcomers w ithin the p a rty  ranks th a t u ltim ate ly  made the d ifference .
New Democracy, a t  le a s t during the e a rly  years a f te r  i t s  formation, 
portrayed some of the d is t in c tiv e  fea tu res  of i t s  predecessor, namely 
lack of in tra -p a rty  organisation  and ideological vagueness. Admittedly, 
in the a fte rm ath  of th e  d ic ta to r s h ip  c o lla p s in g  and in  view of the 
c o u n try 's  mounting problem s, th e re  was in s u f f ic ie n t  tim e fo r  e i th e r  
se ttin g  up a we11-s tru c tu re d  party  o rgan isa tion , or fo r the elaboration  
of concrete ideological p rin c ip le s . N evertheless, New Democracy proved a 
very slow developer in th is  respect. The f i r s t  adm inistrative  ccnm ittee, 
appointed by Karamanlis, served only as an organisational p re tex t, and 
one cannot speak of o rg a n isa tio n  p roper even when the  p a r ty 's  f i r s t  
adm inistrative  ccnm ittee was e lected  a t  ND's f i r s t  congress in 1979. For 
a l l  t h a t ,  th e  1979 C ongress may be c o n s id e re d  to  have l a id  the  
foundation fo r the  p a r ty 's  fu tu re  o rg a n isa tio n a l development, which 
f i n a l ly  made r e a l  headway a f t e r  New Democracy had moved to  th e  
opposition benches in 1981. Until then the adm in istrative  ccnm ittee, as 
well as a l l  o ther higher party  o f f ic ia l s ,  owed th e ir  position  in the 
party  organs to th e ir  le a d e r 's  d isc re tio n  (and to a ce rta in  extent to 
c lie n te lism ), ra th e r  than to th e ir  own s k i l l s  and performance inside the 
organisation . On the o ther hand, even the 1986 and the 1991 cen tra l-  
com m ittee members’ p o l i t i c a l  background p re s e n ts  much th e  same
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c h a ra c te r is tic s  as those of the p a rty  MPs' p o l i t ic a l  a f f i l ia t io n  p rio r 
to  1985 and 1990: th e re  was minimal re p re s e n ta tio n  of p a rty  members 
a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  the  pre-coup ERE, th e  o r ig in s  of the  overwhelming 
m ajority  lying w ithin the p a r ty 's  own ranks. Despite these s im ila r i t ie s ,  
though, and fo llo w in g  th e  f i r s t  p a r ty  c o n g re ss , ND's g ra s s - ro o ts  
organisation  developed to such an ex ten t th a t today 's p ic tu re  of ND's 
higher party  members can be sa id  to  be the reverse: they now owe th e ir
position  on the higher p arty  organs to  th e ir  personal e f fo r ts ,  s k i l ls  
and performance w ithin the o rgan isation , ra th e r  than to th e ir  dependence
i
on the party  leader or on c l ien te l i s t i c  networks!, a l th o u g h  
ic 1i e n t e l i s t i c  p r a c t i c e s  have n o t  e n t i r e l y  d is a p p e a r e d .
One of New Democracy's most s a l ie n t  c h a ra c te r is tic s  ever since i t s
fo rm tio n  has been and s t i l l  is  th a t the overwhelming m ajority  of both 
i t s  MPs and i t s  higher party  members a re  lawyers and doctors. The legal 
and medical professions have a t  a l l  times co n stitu ted  more than 50 per 
cent of both the p a r ty 's  pariiam entary group —as they have in PASOK, i f  
to  a le sse r ex ten t— and of i t s  c en tra l committee (except fo r th a t of 
1991 when these two professions amounted to  43 per cen t). I t  in fac t 
ap p ea rs  th a t  th e  p a r ty  has d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  a t t r a c t i n g  c e r t a in  
professional groups re la tiv e ly  new to  Greek p o l i t ic s ,  e sp ec ia lly  among 
the sa la ried  jobs ( i .e .  teachers, h igher, middle and lower-rank c iv i l -  
serv ice  employees, but a lso  workers, trade  u n io n is ts , e tc . ) ,  a l l  these 
being b e tte r  represented in PASOK. O verall, the ND ranks comprising a lso  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  shipow ners, and o th e r  businessm en, both i t s  MPs and 
central-com m ittee members have been p ro jec tin g  an upper-class, bourgeois 
so c ia l background, as opposed to  the  p e ti t-b o u rg e o is , m id d le -c lass  
social o rig in s of PASOK.
With re sp ec t to  New Democracy then , p o l i t i c s  has remained the 
tra d itio n a l domain of men, lawyers and doctors, as i t  was the case in 
the pre-coup period. The afore-mentioned professions predominated then 
and s t i l l  do for exactly  the same reasons: namely th a t, given the lack
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of a we 11-developed g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  — in o th e r  words when 
p o li t ic a l  p a r tie s  only serve as veh ic les fo r e lec tio n  purposes and do 
not fu n c tio n  as se p a ra te  o rg a n is a tio n a l and id eo lo g ica l e n t i t i e s — 
lawyers and d o c to rs  a re  most l i k e l y  to  c r e a te  p e rso n a l e l e c t o r a l  
c lie n te le s  fo r assuring  th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  career. Moreover, in the post- 
1974 period the lib e ra l professions predominate over sa la ried  categories 
both in ND and PASCJK, although in the l a t t e r  case sa la ried  employees are  
more numerous. Beginning with ND's 1991 cen tra l ccnm ittee, however, the 
predom inance o f th e  le g a l  and m edical p ro fe s s io n s  a p p ea rs  to  be 
d ecreasin g , which may be a f i r s t  in d ic a tio n  of some o rg a n isa tio n a l 
autonomy. I t  remains to  be seen whether the party  o rganisation  w ill 
become p ro p e rly  s tru c tu re d  in  the  near fu tu re  and develop to  such a 
degree as to  play an independent and d is t in c tiv e  ro le  of i t s  own, to 
c lea r the way fo r rank -and -file  members to  reach the top party  organs, 
and to  e laborate  and produce a  v iab le  and coherent ideology.
Under the leadership of C. Karamanlis, New Democracy united  in i t s  
ranks and re p re se n te d  a l l  th o se  who had t r a d i t i o n a l l y  c o n s id e re d  
themselves conservatives, as well as those who believed in Karamanlis 
personally . In time the party  was joined and supported by a good many 
advocates of a c au tio u s , s te p -b y -s te p  co n so lid a tio n  of dem ocratic 
in s t i tu t io n s , an opening of the p o l i t ic a l  system, the m odernisation and 
lib e ra lis a tio n  of Greek so c ie ty . *85* These la t t e r  elements, uninspired 
by the old-fashioned image of the Centre and alarmed by PASOK's rh e to ric  
and the  u l t r a - r a d i c a l  s ta n c e  i t  has adop ted  on v a r io u s  i s s u e s ,  
considered Karamanlis' New Democracy as the only chance for a tta in in g  
th e ir  ideological ends. In the absence of any other p o l i t ic a l  cu rren ts , 
K aram anlis' ch arism atic  appeal and a ll-p o w erfu l p o s itio n  w ith in  the 
party  served during the early  years a f te r  1974 as the unifying element 
fo r keeping ND to g e th e r , d is ta n c in g  i t  from i t s  p re d e c e sso r 's  mal­
p r a c t ic e s  and p o l i c i e s ,  la y in g  th e  fo u n d a tio n s  fo r  i t s  f u tu re
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o rg a n isa tio n a l growth and development, and fu rn ish in g  i t  w ith a more 
c e n tr is t ,  so c ia l- ju s tic e  o rien ted  ideology.
A fter Karamanl i s ' s  w ithdrawal from the p a r ty  lead ersh ip  and h is  
subsequent accession to the Presidency, New Democracy, although plagued 
by in te rnal turm oil, weathered the shock and l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  became 
b e t t e r  o rg a n is e d  w h ile  s im u l ta n e o u s ly  m oving f u r t h e r  tow ards 
ideo log ically  lib e ra l p rin c ip le s . Seme of i t s  prominent party  members 
could not acquiesce in these changes, and s ta r te d  launching th e ir  own 
p o l i t i c a l  views and personal am bitions, s in ce  no p a rty  lead er a f t e r  
Karamanlis ever enjoyed h is  omnipotent p osition  and immense p res tig e . 
This meant tha t several p o l i t ic a l  sub-groups grew up u n o ffic ia lly  inside 
the party . Taking advantage of already e x is tin g  ideological d ifferences 
and in the absence of concrete mechanisms th a t would allow tendencies 
and fac tions to acquire a recognisable form and come out in to  the open, 
th e  p a r ty  s t a t u t e s  c o n ta in in g  no r e le v a n t  p ro v is io n s ,  p e rso n a l 
d ifferences have often  been concealed by a cloak of ideology.
To sum up, we would s t r e s s  th e  f a c t  th a t  i t  was th e  p a r t y 's  
p o l it ic a l  personnel, and e sp ec ia lly  i t s  founder and leader, who d ic ta ted  
ND's pro jected  image and ideology, and not v ice  versa. However, while 
New Democracy can look back on more than eighteen consecutive years in 
Greek p o l i t i c s ,  i t  cannot ye t be sa id  to  have c rea ted  a d i s t in c t iv e  
id en tity  of i t s  own; i t  is  s t i l l  going through a tra n s itio n a l period, 
carrying the burdens of the so -ca lled  Karam anliist p o l it ic a l  tra d itio n , 
together with fresh  c h a ra c te r is tic s  of growing-pains tha t vary with the 
personality  of i t s  leader. I t  remains to  be seen whether New Democracy 
w ill manage to  r id  i t s e l f  of these  burdensome d e fe c ts  and a cq u ire  a 
d is tin c tiv e  and permanent id en tity  of i t s  own, irresp ec tiv e  of whoever 
i t s  leader may be. I t  has yet to  develop a w ell-s truc tu red  g rass-roo ts  
organisation, and to  e laborate  a w ell-defined, concrete, and coherent 
ideology.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP
1. In troduction
Organisation is  not perhaps i t s  best fea tu re  for New Democracy to  be 
proud o f. Although by now reasonably developed, the p a r ty 's  o rganisation  
s t i l l  la g s  f a r  beh ind  th a t  o f PASOK, no t to  m ention o th e r  p a r ty  
o rg an isa t ions, e s p e c ia l ly  those of ND's West-European c o u n te rp a r ts . 
There a re , of course, several explanations fo r th is  la te  development and 
the frequent m al-functioning of ND's o rgan isation , which we sh a ll try  to 
e lucidate  in the present chapter. For a l l  th a t, i t  remains a fa c t th a t, 
with respect to  the p a r ty 's  o rgan isation , there  is  much le f t  to  be done.
What is  s tr ik in g  on the p o s itiv e  side  is  th a t New Democracy is  the 
f i r s t  non-com m unist p a r ty  in  Greek h i s to r y  th a t  has surv ived  i t s  
leaders' withdrawal. In terms of pa rty  o rganisation , th is  is  the most 
remarkable i f  one bears in mind th a t Karamanlis was not an executive 
r is e n  from the ranks, but a c h a rism a tic , ex cep tio n a lly  p re s t ig io u s , 
crmipotent and p a te rn a lis t ic  p e rso n a lity . One need only re c a ll the fa te  
of the People's Party when Marshall Papagos formed the Greek Rally, or 
what happened to  the l a t t e r  a f te r  Papagos’ death and the creation  of ERE 
by Karam anlis. Furtherm ore, when Karam anlis founded New Democracy in 
1974, ERE —headed u n til  then by a close  Karamanlis1 colleague and ex­
premier, P. Kanellopoulos— q u ie tly  disappeared a ltogether, although i t  
was never o f f ic ia l ly  d issolved.
More inportant s t i l l :  New Democracy not only survived i t s  founder's 
withdrawal, i t  a lso  managed to  overcome successfu lly  two fu rther changes
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in i t s  leadership a f te r  i t  had lo s t  the 1981 e lec tion . All in a l l ,  the 
p a r ty 's  parliam entary group e lec ted  the p arty  leader four tim es, and 
the la s t  such e lec tio n  was r a t i f ie d  by the delegates a t the second party  
congress. Except fo r the formation of the DIANA sp lin te r  group in 1985, 
which cannot be considered  to  have s e r io u s ly  a ffe c te d  ND, the p a rty  
remained u n ited  w hile in  o p p o s itio n , and in  A pril 1990 took o f f ic e  
again . There can be no doubt th a t  much of th is  u n ity  and u ltim a te  
e le c to ra l  success i s  due to  the  growing development of the  p a r ty 's  
organisation.
The fo u n d a t io n s  f o r  th e  c r e a t i o n  and developm ent o f ND's 
o rg an isa tio n  were la id  as e a r ly  as 1977 by C. Karam anlis. Enjoying 
unprecedented knowledge of and experience in  Greek p o li t ic s ,  and having 
lived for eleven years in self-im posed e x ile  in Paris (where he was able 
to  reco n sid e r h is  p o l i t i c a l  aims and a t t i t u d e s ) ,  he f e l t  su re  th a t 
without a w ell-s truc tu red  and functioning organisation , the party  would 
quickly d is in te g ra te  a f te r  h is  eventual departure. So he opted fo r some 
kind of in s t i tu t io n a lis a t io n , in th is  way bequeathing to  the party  a 
proper organisation instead of the charism atic power tha t was h is  alone. 
I t  is  th is  d is tin c tiv e  aspect in the c rea tion  of the ND leadership th a t 
has made some scholars carment tha t
" . . . t h u s ,  somewhat p a ra d o x ic a l ly ,  c e r t a in  a sp e c ts  of 
in s t i tu t io n a l i s a t io n  appear to  have been handled more 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  by a 'c o n s e r v a t i v e '  p a r ty  th a n  by a 
's o c ia l i s t  p a rty '"  (in  English o r ig in a lly ) . ( 1’
I t  is  exactly  for th is  reason th a t we sha ll s ta r t  our examination by 
f i r s t  analy sing  and e v a lu a tin g  K aram anlis1 ro le ,  co n tr ib u tio n  and 
influence, and only then embark on a d e ta ile d  presentation  of the ND 
o rg a n isa tio n . More s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  we sh a ll  see to  what ex ten t ND has 
managed to build  a mass o rgan isation  comparable to that of i t s  West- 
European counterparts, and in how fa r  i t  d if fe r s  from the other Greek
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p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  PASOK in  p a r t i c u l a r .  F u rtherm ore , s in c e  New 
Dem ocracy's s t a t u t e s  —as w ell a s  to  some e x te n t  i t s  id eo lo g ica l 
p rin c ip le s— were amended by the p a r ty 's  second congress, we sha ll look 
a t the major changes and explain th e ir  re la t iv e  inportance and how they 
have a ffec ted  ND's o rg a n isa tio n . F in a lly ,  we sh a ll examine the  p a rty  
l e a d e r s h ip 's  s p e c ia l  p o s i t io n  in  and in f lu e n c e  e x e r te d  o v er th e  
organisation a f te r  Karamanlis le f t  a c tiv e  p o l i t ic s  to become President 
of the Republic.
2. K araran lis ' post-1974 P ersonality , and h is  Contribution to  the 
Creation of ND's Organisation
As discussed in the previous chap ter, New Democracy —exactly  lik e  
the pre-coup ERE— was a personal c rea tio n  of i t s  le a d e r ,(2) but i t  was 
by no means a mere revamping of ERE. There a re  two major fa c to rs  
responsible fo r th is :  f i r s t ,  the soc ia l and p o lit ic a l  conditions in 1956 
were v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  indeed from th o se  fo llo w in g  th e  c o l la p s e  of 
d ic ta to r ia l  ru le  in 1974; and secondly , Karamanlis h im self had a lso  
changed. His v ision  of the coun try 's  fu tu re , as well as h is  p o l i t ic a l  
a tt i tu d e s  fo r transforming th is  v ision  in to  r e a l i ty ,  were very d iffe re n t 
from h i s  b e l i e f s  in  1956. T h is  means t h a t  p o s t - d i c t a t o r i a l  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of ND cannot be understood w ithout a comprehensive 
p ic tu re  of Karamanlis' p e rsonality  as i t  developed over the years.
To begin with, we should re c a ll  th a t although Karamanlis in 1955 had 
been chosen by the King to head the conservative camp, by 1963 he was 
unwilling to play a subservient ro le , and resigned a f te r  a clash  with 
the King over curbing the royal powers in p o l i t ic s  (see ch. 1, section  
2 .2 .2 .c ) . More sp e c if ic a lly , Karamanlis had proposed some amendments to 
the c o n stitu tio n , but met with strong opposition from both the Centre
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Union and the EDA., which accused him of a u th o rita rian  tendencies, as 
w ell as from th e  P a la c e , which saw i t s  power p o s i t io n  s e r io u s ly  
threatened. ERE's e le c to ra l defeat in 1963 proved the f in a l blow, which 
resu lted  in Karamanlis stepping down and withdrawing in to  self-imposed 
e x ile  in P aris fo r the next eleven y e a rs .<3)
Throughout the seven-year m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  Karanenlis opted for 
silence; he helped the a n t i -d ic ta to r ia l  strugg le  more by ac tin g  behind 
the scenes than by open, a n ti- ju n ta  po lem ics.(4) His ra re  in terventions 
g rea tly  con tributed  to  widening the gu lf between the m ilita ry  junta and 
" . . . t h e  most competent p a rt of the tra d itio n a l conservative cairp".(5) 
Moreover, Karamanlis had softened during th is  period in e x ile , and he 
now envisaged a new ro le  fo r  Greece w ith in  the  Western w orld. He 
admitted he had become more to le ra n t, mainly because, as he had put i t ,  
" . . .d i f f e r e n t  circumstances force us to  adapt to the new r e a l i t i e s " . ( 61
When he re tu rn e d  to  Greece in 1974 he was, in  many re s p e c ts , a 
d if f e r e n t  main. According to  D. K atsoudas, ‘ 7} he was aware of the 
p o lit ic a l  and social developments th a t had gained momentum during the 
d ic ta to rsh ip , and th a t had led to  the conservatives' rupture with some 
of th e ir  t ra d itio n a lly  cherished values. This rupture was due to the 
d ic ta to rsh ip ,
" .. .w h ic h  made c le a r  to  most o f the  co n serv a tiv es how 
dangerous such a pure right-w ing stance might prove ( i .e .  
s t a te  anti-comminism, d iv e rse  forms of d isc r im in a tio n , 
an ti-caim unist h y s t e r i a ) ( 8 *
Karamanlis was now ardently  sid ing  with social democracy and cu ltu ra l 
development, concepts which before he had never as much as mentioned. In 
addition , although he had s ta r te d  h is  e f fo r ts  towards th is  end in 1958, 
he made i t  c le a r for the f i r s t  time in public  tha t he intended to work 
for Greece's en try  in to  the European Community.( 9 *
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Once he had com pleted  d e m o cra tic  r e s to r a t io n  w ith in  G reece, 
Karamanlis considered the coun try 's  EEC en try  a mission he abso lu te ly  
had to  f u l f i l l .  He can be said  to  have been obsessed by th is  issue and, 
a f te r  overcoming many serious d i f f ic u l t ie s  and o b s t a c l e s /10’ he f in a lly  
met w ith success: on 28 May 1979 the  entry-agreem ent was signed in 
Athens, and on 1 January 1981 Greece became the ten th  fu ll  EEC member. 
As ex-premier G. Rail is  has w ritten ,
" . . . t h e  e n t r y - a g r e e m e n t  was e x c l u s i v e l y  h i s  own 
ach ievem en t. We, th e  r e s t ,  were j u s t  e x e c u tiv e s  and 
a s s is ta n ts " . ( 11’
Within th is  context —i .e .  the strugg le  fo r democratic re s to ra tio n  
as well as the coun try 's en try  in to  the EEC— Karamanlis had to make a 
choice: he could pursue these  two goals as e i th e r  the  lead er of a 
p o lit ic a l  party  or as a na tion -leader, e ith e r  as prim e-m inister o r as 
p res id en t of the  re p u b lic . He f in a l ly  opted fo r the  form er, m ainly 
because he wanted to  have a b e t t e r  g r ip  on ac tu a l policy-m aking. 
However, h is  covert am bition to  become the head of s t a te  continued 
anabated i f  l a t e n t / 12’ and emerged more openly only when h is  two big 
o b j e c t i v e s ,  d e m o c ra tic  r e s t o r a t i o n  and EEC m em bersh ip , w ere 
accomplished.
However, although Karamanlis had opted fo r the prem ier's p o sitio n , 
i t  is  h is  p res id en tia l ambitions tha t " ...accoun t for the serious and 
d isastrous neglect of party  ideology and o rg a n is a t io n " /13’ He sincere ly  
believed that in Greece " .. .o n ly  one person should be in comnand" /  14 ’ 
so he took a l l  the decisions alone and sinply  announced than afterw ards 
to the appropriate co llec tiv e  party  organs, which rubber-stamped than. 
W ithin ND, he enjoyed the  power and re sp e c t of an ab so lu te  monarch, 
i n s p i r in g  in  h i s  c o l le a g u e s  f e e l i n g s  ra n g in g  from  "awe" to  
" i d o l i s a t i o n " . ( 15 ’ He h im se lf  w ished to  be co n sid ered  as a p a te r  
patriae, having a very special re la tio n sh ip  with h is  people; when the
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opposition accused him of ta i lo r in g  the co n stitu tio n  to h is  own designs 
in  order to become, in due time, head of s ta te ,  he rep lied :
"Whether or not I  sh a ll became President of the Republic 
is  a m atter th a t concerns exclusively  myself and the Greek 
people. They have e n tru s te d  me w ith  power; they d id  not 
d ic ta te  the  c o n d itio n s  on how I sh a ll  e x e rc ise  th is  
power". ( 16’
O v era ll, then , h is  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  as an ERE lea d e r, which were 
b asica lly  those described already in the f i r s t  chapter of th is  study, 
remained the same during h is  second six -year term as premier, from 1974 
u n til  1980; the same elements of au th o rita rian  behaviour, paternalism  
and a ls o  m essianism 417 * were again  c le a r ly  id e n t i f ia b le  du ring  th is  
p e rio d . But th e re  was a d if fe re n c e :  now he wished to  see G reece 's 
dem ocratic in s t i tu t io n s  fu n c tio n in g  p ro p erly , the  way they d id  in 
Western Europe; he wanted to e s ta b lish  a  re a lly  sound democracy, not the 
quasi-parliam entarian , po lice  democracy the country had known during the 
p o s t  c iv i l - w a r  d e c a d e s . To a c c o m p lish  t h i s  t a s k ,  he w orked 
simultaneously on two main ob jec tives: the country 's EEC e n t r y / 18 * and 
ND's survival a f te r  h is  departure.
Warning b e lls  rang fo r Karamanlis as early  as 1976, when the Volvi 
Movement was formed and launched i t s  demands fo r dem ocratic p a rty  
organ isation . Karamanlis had already (by the end of 1975){ 19 * appointed 
an a d m in is tra tiv e  committee of 21 members, but the Volvi Movement 
fac tion  kept accusing him of c rea tin g  rubber-stamp organs. On 2 April 
1977, when the p a rty  held  i t s  p re lim in a ry  congress in  C h a lk id ik i, 
Karamanlis for the f i r s t  time tr ie d  to define —somewhat vaguely, as we 
shall see in the next chapter— ND's ideological p r i n c i p le s / 20’ He a lso  
stressed  the fac t tha t
"A p o li t ic a l  party  needs time to  accomplish i t s  mission.
But a p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  cannot e x is t  fo r any reasonable  
length of time unless i t  is  dem ocratically organised; that 
i s ,  i t  must no t i d e n t i f y  i t s  f a t e  w ith  th a t  of i t s  
leader" . ( 21’
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Although th is  prelim inary congress was meant to  lay the foundations 
for the development of ND's party  o rgan isation , th is  s t i l l  remained a 
dead l e t t e r  almost one year la te r .  As a member of the Volvi Movement 
declared:
"Betw een K a ram an lis  and th e  G reek p e o p le  s ta n d s  a 
p o l i t i c a l  e s ta b lis h m e n t th a t  p re v e n ts  th e  p a r ty  from 
c re a tin g  a dem ocratic o rg a n is a tio n . I t  c o n s is ts  o f the 
'bosses' in Athens and th e ir  'd e leg a te s ' in the provinces, 
who, fe e lin g  th e i r  p o s ts  and power p o s it io n  th rea te n ed , 
would not le t  our p rem ier's v is io n  become r e a l i ty " . ( 22 *
On the o th e r  hand, speaking to  the  members of the  a d m in is tra tiv e  
carm ittee, Karamanlis him self admitted in d ire c tly  th a t the party  had not 
yet developed i t s  o rganisation , but assured them that
"We a re  tak ing  cau tio u s but d e f in i te  s tep s  towards our 
p a r ty 's  o rg a n isa tio n , in  s p i te  of o b s ta c le s  due to  our 
governmental responsib i1i t i e s " .< 2 3 1
Two months befo re  the  n e g o tia tio n s  fo r EEC membership were to  be 
coupleted, Karamanlis urged h is  colleagues to arrange for the imnediate 
convocation of the p a r ty 's  f i r s t  congress. ( 241 He wished fo r h is  party  
to present a modem and Europeanised outlook, and because he was ready, 
sh o r tly  a f t e r  sign ing  the  membership t r e a ty ,  to  withdraw from party - 
p o l it ic s  to become head of s ta te .  Accused of c a llin g  the congress only 
for the p’irposes of inpressing the public  —charges which were ju s t if ie d  
to  some e x te n t— Karamanlis n e v e rth e le ss  t r ie d  to  i n s t i tu t io n a l i s e  
in tra -p a rty  procedures which would help New Democracy to remain united , 
to  su c c e ss fu lly  e le c t  a new lead er and continue to  e x is t  a f t e r  h is  
departure. In the end, ND's f i r s t  congress was held in Chalkidiki on 5-7 
May 1979, the EEC membership t r e a ty  was signed th ree  weeks l a t e r  in 
Athens, and in May 1980 Karamanlis was e le c te d  by parliam ent to  the 
Presidency of the Republic.
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I t  has to  be admitted th a t New Democracy did not re a lly  develop i t s  
organisation to  any considerable extent under Karamanlis' leadership . As 
D. Katsoudas has observed:
"As la te  as 1979, ND s t i l l  su ffered  from the tra d itio n a l 
e v i ls  of Greek conservatism : id eo lo g ica l vagueness and 
feeble organisation" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) . ( 25 *
I t  would seem, however, th a t  Karamanlis intended to  m erely lay  the 
organisational foundations, and leave the party  to  develop them fu rther:
" . . . h e  moved c a u t io u s ly ,  knowing th a t  he cou ld  not 
transform a tra d itio n a l p a rty  of notables in to  a party  of 
p r in c ip le s  w ith in  tw e n ty -fo u r  h o u rs , w ith o u t c au s in g  
serious repercussions". ‘ 2 6 *
Indeed, under Karamanlis1 auspices the process fo r the organisation  of 
ND was launched, i t s  foundations la id , and the party  ac tu a lly  held one 
p re lim inary  and one n a tio n a l congress , thus becoming the f i r s t  non- 
ccmnunist party  ever to  have done so in  Greek p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry . ( 27 ’ 
Last but not le a s t, and desp ite  whatever organisational drawbacks, New 
Democracy has managed to  overcome i t s  fo u n d er 's  d ep artu re  and, by 
building up i t s  organisation  to  a considerable extent (as we shall see) 
to disentangle the party  from i t s  fu tu re  leaders.
Karamanlis' goal as a p a r ty -p o lit ic a l  leader was accomplished: a f te r  
having resto red  democracy and having ensured the country 's en try  in to  
the EEC, he not only reco n stitu ted  and reformed the conservative canp, 
but he a lso  inaugurated the s ta r t  of a new era and a new ro le  fo r i t .
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3. The Party O rganisation
3.1 Creation and early  development of ND's organisation: the 1977 
Prelim inary Congress and the 1979 f i r s t  National Congress
When New Democracy was created  in September 1974, Karamanlis made 
only a vague statement concerning the p a r ty 's  foundation (see Appendix 
I ) .  A few p r in c ip le s  o f d em o cra tic  i n t r a - p a r t y  o rg a n is a t io n  were 
p u b l is h e d  to g e th e r  w ith  t h a t  d e c l a r a t i o n ,  b u t n o t g iv e n  due 
consideration by the public  a t  th a t tim e .( 28} Serious steps were taken 
towards the elaboration  of the p a r ty 's  s ta tu te s  before and during ND's 
prelim inary congress in A pril 1977. A f i r s t  ch arte r was drawn up by a 
special c a rm itte e ,( 29 * and d is tr ib u te d  to ND's provisional departmental 
coirenittees (about 100 a t  the  tim e), which were asked to  make th e i r  
corrments and p ro p o sitio n s  and, f in a l ly ,  a re v ise d  v ers io n  of th is  
charter was presented to  the prelim inary congress. The delegates were 
expected to  e laborate  a  f in a l version for p resen tation  to  the p a r ty 's  
f i r s t  n a tio n a l c o n g re ss , where ND's s t a tu t e s  would be o f f i c i a l l y  
r a t i f i e d . ( 3 0 *
We sh a ll  not examine in d e ta i l  the  f i r s t  c h a r te r  nor i t s  amended 
version, since the ND s ta tu te s  obtained th e ir  concrete and fin a l form 
only with the p a r ty 's  f i r s t  national congress. Nevertheless, there are  
ce rta in  c h a ra c te r is tic s  in th is  2 1 -a r tic le  charte r worth noting. F i r s t ,  
the word "party" appears nowhere in the tex t. Exactly like  Karamanlis' 
28 September 1974 founding d ec lara tio n , New Democracy is  a t a l l  times 
c a l le d  a " f ro n t"  (p a r a t a x i s ), o r  "movement", o r even "co n c e p t" . 
Secondly, the language used is  the so -called  katharevousa (the "pure" 
Greek, a r t i f i c i a l ly  bu ild  up on the basis of ancient G re e k ) /31 * and the 
terminology suggests more the regu latory  p rin c ip les  of a corporation or 
a lim ited company than a p a r t y / 32* Thirdly, according to A rtic le  5, 
th is  "front" is  headed by a "leader" (and not by a p residen t). Although
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th e  c h a r te r  p ro v id ed  fo r  t h i s  l e a d e r 's  e le c t io n  by th e  g en e ra l 
assem bly, ( 33’ the  re g u la tio n s  and procedures concerning the l a t t e r 's  
candidacy nomination and e lec tio n  were missing. F ina lly , i t  should be 
a lso  noted th a t th is  f i r s t  ch a rte r  launched a new emblem for the party , 
abandoning the photograph of Karamanlis which had served as such u n til  
then. ( 3 4 >
Although s t i l l  in i t s  o rgan isational infancy, the ND base responded 
qu ite  vigorously to  the provisions of the proposed ch a rte r . All in a l l ,  
72 departmental conmittees as well as 13 individuals (the la t t e r  during 
the prelim inary congress) proposed a to ta l  of 174 amendments.( 351 The 
m a jo r ity  o f th e  amendments (41, o r  24 p e r c e n t)  concerned  p a r ty  
organisation a t  the p rovincial and departmental l e v e l s / 36’ another 33 
(19 per cen t) r e fe r re d  to  the  com position and fu n c tio n in g  of the  
adm inistrative conmittee as the c en tra l party  o rg a n is a t io n /37’ and 16 
amendments (9 p e r  c e n t)  were on th e  com position  o f th e  g e n e ra l 
assem bly .( 38 * In conclusion , the  p a r ty  base rea c te d  to  th is  ra th e r  
a u th o r i ta r ia n , c e n tra l is e d  and p a riia m e n t-o r ie n te d  c h a r te r  th a t was 
d irec ted  and con tro lled  from above by
" . . .b e in g  in c lin e d  to  get r id  of the h i th e r to  ab so lu te  
p o l i t i c i a n ' s  d o m in a n ce  — t h a t  i s ,  o f  w hat had  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  b e e n  c a l l e d  ' d e p u t o c r a c y ' 
(v o u le f to k ra t ia ) . The ra n k -a n d -f ile  members endeavoured, 
th ro u g h  th e  p a r t y ’ s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  to  
p a r t ic ip a te  in the  decision-m aking mechanisms and, by 
a c q u ir in g  a say in  nom ina ting  a c a n d id a te , aimed a t  
a c h ie v in g  a c c e ss  to  th e  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  and so to  
power". <3 9 >
As J . Loulis has observed,
"The slow and p a in fu l  developm ent o f th e  ND's p a r ty  
o rg a n is a t io n  d u rin g  th e  y e a rs  1975-1977, i t s  lim ited  
success in a t t r a c t i n g  new members, and , f i n a l l y ,  th e  
apathy and in a c tiv ity  of most of these members should be 
a ttr ib u te d  to a sing le  and most important fac to r: namely 
th a t  the  p a r ty  was f a r  le s s  s ig n i f i c a n t  as a mass 
organisation than as a group of leaders and professional 
p o litic ian s"  (in  English o r ig in a l ly ) . (*0’
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In th is  sense, then, the prelim inary congress was indeed a major step  in 
ND's e ffo r ts  to organise. But not much e lse  was re a lly  done before the 
1977 e le c tio n  to  p rov ide o rd in ary  members w ith  a c tu a l power, o r the  
party  with a d e fin ite  c h a rte r . Therefore, ND supporters continued to  be
" . . . l in k e d  with the p a rty  not through the organisation but 
—e x ac tly  as in  the  p a s t— through the  lo ca l MPs, who 
continued to  d i s t r ib u te  personal favours s tren g th en in g  
pa tro n -c lien t t ie s " ,  (in  English o r ig in a lly ) . ( 41}
Not su rp ris ing ly , in consequence,
" . .  .most ND members owed th e ir  appointments in the party  
to  pow erful p a tro n s ,  to  whom th ey  s a c r i f i c e d  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  in d e p e n d e n c e . . .  On th e  eve o f  th e  1977 
e le c t io n s ,  a l l  powers s t i l l  re s te d  in  the  hands of the  
party  leadership and the parliam entary group" (in English 
o r ig in a lly ) . ‘ 42 *
The f in a l decisions over the party  s ta tu te s  were made during ND's 
f i r s t  n a tio n a l congress on 5-7 May 1979, which was again  he ld  in 
C halkidiki, two years a f te r  the prelim inary one. Before we proceed to  a 
d e ta iled  examination of c e r ta in  provisions and regu la tions, we should 
f i r s t  note the major amendments tha t were f in a lly  incorporated in ND's 
s ta tu te s ,  thus d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  them from the  e a r l i e r ,  p ro v is io n a l 
c h a r te r .
F irs t  of a l l ,  the e n tire  tex t was rew ritten  in the common everyday 
language, to  the s a tis fa c tio n  of most party  members. Secondly, i t  was 
agreed th a t the head of the party  should be ca lled  "president" instead  
of "leader", " . . . t o  s tre s s  the fac t tha t the party  is  being organised on 
democratic b a ses" .( 43} T hirdly, New Democracy o f f ic ia l ly  accepted, a t  
la s t ,  to  be called  a p o l i t ic a l  "party" instead of a p o lit ic a l  "front" 
(or "camp", or "movement"), so tak ing  the f i r s t  tim id s tep s  towards 
accepting that i t  was in fac t p a rt of the p o l i t ic a l  system and not sane 
kind of a s e lf -s u f f ic ie n t  e n ti ty  th a t stood above i t . <44) Last but not 
le a s t, and contrary to  the f i r s t  c h a r te r 's  provisions, i t  was decided
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tha t i t  would be the ND parliam entary group, instead of the congress, 
which would in the fu tu re  e le c t the p a r ty 's  p residen t.
Figure 4.1 below presen ts a diagram of the party  s tru c tu re , as th is  
appeared a f t e r  th e  s t a t u t e s '  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by th e  f i r s t  c o n g re ss . 
According to  th is , the highest instance in the party  is  the national 
congress, which should be held once every twc years, in October.*45} The 
congress consists of the party  p residen t, the parliam entary group as
Figure 4.1; Diagram of ND S tructure  According to the 1979 S ta tu tes
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well as the  c a n d id a te s  who were n o t e le c te d ,  th e  a d m in is t r a t iv e -  
com m ittee members, ND e x -d e p u t ie s ,  300 r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of th e  
departmental ccm nittees, 60 rep resen ta tives  of ND's youth organisation 
(ONNED) and  50 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  th e  p a r t y  o c c u p a t io n a l  
o rg an isa tio n s .( 46} I t s  main task s, according to  A rtic le  4, are  to r a t i f y  
ND's p o l it ic a l  programme, to  e le c t  the  adm in istra tive-com m ittee  non­
p a r 1 iam entary  members, and to  d is c u s s  th e  r e p o r t  of the outgoing 
a d m in is tra tiv e  committee. There i s  a ls o  a p ro v isio n  fo r an ad-hoc 
cong ress to  be h e ld  in  e x tr a o rd in a ry  c irc u m sta n c e s , and a f t e r  an 
administrative-com m ittee d e c is io n .( 47 *
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  co m m ittee  i s  th e  h ig h e s t  o rg an  betw een 
congresses, though th is  l a t t e r  is  not c le a r ly  s ta ted  within ND's 
s t a t u t e s . ( 48 ' I t  com prises 70 members includ ing  the party  presiden t, 
plus the v ice-p residen t ( i f  one is  appointed by the party  p residen t, in 
which c a se , th e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  com m ittee has 71 members), th e  
parliam entary group secre tary -genera l and the  ONNED p re s id e n t , <49 > 49 
members e lected  by the party  congress (35 to  o rig in a te  from the Greater 
A thens' conglom erate, and 14 from the  p ro v in ces), as well as 18 MPs 
appointed by the parliam entary group. The adm in istrative  carm ittee then 
e lec ts  the nine-member execu tive  commit tee  (which, in tu rn , e le c ts  a 
five-member f in a n c ia l  com m ittee), seven working committees (youth; 
farmers; workers and employees; a r t is a n s  and merchants; s c ie n t is ts ;  
technicians and economists; and in te rnational r e la t io n s ) , ( 501 and i t  can 
a lso  c re a te  occupational o rg a n is a t io n s . ( 51’ L as tly , according to  the 
party  s ta tu te s , the adm in istrative  committee should s i t  once every two 
months, and a lso  serves as the highest d isc ip lin a ry  council fo r i t s  non­
par 1 iamentary members.( 52 *
At th e  g r a s s - r o o ts  l e v e l ,  th e  p a r ty  s t a t u t e s  p ro v id e  fo r  the  
creation  of local o rgan isations. The sum to ta l of the la t te r ,  w ithin a 
p a rtic u la r  provincial department, c o n s titu te  the departmental assembly
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which e le c ts  the departmental commitee (a d m in is tra tiv e , execu tive  and 
f in a n c ia l)  and a three-member d is c ip l in a ry  c o u n c i l . ‘ 53’ As a lread y  
mentioned, ND's departmental carm ittees send 300 delegates to  the party  
congress. The c o n s t i tu t io n , e le c t io n  of departm ental organs, th e i r  
r ig h ts  and d u tie s , as w ell as a l l  re le v a n t d e ta i l s  concerning ND's 
p e rip h e ra l o rg a n is a tio n s , were l e f t  to  be s e t  l a t e r  by a p e rip h e ra l 
o rg an isa tio n  re g u la tio n  (KPO), which would have to  be r a t i f i e d  by a 
party  congress. ( 5 4 >
New Democracy did not e le c t a p residen t during i t s  f i r s t  congress, 
since i t  was c le a r ly  s ta te d  in the pa rty  s ta tu te s , "The president of the 
party  is  the p a r ty 's  founder" . {55 } The main innovation  adopted was, 
th a t  in fu tu re  th e  p re s id e n t  shou ld  be e le c te d  by th e  p a r t y 's  
parliam entary group; A rtic le  5 reads, " . . . t h e  president of the party  is  
e lected , in secre t b a llo t , by the parliam entary group, in accordance 
w ith A r t ic le  37 of the  Greek Const i tu t  io n " . ‘ 5 6 1 Moreover, the  most 
im portant of the  co n sid erab le  powers of the p re s id e n t of the  p a rty  
concerns the choice and fin a l say in the nomination of ND's candidates 
and the com position of the p a r ty 's  e le c to ra l  l i s t s ; <57) he can a lso  
appoint a v ic e -p re s id e n t to  re p re se n t him in p a rty -o rg a n isa tio n a l 
a f f a i r s .{58 *
The above p r e s e n t a t i o n  shows t h a t  th e  1979 p a r ty  s t a t u t e s  
e s ta b lish e d  a t r i - p a r t i t e  p o w er-s tru c tu re  w ith in  ND's o rg a n isa tio n , 
constitu ted  by the party  congress, the president and the parliam entary 
group. Not su rp rising ly , the rea l and main powers lay with the presiden t 
—and, in secondary p lace, with the parliam entary group— ra th e r  than 
with the congress, since the party  organisation  was not an outcome of 
popular, g rass-roo ts expectations and demands, but had been created  from 
above. D esp ite  th e  amendmends fo r  th e  f i r s t  c h a r t e r 's  re fo rm  on 
democrat i sat ion and upgrading of the party  base, the s ta tu te s  which were 
f in a l ly  adopted fea tu red  a c e n tra l is e d  o rg a n isa tio n , d ire c te d  and
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c o n tro lle d  by the  p re s id e n t and the  p a rliam e n ta ria n s  in Athens. The 
congress in general, as well as the various committees stemming from i t  
in p a rtic u la r , were vested with merely symbolic du ties and powers. In 
consequence, the p a rty ’s peripheral and more local o rganisation  was le f t  
incomplete, i t s  development a t  r is k  and i t s  ro le  seriously  underplayed.
Throughout i t s  i n i t i a l  seven-year period in o ff ice  (November 1974 to 
October 1981), New Democracy underwent s ig n if ic an t changes as regards 
i t s  organisation. Until 1979, when the f i r s t  national congress was held 
and the adm in istrative-carm ittee  members were e lec ted  (as were a lso  a l l  
party  delegates who p a rtic ip a te d  in th a t congress) , ( 59 * a l l  higher party  
members had been appointed by Karamanlis, owing th e ir  r i s e  in the pa rty - 
ranks to th e ir  unconditional attachment to the leader; furthermore, the 
overwhelming m ajo rity  of p a r ty  d e le g a te s  who were sen t to  the 1977 
prelim inary congress were appointed by higher party  o f f ic ia ls ,  and not 
e le c te d  by the ND base. The a d m in is tra tiv e  committee appoin ted  by 
Karamanlis in March 1975 never met, whereas the one e lected  by the 1979 
congress did so a few times, i f  only fo r ex p o ste rio ri  r a t i f ic a t io n  of 
decisions already taken by the p a rty  leader. The same held true  for both 
the executive and the financ ia l committees, as well as for every other 
central organisation party  organ.
At th e  d ep artm en ta l and lo c a l  le v e ls  New Democracy, a l b e i t  
developing la te , did much b e tte r . Having only 50 departmental committees 
(NE) and 40 local o rganisations (TO) in 1975, the party  claimed sho rtly  
before the f i r s t  congress in 1979 th a t  62 NEs and 380 TOs had been 
e le c ted  by over 150,000 ra n k -a n d - f ile  p a rty  members, as well as 25 
occupational o rg an isa tio n s  (EKOs); moreover, ND's youth organisation  
(ONNED) possessed a t tha t time 70 local branches in Athens, and another 
150 in the p ro v in ce s . ( 60’ The ground was prepared , th e re fo re , to  
d ra s tic a lly  reduce the power positio n s enjoyed by local party  notables 
and depu ties who, given the  to ta l  absence of organised rank -and-file
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members, were the unique m ediators between the  lead ersh ip  and the  
p a r ty 's  base.
W hatever th e  o rg a n is a t io n a l  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  and drawbacks, two 
extremely important developments stand out. For one thing, New Democracy 
managed to  become the f i r s t  non-conrnunist, bourgeois party  to  have held 
a national congress ?( 61} moreover, the c rea tion  and development of i t s  
g ra s s -ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  (although the  whole procedure s ta r te d  much 
la te r  and the o rganisation  grew a t  a slower ra te  than in the case of 
PASOK) for the f i r s t  time brought i t s  supporters together to  meet, to  
share views, and to  discuss party  or wider p o l i t ic a l  issu es.< 6Z) This 
slowly led to the adoption of a  more formal and concrete p a r ty -p o lit ic a l  
m entality , which in turn was to  play a d is t in c tiv e  ro le  towards fu rth e r 
development, upgrading and b e tte r  functioning of the party  o rgan isation . 
Second and equally  im portan t, ND u ltim a te ly  managed to  overcome th e  
shock of Karamanlis' d e p a rtu re , and i t  has su c c e ss fu lly  surv ived  h is  
absence not only under h is  immediate successor George Rail i s ,  but a lso  
under A veroff's leadership (1981-1984) and under M itsotakis (September 
1984 u n til  October 1993), as is  discussed below.
3.2 ND's o rganisational enlargement and i t s  1986 second national
congress
When Karamanlis became the head of s ta te ,  the parliam entary group 
fo r the f i r s t  time e le c te d  ND's p a rty  lea d e r, duly fo llow ing  the 
procedures se t down in the 1979 s ta tu te s :  on 8 May 1980, G. Rail is  beat 
the o ther candidate, E. Averoff, by a margin of four v o te s .( 631 Under 
h is leadership, the party  made a great e ffo r t  to  figh t the forthcoming 
(1981) e le c t io n , and to  combat the  expected r i s e  of i t s  main r i v a l ,  
PASOK. Many re g io n a l  c o n g re sse s  were h e ld  between 1979 and 1981, 
impeccably following democratic procedures and open to  c r i t i c i s m . ( 64 } 
Nevertheless, as D. Katsoudas observes,
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" . . . i t  was too la te  fo r New Democracy to  change e ith e r  the 
popular d esire  fo r change o r i t s  own image...  The General 
E le c tio n  o f 1981 was fough t w ith  th e  same d a te d  and 
unsophisticated methods, a lb e it  with more m obilisation of 
a now more conscious and a c t iv e  p a rty  base" ( in  E nglish  
o r ig in a lly ) . ( 651
Between i t s  f i r s t  congress and the  1981 e le c t io n , New Democracy 
t r i e d  hard  to  develop  i t s  d e p a rtm e n ta l o r g a n is a t io n .  The p a r ty  
elaborated a so -called  peripheral o rganisation  regu la tion  (KPO), which 
was r a t i f ie d  by i t s  adm in istrative  ccmnitee, and aimed a t  tra n s la tin g  
the party  s ta tu te s  in to  actual p rac tic e . I t  was hoped tha t the party  
base would be properly organised, in time to  be mobilised to help ND 
f ig h t the  forthcom ing e le c t io n . In r e a l i t y ,  very  l i t t l e  indeed, i f  
anyth ing , was accom plished. As an a d m in is tra tiv e -c o m m itte e  member 
admitted,
"Almost noth ing  of the  e n t i r e  KPO is  e i th e r  in use o r 
re sp ec ted ... New party  members are  reg is te red  in defiance 
of KPO ru lin g s . Subscriptions are  not c o lle c te d .. .  In tra ­
p a rty  e le c tio n s  have been postponed four o r f iv e  tim es, 
and for the most p a rt have not yet been held. Where they 
were held, the relevant procedures provided for by the KPO 
were not f o l lo w e d . . .  The a d m in is tra t iv e  committee. . . , 
supposed to meet every two months, a c tu a lly  does so very 
seldom.. . " . ( 66}
Moreover, according to  the same member,
"Not one out of the  more than a dozen suggestions and 
p ro p o sitio n s  [on o rg a n isa tio n a l issu es] I subm itted [to  
the Executive Committee] has ever been se r io u s ly  taken 
in to  account when i t  should have been, le t  alone properly 
applied". In consequence, " I t  seems th a t ND’s organisation  
functions like  the old-fashioned f i r e  brigade did, which 
appeared on the  scene, only a f t e r  the  f i r e  has been put 
ou t".< 6 7}
New D em ocracy 's d e f e a t  in  th e  1981 e l e c t i o n  c a u se d  s e v e re  
re p e rc u s s io n s  w ith in  th e  p a r ty ,  t r ig g e r in g  in te r n a l  d is se n t th a t  
u ltim a te ly  led to  R a l l i s ' re s ig n a tio n  and A v e ro ff 's  e le c tio n  to the 
lead ersh ip .(68 * As a staunch h ard lin e r, Averoff was considered the most 
capable of the candidates to combat Papandreou's PASOK and to re tu rn  ND
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to  o ff ic e ; Rail is  was viewed as too moderate, and so p a rtly  responsible 
for the 1981 e le c to ra l d e fe a t.* 69’ N evertheless, i t  is  largely  due to  
him th a t a  m ild p o l i t i c a l  c lim a te  p r e v a i le d  d u rin g  th e  e l e c to r a l  
strugg le , and the change in o ff ic e  took place fo r the f i r s t  time ever in 
a p e rfec tly  o rderly  and peaceful manner. ND's new leader was (fo r the 
second time) dem ocratically e lec ted  by the p a r ty 's  parliam entary group, 
and the p a r ty 's  un ity  preserved.
A m ajor consequence o f th e  p a r ty  lo s in g  o f f i c e  was th a t  due 
a tten tio n  was f in a lly  paid to  the importance of the organisation . As the 
ND d irec to r-genera l admitted (and h is  views were shared by a good many 
prominent ND members),
" . . . i f  ND had been b e tte r  organised —not ju s t during the 
la s t  few months but a l l  along— we would have cone up with 
a b e tte r  e lec tio n  r e s u l t" .* 70}
Several of the adm in istra tive-carm ittee  members acknowledged th a t, the 
departmental organisation  a p a rt, the cen tra l party  organs had not played 
the ro le  provided fo r by the  p a rty  s t a t u t e s . *71 * So, as the  then 
d irec to r-genera l put i t ,  the party
" . . .m u s t  b u i ld  up i t s  o rg a n is a t io n .  I t  w il l  have to  
continue i t s  figh t as the o f f ic ia l  opposition party . There 
can be no doubt tha t we must a c tiv a te  our organisation a t 
once, . . . s o  th a t ,  through the  l a t t e r ,  new cadres w ill  
emerge to s ta f f  ND in the fu tu r e . .." .*  72}
Another major flaw  in the  e x is t in g  o rg an isa tio n  was, in R ail i s '  
words, tha t
" . . . i t  i s  an endemic sickness of our camp to  lack any 
eagerness fo r  o rg a n isa tio n , which simply goes on in the 
same o ld , fe e b le  m a n n e r ...  There i s  o rg a n is a t io n  in 
theory, but i t  is  not enough. What is  badly needed is  seme 
intense a c t iv i ty  by our supporters, which is  missing from 
our party  a lto g e th e r, whereas i t  abounds in PASOK and in 
the Ccamunist Party" . * 73}
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This p a r t ic u la r  f e a tu r e  of th e  c o n s e rv a t iv e  camp has alw ays been 
renarked on by prominent conservative fig u res . For the conservatives, 
the concept of p a rty -p o lit ic a l o rganisation  smacked of demonstrations, 
so c ia l u n res t and communist a g i ta t io n ,  and a l l  which were u t t e r ly  
incom patible w ith  the  values of so c ia l t r a n q u i l l i t y ,  law and o rd e r , 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  e x a l te d  and upheld  by th e  Greek R ig h t.* 74 * R ail i s ,  
th e re fo re , d isce rn ed  a la te n t  h o s t i l i t y  towards p a rty  o rg a n isa tio n , 
which he described as the
" .. .d o m in a n t  m e n ta l i ty  in  ou r camp: they  [th e  p a r ty  
members and suppo rte rs] want to  have every th ing  w ithout 
r i s k i n g  any e f f o r t  o f t h e i r  own, and th e y  c an n o t 
understand th a t  w ith  such a m e n ta lity , the  game is  lo s t  
before i t  has ever s ta r te d " . ( 75}
During A veroff's term as ND's leader (December 1981-September 1984), 
the p a rty ’s organ isation  developed spectacu larly . Whereas in 1981 the 
party  had 150,000 members and about 500 inac tive  local o rganisational 
branches (TOs), by December 1983 over 2 ,000 TOs were fu n c tio n in g  
throughout the country, and over 70,000 new members had in the meantime 
joined the p a rty .* 76’ A separate ND women's o rganisation  was se t up in
1982, and the a d m in is tra tiv e  committee c re a te d  a working committee 
exclusively orien ted  towards women's qu estio n s .* 77’ Furthermore, by June
1983, the party  had elaborated a new peripheral organisation  regu la tion  
(KPO), which was considered as " . . . a  very important p a rt of our e f fo r ts  
towards the modem organisation  of our p a rty " .* 78 ’
However, th is  unprecedented o rg a n isa tio n a l a c t iv i ty  d id  not stem 
from seme kind of inner-party  dynamics. I t  was mainly an outcome of the 
fact that ND members and supporters, in opposition for the f i r s t  time, 
re a liz e d  the im p o ss ib ili ty  of coun tering  PASOK's in ten se  a n t i - r ig h t  
rh e to ric  and p o lic ie s  unless they were competently organised themselves. 
This is  corroborated by answers from 158 rank -and -file  ND members in the 
Department of L arissa in 1989,*79’ as presented in Table IV .1 below.
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T able IV. 1: Development o f  ND's G ra ss-ro o ts  O rganisation
Ouestion Answer number %
Is  there  organisational Yes 135 85.44
d ifference  between Some 12 07.60
the 1974-1981 period No 3 01.90
and today (1981-1989)? Don't know 8 05.06
Total 158 100.00
1974-81 non-ex isten t, but 
well developed a f te r  1981 107 67.72
I f  yes/some, what 
does i t  consist of? B etter a f te r  1981 19 12.03
Other 21 13.29
Total 147 93.04
According to  the  overwhelming m a jo rity  of the ra n k -a n d -f ile  ND 
members in L arissa  (85.44 per c e n t, o r 93 per cent includ ing  those 
members who th ink  th a t th e re  was a t  any r a te  some d if fe re n c e ) , the  
p a r ty 's  g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  a f t e r  1981 d if fe rs  considerably from 
th a t  between 1974 and 1981. Almost 68 per cent of the p a rty  members 
believe tha t during ND's f i r s t  period in government, party  o rganisation  
was v ir tu a lly  n o n -ex is te n t; i t  developed only a f t e r  th e i r  p a rty  went 
in to  opposition, mainly in order to  combat PASOK, which was much more 
e ffe c tiv e ly  organised. The percentage of those who thought tha t there  
was no d ifference between the two periods is  neg lig ib le  (1.90 per cen t), 
and n ineteen  members (12.03 per cen t) be lieved  th a t the organisation 
underwent a merely q u a lita tiv e  change.
Table IV.2 below is  another corroboration, showing that most of the 
ra n k -a n d -f ile  members in the  Department of L a rissa  jo ined the p a r ty  
a f te r  1981. During the 1974-81 period , only 51 (25.95 per cent) joined 
ND, the remaining 107 (74.05 per cent) did so a f te r  1981, when the party  
had lo s t the e lec tio n  and became the o f f ic ia l  opposition; 65 members 
joined ND between 1981 and 1985, and another 52 from 1985 u n til  1989 
(fieldwork tim e).
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Table IV .2: L a r issa  ND Members: Year o f  R e g is te r in g  in  th e  Party Ranks
Year of re a is tra t io n number %
Before 1977 27 17.09
1977-1981 14 08.86
1981-1985 65 41.14
A fter 1985 52 32.91
Total 158 100.00
While in o ff ic e  fo r seven consecutive years, New Democracy re lie d  
alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  on th e  s o - c a l le d  s p o ils - s y s te m . T his i s  th e  
trad itio n a l usage of the p a rty  in o ff ic e  fo r securing the popular vote 
by d i s t r i b u t i n g  f a v o u r s ,  and f u l l y  e x p lo i t i n g  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  
governmental o ff ic e  e n ta i ls ;  i t  re s u lts  in incorporating the people in 
p o l i t i c s  in  a dependent m anner, th rough  v e r t i c a l  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  
r e l a t i o n s ,  and no t in d e p e n d e n tly /im p e rso n a lly  th rough  th e  p a r ty  
organisation and ideology. To quote R. Macrides,
"A modern party  must be in contact with the people through 
i t s  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  and i t s  id e o lo g ic a l  
p r in c ip le s . . .  In my opinion, ND’s most serious defect is  
th a t i t  was never transformed in to  a party . Consequently, 
when i t s  leader moved to the Presidency of the Republic, 
i t  'co llap sed 1. . . " . ‘ 80 >
N e v e r th e le s s , most s c h o la r s  a re  ag reed  th a t  d u rin g  A v e ro f f 's  
le a d e rs h ip  th e  p a r ty  e x p e rien c ed  an unp receden ted  o rg a n isa tio n a l 
expansion, re g is te r in g  thousands of new and ac tive  members in i t s  l i s t s .  
According to D. Katsoudas,( 81’
" . . . l o c a l  b ranches opened alm ost everyw here and th e  
degree of members' a c t iv e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  grew sharp ly , 
giving the impression tha t ND's re tu rn  to power was almost 
inminent".
But th is  was not the case in  the  June 1984 E u ro -e lec t ion. A v e ro ff 's  
dec ision  to  meet ND's ch a llen g e  to  PASOK across the whole spectrum
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(going as fa r  as heading the p a r ty 's  b a llo t him self and in vain urging 
Papandreou to do likewise) d id  not r e s u lt  in the hoped improvement in 
the  p a r ty 's  fo rtu n e s . ND's share  o f the  vo te  increased  by only two 
percentage poin ts compared to  the October 1981 national e lec tio n , and 
triggered  fresh  c rit ic ism  and resentment in the p a r ty .<8Z)
Three months a f t e r  th a t  e le c t io n  A veroff re s ig n e d , and a new 
le a d e r s h ip  c o n te s t  to o k  p la c e  be tw een  C. M i t s o ta k i s  and C. 
Stephanopoulos. ND's parliam entary group, dyly following the s ta tu to ry  
provisions, convened on 1 September 1984 and e lected  M itsotakis as the 
new p a rty  leader (w ith 71 v o tes  as a g a in s t 40 fo r  S tephanopoulos). 
Although th is  was the th ird  time New Democracy acquired a new leader, 
the party  remained united  and, in th a t respec t, i t s  organisation did 
indeed function properly. A fter M itso tak is ' e lec tio n  to  the leadership , 
ND's most prominent members (including Rail is ,  Averoff, Stephanopoulos 
and Boutos), decided tha t the new leader should be a ss is te d  in major 
p o l i t i c a l  issu es  by an u n o f f i c i a l  body, c o n s is t in g  of le a d in g  ND 
p a rliam e n ta ria n s , and named " p o l i t ic a l  co u n c il" . In la te  1984, th is  
organ consisted of C. Papakonstantinou, C. Stephanopoulos, J . Boutos, 
and A. Kanellopoulos. ( 8 3}
On 3 February 1985 M itso tak is  had a m an ifesto*84} pub lished , to  
se rv e  as th e  somewhat amended b a s i s  o f th e  p a r t y 's  id e o lo g ic a l  
p rin c ip les  and as ND's springboard for con testing  the forthcoming June 
1985 e le c tio n . Although the p a rty  d id  b e t te r  than in the 1984 Euro- 
e lec tio n , i t  again lo s t to PASOK, which remained in o ffice  for a second 
consecutive term. *85‘ In the afterm ath of th is  e lec tio n , Stephanopoulos 
le f t  the party  to  form DIANA, and only then M itsotakis resigned, asking 
ND's pari i amen ta ry  group for a vote of confidence (exactly  like  Rail is  
had done four years e a r l i e r ) .  ND d ep u tie s  e le c te d  him again to  the  
lead ersh ip ,( 86 * and the party  moved towards i t s  second congress on 14-16 
February 1986.
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Seven years had passed since ND had held i t s  f i r s t  congress in 1979, 
and the reason for th is  second congress coining so la te  were, according 
to the party , that
" . . . t h e  consecu tive  e le c t io n s  — i . e  the  1981-n a tio n a l 
e le c t io n , the  1982 m unicipal e le c t io n ,  the  1984 Euro- 
e le c t ion and, again, the 1985 na tional one— did not allow 
f o r  c o n v e n in g  th e  c o n g r e s s  w i t h i n  th e  s t a t u t o r y  
period". ( 87 *
D irectly  a f te r  the la s t  of those e le c tio n , therefo re , ND created  four 
committees (of o rg a n is a tio n , s t a tu t e s ,  ideology, and program ing) as 
well as an organisational sub-conmittee to  thoroughly prepare fo r the 
second congress, so th a t i t  would " ...in a u g u ra te  the renewal of the 
p a r ty ’s o rg a n isa tio n a l s t ru c tu r e  and id e o lo g ic a l  p r in c ip le s "  . ‘ 8 8 ’ 
Moreover, the party  mailed a questionnaire  (15,000 copies) to a l l  ND 
o rg an isa tio n s  —departm en ta l, l o c a l ,  o c c u p a tio n a l— in  G reece and 
abroad; the questions concerned i t s  basic  o rgan isational, ideological 
and policy-progranme issues, and the ND members1 answers were carpi led 
and taken in to  serious account in the p reparation  for the congress. Last 
but not le a s t, 126 prelim inary departmental conferences, six  preparatory 
peripheral assem blies, and five  panhellenic convocations were a lso  held 
(with more than 5,000 e lec ted  ND delegates p a rtic ip a tin g ) , before ND's 
second congress in Salonica in February 1986.( 89}
While a t ND's f i r s t  congress no press coverage was allowed, nor were 
Greek or fo re ign  re p re se n ta tiv e s  of o th e r  p a r t ie s  in v i te d ,( 90 * the 
second congress had fu ll press coverage and a good many represen ta tives 
a ttended  i t s  p ro ceed in g s. ( 91’ Moreover, a p a r t  from the alm ost 1,000 
e le c te d  ND d e le g a te s ,  th e re  were r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of ND's women's 
departments, inv ited  to a ttend  as observers, since, the 1979 s ta tu te s  
made no provisions fo r th e ir  fu ll  p a rtic ip a tio n . The congress concerned 
i t s e l f  mainly with three issues: o rgan isation , ideological p rin c ip le s , 
and the general p o l i t i c a l  p la tfo rm . In the  next se c tio n , we sh a ll
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d iscuss e x c lu s iv e ly  the  o rg a n isa tio n a l q u estio n s , leav ing  those of 
ideology and the p o l i t ic a l  programme u n til  the next chapter.
3.3 S tatutory  changes in 1986
According to the 1986 p a r ty 's  d irec to r-g en e ra l, A. Bratakos, ND's 
s ta tu te s  needed rev ision  because, c e r ta in  p o sitiv e  fea tu res aside , the 
party  s t i l l  suffered  from four basic  o rganisational weaknesses. These 
were,
"(a) the  c o rp o ra te  s t ru c tu re  o f ND's c o l le c t iv e  organs;
(b) the to ta l  absence of pe rsonal r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  in the 
c o l l e c t i v e  o rg a n s ,  i . e .  t o t a l  a b se n c e  o f v e r t i c a l  
s tru c tu re s ; (c) too many organs of cen tra l organ isation , 
and too much autonomy in decision-making, which confuses 
areas of re sp o n s ib ility  in departmental o rgan isations, and 
th is , in tu rn , causes a g rea t deal of p a ra lle l  action ; and 
(d) lack of a c o n s is te n t p o lic y  p reven ting  the c o rre c t 
timing and a c tu a lisa tio n  of decisions taken".*92 *
Most of these  weaknesses had a lso  been mentioned by o th e r prom inent 
party  members and deputies who, among o ther th ings, had advocated a more 
balanced d is tr ib u tio n  of action  and re sp o n s ib ility  between party  organs 
and deputies; a more ac tiv e  ro le  of ND's huge g rass-roo ts o rganisation , 
and b e tte r  corrmunication between the party  base and the higher organs 
(up to the party  lead ersh ip ), through the appointment of medium-rank 
party  o f f ic ia ls ;  and, f in a lly , g rea te r say for the p a r ty 's  rank and f i l e  
in both the nomination of MPs and the party  le a d e r 's  e lec tio n . *93 1 As we 
shall see, most of the above propositions were taken in to  account, and 
voted in by the second congress.
Before we proceed to  a more d e ta ile d  discussion of the changes in 
ND's organisational s tru c tu re , i t  should be noted tha t the 1986 s ta tu te s  
in troduce four b a s ic  o rg a n isa tio n a l and o p e ra tio n a l p r in c ip le s , ( 94’ 
intended to remedy the afore-mentioned organisational weaknesses, and to  
" ...govern  the o rganisation  and functioning of a modern, dem ocratically 
e lected , and re l ia b le  party  mechanism".* 95’ These were: the p rin c ip le s
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of decision-m aking by m a jo rity , o f o rg a n isa tio n a l u n ity , of p a r ty -  
o p e ra tio n a l d e c e n tra l is a t io n , and of each and everyone 's  personal 
re sp o n s ib ility . The dominant ro le  in ND was declared to  be tha t of the 
p a r ty 's  members, given th a t  " . . . a l l  organs a re  c o n s t itu te d  by p a rty  
members, spread from the g rass-roo ts towards the top and ccmnunicating 
with each other both ways". ( 96»
Figure 4.11 below presents a diagram of the party  s tru c tu re  as th is  
appeared a f te r  the second congress in February 1986. F ir s t  of a l l ,  ND's 
organisation  is  sub-divided in to  cen tra l and p eriphera l; ND's cen tral 
o rg a n is a t io n  com prises th e  c o n g re ss , th e  p a r ty  p r e s id e n t ,  th e  
p a rliam en ta ry  group, the  c e n tra l  coiTmittee (as the  a d m in is tra tiv e  
committee was now renam ed), th e  e x e c u tiv e  com m ittee , th e  c e n t r a l  
d i s c ip l in a r y  c o u n c il ,  and th e  c e n t r a l  f in a n c e  co m m ittee .( 37 * The 
peripheral organisation breaks down in to  local (TO), provincial (BO), 
and departm ental (NO), and w ith in  i t s  c o n te x t, sp e c ia l p a rty  ( i . e .  
o c c u p a t io n a l ,  EKO), h e t e r o c i t i z e n s , ( 9 8 } and G reek -im m ig ran t 
organisations can a lso  be e s ta b lish e d .{99}
Contrary to what was the case in 1979, the revised  s ta tu te s  of 1986 
declare  decisively  tha t "The congress is  the p a r ty 's  highest and 
dominant o rg a n " . '100} I t  consists  of the incumbent p residen t, former 
p res id en ts , par1iamentary-group members (in Greece and Europe), c en tra l-  
conmittee members, ex-MPs and Euro-MPs, non-elected candidates a t the 
la s t  e lec tion  p rio r to the congress (fo r both national and Euro- 
parliam en ts), rep resen ta tives fran  departmental organisations e lected  
by every departmental carm ittee (not appointed by the respective 
departmental committees, as under the 1979 s ta tu te s ) ,  each sending to 
the congress as many delegates as there  are parliam entary sea ts  in the 
departm en t concerned . ( 101 ’ M oreover, th e  c o n g re s s  in c lu d e s  36 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from  th e  p a r t y ' s  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  a b ro a d ,  70 
rep resen ta tives of occupational o rganisations (as opposed to 50 under
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Figure 4.11; Diagram of the ND S tructu re  According to  the 1986 S ta tu tes
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the 1979 s ta tu te s ) , 120 ND you th -o rg an isa tio n  (ONNED) re p re s e n ta tiv e s  
(tw ice as many as under the  1979 s t a tu t e s ) ,  and one woman from each 
departmental adm inistrative corrmittee (70 women in a l l ) . * 102>
The main tasks of the Congress, according to A rtic le  11, a re :
—to define ND's ideological p rin c ip le s .
—to r a t i f y  ND's p o l i t ic a l  programme.
—to confirm the p a r ty 's  broader po licy  lin es.
—to sanction and amend the party  s ta tu te s .
—to discuss the report of the outgoing cen tra l carm ittee.
—to  e le c t  the  new c e n tra l-c o n m itte e  from both parliam en ta ry  and 
non-par 1 iamentary members, and
—to make decisions on every item on the agenda.( 103}
The congress should norm ally be he ld  every th re e  y e a rs , fo llow ing  a 
cen tra l-co irm ittee  d e c is io n , and in ex tra o rd in a ry  c ircum stances, and 
a f te r  a decision by the p residen t, or by a tw o-thirds m ajority  of the 
cen tra l corrmittee, an ad-hoc congress may be h e ld .* 104 *
Between congresses, the cen tra l corrmittee is  the highest organ of 
the  p a rty , as the  1986 s ta tu te s  now d e f in i t iv e ly  s t i p u l a t e .* 105 * I t  
c o n s is ts  of the p a r ty  p r e s id e n t ,  ND's p a r lia m e n ta ry  sp e a k e r , th e  
parliam entary group's secre tary -general, the youth-organisation (ONNED) 
president (a ll  of whcm p a rtic ip a te  in the cen tra l corrmittee ex o f f ic io ) ,  
and 75 e lected  ND members for a three-year term (25 of which are  MPs 
e lected  by the congress and not appointed by the parliam entary group, as 
under the  1979 s t a t u t e s ) .* 106' Being the  h ig h es t p a rty  organ between 
congresses, the cen tra l carm ittee should s i t  once every two months (or 
ad hoc, i f  special circumstances make i t  necessary), and, aside  from 
e lec tin g  the executive committee as well as the  c e n tra l  d is c ip l in a ry  
council (eleven and f iv e  members re sp e c tiv e ly )  and app o in tin g  the  
departm ental d i s c ip l in a r y  c o u n c i ls ,  i t  p la y s  much th e  same r o l e ,  
although more frequently , as the party  congress. *107'
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The executive committee consists  of the above four party  members who 
s i t  ex o ff ic io  on the cen tra l corrmittee, together with eleven e lec ted  
members (six  of whom a re  n o n -parliam en ta rian s) fo r an eighteen-m onth 
term. Normally, i t  is  ca lled  to  session once a week by ND’s p residen t, 
and ad hoc in sp e c ia l c ircum stances. The execu tive  corrm ittee is  the  
h ighest in s t ru c t iv e  p a r ty  organ between c e n tra l  corrm ittee se ss io n s , 
re s p o n s ib le  fo r  ev ery  is su e  c o n ce rn in g  p a r t y - p o l i t i c a l  t a c t i c s ,  
organisation and functioning. Moreover, i t  appoints a l l  seven members of 
th e  c e n t r a l  f in a n c e  com m ittee, and can d e c id e  w hether o r no t to  
e s ta b l is h  sp e c ia l p a rty  (EKOs), h e te ro c i t iz e n ,  and Greek-immigrant 
o rg an isa tio n s .( 108}
At the  p e rip h e ra l le v e l, ND's o rg a n isa tio n a l s t ru c tu re  d id  not 
change very much frcm tha t of the 1979 s ta tu te s . Local organ isations 
(TOs) co n stitu te  the nucleus of the p a r ty 's  g rass-ro o ts , th e ir  organs 
being the  local assembly (TS) and the  lo ca l committee (TE); women's 
departments are se t up w ithin the local o rgan isa tions ' context. A second 
rank of the peripheral organisation  (missing from the 1979 s ta tu te s )  are  
p ro v in c ia l  o nes, in  th e  form o f p ro v in c ia l  a sse m b lie s  (ES) and 
provincial committees (EE). F in a lly , departm ental o rg a n isa tio n s  (NO) 
c o n s t i tu t e  th e  t h i r d  o rg a n is a t io n a l  g ra d e , and c o n s is t  of th e  
departmental assembly (NS), the departmental adm inistrative  (NODE), the 
departmental executive (NQMEKE), and the departmental finance carm ittees 
(NOE) and, la s tly , of the three-member departmental d isc ip lin a ry  council 
(NOPS).110!"
By and la rg e  then , the  new s ta tu te s  provided fo r a much g re a te r  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  by ND's rank and f i l e  in  the  p a r ty 's  h igher c e n tra l  
organs. However, the  main innovation in troduced  by the 1986 s ta tu te s  
—not irre lev an t to the afore-mentioned upgrading of the g rass-ro o ts— 
concerned the p r e s id e n t 's  e le c tio n  and the nom ination of the p a r ty 's  
parliam entary candidates. As we sha ll demonstrate, New Democracy came
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c lo s e r  to  a more d e m o c ra tic , E u ropean-type  p a r ty  o rg a n isa tio n  by 
involving p a rt of i t s  base in the e lec tio n  of the party  p res iden t, and 
by allowing i t  more say in drawing up the p a r ty 's  e lec to ra l l i s t s .
According to A rtic le  13 of the 1986 s ta tu te s , then, the presiden t 
leads and represen ts the party  in general; he expresses i t s  p o lic ie s  on 
every p o li t ic a l  and ideological m atter; he supervises and co-ordinates 
the p a r ty 's  organisation ; he presides a t  meetings of the cen tra l and 
executive committees as well as of the parliam entary group, and he bears 
fu ll  re sp o n sib ility  fo r the proper re a liz a tio n  of a l l  decisions taken by 
the congress, the cen tra l and executive committee and the parliam entary 
group; moreover, he is  responsible  fo r the p a r ty 's  national conference 
being convened —norm ally once a y ear, or ad hoc i f  he considers i t  
necessary .*110 *
In the 1979 s ta tu te s  the party  president was the p a r ty 's  founder; 
now the "President of the p a rty  is  the one duly e lec ted " .* 111’ The v ice - 
p re s id e n t 's  p o s it io n  has been abo lished  seeing  th a t no p a r t ic u la r  
problems were c re a te d  fo r  the  p a rty  o rg an isa tio n  by th is  p o s it io n  
rem ain ing  v acan t ev e r s in c e .*  112) F u rthe rm ore , i t  i s  no t ND's 
parliam en tary  group th a t  now e l e c t s  th e  p r e s id e n t ,  bu t a s p e c ia l  
e lec to ra l body, consisting  of the party  deputies and rep resen ta tives of 
ND's p e r ip h e ra l  o r g a n is a t io n  e l e c t e d  in  each  d e p a r tm e n t. More 
sp e c if ic a lly , unless the p re s id e n t 's  e lec tio n  is  held during a congress 
every departmental assembly convenes ad hoc; i t  consists of the members 
of the departmental adm in istra tive  committee, and the p residen t, v ice - 
president and secretary-general of every local and ONNED committee in 
the department; and, f in a l ly , th is  special departmental assembly e le c ts  
one rep resen ta tive . All these departmental rep resen ta tives (70 a t  the 
time of w riting ), together with the parliam entary group and the Euro- 
MPs, c o n s t i tu te  the  sp e c ia l e le c to ra l  body, th a t is  re sp o n sib le  fo r  
e lec tin g  the party  p re s id e n t.* 113 ’ Thus,
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" . . .s in c e  the peripheral o rgan isation , through i t s  e lected  
re p re s e n ta tiv e s , can d e c is iv e ly  in fluence  developments 
concerning the c r i t i c a l  issue of the p re s id e n t's  e lec tio n , 
i t s  ro le  becomes a c ruc ia l one —in the sense th a t i t  is  
upgraded to  the  c e n tre  of in te rn a l-p a r ty  procedures and 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  and so i s  re s p o n s ib le  fo r  prom oting  and 
safeguarding the p a r ty 1s fu tu re  p rogress". ‘ 114 *
A c co rd in g  to  A r t i c l e  19 o f th e  1986 s t a t u t e s ,  th e  p a r t y 's  
parliam en tary  group com prises both  n a tio n a l and Euro-MPs (s in ce  the  
country  is  a f u l l  EEC member), norm ally s i t s  once a month —or in  
extraordinary  circumstances ad hoc— and appoints i t s  own d isc ip lin a ry  
c o u n c il, which c o n s is ts  of the  f iv e  most sen io r d ep u ties  of ND's 
p arliam en tary  g ro u p .( 1 15 * Due c a re  was e x e rc is e d  so th a t  th e  new 
s ta tu te s  would guarantee
" . . . t h e  much needed e q u il ib r iu m  between th e  two main 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  b ra n c h e s  o f o u r p a r t y ,  nam ely th e  
p a r l i a m e n ta r y  g ro u p  and  th e  r a n k - a n d - f i l e  p a r ty  
members". ‘ 116}
I t  was f o r  t h i s  re a s o n  t h a t  th e  p a r ty  b a se  was g iv e n  d i r e c t  
p a rtic ip a tio n  in the formation of ND's e lec to ra l l i s t s .
Apart from the candidates for the European Parliament, and those on 
the S ta te - l i s t  whose se lec tio n  and nomination remains a t the absolute 
d isc re tio n  of the p residen t, ND's g rass-roo ts have now a say concerning 
th e  n o m in a tio n  o f a l l  th e  r e s t . (117) More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  e ach  
departmental assembly —composed of the same members as who w ill decide 
departm en t's  re p re se n ta tio n  on the  sp ec ia l e le c to ra l  body fo r the  
p re s id e n t 's  e lec tio n — draws up a l i s t  of twice as many candidates as 
there  are  a v a ilab le  p a rliam en ta ry  s e a ts  in the department concerned, 
accord ing  to  the  p re fe ren ce  vo tes  received  by each of them from the 
afore-mentioned departmental-assembly members. This l i s t ,  drawn up with 
th e  p a r t y 's  incum bent MPs in  th e  d ep artm en t, i s  se n t to  A thens 
h ead q u arte rs , where the  execu tive  corrmittee subm its i t  to  a f i r s t  
screening. A fter th a t, the l i s t  reaches the p residen t, who " . . . f i n a l ly
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se lec ts  the candidates and forms the  e le c to ra l  l i s t s ,  b a s ic a lly  from 
among those proposed by the departmental assem blies". ‘ 118 *
There can be no denying th a t the 1986 s ta tu te s  have a llo t te d  a much 
more inportant and decisive  ro le  fo r the p a r ty 's  g rass-roo ts than did 
those of 1979. The ND p re s id e n t h im self adm itted  th a t " . . . i n  the  
previous s ta tu te s , there  was no guarantee whatsoever for the e ssen tia l 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f th e  p a r t y 's  rank  and f i l e  in  th e  c a n d id a te s ' 
nomination".<119 > C ertain prominent ND deputies have, however, resented 
th is  upgraded ro le  of the rank and f i l e ,  and denounced the new s ta tu te s  
as counter-parliam entarian .( 1201 For a l l  th e ir  ob jections, the request 
by ND's rank and f i l e  fo r the adoption of democratic pa rty  procedures 
and th e ir  own g rea te r share in decision-making had emerged as early  as 
1976 —when the  Volvi Movement fa c tio n  was formed— and became more 
pressing as time went by. This is  confirmed by the data presented in 
Table IV. 3 below on the  op in ions of ND members in  the Department of 
L arissa in 1989.<121 *
Table IV.3: ND Members' Views Regarding the Party Candidates' Nomination
number %
Should th is  be the party  p re s id e n t 's  Yes 
exclusive re sp o n s ib ility  ?
No
68
100
36.71
63.29
Total 158 100.00
I f  not, what would you personally  prefer? number %
(a) Exclusive re sp o n s ib ility  by the p a r ty 's  
g rass-roo ts o rganisation 18 11.39
(b) Formation of the e le c to ra l l i s t s  by in tra ­
party  e lec tions p rio r  to  the p re s id e n t 's  decision 82 51.90
Total 100 63.29
As we can see, more than 63 per cent of ND's rank -and-file  members in 
Larissa believed tha t the party  base should have a g rea ter say in the 
candidates' nomination, as opposed to  almost 37 per cent who approved of 
the president having exclusive re sp o n s ib ility  in th is  respect; a l i t t l e
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over 11 per cent of the  form er want the  p a r ty 's  rank and f i l e  to  be 
exclusively  responsible for ND's e le c to ra l l i s t s ,  whereas the m ajority  
(almost 52 per cent) acknowledge the p re s id e n t 's  r ig h t to  have the f in a l 
say —w ith the  p rov iso  th a t  th e  p a r ty  l i s t s  should be formed on the  
b asis  of p r io r  in tra -p a rty  e le c tio n s , i .e .  th a t they absolu tely  agree 
w ith  the  re sp e c tiv e  p ro v is io n s  of the  1986 s t a t u t e s . 11221 The l a t t e r  
have been te s ted  in p rac tic e , f i r s t  during the 1986 congress, when the 
party  delegates r a t i f ie d  M itso tak is ' 1984 e lec tio n  to the leadership by 
ND's parliam entary group, and, again during the June 1989 e lec tio n , when 
the  cho ices of cand idates by departm ental assem blies were resp ec ted  
(iso la ted  exceptions a p a r t ) ;1123} for the November 1989 and the A pril 
1990 e lec tions a l l  p a rtie s  more or less used the June 1989 e lec to ra l 
l i s t s  again, as there was not enough time fo r preparing new ones.
Aside from the new and more im portant ro le  assigned  to  the p a rty  
base by the 1986 s ta tu te s , and fu rth e r aside frctn the steps taken for a 
w e ll-s truc tu red  and b e tte r  functioning organisation  a t peripheral lev e l, 
ND tr ie d  to s im ila rly  improve i t s  cen tra l party  services in Athens fo r 
the purposes of proper supervision and b e tte r  co-ordination of the whole 
o rg a n isa tio n a l ap p ara tu s . A whole nexus of s e c r e ta r ia t s  and sp e c ia l 
o f f ic e s  was s e t  up a few months a f t e r  the  1986 congress by the ND 
d i r e c t o r - g e n e r a l ,  and a d e t a i l e d  p i c t u r e  o f th e  p a r t y 's  new 
organisational scheme is  presented  in Figure 4.111 below. We can see 
tha t eight separate s e c re ta r ia ts  were estab lished , responsible fo r the 
s e c to r s  o f p o l i t i c a l  p la n n in g , program m ing, o rg a n is a t io n , women, 
farmers, trade unionism, inform ation, and fo r adm in istra tive /financ ia l 
s e r v ic e s ;  they  were headed by seven ND d e p u tie s  and one non­
p a rliam e n ta ria n , a l l  s e le c te d  and appoin ted  by the  p a rty  p re s id e n t. 
However, most im portantly, s ix  of these se c re ta r ie s  were newcomers to  
p o l i t ic s  (that i s ,  th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  career began a f te r  1974), wheras 
only two had been a f f i l ia te d  w ith the pre-coup ERE. This was the f i r s t
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Figure 4-111: New Democracy's O rg a n isa tio n a l Scheme
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time tha t the ND leadership brought r e la tiv e ly  new p o lit ic ia n s  to  the 
foreground and en trusted  them with serious tasks and re sp o n s ib ili t ie s  
—indicating  th a t the much premised renewal of persons and ideas in 
the party  ranks would, q u ite  probably, be more than words. Under the 
s e c r e ta r ia t s ,  e ig h t sp e c ia l o f f ic e s  were e s ta b lish e d  (in  charge of 
stud ies and gallup p o l ls ,  e le c t io n s ,  education  and t r a in in g  of p a rty  
c a d re s , th e  p r e s s ,  h e te r o c i t i z e n s ,  in te r n a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  and 
information, inm igrants, and m o b il is a tio n ) , and they were a l l  headed 
—as a lso  were the  s e c r e ta r i a t s — by some of the p a r ty 's  youngest 
p o lit ic ia n s , a l l  of whom s ta r te d  th e ir  careers a f te r  1974.( 124 *
All of the e f f o r t s ,  which had begun w ith  the  second congress and 
aimed a t the rapid  organisational development of the party  to  upgrade 
i t s  rank and f i l e  to  g rea te r p a rtic ip a tio n  in p a rty -p o lit ic a l  issues, as 
well as bringing younger cadres in to  the higher party  echelons, bore 
f r u i t  as e a r ly  as October 1986, when ND met w ith i t s  f i r s t  e le c tio n  
success vis-cL-vis PASOK sin ce  i t  had lo s t  in  1981. ND saw i t s  own 
candidates e lected  as c ity  mayors in the th ree  biggest c i t ie s  of the 
country, Athens, Salonica and P ira e u s .<125} Although the next national 
e le c tio n  was not scheduled u n t i l  1989, th is  e le c tio n  trium ph, as ND 
supporters considered i t ,  proved a unifying fac to r and a major boost for 
both high-ranking and ordinary party  members. I t  signalled  a period of 
optimism and in te n s iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  geared to  winning the  forthcom ing 
national e lec tion  and re tu rn ing  to  o ff ic e .
This organisational take o ff  soon a f te r  the 1986 congress affected  
a l l  ND branches, e sp ec ia lly  the p a r ty 's  youth organisation ONNED, and 
the women's departments. As we have already mentioned, the f i r s t  women's 
department was created  in 1982 a t  cen tra l lev e l, and since the second 
congress th e re  has been a se p a ra te  women's departm ent in each loca l 
o rganisation , which sends one rep resen ta tive  to  the party  congress. With
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re sp ec t to  ONNED, and in  c o n tra s t  to  la te  1975, the year of ONNED's 
foundation when, in Katsoudas1 words,
" . . . t h e  young man belonging to  the l ib e ra l cam p..., soon 
became a p a th e tic  c a s e . . . ,  id e o lo g ic a lly  d e f ic ie n t  and, 
more often  than not, pointed a t  in sc o rn " ,{126 *
ONNED has developed  s p e c ta c u la r ly .  I t  a lre a d y  has two n a t io n a l  
congresses behind i t ,  and today claim s more than 80,000 members and 
20,000 e lected  o f f ic ia ls  (see Appendix I I I ) .  Following the same trends, 
ND's university-youth organisation  (DAP-NDFK), which in 1980 had po lled  
i t s  lowest percen tage ever of a l i t t l e  over 10 per c e n t, reached an 
unprecedented 28.29 per cent in 1986, and has ever since 1987 been the 
la rg est group in the u n iv ers ity  p o llin g , taking a t  times, as much as 45 
per cent of the v o te .( 127 * In general, ONNED has been considered as the 
most notable ND success. ONNED and the wcmen's departments a re  viewed as 
the p a rty 's  two most dynamic campaigning groups, th e ir  importance having 
increased tremendously since 1981.<128>
One f in a l  p o in t shou ld  be made b e fo re  we c lo s e  t h i s  s e c t io n ,  
concerning the re la tio n sh ip  between ND's organisations and o ther soc ia l 
groups, sp e c if ica lly  with the trade unions. Although i t  is  not possib le  
to present here in d e ta il  the course and development of the trade-union 
movement in Greece, su ffice  i t  to  mention tha t before the re s to ra tio n  of 
democracy in 1974, trade unions were e ith e r  under the control of the 
s ta te  —in which case most trade-union leaders were appointed d ire c tly  
by the M inistry of Labour and a system of sp o ils  and favours kept the 
tra d e -u n io n  movement under t i g h t  s t a t e  c o n tr o l— o r ,  but to  a 
considerably le sse r ex ten t, they were con tro lled  by the cannunists. In 
the former case, trade unions and th e ir  leaders were connected more with 
the government than with the ru lin g  party , given that ERE had no g rass­
ro o ts  o rg an isa tio n . A fte r 1974 the  communists, always m ain ta in ing  a 
w el1-s tru c tu re d  and e f f e c t iv e  o rg a n isa tio n , kept co n tro l of c e r ta in
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trade  unions (then as now the construction  workers, and a lso  several 
unions in lig h t and heavy industry , most of which were la te r  lo s t to  
PASOK). New Democracy, having f a i le d  to  develop i t s  own o rg an isa tio n  
d u rin g  th e  y e a rs  i t  was in  o f f i c e ,  fo llow ed  th e  p o l i c i e s  o f i t s  
predecessor, i .e .  i t  fu lly  explo ited  the sp o ils  system to keep trade 
unions loyal to the government; in o ther words, i t  did what i t  could to  
in co rp o ra te  them in  a dependent manner, in s tea d  of try in g  to  c re a te  
connections and linkages th a t would lead to a more equal and balanced 
re la tio n sh ip  between the party  and the trade-union movement .<12 9 ’
A fte r ND lo s t  the  1981 e le c t io n , and knew i t  could never compete 
w ith  PASOK un less i t  developed an e f f e c t iv e  o rg a n isa tio n , the p a rty  
t r ie d  to approach the unions more c losely  and to exert i t s  influence 
from w ithin. For th is  reason i t  made serious e ffo r ts  to  rejuvenate and 
a c tiv a te  i t s  occupational o rganisations (EKO) which, in turn , would act 
as a b ridge  between ND and the  unions; in  th is  the p a rty  d id  w e ll, 
see ing  th a t i t s  25 EKOs in 1981 had grown by a fa c to r  of e ig h t f iv e  
y e a rs  l a t e r  (see  Appendix I I I ) .  F u rth e rm o re , a s e p a ra te  lab o u r 
o rg a n isa tio n , a f f i l i a t e d  to  ND (DAKE), was c re a te d  a f te r  1981, to  
express and dissem inate the party  p o lic ie s  w ithin the trade unions. All 
these e ffo r ts  bore f r u i t ,  since ND managed to  obtain a foothold in and 
even achieve a decent rep resen ta tion  in q u ite  a few of the trade unions. 
Since, however, as the p a r ty 's  main re c ru its  come from the upper and 
most wealthy social and occupational categories —as w ill be discussed 
in  more d e ta i l  in  the  next ch ap te r— ND's o v e ra ll  performance and 
influence in the labour movement lags fair behind the one enjoyed, i f  not 
monopolised, by PASQK and the p a r tie s  of the L e f t . ‘ 130 *
In terms of the development of ND's o rganisation , the pre-1981 years 
and more recent ones are  hardly comparable. We shall not present the 
d if fe re n c e s  again , nor the  e f f o r t s  towards a f u l l e r  development and 
e f f e c t iv e  fu n c tio n in g  of th e  p a r t y 's  o rg a n is a t io n .  I t  shou ld  be
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m entioned , how ever, th a t  th e  p a r ty  nowadays c la im s 3,500 lo c a l  
o rganisations throughout the country, 70 departmental committees, 106 
EKOs and almost 400,000 members; th is  makes a  ra t io  of 1:7.7 between 
members and v o te rs , a r a t io  very c lose to  th a t of the Qarcnunist Party , 
which is  1 :6 .( 131 ’ I t  is  impressive th a t what in 1974 was a party  of 
notables has been transformed in to  a m ass-party, with a huge organised 
base th a t enjoys a h igh degree of p a r t ic ip a t io n  in p a rty  p o l i t i c s ,  
through having a say in  e le c t in g  th e  p re s id e n t and in  forming the  
e lec to ra l l i s t s .
Unfortunately, th is  is  not the complete p ic tu re . Despite a l l  th is  
development and p ro g re ss , th e re  a re  s t i l l  some not in co n s id e rab le  
shortcomings tha t deprive the o rg a n isa tio n  from fu n ctio n in g  p ro p e rly . 
They confine i t s  ro le  to  th a t  o f a m o b ilis in g  fo rce  fo r e le c tio n  
campaigns, while during  the  in te rim  perio d s the  o rg an isa tio n  rem ains 
dormant. Apart from the ND su p p o rte rs ' in n a te  and la te n t  h o s t i l i t y  
towards p a rty  o rg a n isa tio n  (as seen by R a l l i s ) ,  th e re  a re  much more 
im portant reasons why the p a rty  has s t i l l  not managed to  reach the  
standards and e ffic iency  of the PASOK organ isation , not to  mention tha t 
of the Left.
F irs t  of a l l ,  desp ite  the numerous and d e ta iled  s tip u la tio n s  of the 
party  s ta tu te s , a host of i r r e g u la r i t ie s  can be discerned in the cen tra l 
organisation . To begin w ith, although i t  is  mandatory fo r the congress 
to  be held every th ree  years, the th ird  congress, scheduled for 1989, is  
s t i l l  overdue. In the same fashion, the c e n tra l, executive, and every 
other committee, as well as the parliam entary group, are  not ca lled  in to  
se ss io n  as provided by the  s t a tu te s ,  sim ply because they have no 
important decisions to  make. In p ra c tic e , a l l  major powers are  reserved 
for and exercised by the p residen t, together with a small group of h is  
c lo s e s t  co lleag u es . The only  d if fe re n c e  w ith  the pre-1981 p erio d  is  
q u a n tita tiv e , not q u a lita tiv e : whereas under Karamanlis' leadership a l l
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higher party  organs played a purely decorative ro le , nowadays they meet 
ra th e r  more often  (but s t i l l  in frequently  and a t irreg u la r in te rv a ls) to  
d iscuss minor p o l i t ic a l  issues and to  be informed about major decisions 
already tak en .‘ 13 2 >
Very much the same fea tu res are  to  be found on the peripheral level 
of ND's o rganisation . Although the p a rty  has claimed 400,000 members, i t  
seems reasonable to  ad just th is  figu re  in p rac tice . New members always 
appeared in the  l i s t s  s h o r tly  befo re  in tr a -p a r ty  e lec tio n s , because 
candidates re c ru it  th e ir  re la tiv e s , acquaintances and friends to  vote 
fo r than; a f te r  the e lec tio n  is  over, most of these new manbers f a l l  by 
the  wayside, having no o th e r  p a r ty - p o l i t ic a l  i n t e r e s t s . ( 133 * This 
assum ption rec e iv e s  support from the  fa c t  th a t in 1991 New Democracy 
co llec ted  from i t s  local organ isations throughout the country only 72 
per cent of the expected subscrip tion  f e e s .<134)
T his lack  o f c o n tin u a t io n  and r e g u l a r i t y  in  th e  g r a s s - r o o ts  
o rg a n isa tio n  causes a host of o th e r  problem s. As Table IV .4 below 
shows,(135} more than 75 per cent of the p a r ty 's  rank and f i l e  in the 
Department of L arissa  thought in 1989 tha t th e ir  organisation had one or
Table IV. 4: Most Important Problems Faced by TQs 
in the Department of L arissa
Major problem number %
Financial problems 74 46.84
Lack of professional party  o f f ic ia ls 24 15.19
Lack of d isc ip lin ed  party  manbers 23 14.56
Poor cormunication between base 
and higher party  organs 21 13.29
Lack of in te rnal democratic procedures 18 11.39
General in a c tiv ity /in e ff ic ie n c y 17 10.76
D iff ic u ltie s  in a tt ra c t in g  new manbers 11 06.96
Other 5 03.16
None/Don't know 35 22.15
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more problems, whereas only a l i t t l e  over 22 per cent thought otherwise. 
The m ajority of the former regarded financ ia l shortages as the most 
serious d if f ic u lty , but a good many party  members id e n tif ie d  a lso  
other major flaws, such as lack of p rofessional cadres and d isc ip lin e  
among the  rank and f i l e ,  m al-coirm unication between the  base and the 
higher echelons of the p arty  h ierarchy (in  o ther words, the views and 
expectations of the base were not being c o rrec tly  channelled to  party  
headquarters and v ic e -v e rs a ) ,  and lack of re sp ec t fo r  in tr a -p a r ty  
dem ocratic procedures in  decision-m aking —a l l  of th ese  lead ing  to  
grievances and com plaints concerning  the  general in e f f ic ie n c y  of the 
local organisation .
Generally speaking, s in se  on the one hand the s ta tu to ry  regu lations 
on the functioning of the higher cen tra l party  organs a re  not regu larly  
observed and, on the o ther, national e lec tio n s are normally held every 
four years, the loca l and departm ental p a rty  o rg a n isa tio n s  see th e i r  
respective  ro les  confined to  th a t of mere campaign groups fo r m obilising 
ND supporte rs  and v o te rs  du ring  dem onstrations and e le c t io n s .  Thus, 
local and departmental conmittees function mainly as ad-hoc propaganda 
o rg an isa tio n s  in the p u rs u it  of c e r ta in  p a r ty -p o l i t ic a l  ends, ra th e r 
than as p a rty  in s t i tu t io n s  o rg an is in g  a c tio n , dev is in g  p o l ic ie s  and 
ex e rtin g  th e i r  own in flu en ce  on p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s .  I t  i s  th is  la s t  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  w h ich , we th in k ,  m a in ly  a c c o u n ts  f o r  th e  m al- 
conmunication between the g rass-ro o ts  and the higher party  ra n k s .4136’ 
Despite the 1986 appropriate provisions of the s ta tu te s , the organised 
p a r ty  b a se  has n o t y e t  been  g iv e n  th e  chance  to  s e c u re  and 
in s t i tu t io n a lis e  democratic procedures w ithin i t s  ranks, nor i t s  ro le  as 
a policy-shaping and decision-making body; in consequence, cannunication 
between lower and h igher o rg a n isa tio n a l le v e ls  and, more so , upward 
m obility , is  s t i l l  lim ited fo r the rank and f i l e .
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Before d iscussing the re la tio n sh ip  between the organisation  and the 
party  leadership, we would lik e  to  remark b r ie f ly  on a subject already 
touched on in the previous chapter, namely the so -called  bureaucratic  
c lien te lism  or p a rty -d irec ted  patronage. I t  w ill be remembered th a t th is  
phenomenon was f i r s t  noticed a f te r  PASOK had come to o ff ic e  in 1981; i t  
was an outcome of the party  o rganisation  having taken over —mainly from 
the MPs but a lso  from other no tab les— the task  of d is tr ib u tin g  spo ils  
a n d .fa v o u rs  to  th e  p a r t y 's  fo l lo w e rs ,  and o f c o n t r o l l in g  p u b lic  
appointments. <13 7 1
New Democracy having experienced  an unprecedented o rg a n isa tio n a l 
expansion a f te r  i t s  second congress and by la te  1991 having doubled i t s  
members, p lu s the  s ta tu to ry  upgrading of ND's base and i t s  r ig h t  to  
p a r t ic ip a te  and so in f lu e n c e  th e  c a n d id a te s ' nom inations and th e  
p re s id e n t 's  e le c t io n , meant th a t when the  p a rty  f in a l ly  took o f f ic e  
again in A pril 1990, i t s  o rg a n is a tio n  p layed  alm ost the  same ro le  
PASOK's had done n ine years e a r l i e r :  i t  was now ND membership th a t 
guaranteed one a p u b lic  appointm ent, something much needed and long 
expected by rank -and -file  members through th e ir  p a r ty 's  many years in 
opposition. The only d ifference  with PASOK's record in th is  respect was 
that in ND i t  was not only the organ isation  which performed th is  task , 
but a lso  a few se n io r  p a r ty  n o tab les  and d e p u tie s , whose personal 
c lie n te le s  assured them of a c e r ta in  degree of autonomy both towards the 
leadersh ip  and the  o rgan ised  p a r ty  b a s e .( 138’ So the ND g ra s s -ro o ts  
o rg a n is a t io n  a f t e r  1986 a c te d  m ain ly  as th e  p a r t y 's  vanguard  in 
m obilising i t s  supporters and dissem inating p o li t ic a l  propaganda while 
the party  was in opposition, whereas a f te r  ND had returned to o ff ic e , 
i t s  organised base in s is te d  —in re tu rn  for i t s  help with the p a r ty 's  
eventual r i s e  to  power again— on a decisive  ro le  in the d is tr ib u tio n  of 
spo ils and the co lon isa tion  of the public  bureaucracy with i t s  members.
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I t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to  assess the exact degree of in s t i tu t io n a lis a t io n  
of bureaucratic c lien te lism  in the ND organ isation ; n e ither p a rtie s  nor 
MPs and o th e r p a rty  n o tab les  p u b lish  d a ta  on personal favours and 
ob ligations to  th e ir  v o te rs .* 139 * N evertheless, i t  is  only f a i r  to  say 
that the ND rank and f i l e  do have a say in the d is tr ib u tio n  of favours 
and s p o ils ,  and. in  a rran g in g  fo r  p a rty  members' jobs in the  p u b lic  
sector. Notwithstanding i t s  la te  development and ill- fu n c tio n in g , ND's 
organisation has shown i t s e l f  b e tte r  ab le than o ther social in s t itu t io n s  
(trade unions, occupational and o ther c i t iz e n s ' associations) to o ffe r  
fa s te r  and sa fe r upward soc ia l and occupational m obility  —ju st as PASOK 
had done n ine years e a r l i e r .  For a l l  th a t ,  from the  time of ND's 
c reation  and a t le a s t u n til  the time of w riting , the rank and f i l e  has 
remained the  w eakest e lem ent in  th e  p a r ty ,  d e s p i te  i t s  num erica l 
superio rity  much weaker than the parliam entary group, and of course the 
party  leadership.
4. The Party Leadership
ND's leadership has been the most s a lie n t fea tu re  of the party  ever 
since i t s  foundation, and has a ffec ted  party  a f f a i r s  in ways and to  an 
e x te n t  n o t co m p arab le  by any s ta n d a r d s  to  i t s  W est-E uropean  
counterparts. I t  has always marked the party  with i t s  own p a rtic u la r  
in p rin t, which has varied  with each le a d e r 's  p e rs o n a li ty .( 140 * As may be 
expected, the ro le  and influence of the leader did not remain the same 
throughout the years; fo r a l l  th a t, with the exception of Rail is ,  no ND 
leader has ever been a primus in te r  p a re s . As we sh a ll  t ry  to  show 
below, w hile only Karamanlis was v ested  w ith  omnipotence during  h is  
term , th e  a u th o r i ty  en joyed  today  by M its o ta k is ,  d e s p i te  ND's
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sp ec tacu la r o rg a n isa tio n a l development, is  s t i l l  a (much weakened) 
re f le c tio n  of tha t predominance.
We have already examined Karamanlis' con tribu tion  to the creation  of 
ND's o rganisation , and we have a lso  ou tlined  seme of the more important 
a s p e c ts  of h is  p o st-1974  p e r s o n a l i ty .  I t  may be added h e re  th a t  
Karamanlis pro jected  the id ea l-ty p ica l example of the tra d itio n a l party  
le a d e r  in  Greek p o l i t i c s :  a m e s s ia n ic , c h a r ism a tic  f ig u re  who 
e stab lish es , owns and leads a  p o l i t ic a l  party , and so co n stitu te s  i t s  
only source of power and only decision-making cen tre . Typical examples 
of th is  kind of leader a re , fo r the conservative cairp, P. T sa ldaris , A.
Papagos, and C. Karamanlis; and fo r the lib e ra l camp, E. Venizelos, G.
Papandreou, and (fu rth e r to  the le f t )  h is  son A. Papandreou. ( 141}
In h is  days as ND leader, Karamanlis hardly concerned himself with 
party  a f fa i r s .  He was too occupied w ith making a l l  the major decisions 
more or less alone, and sometimes aided by h is  c lo sest and most loyal 
c o l le a g u e s .  A ll o f th e  h ig h e r  p a r t y  o rg a n s  — e .g .  th e  f i r s t  
adm inistrative committee appointed in 1975, and those that emerged a f te r  
the f i r s t  congress in 1979, as well as the parliam entary group a t  a l l  
times— were simply rubber-stamp mechanism.( 142'
Standing a t  f i r s t  between democracy and the  re tu rn  of the  tanks, 
Karamanlis used h is  immense p re s tig e  to  re s to re  democratic in s t itu t io n s  
and lead the country in to  the EEC. His supporters seem to agree th a t he
made the r ig h t choices. As Table IV .5 below shows, ND's party  members
in the Department of L arissa in 1989 do not a t a l l  consider th a t th e ir  
p a r ty  n e g le c te d  them, o r th a t  t h e i r  view s were no t g iven  due 
co n sid era tio n  a t  the t im e .<143) Indeed, only 27.85 per cen t of them 
c o n s id e r  th e  d e m o c ra tic  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f th e  p a r ty  a s  a m ajor 
achievem ent, and even few er (10 .75  p e r  c e n t)  th in k  so about th e  
convention of the f i r s t  congress. C onversely, the la rg e  m a jo rity  
(almost 70 per cent) regard G reece's EEC entry  as the most important
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Table IV .5: ND's G reatest Achievem ents w h ile  in  Government
Achievement number %
EEC entry 108 68.35
Restoration of democracy 103 65.19
National reco n c ilia tio n 69 43.67
Democratic o rganisation  of the party 44 27.85
ND governmental p o lic ie s 43 27.22
Legalisation of the ConiTTunist Party 36 22.78
The f i r s t  party  congress in 1979 17 10.75
Other 4 02.53
achievement, while 65.18 per cent give g rea te r weigh to  the re s to ra tio n  
of democracy; ranked  t h i r d  in  th e  l i s t  o f ach ievem ents i s  th e  
establishm ent of n a tio n a l r e c o n c i l ia t io n ,  a view shared by 43.67 per 
cent of the rank and f i l e .  On the o ther hand, only 27.22 per cent of the 
party  members consider ND's p o lic ie s  in government successful, with only 
ju s t over o n e -f if th  (36 party  members, or 22.78 per cent) en th u s ias tic  
over the 1974 leg a lisa tio n  of the Conmunist Party.
The a u th o r i ta r ia n  lead e rsh ip  s ty le  and a u to c ra tic  behaviour of 
Karamanlis no tw ith s tand ing , h is  v a s t personal c o n tr ib u tio n  to  the  
c re a tio n  and development of ND's o rg a n isa tio n  cannot be denied . As 
a lre a d y  m entioned , K aram anlis managed to  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e  b a s ic  
democratic procedures and even e s ta b lish  a modicum of in ternal democracy 
in the party  ranks before he le f t  the ND leadership for the presidency 
of the republic in 1980. Although the party  did not manage to  organise 
properly under h is  corrmand, i t  did so eventually , and h is  much e a r l ie r  
views on party  organisation  (of the EE®) were rea lized  in the case of 
New Democracy:
" I t is  only when we cease to govern that w e 'll manage to 
organise the party . As long as w e're in o ff ic e , the centre 
o f  g r a v i t y  l i e s  in  g o v e r n m e n t ,  n o t  in  p a r t y  
o rgan isa tion". < 14 4 >
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A fte r i t s  founder’s w ithdraw al, ND's p arliam en ta ry  group e le c te d  
George R ail is  to  the  p a rty  le a d e rsh ip , by a narrow m ajo rity  of four 
votes over E. Averoff. Rail is  expressed the moderate, c en tre -rig h t wing 
of th e  p a r ty  a t  th e  tim e; A veroff re p re s e n te d  th e  r ig h t-w in g , 
conservative h a rd lin e rs .( 145} This leadership contest was the f i r s t  and 
only one fought over broader ideological issues. Rail i s '  e lec tio n  led 
the p a rty  to  a more modern outlook and moved i t  fu r th e r  towards the 
c e n tre  and lib e ra lism ; whereas A v e ro ff 's  e le c t io n  would have meant 
id eo lo g ica l re g re s s io n  and th e  a d o p tio n  o f o ld - fa s h io n e d , u l t r a ­
conserva tive  p o l ic ie s  —something th a t  a c tu a l ly  happened la te r ,  when 
Averoff succeeded Rail is ,  as we sh a ll see below.
R a llis , unlike Karamanlis, came from a tzak ia  family of p o l i t ic a l  
notables. His fa ther and two grandfathers in th e ir  time had a l l  held the 
p r e m ie r s h ip ,  and he h im s e lf  was' e l e c t e d  to  p a r l ia m e n t  a lm ost 
con tinuously  s in ce  1950. When he took over th e  p a r ty  lead e rsh ip  and 
prem iership  a t  the age of 62, he proved a decent but u n in sp ir in g  
personality , to ta l ly  unlike Karamanlis. A deeply sincere democrat, he 
alw ays c o n su lte d  w ith  th e  h ig h e r  p a r ty  o rg an s b e fo re  he made a 
d e c is io n ,( 146’ but there was simply not enough time to re-educate the 
party  as well as to cope with PASOK knocking a t  the doors of government. 
Trapped between the rad ical demagogy of Papandreou and the fanaticism  of 
ND's right-w ingers, R a llis  was unable to prevent h is  p a r ty 's  e lec tio n  
d isa s te r . He resigned. Unsuccessful as R a llis  might have been as a party  
lead er, h is  g rea t c o n tr ib u tio n  l i e s  elsew here: ( i)  he was the f i r s t  
p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r  who du ly  re s p e c te d  th e  p ro v is io n  in  th e  Greek 
C onstitution which s tip u la te s  th a t a national e lec tio n  must be held once 
every four y e a rs ;* 147} ( i i )  he succeeded to  a considerab le  ex ten t in 
e s ta b lis h in g  a calm and c iv i l i s e d  p o l i t i c a l  c lim ate  during the whole 
p re -e lec to ra l period, and to conduct the e lec tio n  in an impeccable and 
orderly manner; and ( i i i )  and most important, he immediately accepted
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h is  p a r ty 's  defea t, and tran sfe rred  power to PASOK in an unprecedentedly 
honest and peaceful manner. I t  was only then tha t the p o l it ic a l  system 
of the new regime, which Karamanlis had estab lished  in 1974, was fu lly  
legitim ised and consolidated.
A fte r a long s t r e tc h  of being in  power —alm ost u n in te rru p te d ly  
since 1946— the conservative party  now found i t s e l f  on the opposition 
benches. Poorly organised and with only a  vague ideology, ND went in to  a 
tran s itio n a l phase, try in g  to  work out what went wrong, to  revamp i t s  
image, and to  issue a new challenge to  PASOK. I t  began i t s  e ffo r ts  a t 
the top and, on 9 December 1981, ND deputies e lected  Averoff as the new 
party  leader a f te r  R a llis  fa ile d  to  obtain  a vote of confidence two days 
e a r l i e r .*148 * Party mambers as well as deputies considered Averoff ideal 
fo r perform ing an anti-Papandreou  ro le ,  as they saw i t ,  capable of 
figh ting  and ousting him from power.*1491
A veroff, l ik e  R a l l i s ,  was descended from a prominent p o l i t i c a l  
family in the Department of Ioannina, where he had created an extensive 
personal c lie n te le ;  e lec ted  to parliam ent ever since 1946, he became ND 
p a rty  leader a t the  age of 71. Although he had begun h is  p o l i t i c a l  
career as a Liberal Party deputy (jo in ing  ERE in 1956), h is  a tt i tu d e s  
and ta c tic s  suggested him to be more of an an old-fashioned p o lit ic ia n , 
unab le  to  g iv e  ND a more modern i d e n t i ty .  Indeed , a lth o u g h  he 
fan a tica lly  attacked the PASOK leader and h is  p o lic ie s , i t  was by simply 
re jec tin g  them in to to , without constructive ly  presenting a convincing 
a l te rn a t iv e .  This made ND's p ro p o s itio n s  end up as scarem ongering; 
suggesting tha t the country was headed towards a one-party d ic ta to rsh ip  
of the Left, and tha t a new, serious national schism was inminent. * 1 50 ’ 
As might be expected , A v e ro ff 's  r i s e  to  the leadersh ip  lo s t  the 
party  the cen tre -rig h t o rien ta tio n  given i t  by Karamanlis and R a llis , 
and imposed a more rig h t-w in g  co n serv a tiv e  a t t i tu d e .  As a c e n tr a l -  
conmittee member a tte s te d ,
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" . . . a f t e r  Averoff had succeeded R a llis , the Greeks and a l l  
of us in  New Democracy thought th a t the  p a rty  had moved 
fu rth er to the r ig h t" .* 151}
So for instance New Democracy p a rtic ip a ted  dynamically, together w ith 
u l t r a - r ig h t i s t  and o ther minor fa s c is t  groups, in ceremonies organised 
to  commemorate a l l  those "slaughtered by communist rebels" during the 
c iv il  war, and i t  l e f t  parliam ent en masse when PASOK entered to vote in 
a b i l l  on the o f f ic ia l  recognition of the national res is tan ce  movement 
during and a f te r  World War I I . <15Z> I t  was not su rp rising , then, th a t P. 
Bakoyiannis could w rite:
" . . . s i n c e  the 1981 e le c tio n  ND has moved so fa r  to  the 
r ig h t th a t today the party  is  more conservative than the 
pre-coup ERE, and bears very  l i t t l e  resem blance to  i t s  
1974-1980 p o l i t i c a l  id e n t i ty .  I t  unfortunately  gives the 
impression of try in g  to  re su sc ita te  the p a s t " . '153’
Despite h is  moving ND to  the r ig h t, A veroff's major contribu tion  lay 
w ith  th e  p a r t y 's  o r g a n is a t io n a l  developm ent. As we have a lre a d y  
explained, i t  was under h is  leadership th a t ND managed to e s ta b lish  a 
local organisation in almost every one of the coun try 's departments and 
to achieve a substan tia l increase of i t s  rank -and-file  membership. On 
the other hand, A veroff's handling of party  a f f a i r s ,  lim ited by h is  o ld - 
fashioned and outmoded p o l i t i c a l  m en ta lity , l e f t  l i t t l e  roan for the 
cen tral party  organisation  to  operate; ND's higher organs, contrary to 
the  s t a tu to r y  p ro v is io n s ,  n e i th e r  made d e c is io n s  nor c o n fe r re d  
regu larly ; la s t  but not le a s t , whereas the second party  congress was 
often promised as imminent, i t  never ac tu a lly  m et.( 154 *
The re la tiv e ly  poor performance of the party  in the June 1984 Euro- 
e lec tion  struck the f in a l blow to  A veroff's already shaky position  as 
ND's l e a d e r . '155’ and the party  MPs duly convened on 1 September 1984 to 
e lec t a new leader. The candidates were C. M itsotakis (66 years old) and 
C. Stephanopoulos; the former had joined ND in 1978 and was believed to
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enjoy A veroff's favour; the l a t t e r  had been an e lected  ERE deputy in 
1964 and one of ND's found ing  members. The 111 ND d e p u tie s  gave 
M itsotakis 71 votes and Stephanopoulos 4 0 .<156)
M itso ta k is , l ik e  R a ll is  and A veroff, o r ig in a te d  from a prominent 
tzak ia  family in C rete, in the Department of Chania, being himself a 
grandson o f  th e  le g e n d a ry  E. V e n iz e lo s ;  h i s  f a t h e r ,  b o th  h i s  
g ra n d fa th e r s ,  and h i s  u n c le s  had a l l  been members of pa rliam en t. 
M itsotakis himself exercises an important influence over a very large 
personal c lie n te le  in Chania; he had been elected  to parliam ent ever 
s in ce  1946 on the  l ib e r a l  t i c k e t ,  and was one of the  most prominent 
c e n tr is t  p o lit ic ia n s  in the 1960s and a founding member of the Centre 
Union in 1961. Colleague and a t the same time major r iv a l of Andreas 
Papandreou in the 1963-65 Centre Union governments, he joined and played 
a leading but obscure ro le  in the group known as the ap o sta te s , i .e .  
those who defected from G. Papandreou's p a rty .* 157 * In 1974 he fa ile d  to 
e n te r  parliam en t w ith  h is  P arty  of N e o -lib e ra ls  ( th is  was the  only 
e lec tion  he ever lo s t) .  He eventually  succeeded in 1977, and in 1978 he 
jo ined ND to  become M in is te r  of C o-ord ination  and la t e r  of Foreign 
A ffa irs . In September 1984 he was e le c te d  to  the lead ersh ip  and has 
remained in tha t position  u n til  today.
Under h is  conmand, New Democracy has been moving fu r th e r  towards 
n eo -1 ibera lism , and fo r  the  f i r s t  time a r t ic u la te d  a coherent and 
concrete body of ideological p rin c ip le s , which g rea tly  helped the party  
present a new p ro f ile  to the people and to perform a more p o sitiv e  and 
constructive  ro le  in parliam ent (a ll  these poin ts w ill be discussed in 
d e t a i l  in  th e  n e x t c h a p t e r ) .  M oreover, th e  p a r ty  g r a s s - r o o t s  
o rganisation experienced an unprecedented development, both quantatively  
but m ainly q u a l i ta t iv e ly .  In February 1986, and a f te r  the p a rty  had 
again lo s t the (1985) national e lec tio n  and allowed PASOK a second term 
in o f f ic e , *158} ND held i t s  second congress. Here M itsotakis' e lec tio n
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as party  leader was r a t i f ie d  by the delegates, and new s ta tu te s  voted in 
to  provide fo r g re a te r  p a r t ic ip a t io n  of the rank and f i l e  in  p a rty  
a f f a i r s  and fo r  t h e i r  g e n e ra l u p g rad in g  in  th e  d ec is io n -m ak in g  
p rocesses . E lec tio n  success follow ed: as a lread y  m entioned, in  the  
October 1986 municipal e lec tio n  ND saw i t s  own candidates e lec ted  in the 
three biggest c i t i e s  of Greece, namely Athens, Salonica and P iraeus, but 
i t  took the party  four more years and th ree  e lec to ra l f ig h ts  to re tu rn  
to o ffice  in April 1990.<159>
As T able  IV .6 below shows, th e  r a n k - a n d - f i le  members ( in  th e  
Department of L arissa in 1989) are  more concerned with p a rty -p o lit ic a l  
than  b ro ad e r n a t io n a l  is s u e s  when asked to  name ND's g r e a te s t  
achievements w h ile  in  o p p o s i t io n . Not s u r p r i s in g ly ,  th e  m a jo r i ty  
mentioned the e lec tio n  v ic to ry  in the 1986 municipal e lec tio n s, since 
th is  was the f i r s t  such v ic to ry  a f te r  continual defeats ever since 1981 
(ND lo s t  the 1982 m unic ipal, th e  1984 Euro, and the 1985 n a tio n a l 
e lec tio n s). Almost h a lf  of the rank and f i l e  (48.73 per cent) viewed 
th e ir  p a r ty 's  new ro le  in parliam ent as a major achievement. Having been 
in o ffice  for seven consecutive years, ND was re la tiv e ly  inexperienced 
as the leading opposition party  in 1981; in any case, i t s  behaviour in 
parliam ent was c e r t a i ly  not "decent, m ild and co n stru c tiv e"  under 
Averoff. Furthermore, a s tr ik in g ly  high percentage (66 members, or 41.77 
per cen t) ap p rec ia ted  the  development of the  p a r ty 's  dem ocratic 
organisation, conpared to  only 27.85 per cent who had thought so while 
ND was in  government (see above, Table IV .5). There is  a s im ila r  
discrepancy between the number of those who considered the convention of 
the second party  congress a major success (15.19 per cen t), and those 
who thought so about ND's f i r s t  congress (10.76 per cent) —see Table 
IV.5. There was a lso  a considerable number of members (35, or 22.15 per 
cent) who considered the smooth tra n s it io n  in party  leadership a major 
achievement. F ina lly , the percentage of those who saw the a r t ic u la tio n
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Table IV .6: ND's G reatest A chievem ents w h ile  in  O pposition
Achievement number %
Electoral v ic to ry  in the 1986 municipal e lec tio n 84 53.16
Decent, calm and constructive  opposition in parliament 77 48.73
Democratic organisation  of the party 66 41.77
ND's p o l i t ic a l  and economic programme 50 31.65
Smooth tra n s it io n  in the p arty  leadership 35 22.15
The second party  congress in 1986 24 15.19
Other 6 03.80
None/Don't know 5 03.16
and p r o je c t io n  o f ND's p o l i t i c a l  and economic programme as more 
important while ND was in opposition, was g rea te r than for the time the 
party  was in power (31.65 per cent and 27.22 per cent resp ec tiv e ly ).
To summarise: a f t e r  M itso ta k is ' e le c tio n  to  the party  leadersh ip , 
the p a rty  seemed to  come out of the  1980-84 t r a n s i t io n a l  p e rio d  of 
ideological uncerta in ty , and i t s  f l i r t a t io n  with the u l t r a - r ig h t .  The 
new leader endowed ND with a concrete ideological id en tity  and, desp ite  
h is  personal c l i e n te l i s t i c  record, sh if ted  the centre  of g rav ity  more 
towards the  p a rty  o rg a n isa tio n  and i t s  non-parliam en tarian  c ad res , 
ra the r than the parliam entary group (as was the case before). Without 
losing h is  predominant p o sitio n  w ithin the party  —which was never as 
pronounced as th a t of e ith e r  Karamanlis or Papandreou— he gave g rea te r 
weigh to  the ro le  and importance of the organisation , thus weakening the 
r e la t iv e  autonomy t r a d i t io n a l ly  enjoyed by severa l p a rty  n o tab les  
towards both the leadership and the party .
His d if f e r e n t  s ty le  of p a rty  lead ersh ip  was acknowledged by the  
larg e  m a jo rity  of the  ra n k -a n d - f ile  members (Department of L a ris s a , 
1989) as Table IV.7 shows.* 1601 Whereas only 10.76 per cent of them 
thought tha t there is  no d ifference  between the ND leadership and tha t
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Table IV.7: Is  there  a d ifference  between the ND Leadership and that of 
other P arties?
Answer number %
Yes 117 74.05
Some 20 12.66
No 17 10.76
Don't know 4 02.53
Total 158 100.00
I f  ves/scme, in what way? number %
More serious, c red ib le , re l ia b le 85 53.80
More dem ocratically e lected 56 35.44
Other 9 05.70
of o ther p a r t ie s , (and 2.53 per cent did not express th e ir  opinion), the 
rem aining over 86 per cen t b e liev ed  o therw ise . More s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  a 
l i t t l e  more than h a lf  of the party  members saw the main d ifference to  be 
the se rio u sn ess , c r e d ib i l i ty  and r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  ND lead ersh ip , 
whereas 35.44 per cent consider i t  to  l ie  in the way the ND e le c ts  i t s  
leadership. As mentioned already, th is  applies to  a l l  ND leaders a f te r  
Karam anlis, but p a r t ic u la r ly  to  M itso tak is , who is  the only non- 
conmunist p o l it ic a l  leader whose e lec tio n  has been d ire c tly  r a t i f ie d  by 
h is  p a r ty 's  rank and f i l e  (at the second party  congress in 1986).( 1611
The p ic tu re  is  very d iffe re n t with respect to  in ternal democratic 
p ro ced u res  in  th e  d e c is io n -m ak in g  p ro c e ss  a t  le a d e rs h ip  le v e l .  
D iscontinuity and in co n sis ten cy  in the  c lo se  observance of s ta tu to ry  
regulations are  g rea tly  responsible fo r a cen tra lised  and p e rso n a lis tic  
exercise of leadership power. Aside from the continual postponement of 
the th ird  congress (due in 1989), n e ith e r does the cen tra l coirmittee act 
as the highest party  organ between congresses, nor is  any other higher 
p a rty  organ asked to  confer a t  re g u la r  in te rv a ls  to  d iscuss p a rty
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a f f a i r s  and government p o l ic ie s ,  and to  ap p ra ise  the p a r ty 's  general 
course, i t s  s tra te g ie s  and ta c t ic s .  This means th a t a l l  major decisions 
are made by the party  leader alone, who exercises h is  powers v ir tu a lly  
without con tro l. I t  is  only fo r show, to  present ND to  the public  as a 
developed and w ell-functioning  organ isation , tha t party  organs are  ever 
c a l le d  in to  s e s s io n ,  b u t even on th e s e  in fre q u e n t o c c a s io n s  no 
p a rticu la r  dialogue takes p lace, nor a re  any decisions made; instead , 
the party  leader usually  makes a  speech, o r, scmetimes party  members are  
informed post festum about h is  ac tions and h is  decisions.
I t  would appear, then , th a t  the  ND p a rty  leader enjoys a more 
powerful position  towards ND's h igher organs than provided fo r by the 
s ta tu te s . On the o ther hand, there  a re  several prominent deputies who 
hold a s im ila rly  semi-autonomous p o sitio n  v is -a -v is  the party  leadership 
and the organ isation , ch ie fly  because of th e ir  tra d itio n a l connection 
with and extensive use of c l i e n te l i s t i c  p rac tices . I t  remains to be seen 
whether ND's high-ranking members as well as the organised rank and f i l e  
w ill  manage to  develop  s u f f i c i e n t l y  to  p la y  an autonomous and 
independent ro le  of th e ir  own in party  a f f a i r s .  I f  they do, they w ill 
transform ND in to  a genuinely democratic, organised m ass-party, lik e  i t s  
West- European counterparts.
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5- C onclusion
Enjoying governmental power for seven consecutive years a f te r  1974, 
and led  by a c h a rism a tic , om nipotent, and a u th o r i ta r ia n  le a d e r, New 
Democracy pro jected  the p ic tu re  of a  p e rso n a lis tic  party  of notables; 
w ithout a g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n is a tio n , i t  has depended h e av ily  on th a t  
lead er 's  charisma on the one hand, and on c l i e n te l i s t i c  p rac tices  on the 
o ther. The special social and p o l i t ic a l  conditions tha t prevailed  in the 
a fterm ath  of the  c o lla p se  of the  d ic ta to r s h ip ,  and a d isc rim in a to ry  
d is tr ib u tio n  of governmental spo ils  and control of public appointments 
allowed the party  to remain in  o ff ic e  fo r two consecutive terms.
A fter the 1977 e lec tio n , and in view of h is  an tic ip a ted  departure 
from the p a rty  le a d e rsh ip , Karamanlis la id  the  foundations fo r  the 
development of ND's o rganisation , c e r ta in  th a t, unless h is  party  managed 
to organise, i t  would inev itab ly  su ffe r the fa te  not only of i t s  d ire c t 
predecessor, but of a l l  o ther personally -created  p o li t ic a l  instruments 
—i t  would inevidably d is in te g ra te . Under h is  leadership, New Democracy 
held two congresses, a prelim inary (1977) and a national (1979) one. 
Although i t  is  only f a i r  to argue tha t ND took no major steps towards 
i t s  organisational development in those early  years, i t  is  equally  f a i r  
to acknowledge tha t Karamanlis managed to  in s t i l  a modicum of democratic 
procedures in to  th is  inexperienced in fa n t o rg a n isa tio n . D esp ite  i t s  
elementary level of o rganisational development, the party  survived the 
shock of i t s  le a d e r 's  d ep artu re  by duly e le c t in g  h is  successo r and 
preserving i t s  un ity .
H arassed  by i t s  u l t r a - c o n s e r v a t iv e ,  r i g h t i s t  f a c t io n  and th e  
progressive, rad ica l demagogy of the opposition leader, New Democracy 
under the leadership of the decent, moderate but co lourless R a llis , had 
neither the time nor the a b i l i ty  to avert PASOK's r i s e  to power. I t  met 
with grave defeat in the 1981 e lec tio n , and for the f i r s t  time crossed
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over to the opposition benches. The p arty  was now expected to  learn  and 
perform a task that proved enormously d i f f ic u l t  because not only had ND 
alw ays o p e ra ted  in  governm ent and was w ith o u t e x p e rie n c e  o f th e  
opposition ro le , but e sp ec ia lly  because in PASOK i t  had to  challenge a 
p a r ty  which was led  by a s tro n g  and c h a r is m a tic  le a d e r ,  and had 
developed an extensive, w ell-functioning  and m ilita n t o rganisation .
New Democracy was ob lig ed  to  e n te r  a t r a n s i t io n a l  p e rio d , w hile 
try ing  to elaborate  a concrete ideology and to  re s tru c tu re  and develop 
i t s  organisation, to  something lik e  th a t of PASOK1 s. Averoff, who had 
m eanwhile succeded R a l l i s ,  took th e  f i r s t  m ajor s te p s  tow ards 
organisational expansion, and i t  was to  a considerable extent due to 
these e ffo r ts  tha t ND acquired a la rger and more ac tiv e  party  base. On 
the o th e r hand, A v e ro ff 's  o ld -fa sh io n e d , r ig id ly  u ltra -c o n s e rv a tiv e  
outlook, caused resentment, fear and d is ta s te  among both some ND groups 
and cen tre -rig h t and moderate vo ters . This undermined the whole e ffo r t  
a t  o rg an isa tio n a l r e s t ru c tu r in g ,  and ND performed very poorly in the 
1984 E u ro -e le c tio n , so th a t  A vero ff f i n a l l y  re s ig n e d  th e  p a r ty  
leadership.
The tran s itio n a l period of ideological regression and organisational 
stagnation ended when M itsotakis succeeded Averoff in September 1984, 
and a new era  of recovery s ta r te d  fo r  ND. I t  was only then th a t the 
party  began a period of rea l progress, acquiring a concrete ideological 
i d e n t i t y ,  and a b o th  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  and q u a l i t a t i v e l y  dynamic 
organisational growth. Especially  a f te r  the second congress in 1986, New 
Democracy managed to e s ta b lish  an organ isational branch in every corner 
of the country; to bridge the gap between the party  and the trade-unions 
and various o th er o rg a n isa tio n s ; to  make i t s  p resence s tro n g ly  f e l t  
where i t  had been v i r tu a l ly  n o n -e x is te n t (e .g . the u n iv e r s i t ie s  and 
among the c o u n try 's  you th ), and to  in c rease  i t s  membership to  a new 
record. Moreover, under the 1986 s ta tu te s , the organised rank and f i l e
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was given a more im portant and a c t iv e  ro le  in p a rty  a f f a i r s ,  and a 
g rea ter say in the  decision-m aking and po licy -shap ing  p ro cesses . New 
Democracy could f in a l ly  c a l l  i t s e l f  a dem ocratica lly  organised mass- 
party , the only non-conrnunist party  with a leader properly e lected  by 
ND's parliam entary group and h is  e lec tio n  r a t i f ie d  by delegates of the 
rank and f i l e ,  and w ith  perhaps the  most dem ocratic c o n s t i tu t io n , 
equally balanced between the MPs and the non-parliamentary branches of 
the o rganisation .
Our examination of the ND organisation  has shown, however, th a t in 
p ra c tic e  th is  is  not the  tru e  p ic tu re .  In r e a l i t y ,  i t  is  the  ND 
p res id en t who occupies the  dominant p o s it io n , makes a l l  im portant 
decisions, and runs the party  —and the government, when the party  is  in 
o ffice— v ir tu a lly  without con tro l. All the higher party  organs —that 
is , the cen tra l and the executive carm ittee and also  the parliam entary 
group— confer in fre q u e n tly  and a t  i r r e g u la r  in te rv a ls ,  and not to 
discuss party  and/or governmental a f f a i r s  and to express th e ir  views, 
but usually  to l is te n  to the le a d e r 's  speech or to be informed and asked 
for th e i r  approval of d e c is io n s  a lread y  taken and p o l ic ie s  a lread y  
enforced.
Given th a t, on the one hand, the current ND president has n e ither 
Papandreou's charism a nor, on the o th e r , the PASOK le a d e r 's  sp e c ia l 
position  and autonomy in respect of h is  p a r ty 's  organisation, i t  has to 
be admitted tha t ND's s ta tu to ry  regu lations are not being observed as 
they should be — in any case w ith  regard  to  the fu nc tion ing  of the 
higher party  organs— p rec ise ly  because th is  would seriously  hinder the 
ND le a d e r 's  u n co n tro lled  e x e rc ise  of power. In o th e r words, whereas 
PASOK's higher party  organs confer more often  and more regu larly  (except 
for i t s  party  congress), i t s  p re s id e n t 's  predominant position  has never 
been questioned  and the powers he a lone ex e rc ise s  have never been 
threatened. The New Democracy p arty , on the other hand, system atically
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evades observance of the s ta tu to ry  regu lations on consu lta tion  with the 
higher party  organs, in order to  safeguard the lead e r 's  dominant ro le  
and to maintain h is  powers in ta c t.
Today, New Democracy p o sse s se s  an e x c e p tio n a l o rg a n is a t io n a l  
framework, a we 11-developed g rass-roo ts organisation  and an ac tiv e  rank 
and f i l e  which, nevertheless, is  asking fo r more p a rtic ip a tio n  in party  
a f fa ir s  —that is ,  more respect fo r democratic procedures in decision­
making, and b e tte r  corranunication between the  va rious branches of the  
o rg a n is a t io n ,  most p a r t i c u l a r y  betw een th e  g r a s s - r o o ts  and th e  
le a d e rs h ip . On th e  o th e r  hand, New Democracy has e la b o ra te d  a 
con stitu tio n  which provides fo r the creation  and functioning of several 
higher party  organs, reserv ing  for than both extensive r ig h ts  and grave 
re s p o n s ib ili t ie s " . Unless the  p a rty  is  ready to  law fu lly  re sp ec t the 
s ta tu to ry  regu la tions, to  transform the l a t t e r 's  th eo re tica l provisions 
into everyday p ra c tic e , the much-heralded danocratic party  organisation  
and the ro le  of the rank and f i l e  w ill remain a dead le t te r .  ND s t i l l  
has a long way to  go befo re  i t  has become a t ru ly  dem ocratic and 
organised m ass-party lik e  i t s  West-European counterparts.
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CHAPTER FIVE: IDEOLOGY. PROGRAMME AND STRATEGY
1. Introduction
A non p a r t ic u la r is t ic  ideology based on u n iv e rsa lis t p rin c ip le s , hats 
never been a fea tu re  of the Greek Right. On the contrary , as already 
discussed in ch. 1, the most p e rs is te n t c h a ra c te r is tic  of both the Greek 
Rally and ERE has been ideological vagueness, i f  not an innate d is l ik e  
and m is tru s t of ideology as such; "nation-m indedness" and passionate 
anti-ccmnunism in the realm of ideas, matched with the enforcement of 
a u th o r i ta r ia n , p a te r n a l i s t i c  and s t a t i s t  p o l ic ie s  w ith  regard to  the 
so c ia l and economic sphere — th ese  a re  what has b e s t expressed the  
ideological arsenal of the Right during the early  post-war years u n til  
the inposition  of m ilita ry  ru le  in 1967.
The s i t u a t i o n  became v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  a f t e r  th e  r e s to r a t io n  of 
democracy in 1974. All o ther e v ils  a p a rt, the seven-year d ic ta to rsh ip  
had le f t  behind i t  a widespread d is t ru s t  and deep -fe lt h o s t i l i ty  against 
whatever values and ideas the jun ta  regime had —or appeared to have— 
rep resen ted . As a r e s u l t ,  th e re  was a dram atic swing to  the  L eft 
(especially  by the coun try 's  in te lle c tu a l e l i t e  and the educated youth), 
and an in ten se  " id e o lo g if ic a tio n "  of p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  As G. R a ll i s  
observed a t  the time,
" . . .o n e  o f th e  g r e a te s t  e v i l s  caused  by th e  j u n t i s t  
d i c t a to r s h ip  i s  th a t  fo r  most young peo p le  who were 
d e v e lo p in g  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  d u r in g  t h a t  p e r i o d ,  
au thoritarian ism , the loss of basic  freedoms, and the loss 
of human d ig n ity  were id e n t i f ie d  e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith the 
d ic ta to r ia l  Right. As an extension of th is  (an absurd but 
nonetheless almost unavoidable extension), the opposite of
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such su ffe rings, the most precious of values, freedom, was 
i d e n t i f i e d  w i th  th e  com m unist L e f t "  ( in  E n g lis h  
o r ig in a lly ) . ( 11
Despite th is  in tense ra d ic a l  i s a t  ion and f l i r t i n g  w ith  l e f t i s t  and 
coirmunist id eas, when ND fought the  1974 e le c t io n , fo r  a good many 
reasons already discussed (ch. 2) i t  not only re ta ined  i t s  appeal, but 
ac tually  scored an e le c to ra l triumph, gaining an absolute m ajority  of 
votes and over tw o-thirds of the parliam entary se a ts . N evertheless, as 
w ith  th e  g r a s s - r o o t s  o r g a n is a t io n ,  i t  was now a m a tte r  o f m ajor 
importance fo r ND to  e labo ra te  a concrete and coherent ideology, as well 
as to modernise and Europeanise i t s  outlook, and to  transform  i t s e l f  
from a party  of notables in to  an in s t i tu t io n  of p rin c ip le s .
In th is  chapter we sh a ll f i r s t  examine ND's ideological p rin c ip le s  
as they  were e la b o ra te d  and p re s e n te d  by K aram anlis a t  th e  1977 
p re lim in a ry  c o n g re ss ; due c o n s id e ra tio n  w i l l  be g iven  to  t h e i r  
t h e o r e t i c a l  d im ension , and a ls o ,  th rough  th e  exam ina tion  o f ND 
governmental p o lic ie s  (economic and foreign p a r tic u la r ly ) , to  how they 
were expressed and implemented by the party  while in government. These 
p rincip les were reaffirm ed by the 1979 f i r s t  congress, when they were 
a lso  grandly s ta te d  to  be u n a lte ra b le , and served as ND's o f f i c i a l  
ideo log ica l l in e  fo r alm ost the  whole of the f i r s t  ten  years o f i t s  
existence.
Thereafter we sha ll give a d e ta iled  presen tation  of ND’s ideology as 
th is  appeared a f te r  M itso tak is ' m anifesto, "A new proposal fo r freedom" 
in February 1985, which to  a c e r ta in  ex ten t amended K aram anlis' 
id eo log ica l fo rm ula tion , and caused considerab le  uneasiness in  some 
p a rty  q u a r te rs . What e f f e c t  th is  had on shaping ND's governmental 
p o lic ie s  can be a ssessed  only  p ro v is io n a lly , s ince  a t  the  tim e of 
w riting i t  is  only th ree  years since the party  returned to o ff ic e  again 
in 1990. We s h a l l ,  however, b r ie f ly  examine the Greek v e rs io n  of
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campramesso s to r ic o  —th a t  i s ,  the  s h o r t- l iv e d  c o a l i t io n  government 
form ed, a f t e r  th e  June 1989 e l e c t i o n s ,  by New Democracy and th e  
communist-led A llian ce  of th e  L eft and P rogress (SYN), which la s te d  
u n til  November 1989 when fresh  e lec tio n s  were held— to  see whether th is  
was an outcome of a broader ideological and p o li t ic a l  convergence, or 
m erely  a sim ple  ad-hoc  manoeuvre in  p o l i t i c a l  t a c t i c s ,  w ith o u t 
ideological im plications.
2. Karamanlis1 Contribution to  the E laboration of the Party*s Ideology
2.1 Radical liberalism : T heoretical foundation
A f te r  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f dem ocracy  in  1974 and u n t i l  ND's 
prelim inary congress in 1977, the party  no more concerned i t s e l f  with 
ideological issues, than with i t s  organisational development. I t  d id not 
even follow the old tra d itio n a l ideological p a tte rn , according to which
" . . . t h e  id e o lo g y  o f th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e  camp, o f the  
p a t e r n a l i s t  R ig h t ,  d id  n o t c o n s i s t  o f  a f f i r m a t i v e  
p r in c ip le s  but of negations o f the  ideas of the  L eft. 
W orship of th e  a n c ie n t  Greek h e r i t a g e  and " n a t io n -  
m in d ed n ess"  p r e t t y  w e ll p ro v ed  th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e s ’ 
in a b i l i ty  to  o f f e r  worthy and r e l i a b le  a l te r n a t iv e s  to  
so c ia lism  and Marxism, leav ing  these  to  monopolise the 
domain of id eas" .<z 1
In the context of the early  post-1974 social and p o li t ic a l  r e a l i ty ,  of 
an intense "ideo log ification" of p o l i t ic s  in g e n e ra l,(3> with PASQK and 
the communists lead ing  in  the  realm  of ideology and the  re sp e c tiv e  
theo re tica l d iscourse, New Democracy ra th e r  adopted a passive stance, 
re ly ing  on i t s  founder's inmense p re s tig e  and h is  personal handling of 
p ra c t ic a l  everyday governmental a f f a i r s .  N evertheless, K aram anlis' 
proclam ation of 28 September 1974 on the  p o l i t i c a l  f ro n t of New 
Democracy (see Appendix I ) ,  and a lso  sev era l A r t ic le s  of the Greek
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C onstitu tion*4} w ith  im p lica tio n s fo r  the  c h a ra c te r  of the  c o u n try ’s 
economic and p o li t ic a l  system th a t have been understood as basic  r ig h ts  
in the economic sphere,*5> do provide a very general o u tlin e  of ND's 
ideology.
According to  the September 1974 proclamation then, which has r ig h tly  
been ca lled  "a somewhat vague document" and "a woolly and unsubstantial 
te x t" ,* 6 } New Democracy pledged i t s e l f  to  serve the true  in te re s ts  of 
the people —and the nation , of course, since these two were considered 
id e n t ic a l— which could not be c a te g o rise d  as R igh t, C entre , and 
L e f t .<7) I t  declared i t s e l f  to  consist of experienced, but a lso  of new 
progressive p o l i t ic a l  forces. I t  would se lec t and preserve from the past 
only what time had shewn to be u sefu l. I t  would ignore the o ld  p o l i t ic a l  
schisms, and i t  would s tr iv e  fo r the coun try 's economic development by 
estab lish in g  a free  market economy, with the proviso th a t the economic 
freedom in which i t  b e lieved  "would not exclude the  widening of the  
economic s e c to r  c o n tro lle d  by the  s t a te " .  Last but not l e a s t ,  ND 
strongly affirm ed i t s  European o rien ta tio n , in the sense th a t the party  
be lieved  th a t  Greece deserved a d is tin g u ish e d  p lace  in the Europe to 
which she belonged and would, therefo re , con tribu te  in every way to  the 
idea of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  and economic u n if ic a t io n .( 8}
Sim ilar ideas, p rin c ip le s , and basic  c iv il  r ig h ts  appear again in 
the June 1975 C o n stitu tio n , in  the  same g e n e ra lise d  fo rm ulation : a l l  
Greek c i t i z e n s  a re  f r e e  and equal b e fo re  th e  law, f r e e  to  form 
assoc ia tions, trade unions and o ther organised in te re s t  groups; p riv a te  
p ro p e r ty  and p r iv a te  economic i n i t i a t i v e  a re  bo th  re s p e c te d  and 
protected by the s ta te . Nevertheless, the c it iz e n s ' r ig h t to  property 
may not be enjoyed i f  i t  is  against the general public in te re s t ,  and 
p r iv a te  economic i n i t i a t i v e  must never contravene freedom and human 
d ig n i ty ,  n e i th e r  be to  th e  d e tr im e n t o f th e  c o u n try 's  n a t io n a l  
economy. *9 ’
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There does seem to  have been a d e f in i te  in te n tio n  to  produce a 
balance between economic freedom and so c ia l ju s t ic e .  S t i l l ,  in  the  
partnersh ip  between p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e  and a widening of the economic 
se c to r  c o n tro lle d  by the  s t a t e ,  i t  was th e  l a t t e r  who had the  upper 
hand, not only according to  the September 1974 declara tion , but a lso  
under the c o n s titu tio n , which s ta ted  e x p lic it ly :
"The S ta te  programmes and c o o rd in a te s  th e  c o u n tr y 's  
economic a c t iv i ty  fo r the establishm ent of social ju s tic e  
and p ro tec tion  of the public  in te re s t ,  and works to secure 
the  economic development o f a l l  se c to rs  of the  n a tio n a l 
economy". <10 >
With drawing up and r a t i f y in g  the  1975 c o n s t i tu t io n , ND made i t s  
f i r s t  e ffo r ts  towards a more concrete elaboration  of i t s  ideology. This 
was a  task Karamanlis undertook him self, in co-operation with some of 
h is  c lo s e s t  a s s o c ia t e s .  Having been sa n c tio n e d  by th e  p a r t y 's  
p a r l i a m e n ta r y  g ro u p  and  th e  f i r s t  a p p o in te d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
corrmittee, *11 * ND's ideological p rin c ip le s  were published in July  1975. 
Nonetheless, during the ea rly  years of i t s  existence, and a t  le a s t u n til  
the 1977 prelim inary congress, the party  did not concern i t s e l f  much 
with ideological m atters. On the contrary , as J . Loulis has argued, i t  
su ffe red  from two b a s ic  "defec ts"  th a t ,  whether d e lib e ra te ly  or not, 
encouraged paternalism : "considerable ideological vagueness on the one 
hand, which resu lted  in the re ten tio n  of the overriding importance of 
the 'le a d e r '" ;  and on the o ther, fo r i t s  economic p o lic ie s  ND adopted a 
"pseudo-progressive id eo lo g ica l and socio-econom ic approach, which 
u ltim ately  favoured extensive s ta te  in te rven tion" . ‘ 12’ As we sha ll try  
to show in what follows, New Democracy fa ile d  to overcome these defects 
during i t s  seven-year term in o ff ic e . Nevertheless, the party  d id  a t 
lea st manage to e laborate  i t s  six  basic  ideological p rin c ip le s , which 
were sanctioned by the 1979 Chalkidiki congress and have ever since been 
considered as the backbone of i t s  ideology.
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During the 1977 p re lim in a ry  congress, a speech by Karamanlis 
discussed the record of h is  f i r s t  three-year term in government, and 
spoke generally  about democracy and p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  A fte r  a rgu ing  
tha t fo r p o l i t ic a l  p a r tie s  to  f u l f i l l  th e ir  mission they must have "a 
co h eren t ideo logy  and c o n s ta n t  o r i e n ta t io n " ,  "a deep sen se  o f 
re sp o n sib ility " , and "an in te rn a l democratic organ isation", he went on 
to  p resen t ND's ideology fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e. In a  way very  much 
reminiscent of h is  pre-coup p o l i t ic a l  a tt i tu d e , he claimed th a t "ND's 
foundation has been an outcome of national necessity" and enumerated s ix  
id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s ,  the  same th a t  were l a t e r  to  be o f f i c i a l l y  
sanctioned by the 1979 congress; he placed the "national ideal" above 
a l l  o th e r id eo lo g ica l v a lu e s , and proclaim ed ND's b e l ie f  in  so c ia l 
democracy —in other words, he sa id  th a t for the party  soc ia l ju s tic e  
and freedom were one and the same th in g .( 131
Two years l a t e r ,  a t  the  f i r s t  n a tio n a l congress in  1979, a f t e r  
having emphasised th a t "ND's p o l i t ic a l  philosophy is  firm ly associated  
with Greece's true  n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s " , ( 14 * Karamanlis moved on to  a 
somewhat more d e ta iled  d e fin itio n  of ND's six  ideological p rin c ip le s . He 
declared  th a t ND b e liev ed , f i r s t ,  " in  the n a tio n a l id e a l" , in  o th e r  
words th a t the n a tio n  c o n s t i tu te s  a supreme va lue , th a t  no th ing  and 
nobody is  of su ff ic ie n t worth to  stand outside the national framework; 
ND therefo re , premised to  safeguard the country 's t e r r i to r i a l  in te g r ity  
and i t s  national independence, since the la t te r  is  a p re re q u is ite  fo r 
democracy.
He gave ND's second b e l i e f  a s  " th e  p e ac e fu l c o e x is te n c e  o f 
peoples", in the sense tha t the party  was opposed to violence and a l l  
kinds of in tervention in o ther co u n tries ' in ternal a f fa ir s ;  furtherm ore, 
i t  considered that G reece's p lace was w ithin the Western world and so 
w ith in  the  EEC, an o b je c tiv e  th a t  the  p a rty  had a lread y  managed to
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re a liz e , since i t  adhered to  the ideal of a United Europe and wished to  
con tribu te  towards th is  end.
T h ird , he gave a s su ra n c e s  th a t  ND b e lie v e d  in  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  
democracy, more sp e c if ic a lly  "in  a  democracy th a t combines freedom with 
order, and order with social ju s tic e " ; but th is  time Karamanlis d id  not 
claim th a t ND id en tif ie d  p o l i t ic a l  freedom with social ju s tic e , as he 
had done two years e a r l ie r .  ND, he added, stood firm ly against communism 
or any o ther kind of d ic ta to rsh ip . I t  d id not accept th a t there  could be 
any o b je c tiv e s  fo r  which freedom should be s a c r i f ic e d ,  but n e ith e r  
should i t  be abused by the  in d iv id u a l. ND d id  not id e n tify  w ith  the 
in te re s ts  of some p a r tic u la r  social c la ss , he sa id , but represented a l l  
c l a s s e s  o f  G reek s o c i e t y .  I t  c o n s id e r e d  th e  R ig h t-C e n tre -L e f t  
c la s s if ic a tio n  as a rb itra ry  and absurd, and id en tified  with and served 
only the  n a tio n a l in te r e s t ,  in  whatever ways a re  b est a t  the  time 
—"even the most rad ical ones, when these are  d ic ta ted  by the national 
in te r e s t" .  Serious d if fe re n c e s  occurred  only between dem ocratic and 
to ta l i ta r ia n  p a r t ie s ,  but i f  th e re  r e a l ly  were d iffe re n c e s  among the  
fo rm er, th e se  concerned  " th e  e x te n t  o f s t a t e  in te rv e n tio n  which, 
however, they a l l  accept in p rin c ip le " .
ND's fourth b e lie f  he announced to  be "social ju s tic e " , since only 
i f  each c it iz e n  partakes of the na tional product in proportion to  h is  
contribu tion  to i t s  c rea tion  does democracy have any rea l meaning. When 
people are  burdened with uncerta in ty  fo r the fu ture  —when they have no 
permanent employment, f a i r  pay for th e ir  work, fu ll  assurance of th e ir  
own and t h e i r  c h i l d r e n 's  f u tu r e — th en  they  become v u ln erab le  to  
to ta l i ta r ia n  propaganda, and democracy is  undermined.
F if th ,  he sa id  th a t ND b e liev ed  " in  a f re e  dem ocratic economy", 
although th is  freedom cannot be unlim ited but should combine individual 
with social in te re s t;  i t  was exactly  th is  balance that ND's economic 
philosophy rep re sen ted . According to  the  p a r ty 's  ideology, excessive
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free  carpet i t  ion th rea tens the foundations of a  country’s economic as 
well as social l i f e ;  in consequence, "the s ta te  should intervene and 
balance economic and social an tith e se s ; i t  should reduce in eq u a litie s , 
and step  in  to  replace p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e  whenever economic and social 
reasons d ic ta te  such a course".
S ix th  and l a s t ,  he concluded th a t  ND be lieved  "in  the  c o u n try 's  
cu ltu ra l p o te n tia l" . Providing care and education, p a rtic u la rly  fo r the 
young, the party  would c rea te  the preconditions for the development of 
in te lle c tu a l and c u ltu ra l values, which would g rea tly  help the country 
fin d  a more permanent and b e t te r  p lace  fo r  i t s e l f  in  in te rn a tio n a l 
society . In th is  respect ND believed th a t the country 's en try  in to  the 
EEC offered  our young people a unique id ea l, namely p a rtic ip a tio n  "in 
th e  c ru sad e  fo r  a U nited  Europe, and th rough  th e  l a t t e r  to  th e  
transform ation of modem l i f e " . ( 15 *
Although as an id eo lo g ica l e x p o s itio n , the  te x t seems "g en e ra lly  
weak and asymmetrical", 116} Karamanlis' formulation of these ideological 
p rin c ip le s , th e ir  p resen ta tion  a t  ND's prelim inary congress, and th e ir  
sanction two years la te r  by the p a r ty 's  f i r s t  congress, represented a 
remarkable break with the almost to ta l  ideological vacuity of ND's f i r s t  
term in o f f ic e  (1974-1977). The 1979 congress was the f i r s t  time 
Karamanlis gave a t  le a s t  some kind of a  d e f in i t io n  of the  p a r ty 's  
ideology —a ca tch -a ll party  ideology— which he described as "radical 
l ib e r a l i s m , ly in g  betw een t r a d i t i o n a l  l ib e r a l i s m  and d em o cra tic  
so c ia lism " . {17 * This q u ite  c le a r ly  meant, th a t ND was not a s o c ia l -  
democratic party  and, moreover, abandoned the term "social democracy", 
he had used two years e a r l ie r .
The overwhelming m ajority  of ND o f f ic ia ls  did not, however, follow 
h is  le a d , and h a rd ly  ev e r concerned  them selves w ith  th e  p a r t y ’s 
ideology. The few who did  managed only to  confuse the n a tte r  instead  of
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contributing  to i t s  c la r if ic a t io n , as w ill be shown below. As J . Loulis 
has argued repeatedly:
"Within the  p a rty  th e re  was l i t t l e  c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is  of 
th ese  id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s  (a t le a s t  u n t i l  1977) or 
d is c u s s io n  c ap a b le  o f g iv in g  them dep th  and scope. 
In s te ad , most p a rty  cadres appeared con ten t sim ply to  
parro t Karamanlis and repeat s im p lis tic  party  slogans" (in  
English o r ig in a lly ) . <18 >
Before embarking on a d e ta iled  examination of ND’s economic and foreign 
po lic ies  while the party  was in government —which w ill provide a more 
accu ra te  p ic tu re  of ND's id eo lo g ica l o r ie n ta t io n — we th in k  i t  is  
important to conment b r ie f ly  on ND's ideological p rin c ip le s  as drawn up 
by Karam anlis, not only because they express h is  personal p o l i t i c a l  
philosophy, but a lso  because they have indelib ly  stamped the party  with 
the so -called  Karamanlis legacy, which s t i l l  weighs heavily  on i t  even 
today .{19}
The most s tr ik in g  c h a ra c te r is tic  permeating the whole se t of ND's 
ideological p r in c ip le s  is  undoubtedly K aram anlis' obsession  w ith  the  
importance of the nation and the national idea l. ND was the outcome of 
"national n e c e ss ity " , so i t  b e liev ed  in the "n a tio n a l id e a l" ;  the  
essence of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  philosophy was Greek, i t  was the party  not of 
some p a rtic u la r  social c lass but of a l l  Greeks; i t  would not h e s ita te  to 
adopt whatever so lu tions were necessary a t any time as "d ic ta ted  by the 
national in te re s t"  —and so i t  stood above ordinary party  squabbles and 
beyond the L eft-R igh t spectrum . I t  was, in o th e r words, a p u re ly  
"national" party .
This id e n tif ic a tio n  of narrow p a rty -p o lit ic a l  with broader national 
in te r e s ts  was never questioned  as long as Karamanlis led  ND. Major 
c ritic ism s came only a f te r  h is  accession to  the presidency, mainly from 
J . Loulis, who argued that
"Karamanlis seemed to claim th a t ND's b e lie f  in the 'id ea  
of the n a tio n ' s e t  i t  'above ' the  o th er p a r t i e s ,  which
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alone occupied the le f t - r ig h t  spectrum —a view th a t was 
dangerously p a te rn a l is t ic  and a rb i tra ry " ; ‘ 20’
and a ls o  th at
"There i s ,  of course, no such th ing  as a 'n a tio n a l1 party  
'above' o ther p a r t ie s ,  and to  in s is t  on the existence of 
such a p a r ty  i s  d an g ero u sly  a u th o r i ta r i a n "  (bo th  in  
English o r ig in a lly ) . ‘ 21}
The p a r t y 's  a l l  too  g e n e ra l and vague b e l i e f  in  th e  p e a c e fu l 
c o e x is te n c e  o f p e o p le s  and in  th e  c o u n tr y 's  c u l tu r a l  p o te n t i a l  
aside , *22 > ND stood against a l l  brands of to ta lita r ia n ism  and believed 
in parliam entary democracy, based on a free  economy but a t  the same time 
characterised  by social ju s tic e  —in o ther words, in a democracy th a t is  
a f a i r  combination of freedom, order, and socia l ju s tic e . Although i t  
was never sp e lle d  out which of th ese  th ree  elem ents was the most 
important, i t  would appear th a t the cen tre  of g rav ity  was the s t a te 's  
ob ligation  to  o ffe r  and guarantee socia l ju s tic e , since i t  was abuse of 
freedom th a t was considered mainly responsible fo r the d is in te g ra tio n  
and c o lla p se  of a dem ocratic regim e. As a prom inent ND deputy has 
argued, the p a r ty 's  ideology could be labe lled  as a "social libera lism  
within which the element of social ju s tic e  predominates". ‘ 23 * This would 
mean tha t s ta te  in terven tion  in the economy should lim it in eq u a litie s  
and take the  p lace  of p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e ,  when economic and so c ia l 
reasons demand i t .
As with regard to  the p a r ty 's  position  in the p o l i t ic a l  spectrum, 
however, Karamanlis has never defined  the  p re c is e  l im its  of s t a te  
in tervention , or how fa r  i t  should go; he was content to exercise h is  
own s k i l l s  in the m atter and, as we sh a ll see below, enforced extensive 
in te rv e n tio n is t  p o l ic ie s  whenever he h im se lf  though t a p p ro p r ia te .  
V irtua lly  uncontrolled as he was, he never had to  inform the party  in 
advance of what he was going to  do, n e ith e r did he have to  account to 
anybody a fte rw ard s . In  consequence a l l  ND members and d ep u ties  were
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to t a l ly  confused and c o n tra d ic te d  each o th e r f re e ly  whenever they  
attempted to  explain th e ir  p a r ty 's  ideology.
In view of the above i t  i s  not a t  a l l  su rp rising  th a t a leading ND 
mamber s ta ted  tha t p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  could be d iffe re n tia te d  by whether 
they a re  "dem ocratic o r a n ti-d e m o c ra tic ", "modern o r outmoded" and 
"M arxist o r non-M arxist", and he concluded th a t  ND was "a modern, 
democratic, non-Marxist" p a rty .* 24 * Another one wondered why "we should 
c la s s ify  ND with the s o c ia l is t  or social-dem ocratic or o ther democratic 
p a r t ie s  o f Europe. We a re  not w il l in g  to  rep la ce  our n a tio n a l and 
progressive ideology with empty id eo lo g ica l r e c ip e s " .* 25’ Yet ano ther 
claimed th a t ND was "a progressive p a rty  of the cen tre , r ig h t i s t  when 
ta c k l in g  n a tio n a l  i s s u e s ,  and l e f t i s t  when d e a l in g  w ith  s o c ia l  
issu es" .* 261 Since with regard to  s ta te  in tervention  Karamanlis him self 
had repeatedly declared (immediately a f te r  the 1974 e lec tio n , and again 
during  the  1977 p re lim in a ry  c o n g re ss )  th a t  ND b e lie v e d  in  s o c ia l  
democracy, one of the  p a r ty 's  prom inent d ep u ties  s ta te d  th a t  "ND's 
ideology is  so broad th a t i t  can draw i t s  ideological weapons from the 
qu ivers of both the  Right and the  L e f t" ,* 27’ whereas another leading 
party  member hastened to  add th a t
"ND looks u n a f ra id  and u n p re ju d ic e d  a t  non-M arx ist 
socialism  of the Western kind, as a socio-economic system 
w ith in  th e  l im i t s  o f a f r e e  dem o cra tic  reg im e. And 
although ND is  not, a t  le a s t u n til  now, a s o c ia l is t  party , 
i t  does not h e s i ta te  to  adopt and implement s o c ia l i s t  
m easu res  when th e s e  a r e  u s e f u l ,  d e v o id  o f  a d v e rse  
consequences, and app licab le  to the national economy".* 28 *
Even a f t e r  the  1979 f i r s t  c o n g re ss  when, a cc o rd in g  to  some 
s c h o la r s ,*29 ’ the p a r ty 's  ideology had been c l a r i f i e d  and given due 
co n s id e ra tio n , th e re  was s t i l l  co n sid erab le  confusion concerning 
ex ac tly  what ND b e liev ed . Although sev e ra l p a rty  members had already 
warned the party  th a t i t s  p resence in p o l i t i c s  was "anaemic"*30’ and 
th a t  th e re  was no " r e l i a b l e  e la b o ra t io n  and e x p re ss io n  of i t s
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id e o lo g y " /311 the m in is te r of labour probably f e l t  qu ite  proud in 1979 
when, in a speech addressed to  the party  delegates, he declared th a t ND,
" ...d o in g  away w ith dogmatic ab su rd itie s , has managed to  
c r e a t e ,  from  th e  a n t i t h e s e s  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f 
un lim ited  l ib e ra l is m  on the  one hand and, on the  o th e r , 
from the ccmnunal economy (sy lloq ik i oikoncmia) , a  modem 
so c ia l p o lic y  th a t  means r e a l i s t i c  a p p lic a tio n  of the  
p r i n c i p l e s  and im p e r a t iv e s  o f  econom ic and s o c i a l  
democracy". 13 2 *
To summarise: a t  le a s t  during i t s  f i r s t  three-year term in o ff ic e , 
ND hardly, i f  a t  a l l ,  concerned i t s e l f  with ideological issues. During 
the  1977 p re lim in a ry  congress and during  the 1979 f i r s t  congress, 
Karamanlis f i r s t  e la b o ra te d  and p resen ted  a s e t  of s ix  g e n e ra lise d  
ideological p rin c ip le s , which were to  form the p a r ty 's  o f f ic ia l  ideology 
under the name of rad ica l liberalism .
As ND had f a i le d  to  o rg an ise  p ro p erly , and no h igher c o l le c t iv e  
p a r ty  o rg a n s  e x i s t e d  a t  th e  t im e , th e  c l a r i f i c a t i o n ,  f u r t h e r  
development, and dissem ination of ideology was in the hands of leading 
party  members. They fre e ly  expressed th e ir  own personal opinions which, 
however, not only did  not con tribu te  to  the formation of a concrete and 
coherent ideology, but very  o ften  were c o n tra d ic to ry  of one an o th e r. 
Radical l ib e ra lism , i t s  pro-W estern and pro-European s tance  a p a r t ,  
rem ained b e se t w ith  vagueness and u n c e r ta in ty  as to  i t s  d e e p e s t 
th eo re tica l in p lica tio n s  —whereas in p rac tice  i t  meant extensive s ta te  
i n t e r v e n t io n  and e n fo rc e m e n t o f s t a t i s t ,  p a t e r n a l i s t i c ,  and 
au th o rita rian  p o lic ie s  in the economy, as w ill be discussed in d e ta il  in 
the following section .
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2.2 Radical Liberalism  applied: ND's programme and s tra teg y  1974-1981
2.2.1 Economic policy
The 1973-1974 in te rn a tio n a l o i l  c r i s i s  combined w ith  the  h e r i ta g e  
le f t  by the d ic ta to rsh ip , struck  the coun try 's economy a serious blow: 
in la te  1974, in f la t io n  ran  a t  26.9 per c en t, GNP, investm ent and 
in d u stria l production were declin ing  a t  an annual ra te  of 3.8 per cen t, 
25.6 per cent and 1.6 per cent respec tiv e ly , and the national p e r-cap ita  
inccme was U.S. d o lla rs  2,165. Employing a policy  "firm ly wedded to  the 
Keynesian model of e ffe c tiv e  f in a l aggregate demand",*33 * Karamanlis in 
ju s t one year managed to  bring  in f la tio n  down to  13.4 per cen t, while 
in d u stria l production rose by 4.4 per cent and by 10.6 per cent in 1976; 
the price-index over the 1975-1979 period went up by 93.0 per cen t, or 
18.3 annually and, by 1979, the average income was almost double th a t of 
1974, s tand ing  a t  $4,163 (a 92.3 per cen t in c re a se ) ; t h i s  meant a 
substan tia l improvement in the peop le 's  liv ing  standard. ‘34*
This su b s ta n tia l  economic growth was due to  a broad investm ent 
prograirme rea lized  a t Karamanlis' bidding, much as had been the case 
from 1955 to 1963, the so -ca lled  eight golden years (see ch. 1, section  
2 .1 .1 ). In other words, i t  was again the s ta te  tha t provided the bulk of 
a l l  the basic financing needed fo r the country 's development, leaving 
the free  entrepreneurs to  pocket the p ro f i ts .  Between 1974 and 1981, 
p u b lic  expenditu re  ro se  from d rs 110 b i l l io n  to  552 b i l l io n  and, 
a cco rd in g  to  the  n a t io n a l  a c c o u n ts , t o t a l  ex p en d itu re  (which had 
represented 30.8 per cent of the GNP in 1974) went up to 35.2 per cent 
in 1978, and round 42 per cent in 1979 .'35 ’ For a l l  th a t, the period 
under consideration has been described as one of " . . .  economic stagnation 
and non-increase of in d u str ia l production". ( 36 *
In  p ra c t ic a l  term s, a l l  ND governments in the 1974-1981 p e rio d  
seemed to  believe tha t the place of p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e  can e a s ily  and
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harm lessly be taken by growing s ta te  in tervention  in every secto r of the 
economy. These i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  e v e n tu a lly  g a in ed  such a 
momentum, th a t ND was w idely accused of ”sociomania" (so c ia lm an ia ) 
—th at i s ,  of intense persecution of p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e ,  coupled with 
widespread s ta te  control of the economy.137 * Karamanlis him self sa id  in 
1979 th a t ND
"enforced c e r ta in  p o l ic ie s  th a t  rep re se n t an o u tlin e  of 
i t s  economic ph ilosophy. I t  c a r r ie d  out a programme of 
bo ld  in te rv e n t io n s  w ith in  th e  framework of th e  f r e e  
economy... And i t  d id  so not out o f dogmatism, but from 
economic and soc ia l necessity . So, ND nationalised  Olynpic 
Airways, the  Aspropyrgos R efine ry , the  Commercial Bank 
group, and urban t r a n s p o r t .  I t  a lso  e s ta b lish e d  a  g re a t 
number of s t a t e  in d u s t r i e s  in  such f i e l d s  as su g a r, 
f e r t i l i s e r s ,  p e tro c h e m ic a ls , arm am ents, as w ell as 
o th e rs" . <38 >
A prominent ND deputy and cabinet member a t  the time was proud of h is  
p a r ty 's  record of n a tio n a lisa tio n s , and claimed tha t by June 1980 ND had 
done so much in th is  d irec tio n  th a t there  was l i t t l e  le f t  for PASOK,
" .. .s in c e  the s ta te  now con tro ls 95% of the banks, 100% of 
the energy companies, 100% of conmuni cat ions, 100% of the 
conpanies re la te d  to  national defense, 100% of the public- 
u t i l i t y  companies, 100% of tran sp o rt, 100% of railway and 
a i r  t r a v e l ,  60% of the  insurance conpanies, 50% of the 
r e f i n e r i e s ,  50% o f th e  s h ip y a r d s ,  and 70% o f th e  
f e r t i l i s e r  companies". ( 39 *
All th is  n a tio n a lisa tio n  re su lted  in an excessive expansion of the 
p u b lic  se c to r , of cou rse , and th is  in  tu rn  in se r io u s ly  harming th e  
com petitiveness of the  Greek economy and sabotaging of i t s  p r iv a te  
sec to r. As Table V .l below shows,( 40 * between 1974 and 1978 the number 
of employees of the public  sec to r as a whole rose by almost one-th ird ; 
the la rg e s t  increase  was in employees in  p u b lic  corporations (79 per 
cen t), due mainly to the wave of n a tio n a lisa tio n  a f te r  1974, and p a r tly  
to the creation  of new public  en te rp rise s . The public secto r kept on 
growing even a f te r  1978, and there  were 38 public corporations by 1981
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Table V. 1: Number o f  Persons Employed by th e P u b lic  S ector 1974-1981
Public sector 1974 1978
% change 
1974-1978 1981
% change 
1974-1981
Central government 146,896 164,453 12% 183,690 25%
Public corporations*a ’ 73,000 130,996 79% ----- —
Social secu rity 25,000 28,194—i 13%
- -> 58,514 17%
Local government 25,000 27,052—1 8%
Total 269,896 350,695 30% ----- —
Note (a): figures re fe r  to  the 20 biggest public  corporations.
—ccnmercial banks not included, although 80 per cent of a l l  banking 
business in  Greece was done by banks under s ta te  co n tro l a t  th a t 
t im e .141 * M oreover, ND governm ents a f t e r  1979 were u n w illin g  to  
d is c lo s e  d a ta  concerning the  number of people employed in 
p u b lic  c o rp o ra tio n s . An e s tim a te  made in  1981 noted th a t  the  exact 
growth of the public sec to r as a whole could not be carpared in any way 
w ith  th a t of any o th e r  EEC coun try , s in ce  " . . . r e l e v a n t  d a ta  in  our 
country are to ta l ly  u n re liab le ". ( 471
Despite ND's s ta te -p a te rn a lis t  and in te rv en tio n is t p o lic ie s  and the 
ensuing broad n a tio n a lisa tio n s , the average GNP ra te  went up by 4.9 per 
cent annually , during  the second o i l  c r i s i s  between 1974 and 1979 
(against an average of 2.6 per cent fo r the other EEC coun tries), and 
the level of unemployment was kept a t  the very low annual ra te  of around 
2 per cent. I t  was mainly due to the favourable psychological clim ate 
created  by the successful tra n s it io n  to democratic ru le , th a t the Greek 
economy had done so w e ll. There were s tro n g ly  p o s it iv e  changes in 
several of the economic indices concerning industry, a g ricu ltu re , the 
merchant marine and tourism ; and i t  was alm ost e n t i r e ly  due to  the  
personal commitment of C. Karamanlis th a t  the country en te red  the 
European Carmuni ty . 14 3}
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Although a f te r  the second o il  c r i s i s  in 1979 there  was no fu rth er 
n a tio n a lisa tio n , in terven tion  in the economy continued (as fo r instance 
in the form of p rice  and ren t c o n tro ls ) , as did paternalism  (e.g . in the 
form of w ide-ranging  d ir e c t iv e s  issu ed  by the  ND government). The 
p a t e r n a l i s t i c  m e n t a l i ty ,  w hich  so o f t e n  h as  le d  to  p o l i t i c a l  
au thoritarian ism , was most evident in the way the s ta te  intervened and 
kept a t ig h t  g r ip  on lo ca l o rg a n is a tio n , trad e  unions and —most 
important perhaps— on the e lec tro n ic  mass media, which were a l l  s ta te -  
contro lled  and always closed to  p luralism . Karamanlis himself admitted 
a t the time, th a t party  p o l i t ic s  on te lev is io n  "divide the nation", and 
one of h is  c r i t i c s  wrote tha t
"ND's d is tin c tio n  between party  p o l i t ic s  and governmental 
p o l i c i e s  was s e r io u s ly  f la w e d . . .  Time and ag a in  th e  
c h an n e ls  p re s e n te d  ND's governm ental a c t i v i t i e s ,  and 
various m in iste rs  explained in long monologues th e ir  aims 
and  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s "  ( i n  E n g l i s h  
o r ig in a l ly ) . ‘ 44 *
A ll in  a l l ,  th en , ra d ic a l  l ib e ra lism  in  the economic and so c ia l 
sphere  meant th e  c r e a t io n  of a good many e n te r p r i s e s  owned and 
contro lled  by the  s ta te ,  broad n a tio n a lisa tio n  —a ll  of i t  leading to 
the c re a tio n  of a  huge, o v e r in f la te d , and hence unproductive p u b lic  
se c to r— and p a te r n a l i s t i c ,  but sometimes a lso  a u th o r i ta r ia n , s t a te  
in te rv e n t io n  in  c e r t a in  sp h e re s  of everyday  l i f e  where p r iv a te  
i n i t i a t i v e  and c iv i l  so c ie ty  should have been l e f t  a lone to  a c t and 
develop  on t h e i r  own ( fo r  example in  th e  t ra d e  u n io n s , lo c a l  
o r g a n i s a t io n ,  th e  m ass m e d ia ) . L ack in g  a c o h e re n t  p o l i t i c a l -  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  i d e n t i t y ,  ND's r a d i c a l  l ib e r a l i s m  proved m erely  
e m p ir ic is t , m an ifes tin g  i t s e l f  d i f f e r e n t ly  each time as the  vary ing  
social and economic conditions n ecessita ted . This is  to say th a t i t  was 
a t a l l  times the socio-economic conditions th a t shaped ND's governmental 
p o lic ie s , and never the o ther way round.
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When socio-economic circumstances d e te rio ra ted  a f te r  1979 and with 
the second o il  c r i s i s ,  ND's governmental record followed s u i t .  By 1980, 
in f la tio n  had gone up to  19 per cen t, and in 1981 to 26 per cent; the 
average annual r a t e  of economic growth dropped to  3 p er cen t in  the  
years 1978-1980, and f e l l  to  zero in 1981. The country was now faced 
w ith  growing unemployment, a w idening  o f th e  balance-of-paym ents 
d e f i c i t ,  low investm ents in  m anufacturing, expansion of the  p u b lic  
secto r and a simultaneous lowering of i t s  p roductiv ity , not to  mention 
outrageous tax evasion and the existence of a huge hidden economy*4 51 
—two problems the ND governments fa ile d  to  deal with a lto g e th e r .*46’
At the time of the 1981 e lec tio n s , therefo re , the country was beset 
by mounting economic problem s, and New Democracy had to  combat the  
a n tic ip a te d  r i s e  o f PASOK and p a rry  i t s  c a tc h -a ll  slogan prom ising 
"Change!" Lacking s p e c if ic  id eo lo g ica l weapons as well as c re a t iv e  
p o l ic ie s  fo r the  fu tu re , ND kept s t r e s s in g  i t s  p a st achievem ents, 
p a rtic u la rly  in conso lidating  democracy and leading the country in to  the 
EEC. In overall terms, the party  was fig h tin g  from a negative stance, 
simply "leaning against the predominant heresy of the day", tha t of the 
s o c ia l is t  premise of change which ND viewed as extremely dangerous fo r 
the nation. In fa c t ,  ND's famous rad ica l liberalism  d e te rio ra ted  in to  
p la in  scaremongering, with frequent a lleg a tio n s  about PASOK intending to 
abandon the c o u n try 's  t r a d i t io n a l ly  pro-W estern o r ie n ta t io n , and to  
abolish  democratic in s t i tu t io n s  in favour of a s o c ia l is t  one-party s ta te  
of the third-w orld type .*47> In the end, ND's e lec tio n  s tra teg y  proved 
qu ite  inadequate; i t  could n e ith e r keep ND in o ff ice  for another te rn , 
nor could i t  even prevent the huge e le c to ra l fa ilu re  (comparable only to 
tha t of ERE in 1964) of the "anti-PASOK and an ti-m arx ist camp".* 48}
Before moving on to  an examination of ND's foreign po licy , i t  should 
be m en tioned  t h a t  d u r in g  th e  w hole tim e  ND was e n fo r c in g  i t s  
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  in  th e  economy, th e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r
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( i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  businessm en and o th e r  e n tre p re n e u rs )  was q u i te  
u n w illin g  to  in v o lv e  i t s e l f  in  new v e n tu re s ,  and i t  rem ained an 
acqu iescen t sp e c ta to r  o f the  s t a te  i n i t i a t i v e s . ‘ 49’ In  answer to  S. 
Manos (an i n d u s t r i a l i s t  and former ND m in is te r  of in d u s try , who in  
November 1983 had c r i t ic is e d  h is  p a r ty 's  governments in a  speech to  the 
Centre of P o lit ic a l  Research and Information for th e ir  excessive s ta te  
in terven tion  and th e ir  social-dem ocratic and s t a t i s t  economic p o licy ), 
ND's r e t ire d  secre tary  of p ress and information, N. D elipetros, wrote:
"Mr. Manos to ld  only  the  h a lf  t r u th ,  i f  he indeed to ld  
any: He said  th a t the overblown public secto r was due to  
'some s o c ia l-d e m o c ra t ic  te n d e n c ie s ’ o f New Democracy 
—tendencies th a t , of course, even i f  they ex is ted , would 
no t c o n s t i t u t e  an id e o lo g ic a l  s in — b u t he fo rgo t to  
mention anything about the unwillingness o r, a t any ra te , 
the in a b il ity  of the rep resen ta tives of the p riv a te  secto r 
to invest su b s tan tia l c a p i ta l . . .  Maybe ND was mistaken in 
two or three instances, and na tionalised  seme businesses 
that should have been le f t  outside s ta te  c o n tro l. . .  ND not 
only did not persecute p riv a te  businesses, on the contrary 
i t  p r o t e c t e d  th em , to  th e  e x t e n t  th e  o r g a n i s e d  
en trep ren eu rs  p e rm itted . ND o ffe re d  them m otives, tax 
exem ptions, and f in a n c ia l  su b s id ie s  —and, l a s t  but not 
l e a s t ,  ND o f f e r e d  them Mr. Manos a s  m in i s t e r  o f 
industry". <50 >
2.2 .2  Foreign policy
As we have sa id  a lre a d y , ND's ra d ic a l l ib e ra lism  was much more 
c o n s is te n t and e f f e c t iv e  w ith  regard  to  the c o u n try 's  in te rn a tio n a l  
a f f a i r s .  Inspired, formulated and implemented mainly by Karamanlis, ND's 
fo re ig n  p o licy  re s te d  on the  p r in c ip le  th a t "Greece belongs to  the  
West"; the main d ifference  with ERE's foreign policy in the pre-coup 
period —which can be said  to  have been to ta l  loyalty  to the A tlan tic  
A lliance (NATO) and more sp e c if ic a lly  to  i t s  American a l l i e s — was th a t 
Greece now followed a m ulti-dim ensional policy , e spec ia lly  v is -a -v is  the 
countries of the East Bloc ( i t s  Balkan neighbours p a r t i c u la r ly ) ,  the  
Arab Middle East and the Third World.
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The " c l i e n t e l i s t i c  re la t io n s "  between Greece and th e  U.S. during  
almost twD decades a f te r  the c iv i l  war(51) seemed to  have ccme to  an 
abrupt end as e a r ly  as August 1974, when the  country  withdrew from 
NATO's m ilita ry  branch, on the grounds tha t NATO had "not only proved 
incapable of stopping  the  T urkish  invasion  of Cyprus, but had a ls o  
to le ra te d  such an a c t io n " . ( 52 * As Karamanlis d ec la red  a t  th a t  tim e, 
Greece would not r e jo in  the  A llia n c e , un less the occupation  troops 
withdrew from Cyprus. A fter long nego tia tions, over more than s ix  years, 
Greece f in a lly  returned to  the m ili ta ry  branch of NATO in October 1980, 
although the Turkish occupation had not ended —and s t i l l  has no t, a t  
the time of w riting .
Greek-Turkish r e la t io n s  were always a c e n tra l  problem fo r ND's 
fo reign  p o lic y  (as a lso  fo r  a l l  PASOK governm ents), and one which 
remains unresolved u n t i l  today. The Cyprus question  ap art, there  was 
f r ic tio n  with Turkey i t s e l f  over the Aegean Sea, the continental sh e lf 
of the Aegean islands as well as th e ir  armament, and over the Moslem 
m inority  in the  Department of Thrace in northern  Greece. Karamanlis 
chose to  deal with these questions through peaceful negotiations with 
Turkey, but in a considerab ly  more independent, se lf -c o n ta in e d  and 
m il i ta n t  way than had been usual in  the pre-coup p e rio d , when the  
in fluence , and a t  tim es o v e rt in te rv e n tio n , of the U .S ., was always 
obvious. As he declared in April 1978,
"The American government has the  r ig h t  to  re g u la te  i t s  
re la tio n s  with Turkey according to i t s  own judgement. But 
i t  must not do so to  the  detrim en t of the in te r e s ts  of 
Greece and Cuprus". ‘ 5 3}
Greek-American re la t io n s  underwent ex tensive  re c o n s id e ra tio n , and 
came to be based on more e g a lita r ia n  and mutually benefic ia l grounds. 
All agreements made between the U.S. and the d ic ta to rsh ip  regime —chief 
among than those concerning shipyard and anchorage f a c i l i t i e s  fo r the
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American Sixth F lee t— were annulled, and fresh  negotiations begun to  
regu late  the s ta tu s  and functioning of U.S. m ilita ry  bases in Greece. To 
the f ie rc e  c r itic ism  of PASOK, which launched the slogan tha t "Greece 
belongs to  the Greeks" and clamoured fo r withdrawal from NATO's m ilita ry  
and p o lit ic a l  branches as well as fo r c losing  down a l l  the U.S. m ilita ry  
bases, Karamanlis rep lied  th a t "Greece belongs to  the West". E. Averoff, 
as m in is te r  of n a tio n a l defence, to ld  the  ND p ro v in c ia l congress in 
Salonica in January 1981:
"We want the U.S. bases of NATO to remain in our country, 
beause we consider th e i r  presence usefu l, not only for the 
A lliance but a lso  fo r our own national s a fe ty . . .  The only 
thing we want is  to  reach an agreement leading to  a deal 
th a t w ill  serve  our n a tio n a l in te r e s t s  b e t te r  than the 
o ld e r ones, and s im ila r  to  those  o th e r  co u n trie s  have 
a lread y  m ade ... In those c ircum stances, the bases w ill 
stay  here, fo r we consider than u se fu l" . {54 *
Concerning G reece's re la tio n s  w ith the Balkan and other countries of 
th e  E ast B loc, and a ls o  w ith  th e  Arabs and v a r io u s  th ird -w o r ld  
countries, Karamanlis b e liev ed  th a t  d e sp ite  i t s  c lo se  lin k s  w ith  the  
Western A lliance, the country should promote an "independent, though not 
a non-aligned p o l ic y " .* 55’ Moreover, he po in ted  out th a t a l l  E as t-  
European countries were s t i l l  "terra incognita" fo r Greece —"as i f  the 
so-called  iron c u rta in , which was torn  out long ago for most Westerners 
to make room for c lose  economic and trade  re la tio n s , had remained up 
only for u s" . ( 56 *
I t  was w ith in  th i s  c o n te x t, th a t  m in is te r  of fo re ign  a f f a i r s  G. 
Rail is  went to Moscow in 1978 and in i t i a l l e d  an agreement that provided 
for shipyard f a c i l i t i e s  in Greece fo r the USSR merchant f le e t .  One year 
la te r , in October 1979, i t  was Karamanlis' turn to v i s i t  Moscow (the 
f i r s t  Greek premier ever to  do so ), before going to Budapest, Prague, 
and Peking in November. Furthermore, he inaugurated a m u lti- la te ra l co­
operation pact among the Balkan countries —the f i r s t  Balkan conference
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s in c e  World War I I  took p la c e  in  A thens in  e a r ly  1976— and he 
re v ita lis e d  and expanded Greece's p o l i t ic a l  and econcmic re la tio n s  with 
most countries of the Arab World, and many o thers of the th ird  world in 
A frica and A sia .‘ 57 *
Above a l l  e ls e , though, the g rea tes t e f fo r ts  of the government and 
p a rtic u la rly  Karamanlis him self were channelled towards Greece's en try  
in to  the  European Economic Community. ‘ 58 * Karam anlis, who had always 
been a fe rven t su p p o rte r of the  idea  of a United Europe, moved both  
c ircum spectly  and ra p id ly , and f in a l ly  succeeded in overcoming a l l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and to  see h is  v is io n  of Greece as a f u l l  EEC member 
rea lized . He had the lukewarm support of G. Mavros and h is  party  (the 
Union of the Democratic Centre, EDIK), but was f ie rc e ly  opposed by PASOK 
(and the L eft), which saw the EEC as representing  the econcmic side  of 
NATO and, instead of jo in ing , advocated seme special agreement with the 
Common Market to  "guarantee our being  ab le  to  p ra c t ic e  a f re e  tra d e  
policy , control c ap ita l flow and ensure a national programme for our 
economy" (in English o r ig in a l ly ) . <59 >
I t  would appear th a t p la in  econcmic reasons were of only secondary 
importance to Karamanlis. He la id  much g rea ter s tre s s  on the p o l i t ic a l  
aspect, and made th is  c lea r on various occasions. A fter the reac tiv a tio n  
of the 1961 Association Agreement in December 1974, Karamanlis submitted 
G reece 's formal a p p lic a tio n  fo r  f u l l  membership on 12 June 1975. He 
c a l le d  th e  am bassadors o f th e  n in e  EEC c o u n tr ie s  to  h is  o f f i c e  
immediately afterw ards, and to ld  them:
"I would lik e  to s tre s s  th a t Greece does not wish to en ter 
[the EEC] fo r  e x c lu s iv e ly  economic reasons. She does so 
m ainly fo r  p o l i t i c a l  reaso n s, which a re  r e la te d  to  the 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n  of dem ocracy and to  th e  fu tu re  o f th e  
na tion". ( 60 *
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On ano ther occasion  l a t e r ,  in a speech he made to  the  governmental 
council of economic and soc ia l policy  on 27 June 1978, he was somewhat 
more sp ec ific :
"...beyond safeguarding our national independence, jo in ing  
a U n i te d  E u ro p e  w i l l  g u a r a n t e e  o u r  d e m o c r a t i c  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  f o r  th e  w hole  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  EEC 
presupposes the existence and functioning of democracy in 
a l l  m e m b e r-s ta te s . T h is means th a t  no coup a g a in s t  
democracy w ill  ever again  be p o s s ib le . Because they who 
would r i s k  i t ,  would know th a t  the  very  next day they 
would be thrown out of the Comnunity, and th is ,  in tu rn , 
would have d ire  consequences for the country". *61 y
The Accession Treaty was f in a l ly  signed in Athens on 28 May 1979, and 
Greece became the ten th  fu ll  EEC-member on 1 January 1981, ten months 
before PASOK came to  power.
One l a s t  p o in t th a t  should be made befo re  we c lo se  th is  se c tio n  
re fe r s  to  ND's mechanisms fo r  decision-m aking in m atte rs  o f fo re ig n  
policy. During the f i r s t  seven years ND was in power, i t  seems th a t the 
shaping and implementation of foreign po licy  was the exclusive p riv ileg e  
of the prime m in iste r, aided by h is  diplom atic o ff ic e , but overrid ing  
the cen tra l bureaucratic  serv ices of the m inistry  of foreign a f f a i r s .  On 
the one hand, the prem ier's predominant ro le  secured various advantages: 
f le x ib i l i ty ,  sw ift decision-making, and absolute control over even the 
most sub tle  and se n s itiv e  issues of foreign policy . The disadvantages, 
on the  o th e r  hand, were: f i r s t ,  th a t a l l  fa c to rs  r e la t in g  to  and 
e x e r t in g  in f lu e n c e  on fo re ig n  p o l ic y  rem ained o b sc u re , s in c e  no 
bureaucratic processes ex is ted  to id en tify  and record them. Secondly, 
implementing th e  f in a l  d e c is io n  in p ra c t ic e  became more d i f f i c u l t ,  
because th e  r e s p o n s ib le  s e r v ic e s  had had no say in  shap ing  th a t  
decision. F in a lly , and perhaps most importantly as i t  turned out a f te r  
PASOK took over in 1981, the coun try 's  foreign policy  lacked con tin u ity , 
and so c r e d ib i l i ty ,  on issu e s  of n a tio n a l importance —such as the  
Cuprus question and re la tio n s  with Turkey. In o ther words, issues of
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broad n a tio n a l in te r e s t ,  which should have been kept se p a ra te  from 
p a r ty - p o l i t ic a l  squabbles, o fte n  became the su b je c ts  of am ateurish  
ir re sp o n s ib ili ty  and s in p l is t ic  s logans, in s tea d  of re c e iv in g  se rio u s  
c o n s id e ra tio n  in  terms of long-term  planning  and s t r a te g ie s .  This 
p e rso n a lise d  policy-m aking in  fo re ig n  a f f a i r s ,  the so -c a lle d  se c re t  
d ip lom acy , has o f te n  been o b je c te d  to  by p a r ty  le a d e rs  when in  
o p p o s i t io n , p a r t i c u l a r l y  so by Papandreou and M its o ta k is ;  bu t 
im m ediate ly  a f t e r  a cced in g  to  o f f i c e  they  fo rg e t  a l l  about th ese  
drawbacks and th e i r  o b je c tio n s , and them selves follow  e x ac tly  th is  
p a tte rn  a g a in .( 62 *
3. ND in Opposition (1981-1989): Seeking for an Ideological Id en tity
3.1 The 1985 m anifesto ”A new proposal fo r freedom” , and the s h if t
towards neo-libera lism
The e lec tio n  of E. Averoff to the party  leadership almost two months 
a f te r  PASOK took o ff ic e  in October 1981 meant ND moving fu rther r ig h t 
along the p o l i t ic a l  spectrum, and adopting u ltra -conserva tive  positions 
often  very s im ila r to those of u l t r a - r ig h t i s t  and fa s c is t  groups. Except 
for the new lea d e r 's  e f fo r ts  to  expand and develop the p a r ty 's  g rass- 
root o rgan isation , not much e lse  of importance was done. There was no 
sc ru tin y  of p a s t m istakes, no new programmes, no adoption of modern 
s tra te g ie s  and ta c tic s ,  and no e laboration  of sp ec ific  and convincing 
a lte rn a tiv e s  to PASOK's p o l ic ie s . ( 63 *
For the g rea te r p a rt of ND's f i r s t  term in opposition, therefo re , 
(Dec. 1981-Sep. 1984), the  p a rty  seemed to  be in a s t a te  of general 
confusion, p a r tic u la r ly  concerning i t s  a tt i tu d e  to  the economic p o lic ie s  
being enforced by the government. This was indeed the case, p rim arily  
because ND lacked firm  id eo lo g ica l foundations and an unequivocal
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economic philosophy ( le t  us remember th a t, while i t  was in power, the 
most common m anifestations of i t s  "radical liberalism " in the economy 
were e m p ir ic is t and unchecked s t a t e  p a te rn a lism  and in te rv e n tio n ) ;  
secondly, i t  was of course awkward to  c r i t i c i s e  PASOK's in te rv en tio n is t 
p o l ic ie s ,  when ND i t s e l f  had so g re a t ly  c o n trib u te d  to  the  s t a t e 's  
growing importance and ro le  in economic a c t iv i t ie s .  So when the very 
same persons who had enforced  p o l ic ie s  of s t a te  in te rv e n tio n  in  the  
economy when they were ru lin g  the country turned round and berated PASOK 
for doing likew ise, not only fa ile d  to  improve ND's general image, but 
a ls o  c re a te d  y e t one more problem : namely th a t  o f "a lack  o f 
c r e d ib i l i ty ,  which n e c e s s i ta te d , in te r  a l i a , renewing the p o l i t i c a l  
personnel to  a  much g rea te r extent than had ever been done befo re" . <6 4 >
The party  showed no sign of recovering from th is  s ta te  of lethargy 
and ideological confusion, i f  not reg ression , u n til  C. M itso tak is ' rose 
to i t s  leadership in September 1984. O rig inally  from the broader l ib e ra l 
p o lit ic a l  camp (he had joined ND in 1978), he tr ie d  to  give the party  a 
more c e n tr is t  o rien ta tio n , which became evident in February 1985, when 
he presented a  new ideological dec la ra tion , e n ti t le d  "A new proposal fo r 
freedom". Before we examine th is  te x t  —which abandoned t r a d i t io n a l  
Karamanlis ta c tic s  of ideological recruitm ent— we sha ll f i r s t  take a 
b rie f  look a t how th is  ideological declara tion  came about, and a lso  the 
ro le  played by the Centre fo r P o lit ic a l Research and Information (KPEE) 
in i t s  form ulation .( 65}
One of M its o ta k is ' f i r s t  a c t io n s  a f t e r  ta k in g  over th e  p a r ty  
leadership was to se t up a special e lec tio n  committee, to  organise ND 
stra tegy  in the forthcoming October 1985 national e le c t io n s .( 66 * This 
committee was headed by prominent ND member, ex-m inister of industry , S. 
Manos, a s s is te d  by p o l i t i c a l  a n a ly s ts  and o th e r  s p e c ia l i s t s  of the  
resea rch  departm ent of KPEE. The c re a tio n  of th is  committee had two 
reasons: f i r s t ,  i f  ND was to  have any chances of winning the e lec tio n ,
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i t  would have to do away with a l l  the c h a ra c te r is tic s  and p rac tices  tha t 
had caused i t s  defeat in 1981 and i t s  poor performance in the 1984 Euro- 
e le c t  ion ; th is  req u ired  th a t  i t  should p resen t a new p r o f i le  and a 
modem id en tity . Secondly, the e lec tio n  committee would have to  find  and 
adopt modem ta c tic s  fo r dissem inating ND's message to the pub lic , since 
the trad itio n a l huge party  demonstrations p r io r  to each e lec tio n  brought 
te n s io n  and fa n a t ic is m  in to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a tm osphere in s te a d  o f 
a ttra c tin g  new vo ters fo r the party .
The e le c t io n  com m ittee a c c o rd in g ly  used  th e  most u p - to -d a te  
techniques, tak in g  f u l l  advantage of the  s c i e n t i f i c  and computer- 
analysis assistance  of KPEE. Analysis of a l l  e lec tio n  re s u lts  since 1974 
id en tified  the constituencies with the g rea tes t percentage of f lo a tin g  
v o tes ; ex tensive  op in ion  p o l ls  c l a r i f i e d  which were the most serious 
problems, and how the people were hoping to  see them solved. The re s u lts  
of these  p o l ls  showed th a t  the  m a jo rity  of the  people considered  
economic problem s, and p a r t i c u la r ly  unemployment, to  be of prim ary 
importance; and tha t in f la tio n , taxa tion , and the national health  system 
should be given g rea te r weight in the p a r t ie s ' p o l i t ic a l  programmes. To 
questions concerning th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  id e n tif ic a tio n , most of the people 
interviewed described themselves as c e n tr is ts  or l ib e ra ls , who valued 
moderation, to lerance, dialogue, m eritocracy, and equality  before the 
law .‘67 ’
Having com pleted t h i s  f i r s t  s ta g e  of r e s e a rc h , th e  e le c t io n  
committee t r ie d  to  develop p o l ic ie s  th a t would r e f le c t  the needs and 
expectations of the f lo a tin g  vote. New opinion p o lls  were conducted to  
f ind  out whether people thought th a t le s s  s t a te  in te rv e n tio n , the  
p r iv a t is a t io n  of p u b lic  e n te r p r i s e s ,  p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e ,  and th e  
establishm ent of a market economy were measures that would r e v i ta l iz e  
the economy, and the m ajority  rep lied  a ffirm atively . ‘ 68 * I t  was a t  th is  
point tha t the presiden t of the e lec tio n  committee himself drew up ND's
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id eo lo g ica l d e c la ra tio n , the  p r in c ip le s  of which provided ND's 1985 
e lec tion  platform .
As m entioned a lre ad y , the  sp e c ia l e le c t io n  coirm ittee was g re a tly  
a ss is te d  by the research  department of the Centre fo r P o li t ic a l  Research 
and Information (KPEE). KPEE is  an Athens-based, p riv a te  in s t i tu te .  I t  
was founded in  e a r ly  1976, i t s  prim ary aims being (a) " the  b roader 
promotion of the  fundamental p r in c ip le s  of a p l u r a l i s t  dem ocratic 
s o c ie ty " ;  (b) " th e  s tr e n g th e n in g  o f l i b e r a l  v a lu e s ,  in d iv id u a l  
i n i t i a t i v e ,  and the  te n e ts  of a f re e  market economy"; and (c) "the  
con tinu ing  study  and re sea rch  of contemporary s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and 
economic phenomena". Since January 1978 i t s  a c t iv i t ie s  have included the 
o r ig in a lly  bi-monthly, now q u arte rly  pub lication  of Epikentra, a journal 
of p o l i t ic a l  and economic a f f a i r s ;  i t  has a lso  brought out occasional 
s c i e n t i f i c  m onographs, o rg a n is e d  se m in a rs , symposiums and p u b lic  
debates, done research  on public  po licy , studied public-opinion trends 
in Greece, and collaborated  c lose ly  w ith organisations or individuals 
with sim ila r o b je c tiv e s .( 69’
C ontrary  to  what one might expec t, l ib e ra lism  was not c e n tra l  to  
KPEE's in te re s ts  when i t  was founded. As the president of the Centre put 
i t ,
"When we s t a r t e d ,  G reece had on ly  Marxism and a n t i -  
M arx ism .. .  We though t th a t  KPEE co u ld  not fu n c tio n  
p ro p e r ly  u n le s s  i t  had a , so to  speak , s c i e n t i f i c  
s t r u c tu r e . . .  We tr ie d  to  re c ru it  s c ie n t is ts  who would work 
on a sy s tem atic , fu l l- t im e  b a s i s . . .  As th e i r  work was 
p ro g re ss in g  we began l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  to  ge t to  know 
b e tte r  the philosophy of lib e ra lism ". (70 >
F inally , in May 1981, KPEE held i t s  f i r s t  In terna tional Synposium in 
Athens on "New Liberalism ", aiming to introduce a new school of thought 
in Greece which, according to  KPEE, was "rapidly  gaining advocates in 
the West among scholars and p o li t ic a l  a c t iv is ts " .  I t  w els  announced a t 
that time th a t
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"KPEE aimed a t  encouraging an exchange of ideas on 'neo- 
l ib e ra l ' philosophy and p ra c tic e . The 'school' in question 
which could be la b e lle d  'n e o - lib e ra lis m ' enphasizes the  
freedom  o f i n d i v i d u a l s '  p r i v a t e  i n i t i a t i v e ,  th e  
fu n c tio n in g  of a  f r e e ,  o r  m arket economy, and th e  
l i m i t a t i o n  o f th e  r o l e  o f  th e  S ta te "  ( in  E n g lis h  
o r ig in a lly ) .* 71}
Ever since i t s  establishm ent, KPEE served as a think-tank fo r ND, of 
a kind unheard-of fo r a bourgeois pa rty  in Greece. Although KPEE has 
always denied th a t i t  is  in any way dependent on ND, i t  would appear 
tha t the Centre was se t up as p a rt of Karamanlis' e ffo r ts  to  modernise 
h is  p a r ty .( 72 * As time passed and, p a rtic u la rly  a f te r  1981, when KPEE 
advocated n e o -lib e ra lism  and favoured the  l a t t e r ' s  adoption as ND's 
o f f i c i a l  ideology, the  o ld  guard of the  p a rty  rea c te d  n e g a tiv e ly , 
because "the larger the public  sec to r the g rea ter the opportun ities fo r 
p o l it ic a l  patronage". ( 73 * T hereafter, KPEE's formal links with ND began 
to  le ssen , but i t  c re a te d  new ones w ith  the  a t  the  time u n o f f ic ia l  
Liberal Forum fac tio n , which doggedly promulgated the same ideological 
p r in c ip le s . ( 74 * But i t  was not u n t i l  C. M itso tak is  assumed the  ND 
leadership th a t KPEE was associated  with a re a lly  important p ro jec t, the 
e la b o ra t io n  of th e  m a n ife s to  "A new p ro p o sa l fo r  freedom "; i t s  
involvem ent h e lp ed  to  p u t a n e o - l ib e r a l  stamp on th e  ND p a r t y 's  
ideology.( 75’
C ontrary to  K aram anlis' keeping the  balance between order, social 
ju c tice  and individual freedom —with the cen tre  of g rav ity  in socia l 
ju s t ic e — i t  was freedom th a t  was now proclaim ed as c o n s titu tin g  the 
cornerstone of the p a r ty 's  ideology. The very beginning of the February 
1985 ideological declara tion  s ta te d  qu ite  e x p lic it ly  th a t ND promised 
the Greek people tha t freedom would co n s titu te  the overriding p rin c ip le  
of every  id e o lo g ic a l  c o n s id e ra t io n  and everyone of i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
actions. Without o rd er and so c ia l ju s t ic e  being d ism issed , these  two 
were now considered  as of le s s  im portance than freedom: "ND believes
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that freedom is  assured through order —an order, however, th a t ' i s  not 
the mother, but the daughter of freedom', an order fo r, and not aga in st, 
freedom". There can be no doubt of ND's ideological p r io r i t i e s ,  when i t  
was announced th a t ,  fo r ND,
" . . . t h e  overrid ing  idea l, d irec tin g  i t s  p o l i t ic a l  path is  
freedom. ND condemns the denial and undermining of freedom 
in the name of o ther, supposedly higher, values. Freedom 
c e r ta in ly  cannot stand on i t s  own and must coexist with 
o ther important values, such as equality  of opportunity, 
so c ia l j u s t i c e ,  and o rd e r. But fo r  ND freedom is  not 
simply a means to  a g rea te r end? i t  is  i t s e l f  the highest 
p o l i t ic a l  aim."
I t  was on th is  b a s is  th a t  ND's newly adopted l ib e ra l  id eo lo g ica l 
p rin c ip les  were fu r th e r  a r t ic u la te d  and exp la ined . At the  same tim e, 
s e r io u s  e f f o r t s  were made to  r e a s s u re  th e  more c o n s e rv a tiv e  and 
Karamanliist members and v o te rs ;  not only were th e re  four q u o ta tio n s  
from Karamanlis' speeches to  the prelim inary and the f i r s t  congress, 
but i t  was a lso  s ta te d  c a te g o r ic a l ly  th a t  New Democracy a t  the  1979 
C h a lk id ik i C ongress " d e te rm in e d .. .  the  id eo lo g ica l framework th a t  
c o n stitu tes  rad ica l l ib e ra lism ... New Democracy is ,  and always w ill be, 
unequivocally committed to  these p rin c ip le s ."  Nevertheless, as we sha ll 
see below, ND's departure from the Karamanlis tra d itio n  has been more 
than obvious.
According to  the 1985 m anifesto, i t  was "the rapid  sw elling of an 
already overblown pub lic  sec to r with low productiv ity", which had caused 
"high in f la tio n , increased unemployment, g re a te r  bureaucracy, h eav ie r 
tax a tio n , and a growing fo re ig n  d eb t" , th a t was the c o u n try 's  most 
p ress in g  problem , and PASOK was c r i t i c i s e d  fo r  having e x c lu s iv e ly  
contributed to  "the growth of a c en tra lised , bureaucratic  and a rb itra ry  
s ta te ,  which e a s i ly  passes in to  the  t ig h t  co n tro l of the government 
p a r ty  and becom es a means f o r  th e  p e r p e tu a t io n  o f i t s  power 
p o s itio n " . ( 76 ’ ND charged th a t th is  had led to Greece's g rea ter economic
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dependence, and to  an u n p reced en ted  a rro g a n ce  of power such a s  
unavoidably b rin g s "the  weakening and m a rg in a lisa tio n  of every Greek 
c itiz e n " , and the p a r ty - s ta te ' s re fu sa l to  acknowledge the individual as 
a free  and independent p e rso n ality .
ND argued th a t  Greece had no need of a v a s t  s t a te  ap p ara tu s , and 
would be much b e t te r  served  by a more "competent s t a t e ,  sm aller in  
extent and con tro lled  by democratic le g a lity " . I t  believed th a t lib e ra l 
so lu tions, centred on freedom and "based on the p rin c ip le s  of equality  
of r ig h ts  and m eritocracy", were the most appropriate  and e ffe c tiv e , and 
promised to  c rea te  and guarantee a "p o lit ic a l  framework tha t encourages 
dialogue, moderation, to lerance, consensus, and which w ill give young 
people the  chance to  develop th e i r  a b i l i t i e s  and to  c re a te  a new, 
modern, and open socie ty".
The m a n ife s to  then  s p e l le d  ou t ND's programme and p o l i t i c a l  
p r io r i t ie s  i f  the party  were returned to  o ff ic e . I t  pledged i t s e l f  to  
t o ta l ly  d ise n ta n g le  the  machinery of s t a te  from th a t  of the  ru l in g  
party ; th a t s ta te  expansion p a r t ic u la r ly  in the economic sec to r, would 
be reduced; th a t p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  appointm ents to  p o s it io n s  in the  
ju d ic ia r y  would c ea se  and th e  le g a l  system  would r e a l l y  become 
independent; th a t  the  ro le  of parliam ent would be upgraded consonant 
with i t s  high mission, so th a t i t  would cease to  be of merely marginal 
importance; th a t the mass media would be opened up to  d issen ting  views, 
to  become f re e  and o b je c tiv e  so th a t an end be put to  the  p resen t 
p i t i f u l  s i t u a t i o n ;  and, f i n a l l y ,  th a t  th e  tra d e  un ions would be 
encouraged to  be in d ep en d en t, n o t th e  p u p p e ts  o f p a r t y - p o l i t i c a l  
machinations.
In connection with individual personal freedom, ND stressed  th a t a 
market economy and the  personal ownership of p ro p erty  were e s s e n t ia l  
preconditions of p o l i t ic a l  freedom: i t  is  p rec ise ly  where "free  economy 
and p riv a te  ownership have been abolished", th a t "an omnipotent s ta te
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has been c re a te d , c iv i l  l i b e r t i e s  have been v io la te d , so c ie ty  has 
withered and economic development has been obstructed ." For a l l  th a t, 
sa id  the m an ifesto , the  s t a te  d id  have a le g itim a te  fu n c tio n , ND’s 
ideology was not th a t of the "undiluted libe ra lism  of the la s t  century. 
The s ta te  has an im portant ro le  to  p lay  in  the  economic s e c to r :  in  
assuring and in encouraging carpet i t  ion, guarding against every kind of 
monopoly, providing incentives fo r economic development, and o fferin g  
p ro te c t io n  to  th e  weak". In  c o n t r a s t  to  p a s t  c o n s id e ra tio n s  and 
p rac tices , ND was now giving an e s se n tia lly  d iffe ren t meaning to  socia l 
ju s tic e , namely equality  of opportun ities in  "the p o l i t ic a l ,  economic, 
and social l i f e . . .  Social ju s tic e  in th is  sense —and not some utopian 
e q u a lity  of income— is  unbreakably linked  w ith  lib e ra lism . Because 
liberalism  is  the foe of every p riv ile g e , and seeks the ju s t recognition 
of every person 's a b i l i t i e s . " ‘ 77 *
The la s t  p a r t  o f the  1985 m anifesto  co n ta in s  some very im portant 
de fin itio n s of ND's p o l i t ic a l  id e n tity . I t  is  s ta ted  tha t the p arty , 
"because i t  is  both rad ica l and lib e ra l"  is  "the standard bearer of the 
lib e ra l renewal which the country needs". ND is  rad ica l, not because, a 
la  Karamanlis, i t  reserves the r ig h t to  implement "even the most rad ica l 
solutions when these  a re  d ic ta te d  by the n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t " , ‘ 78’ but 
because " i t  aims a t  the daring m odernisation of our p o l i t ic a l ,  economic 
and so c ia l l i f e "  in read in ess  fo r  the  tw e n ty - f ir s t  cen tu ry . I t  is  
l i b e r a l ,  because " i t  goes about t h i s  renew al by ensuring  g re a te r  
freedom, more emphasis on the ind iv idual, and g rea ter confidence in the 
Greek and h is  a b i l i t i e s " .  ND, there fo re , was not a conservative but a 
p ro g ressiv e  p a rty  because, above a l l ,  " i t  does not fe a r  change". 
Furthermore, ND choosing to  be " lib e ra l is  progressive par excellence”, 
because i t  means not being bound by dogma... but allowing free  play to 
"the c rea tive  strengths of men and women, to enrich the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  of 
choice, to r id  the individual of both s ta te  cen tra lisa tio n  and of the
253
blank conformity th a t r e s u lts  from everybody embracing a sing le  b e lie f" ;  
i t  was ready to  "combine the ob jec tive  of change with re s p o n s ib ili ty " ; 
and, la s t  but not l e a s t ,  i t  b e liev ed  " in  the  wider co -o p era tio n  and 
brotherhood of man" in the context of a  United Europe.
W ith a l l  th e  above c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  th e  l i b e r a l  ND cou ld  be 
described, according to  the m anifesto, as "the party  of dialogue, of 
moderation, of the middle way and of fa irn e ss" , tha t w ill not revenge 
but co n c ilia te  when i t  resumes o ff ic e . I t  was once again s tre ssed , th a t 
" i t  is  only i f  we lib e ra te  the c rea tiveness, the genius of the Greek, 
th a t we sh a ll  emerge from the  c r i s i s ,  th a t  we can succeed in  th e  
economic rev ival of our country." To th a t end i t  was necessary to  put 
the Greek c it iz e n  above the p a rty  s ta te .  Dealing successfu lly  with the 
most c r i t ic a l  problems of the country, i . e . ,  "unemployment, in f la tio n , 
in to le ra b le  ta x a tio n , s t a te  bureaucracy , and the  v a s t external debt, 
c a l ls  fo r g rea te r, not le s s , economic freedom".
Overall then, less of a s ta te  and more of a free  market economy, as 
well as g rea ter economic freedom and personal choice fo r the ind iv idual, 
were the essence of the February 1985 manifesto and the focus of ND's 
wide-ranging attem pts to  o ffe r  c red ib le  and a t t ra c t iv e  a lte rn a tiv e s  to  
PASOK's p o l ic ie s ,  and to  exchange i t s  p a s t s t a t i s t  and p a te rn a l is t ic  
p rac tices  for a modem lib e ra l outlook, so as to stand a chance in the 
forthcoming June 1985 e lec tio n .
"A new proposal fo r freedom" has proved the event of the g rea te s t 
consequence in  the  l i f e  of the  p a r ty , and has been compared to  a 
" l ib e ra l  id eo lo g ica l r e v o lu t io n " . ( 79’ I t  was the f i r s t  time th a t ,  
instead of ideological w oolliness ND presented a c lea r-cu t p o l i t ic a l  and 
id eo lo g ica l id e n t i ty .  I t  now had a te x t to  which i t  could r e f e r  to  
dem onstrate i t s  id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s .  A lso, as Katsoudas argued 
recently :
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" . . . t h i s  is  the most important p o l i t ic a l  tex t ND has ever 
p u b lish e d  th roughou t i t s  f i f t e e n  y e a rs  of e x is te n c e , 
because  i t  h a s  g e n e ra te d  a  ten d e n c y  in  a  s p e c i f i c  
d irec tio n , aside  from whether th is  tendency is  observed in 
everyday p o l i t i c a l  p r a c t i c e . . .  The M an ifesto  was a 
properly struc tu red  lib e ra l tex t following the r ig h t order 
o f p r in c ip le s ,  and a s  such th e  f i r s t  o f i t s  k in d  in  
Greece".* 8 0 *
During the June 1985 e le c tio n s , libe ra lism  became the watchword of 
ND, and th e  p a r t y 's  name was alw ays p re f ix e d  by p h i l e l e f t h e r i  
( l ib e r a l ) ; ‘81 * moreover, a l l  party  brochures la id  great emphasis on ND's 
lib e ra l p r in c ip le s , and C. M itso tak is ' l ib e ra l o rig in s  were s tre ssed  to  
promote the e le c tio n e e rin g .( 82 * But the most s tr ik in g  c h a ra c te r is tic  of 
ND's canpaign was th a t, fo r the f i r s t  time in i t s  existence, the party  
had an economic programme c o n s i s t e n t ly  based  on i t s  id e o lo g ic a l  
m anifesto, and could support a l l  i t s  proposed p o lic ie s  with ideological 
backing. Also —again  fo r  the  f i r s t  time ever— ND adm itted  c e r ta in  
"misdeeds" in the past (fo r example, i t s  extensive s ta te  in tervention  in 
th e  economy), and e x p la in e d  in  d e t a i l  th e  new p o l ic i e s  i t  would 
implement i f  i t  were e lec ted  to  resume o f f ic e .* 83}
While the  adoption  of n e o - l ib e ra l  p r in c ip le s  rescued ND from i t s  
past outmoded p osition  and gave i t  a modem p o lit ic a l  outlook, th is  did 
not mean th a t a l l  party  members and MPs f e l t  themselves committed to 
these new ideas. There was s t i l l  much confusion, because neo-liberalism  
was given d iffe re n t meanings by d iffe re n t party  o f f ic ia ls ,  and a t  the 
same tim e, "in  r e a l i t y ,  a co n sid erab le  p o rtio n  of ND o f f i c i a l s  and 
v o te rs  remained deeply c o n se rv a tiv e " .* 84’ Furtherm ore, time was too 
short to bring the message heme to  the people credib ly  and convincingly. 
As Katsoudas wrote:
"The Averoff period with i t s  revanchisme was too fresh  in 
the memory of the e le c to ra te . N evertheless, New Democracy 
with more than 41% of the vote rose to the s ta tu s  of one 
of Western Europe's strongest c en tre -rig h t p a rtie s . I t  is  
noteworthy th a t  w hile  the  b a s ic  l ib e ra l  p o s it io n s  ( le s s  
s ta te  in te rference , p revalence of freedom, more economic 
freedom fo r facing unemployment, in fla tio n ) were accepted
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by the  v o te rs , ND had no t convinced them th a t i t  was 
sincere  in i t s  advocation of these p rincip les"  (in  English 
o r ig in a lly ) . (85‘
C re d ib i l i ty  was ND's b a s ic  problem , then , in  the  sense th a t the  
m ajority  of the people considered PASOK more consisten t and, there fo re , 
more competent to hold government o ff ic e . ND's newly adopted p rin c ip le s  
were dism issed  as a mere p re -e le c tio n  t r i c k ,  meant to  conceal the  
p a r ty 's  right-w ing ten d en cies .(86> Although ND received 40.85 per cent 
of the vote (compared to 35.86 per cent in 1981), PASOK secured a c le a r  
5 per cent more and remained in o ff ic e . Ideological refurbishment ap a rt,
"Another problem th a t ND should look a t  more seriously , is  
i t s  [ p o l i t i c a l ]  p a s t .  I t s  ach ievem en ts a re  many and 
c o n s id e ra b le , bu t i t s  s in s  have , r i g h t l y  o r w rongly , 
weighed d isp roportionate ly . A c r i t ic a l  evaluation of th is  
p a s t, and an ou trigh t disentanglement from already outworn 
methods and p ra c t ic e s ,  w ill  g ive c r e d ib i l i ty  to  the  new 
p r o f i l e  th a t  ND has been t r y in g  to  p re s e n t  in  t h i s  
e le c tio n " . <87 >
3.2 The 1986 congress and ND's temporary ideological r e tr e a t
The smooth tra n s itio n  of the p arty  leadership in September 1984, the 
promulgation of the "New proposal fo r freedom", and the unprecedented 
m obilisation  of the g rass-roo ts  o rgan isation  in the course of the 1985 
e lec tio n  campaign had made the ND vo ters and the rank and f i l e  feel th a t 
v ic to ry  was imminent. In consequence, the  d e fe a t a t  the p o l ls  was 
esp ec ia lly  b i t te r  and had severe repercussions in the party  ranks, the 
most serious of which was the defection  of Stephanopoulos and ten o ther 
ND MPs, and the form ation by them of the  Democratic Renewal (DIANA) 
sp lin te r  g ro u p .'881 The conservative wing of ND considered tha t i t  was 
what they saw as the  p a r ty 's  new -tangled l ib e ra l  extremism th a t was 
re s p o n s ib le  fo r  th e  poor perfo rm ance a t  th e  p o l l s ,  and demanded 
(successfu lly , as we sha ll see below) th a t a t the forthcoming second 
party  congress ND should firm ly declare  th a t Karamanlis' speech a t the
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f i r s t  c o n g re ss  d e l in e a te d  th e  p a r t y 's  one and on ly  id e o lo g ic a l  
id e n t i ty .( 89 *
In February 1986, in h is  ad re ss  to  the  d e leg a tes  a t  ND's second 
congress, pa rty  leader C. M itso tak is  acknowledged th a t ND's e le c t io n  
campaign had not been wholy successfu l, since the party  had not managed 
to  convince the  e le c to ra te  th a t  l ib e r a l i s a t io n  of the  economy was a 
c o n d itio  s in e  qua non fo r  so c ia l and economic development; in o th e r  
words, as he put i t ,  "Only where there  is  income, can one have socia l 
ju s tic e  and a welfare s t a t e " / 90’ Furthermore, he accepted tha t ND had 
perhaps not su ff ic ie n tly  emphasised the social side of i t s  programme, 
and th is  enabled PASOK "to c rea te  doubts for our party , p a r tic u la r ly  
amongst the e ld e rly , who depend more d ire c tly  on the s t a t e " 91’
However, "A new proposal fo r freedan" was not abandoned a lto g e th e r, 
as hoped by the p a r ty 's  conservative wing. R etreating c a re fu lly  and in 
an attempt to have i t  both ways, M itsotakis declared:
"ND's ideology is  well known in theory as in p rac tic e . The 
ideological p rin c ip le s  e laborated a t our f i r s t  congress in 
Chalkidiki were and re ta in  our basic  ideological te x t. The 
new proposals fo r freedom, published by ND a year ago, a re  
completely consisten t with those of 1979."192’
The m ajority  of the party  delegates remained unconvinced. Eventually, 
when the new party  s ta tu te s  were voted on, ND's ideological p rin c ip le s  
were again in f i r s t  p lace, ju s t  as in  1979;( 93 * but instead of adopting 
and o f f ic ia l ly  sanctioning the "New proposal for freedom" (since i t  was 
sa id  not to  c o n tra d ic t the  1979 id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s ) ,  the  p a r ty  
adopted and sanctioned  the  id eo lo g ica l form ulation p resen ted  by P. 
Lambrias —a founding member of ND and one of K aram anlis' c lo s e s t  
colleagues— in h is  own speech to the congress. This fac t the KPEE group 
considered an "ideological r e t r e a t " / 94’ but i t  can a lso  be seen as a 
ta c tic a l concession to the p a r ty 's  old guard, and a temporary re tu rn  to  
i t s  Karamanliist beginnings.
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In h is  e f fo r t  to re-designate  ND's real p o l i t ic a l  id e n tity , Lambrias 
t r ie d  to  re su sc ita te  the 1979 ideological tene ts  and, in a  phraseology 
g rea tly  rem iniscent of Karamanlis' own, sa id  th a t nowadays people had to 
make a choice between two extremes: the enormously growing s ta te ,  and 
the  l im i t le s s  s e lf is h n e s s  of the  in d iv id u a l. He a s s e r te d  th a t  the  
p o l i t ic a l  philosophy of ND opted fo r n e ith e r one nor the o ther but fo r a 
midway course , and ye t again  s tre s s e d  th a t ND wished to  e s ta b l is h  a 
democracy th a t, as Karamanlis had described i t ,  combines freedom with 
order, and order with social ju s tic e  —because "there can be no freedom 
w ith o u t o r d e r ,  j u s t  a s  t h e r e  can  be no o r d e r  w ith o u t  s o c i a l  
ju s t ic e " . ( 95 * Within th is  context, he proceeded to  analyse and present 
ND's true  ideological p r in c ip le s .*96}
According to Lambrias, "ND is  a democratic and modem, popular and 
so c ia l, rad ica l and l ib e ra l ,  European and national p o l i t ic a l  party" . As 
a democratic party  " i t  believes in democracy, . . . a  m ilita n t democracy, 
and not one th a t is  paralysed". As a modem party  " i t  corresponds to  the 
needs and concerns of our time". I t  is  a popular party  th a t "o rig ina tes 
from the people, works fo r the people, and id e n tif ie s  with the people", 
because i t  is  "a p a rty  of the  people as an e n t i ty ,  and not a p a rty  
re p re se n tin g  a c e r ta in  c la s s  o r dependent on a p a r t ic u la r  in te r e s t  
group". As a social party  " i t  considers economic development not as an 
end in i t s e l f ,  but as the most r e a l i s t i c  means towards the re a liz a tio n  
of s o c ia l  j u s t i c e " .  As a r a d ic a l  p a r ty  i t  alw ays " re s e rv e s  th e  
p o s s ib il i ty  of adopting the best so lu tions, even the most rad ica l ones, 
when these are  d ic ta ted  by the in te re s ts  of the nation and the people". 
With regard  to  so c ia l and economic p o l ic ie s ,  rad ic a lism  meant "the  
s t a te 's  ob liga tion  and [ i ts ]  a b i l i ty  to intervene and balance economic 
and so c ia l a n ti th e s e s ,  to  reduce in e q u a li t ie s ,  and to  stand  in fo r  
p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e  wherever the l a t t e r  does not respond, or whenever 
economic and social reasons d ic ta te  such a course". ND was a lib e ra l
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p a r ty  because  " i t  d e n ie s  th a t  th e r e  can be s o c ia l  and economic 
ob jec tives fo r the achievement of which democratic freedoms are  worth 
sa c r if ic in g " , and a lso  because " i t  seeks to re in s ta te  the free  economy 
in i t s  dominant ro le  in production, to  safeguard f a i r  competition, to  
ccmbat monopolies, to abolish  prerogatives (often created by the s t a t e 's  
thoughtless in te rven tion ), and everything tha t has proved to  cause mal­
functioning in the economy to  the detriment of the people". ND was a 
European p a r ty , because i t  "has accom plished ... G reece 's e n try  in to  
Europe as an equal pa rtner" , and because i t  "has a permanent and long­
term pro-European po licy"; and i t  was a national party  because " i t  is  
imbued with the v i ta l  awareness th a t  demands the  co n tin u a tio n  of the  
n a tio n 's  h is to r ic  course as the h ighest of m issions".
A ll th e  above c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s  o f ND's id eo lo g y  go back to  
Karamanlis' speech to the f i r s t  party  congress, with one exception: the 
reference to  ND's l ib e ra l aspec ts , which c le a rly  comes frcm the "New 
proposal fo r freedom" m anifesto. So, while Lambrias t r ie d  to  make the 
party  present a un ified  ideological outlook, including s t a t i s t  as well 
as l ib e ra l p rin c ip le s , the re s u lt  heavily  favoured the former. However, 
ND's n eo -libera l o rien ta tio n  was only tem porarily stymied; th e re a f te r , 
the  p a rty  la id  g re a te r  importance to  the  fu r th e r  d issem ina tion  and 
c la r if ic a t io n  of i t s  p o lic ie s  on soc ial w elfare, without abandoning i t s  
basic  ten e ts  fo r p r iv a t is a t io n ,  reduced s ta te  in te rv e n tio n , and f u l l  
operation of a free  market economy —issues tha t remained a t the heart 
of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  platform  u n til  i t  resumed o ffice  in April 1990.
One of the most im portant developments a f t e r  the  second p a r ty  
congress, and one tha t deserves special a tten tio n , is  the e laboration  of 
d e ta i le d  governmental p o lic y  p ro p o sa ls , drawn up by the  re sp o n sib le  
s e c r e ta r i a t ,  which was s e t  up under the  ausp ices of ND's d i r e c to r -  
genera l.*  97 ’ The f i r s t  p u b lic a tio n , concerning ND p o l ic ie s  fo r the  
farmers, appeared in April 1987, and in it ia te d  a se rie s  of many o ther
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such pub lications se ttin g  out ND p o lic ie s  on a wide range of issues. The 
most s t r ik in g  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f th ese  p u b lic a tio n s , apart from th e ir  
an a ly tica l and d e ta iled  approach towards every issue they d e a lt w ith, 
was th a t they were consisten t w ith the lib e ra l p rin c ip les  adopted by the 
1985 "New proposal fo r  freedom", w hile  paying due a t te n t io n  to  the  
social and p ro tec tiv e  aspects of the proposed p o l ic ie s .(98}
The most d e ta iled  and, we th ink , the most important such pub lication  
re fe rred  to ND's policy  proposals fo r the country 's economy. I t  was a 
te rse ly  but very c le a rly  s tru c tu red  tex t in three p a rts : Part I gave an 
account of the sta tu s  quo and the c r i s i s  the Greek economy was sa id  to  
have undergone during the fiv e  years of PASOK government (1981-1986), as 
well as the reasons fo r th is  predicament as id en tified  by ND. Part I I  
presented the p a r ty 's  basic  economic p rin c ip les  and how they could be 
implemented to boost economic a c t iv i ty  and development; Part I I I  made a 
te n ta t iv e  assessm ent of the  economic r e s u l ts  to  be expected i f  ND's 
proposed measures were adopted .( 99 }
According to  the p a rty  a n a ly s is ,  the  Greek economy had en te red  a 
stage of stagnation and d e te rio ra tio n  from the moment PASOK took o ff ic e , 
which by any standards was incompareably worse than not only the  
s i tu a t io n  in the  o th e r EEC c o u n tr ie s , but even w ith re sp ec t to  the  
country 's economy in the p a s t, and espec ia lly  during the 25 years from
1955 u n til  1980.( 100} The ch ief reason for th is  was said  to l ie  with the
PASOK adm inistration and i t s  m al-practices:
"The government favoured a s tro n g  p u b lic  se c to r a t  the  
f ro n t  l in e  o f th e  developm ental e f f o r t ,  which seemed 
always to be in competition with the p riv a te  secto r, while 
i t  should be obvious th a t  co -o p era tio n  of the two is  
necessary in any econcmy. Meanwhile, anonymous bureaucrats 
were p r e f e r r e d  to  e n tr e p re n e u r s ,  and were g iven  th e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  eco n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t . . .  The 
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  th ese  sad developments r e s t s  h eav ily  
w ith  the  government. The unproductive expansion of the  
p u b lic  s e c to r ,  th e  h o s t i l e  a t t i t u d e  tow ards p r iv a te  
e n te r p r i s e ,  and th e  sudden and c o n f l i c t in g  changes
introduced by the government have a l l  caused upheaval in
the market" , ( 1011
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ND promised th a t , to  co rrec t a l l  these economic problems, i t  would 
pursue a very  d if f e r e n t  developm ental course , based on i t s  s tro n g  
attachment to  the free  market economy, the in te rre la tio n  between wages 
and p roductiv ity , and on the p ro f i t  motive. In doing so, ND would bear 
in mind four basic  ob jec tives: (a) ND w ill ensure the freedom of choice 
in every sec to r of everyday l i f e  which is  the only safeguard of personal 
and so c ia l freedom; (b) ND w il l  l ib e r a te  the economic, s o c ia l ,  and 
academic spheres from s ta te  p ro tec tio n  and involvement, and so re s to re  
the c it iz e n s ' t ru s t  and se t free  th e ir  productive c a p a b ili tie s ;  (c) ND 
holds th a t smooth operation of the economy is  founded on emulation and 
c o m p e tit io n , w ith  equal chances fo r  a l l ;  and (d) ND b ases i t s  
developmental e f f o r t  on th e  p ro d u c tiv e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f th e  p r iv a te  
s e c to r . ( 10 2»
C o n tra ry  to  i t s  p a s t  a t t i t u d e  tow ards s t a t e  p a te rn a l is m  and 
in terven tion , ND specified  the ro le  of the s ta te  c le a rly  and p rec ise ly  
fo r the f i r s t  time, and enumerated six  re sp o n s ib ilitie s : (i) exclusive 
re sp o n s ib ility  over national defence, public order, the c iv i l  serv ice  
and ju s tic e ; ( i i )  safeguarding healthy carpet i t  ion and equal r ig h ts  fo r 
a l l  Greeks; ( i i i )  securing soc ia l ju s tic e  by re d is tr ib u tio n  of income, 
and the lev e llin g  of socia l and economic d ifferences; (iv) assuring the 
necessary in fra s tru c tu re  (tran sp o rt, cormunications, energy, e tc .)  fo r 
the coun try 's  so c ia l, economic, and cu ltu ra l development; (v) providing 
social serv ices of high standards to a l l  c itiz e n s  regardless of th e ir  
income, but without excluding the p riv a te  sector from providing s im ila r 
s e r v i c e s ;  and ( v i )  c o n tin u o u s  and c o n s t r u c t iv e  d ia lo g u e  w ith  
p ro fessional, conmercial, and c u ltu ra l o rganisations, so tha t proposals 
fo r improving the sy s to n 's  p roductiv ity  can be accepted and u sed .<103) 
The policy  proposal was q u ite  d e fin ite :
"We believe in the su p e rio rity  of p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e  as a 
means of economic developm ent and p ro g re s s . With the 
e x c e p tio n  o f th e  i n f r a s t r u c tu r e  and p u b lic  u t i l i t y
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se rv ic e s , as w ell as of the  defence in d u s try , the s ta te  
must not compete w ith  p r iv a t e  e n te r p r i s e  as f a r  as 
p ro d u c tiv e  in v es tm en ts  a r e  co n ce rn ed ; i t  must on ly  
supplement these a c t iv i t ie s  when p riv a te  en te rp rise  cannot 
or w ill  not take p a r t  because of p ro h ib it iv e  co s ts  o r 
great r i s k ." ( 104 *
The analysis continued with ND's sp e c ific  p o lic ie s  fo r reac tiv a tin g  
the  economy: p r iv a t is a t io n ,  l ib e r a l i s a t io n  o f the labour market and 
pro tec tion  for the unemployed, free  c o lle c tiv e  bargaining, reforms in 
the  tax  system, the  estab lishm en t of a l ib e r a l  f in a n c ia l  and c re d i t  
system, productive investments, exports, and incentives fo r development. 
These were among ND's measures which, i f  en fo rced , were expected to  
c rea te  enough new jobs, to  halve unemployment by the end of the four- 
y e a r  te rm , and to  make i t  n e g l i g i b l e  t h e r e a f t e r ;  to  im prove 
com petitiveness by in c re a s in g  p ro d u c tiv ity ;  and to  r e - e s ta b l is h  a 
clim ate of tru s t  in the fu tu re  of the Greek economy.{105 }
All of the p a r ty 's  policy  proposals were elaborated along lin es lik e  
th i s ,  and on the  eve of the  June 1989 e le c t io n  ND had a f u l l  and 
d e ta i l e d  governm ental programme. I t s  id eo lo g y  was then  f u r th e r  
c la r if ie d , focusing on th ree  major and in te r - re la te d  elements: supreme 
p r io r ity  was given to freedom —th a t is ,  reducing the s ta te  apparatus, 
and freedom of choice fo r  the  in d iv id u a l— as promulgated in "A new 
proposal fo r freedom". Freedom would then lead to  the establishm ent of a 
free  market economy, which fostered  productive "creativeness" based on 
personal s k i l ls  and p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e ,  and th is  would provide social 
surplus —the much-needed a sse ts  fo r "social p ro tec tion", and ju s tic e . 
Freedom, creativeness, and social p ro tec tion  became the three cardinal 
poin ts of ND's governmental programme. ( 1061
Another important development played i t s  ro le  in giving the party  a 
modern p o l i t i c a l  ou tlook , very  d i f f e r e n t  from ND's past ideas and 
p rac tices . I t  was a f te r  the second congress and as the 1989 e lec tion  was 
coming c loser that ND recognised, fo r the f i r s t  time o f f ic ia l ly ,  tha t
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certa in  of i t s  past p o lic ie s  must by a l l  means be avoided in the fu tu re .
M itsotakis himself declared:
"Many past p rac tices  and th e o r ie s  have been abandoned.. .
But l i f e  goes on, and a  b ig  p a r ty  seeking  power has to  
keep up w ith  i t  in  o rd e r to  be ab le  to  express the  new 
r e a l i t i e s .  In  th e  p a s t ,  we had o n ly  s t a te - c o n t r o l le d  
te lev is io n , with sev era l n a tio n a l is e d  e n tre p r is e s .  Today 
we w ill do exactly  the opposite. We had ren t con tro ls . In 
the fu ture  we w ill l ib e ra l is e  them gradually , while a t  the 
same time we w ill increase the supply of housing." ( 107*
M oreover, ND improved and developed  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w ith the o th e r  
opposition p a r t ie s , p a r t ic u la r ly  w ith those of the carmunist L eft, thus 
b ridg ing  the  t r a d i t io n a l  r i f t  between the  two p o l i t i c a l  camps, the  
o r ig in s  of which dated  back to  the  1944-1949 c iv i l  war. This was 
undoubtedly to the good of th e ir  co-operation in the subsequent sh o rt­
lived co a litio n  government. ( 1081
4. Ideology and Members' A ttitudes
Having o u t l in e d  th e  m ajor b a s ic  t e n e ts  and t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
m odification in ND's ideology, we sh a ll now turn  our a tten tio n  to what 
influence they have had on the party  members. F ir s t ,  the opinions of 
members a t the top of the party  h ierarchy and a t parliam entary level 
w ill be surrnarised, (having been discussed already in the examination of 
ND's p o lit ic a l  personnel). T hereafter we sha ll look in g rea te r d e ta il  a t 
those of the rank and f i l e .
As noted e a r l ie r ,  ideological d ifferences were often  a p re tex t fo r 
concealed personal in te re s ts .  They nevertheless did e x is t to seme extent 
in the four groupings w ithin the pa rty , namely the u l t r a - r ig h t i s t s ,  the 
n eo -lib era ls , the K aram anliists, and the l ib e ra ls , the f i r s t  two former 
always c o n s titu tin g  a m inority  with hardly any influence, and one or
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other of the la s t  two dominant, depending on the person of the party  
leader each tims.
Needless to  mention th a t K aram an liis ts , who fa ith fu lly  adhered to 
rad ical libera lism  and considered the element of social ju s tic e  as the 
most important, were most numerous in ND when Karamanlis him self was 
leading the party ; the  importance of the  u l t r a - r i g h t i s t s  was g re a te r  
during the early  days of ND than la te r  on, since a f te r  1977 the National 
Camp (EP) party  was formed and a ttra c te d  many of those who believed in 
"nation-mindedness" and anti-communism. Today, ever s in ce  M itso tak is  
assumed the party  leadership with the emphasis on personal freedom, i t  
is  the l ib e ra ls  who c o n s titu te  the m ajority ; they have been joined by 
many Karam anliists who, although they are  h o s tile  towards neo -libera l 
ideas, do accept th a t the s ta te  should not intervene in the economy to 
the e x te n t i t  had done in  the  p a s t .  As a founding member of ND has 
w ritten :
"ND's ideology is  rad ical libe ra lism  as determined a t the 
C halk id ik i congress, and no th ing  e ls e  —n e ith e r  'neo- 
lib e ra lism ', nor c la ss ic a l socia l democracy... There is  no 
such thing as a  neu tra l s ta te ,  and ND does not believe in 
anything lik e  i t .  ND believes th a t the s ta te  should play a 
r e g u la to r y  r o l e . . .  I t  sh o u ld  l im i t  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  
a f fe c t in g  p roduction  and the  c ir c u la t io n  of goods, but 
increase  them as regards so c ia l  w e lfa re , education , and 
h e a l th . . .  We b e lie v e  in  the  free-m arket economy and in 
p r i v a t e  i n i t i a t i v e ,  b u t  n o t  in  t h e i r  u n b r i d l e d  
opera tion". ( 109 *
The predominant l ib e r a l s  a re  flanked by staunch K aram an liis ts , 
f e r v e n t  s u p p o r te r s  o f s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  as im plem ented  by 
Karamanlis;( 110} and by the n e o -lib e ra ls , led by A. Andrianopou 1 o s , the 
founder of the L ibera l Forum fa c tio n  and prominent ND member, who 
advocates a minimal s t a te  s in ce  "n eo -lib e ra lism  is  d if f e r e n t  from 
c la s s ic a l  l ib e ra lism  to  the ex ten t th a t i t  accep ts some unavoidable 
s ta te  in tervention  fo r safeguarding the social equilibrium ". ( 111 * Neo­
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l ib e ra ls  have often  been accused of tending to  s p l i t  the party , and a 
prominent lib e ra l ND member has warned them that
"Those who wish to  safeguard  l ib e ra lism  as a system of 
lib e ra l choices and maximazation of social product, must, 
in terms of time and o rgan ica lly , in teg ra te  w ithin i t  the 
element of social ju s tic e  th a t w ill avert the dynamics of 
the  system from being  evolved in to  dynamics beyond the 
system: excessive increase of the economic or social power 
o f  c e r t a i n  s o c i a l  s t r a t a  i n v i t e s  s o c i a l i s t  
experimentation. " <112 >
B efore  r e p o r t i n g  on ND m em bers’ a t t i t u d e s  and o p in io n s  on 
id eo lo g ica l is su e s , l e t  us no te  th a t ,  no tw ithstand ing  the an a ly tica l 
p o lic y  proposals and the  d e ta i le d  e la b o ra tio n  of ND's ideology in  
general and i t s  economic programme in p a r tic u la r , there is  one point fo r 
which the  p a rty  o f f i c i a l s  have perhaps not had due consideration and 
respec t. To put i t  succinctly : i t  was not only th a t ND fa ile d  to s tre s s  
the  so c ia l a sp ec ts  of i t s  p o l ic ie s ,  but i t  seems i t  never r e a l ly  
bothered to determine when and, most im portantly, how the s ta te  should 
intervene. Carried away by i t s  newly-adopted lib e ra l ideas, the party  
claimed th a t lim ita tion  of s ta te  in tervention  and the establishm ent of 
an open and free  market were, in themselves, enough to generate economic 
development; while the s ta te  had only a very lim ited  p a rt to  play in 
th is , i t s  ro le  as re d is tr ib u tiv e  agent, although not ignored, was not 
given d e ta iled  explanation.
ND's fa ilu re  to define the ro le  of the s ta te  as i t  envisioned i t ,  
considerably obfuscated the p a r ty 's  ideological id e n t i ty .( 113 * Moreover, 
the party  did not consider a very important issue, one pointed out by W. 
Eucken, the in te lle c tu a l godfather of post-war German economic policy:
" . . . t h e  question of the ro le  of the s ta te  in the economy 
was wrongly p u t, i f  i t  was to  be reduced in q u an ta tiv e  
terms. I t  did not m atter whether the s ta te  intervened much 
o r  l i t t l e ,  b u t  how i t  i n t e r v e n e d "  ( i n  E n g l i s h  
o r ig in a lly ) . ‘ 114}
Along the same lin e s , N. Mouzelis has argued th a t, in the Greek case,
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"The s o l u t i o n ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  o n e , l i e s  l e s s  in  th e  
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  o f m arket m echanism s, and more in the 
modernisation of the s ta te :  th a t is ,  in the creation  of a 
system where the  in te r e s t s  of the  adm in istrative machine 
do not oppose but id en tify  w ith economic development, and 
where s t a te  in te rv e n tio n , in  c lo se  c o lla b o ra tio n  w ith  
p r iv a te  i n i t i a t i v e ,  t r i e s  to  b e n e f it  from the im portant 
o p p o rtu n itie s  o ffe re d  by the  Coirmon M arket, by the  new 
in te r n a t io n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f lab o u r and by modern 
technologies, to  a l l  those who are  w illin g  and im g in a tiv e  
enough to  take advantage of them". <115 >
I t  may be sa id , therefo re , th a t lik e  rad ica l liberalism , which was 
characterised  by vagueness and empiricism, the post-1985 new libera lism  
has n o t been e x p l i c i t l y  d e f in e d  e i t h e r ,  so c au s in g  c o n s id e ra b le  
confusion as to exactly  what kind of a lib e ra l party  ND is .  Furthermore, 
the party  organisation  has never had a  say on ideological issues, le t  
a lo n e  been a llow ed  to  become th e  main forum fo r  th e  d is c u s s io n ,  
formulation and elaboration  of ND's ideology. Radical liberalism  and new 
l ib e r a l i s m  were p e rso n a l c r e a t io n s  o f K aram anlis and M its o ta k is  
respec tive ly , and th is  may well account fo r the fac t tha t ideology has 
never been an inportant m obilising fac to r fo r ND members and supporters; 
ne ither has i t  ever been considered as the p a r ty 's  most valuable a sse t, 
as we sh a ll  see below w hile  examining the  p a r ty  members' views and 
a tti tu d e s  on these issues.
To begin with and concerning ND's ideological id en tity , the m ajority  
of the rank-and-file  members in the Department of L arissa believe th a t 
i t  is  best characterised  as a l ib e ra l party . Table V.2 below shows th a t 
more than 60 per cent of the rank and f i l e  a re  of th is  opinion, ju s t 
over one-fourth of them would describe ND as c e n tre -r ig h t, 14.56 per 
cent as n e o -lib e ra l, and 10.76 per cent as conservative. There is  a lso  a 
small percen tage (8.22 per cen t) who th ink  ND should be la b e lle d  
christian-dem ocratic, and even fewer members who think i t  is  a popular, 
c e n t r e ,  o r s o c ia l-d e m o c ra t ic  p a r ty .  Looked a t  from a d i f f e r e n t  
perspective, however, almost 40 per cent of the rank and f i l e  in 1989 do
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Table V .2: ND’s  I d e o lo g ic a l I d e n t ity ;  Views o f  th e  P arty  Members in  th e
Department o f  L a r issa  in  1989
ND desianated as: number %
Liberal party 96 60.76
C entre-right p a rty 41 25.95
N eo-liberal p a rty 23 14.56
Conservative p arty 17 10.76
Christian-dem ocratic party 13 08.23
Centre party 6 03.80
Popular party 6 03.80
Social-dem ocratic party 1 .63
Other 6 03.80
not consider ND a lib e ra l pa rty , thus re f le c tin g  the same vagueness and 
confusion tha t ch arac te rises  the top-party  h ie ra rch y .( 116’
I t  seems th a t ideology has been the major reason why party  members 
have jo in e d  ND. As i s  shown in  T able V .3, p e rso n a l id e o lo g ic a l  
id e n tif ic a tio n  was the most important fac to r fo r more than h a lf  of the 
rank and f i l e  (59.49 per cen t); tra d itio n a l fam ilia l id e n tif ic a tio n  
came second (47.47 per cen t); a quarter of the party  members joined ND 
inspired by Karamanlis' charism atic personality , another 12.66 per cent 
of them because they wished to be associated  with ND's organisational 
development and growth, and a few others (5.06 per cent) because they 
were alarmed by the o rganisation  and effic iency  of PASOK. Almost one in 
ten  members jo ined  ND because of some p a rty  o f f i c i a l 's  o r d e p u ty 's  
personal q u a lity , and a very small m inority (3.16 per cent) because they 
were influenced by th e ir  re la tiv e s  and friends. The p ic tu re  looks very 
d iffe ren t when the 94 members who claimed they joined ND because of 
personal ideological id e n tif ic a tio n , a re  asked what ideological label in 
th e ir  view s u i ts  ND b est. The data given in Table V. 3a below i l lu s t r a te  
th a t, even among those who claim tha t they have joined ND because of
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Table V .3: Most Important F actors Im p ellin g  ND Members to  Jo in  th e Party
in  th e  Department o f  L a r issa
Factor number %
Personal ideological id e n tif ic a tio n 94 59.49
Family ideological id e n tif ic a tio n 75 47.47
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal 41 25.95
O rganisational development of ND 20 12.66
Personal q u a lity  of party  o ff ic ia ls /d e p u tie s 15 09.49
Counterbalancing PASOK's o rgan isational performance 8 05.06
Influence of friends and/or re la tiv e s 5 03.16
Other 8 05.06
personal id eo lo g ica l id e n t i f i c a t io n ,  th e re  i s  anything but unanimity 
concerning the p a rty ’s ideological stand. The m ajority  (68.09 per cent) 
considers ND a lib e ra l p a rty , barely  nine per cent more than the general 
average (Table V.2). For the remainder, the p ic tu re  is  almost the same 
as th a t of Table V.2, w ith again a more than 30 per cent m inority th a t 
does not endorse ND's o f f ic ia l  ideology.
Table V.3a: ND's Ideological Id en tity : Views of the 94 Party Members 
who reputedly joined ND because of "personal ideological 
id e n tif ic a tio n ”
ND designated as: number *
Liberal party 64 68 09
C entre-right party 24 25 53
N eo-liberal party 14 14 89
Conservative party 9 09 57
Christian-dem ocratic party 11 11 70
Centre party 5 05 32
Popular party 5 05 32
Social-dem ocratic party 1 01 06
Other 4 04 26
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When the party  members were asked to explain what, in th e ir  view, 
were the  sp e c ia l reasons accounting  fo r  ND's appeal to  the  o rd in a ry  
vo ters , they put ideology in second p lace. As shown in Table V.4 below, 
h a lf  of the rank and f i l e  in the Department of L arissa considered ND's 
r e l i a b i l i ty  and sense of re sp o n s ib ility  as most important in ND's appeal 
to  the  e le c to ra te ;  ideology was second w ith 42.41 pe r c e n t, 
c lo se ly  follow ed by ND's proposed governmental p o l ic ie s  (39.87 p er
c e n t) . More than o n e - f i f th  of the  rank and f i l e  (23.42 per cen t) 
b e liev e  th a t  the  p a r ty 's  appeal to  the  e le c to ra te  i s  due to  i t s  
leadership, 16.46 per cent th a t i t  is  due to i t s  o rganisation , and 
another 14.56 per cent think i t  is  the a c t iv i t ie s  of the party  MPs in 
th e ir  c o n s titu e n c ie s .{117 }
Table V.4: Most Important Reasons fo r ND's Appeal to  the E lecto rate
Reasons number %
ND's re l ia b i l i ty /s e n s e  of re sp o n s ib ility 79 50.00
ND's ideology 67 42.41
ND's p o l i t ic a l  and economic programme 63 39.87
ND's leadership 37 23.42
ND's organisation 26 16.46
A c tiv itie s  of ND deputies in th e ir  constituencies 23 14.56
Other 14 08.86
Although ideology is  given as the  second most im portant fa c to r  
accounting for ND's appeal to  the v o ters , the m ajority of the rank and 
f i l e  in the  Department of L a ris sa  a re  not fa m ilia r  w ith  the  p a r ty 's  
basic ten e ts  as elaborated  in the 1985 ideological manifesto. As Table 
V.5 below shows, whereas 43.67 per cent of the ordinary party  members 
in the Department of L arissa  had studied the "New proposal fo r 
freedom", 24.05 per cen t acknowledged th a t they were not f u l ly  
fam iliar with i t ,  and another 32.28 per cent admitted they had never
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Table V.5: Party Members' Acquaintance with the 1985 Ideological 
Declaration
Question
Have you personally  read the ideological 
declara tion  of the party  ("A New Proposal 
for Freedom", of 3 Feb. 1985)?
Answer number %
Yes 69 43.67
In p art 38 24.05
No 51 32.28
Total 158 100.00
read i t .  We see, then, th a t on the eve of the June 1989 e lec tio n , ND not 
only d id  not s u f f ic ie n t ly  s t r e s s  the  so c ia l a sp ec ts  of i t s  proposed 
p o lic ie s , but had fa ile d  to  inform even i t s  own members of the exact 
reach and meaning of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  platform . ‘ 118 *
This point is  fu rth e r corroborated by Table V.6 below, with only a 
38.61 pe r cent of the  rank and f i l e  in the  Department of L a rissa  
c o n s id e r in g  th a t  ND's p o l i t i c a l  programme had been s u f f i c i e n t l y  
disseminated, explained to , and understood by the e le c to ra te ; whereas 
the m ajority  think th is  was achieved only in p a rt (41.77 per cen t), o r 
not a t  a l l  (14.56 per cen t). N evertheless, most of those who ackowledge 
th a t ND's proposed p o l ic ie s  were not s u f f ic ie n t ly  d issem inated  and 
understood, do not hold th e ir  p a rty  as mainly responsible fo r th is .  On 
the contrary , 41.77 per cent of the rank and f i l e  believe th a t i t  was 
due to  a lack of appropriate  means of propaganda —for exairple, use of
Table V.6: Degree of Dissemination/Explanation of ND's P o lit ic a l  
Proqrairme
Question Answer number %
Do you think that ND's Yes 61 38.61
p o l. programme has been In p a rt 66 41.77
su ff ic ie n tly  dissem inated, No 23 14.56
explained and understood? Don' t  know 8 05.06
Total 158 100.00
Lack of appropriate propaganda 66 41.77
Party  o f f ic ia l s ' inefficiency 24 15.19
I f  no/in  p a rt, what
do you think are  the O rganisational ineffic iency 20 12.66
reasons for th is?
Leadership ineffic iency 5 03.16
Other 11 06.96
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the m ss  media, which were state-owned and under the tig h t control of 
the ru ling  party , so th a t ND was not given the chance of informing the 
e le c to ra te  p roperly  on th ese  is su e s . However, th e re  were some p a r ty  
members vftio d id a t t r ib u te  re sp o n s ib ility  to  the ND o f f ic ia l s ' (15.19 per 
c e n t) , to  the  g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n is a t io n 's  (12.66 per c e n t) ,  and to  
leadersh ip 's  (3.16 per cent) ineffic iency .
F in a lly  th e re  is  the  q u estio n  of w hether o r not ND rep re se n ts  a 
p a rtic u la r  social c la ss . As we have discussed already, no ND leader or 
deputy or member of the  to p -p a rty  h ie ra rch y  has ever declared  ND to  
iden tify  with the in te re s ts  of a p a r tic u la r  c la ss . On the contrary , i t  
has been s ta ted  again and again th a t ND is  a national party , a popular 
party , that i t  rep resen ts the in te re s ts  of the Greek society  a t  large , 
and th a t, therefo re , i t  cannot be described as a party  of the Centre, 
the Right, or the L eft. I t  tran sp ire s  tha t th is  o f f ic ia l  party  p o sitio n  
is  not unanimously shared  by the  rank and f i l e  in the  Department o f 
L arissa. Table V.7 below shows th a t , although the m ajority of the p a rty  
members (63.92 per cen t) do su b scrib e  to  the o f f i c i a l  p a r ty  
a n a ly s is , alm ost 30 per cen t of them do n o t. Most of these  members 
(20.25 per cent) think th e ir  party  rep resen ts mainly the in te re s ts  of 
the middle c la s s ,  ano ther 10.76 per cent those of the upper m iddle 
c la ss , and a 8.23 per cent those of the upper-class bourgeoisie. (For 
more d e ta ils  on these po in ts see below ch. 6, section  3.3, Table V I.24).
Table V.7: Class Representation and ND: Party Members' A ttitudes
Question Answer number %
Are there any social c lasses Yes 47 29.75
tha t you would say ND mainly No 101 63.92
represents? Don't Know 10 06.33
Total 158 100.00
Middle c la ss 32 20.25
Upper-middle c la ss 17 10.76
I f  yes, which one(s)?
Upper-class bourgeoisie 13 08.23
Other 4 02.53
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By and large, then, i t  is  reasonable to  argue tha t the m ajority  of 
the  rank and f i l e  i s  to  a  co n sid erab le  ex te n t informed on and in 
agreement with the basic  ideological tene ts  of the p arty , although i t  
seems th a t l ib e ra lism  and the  predominance of freedom i s  given le s s  
importance than o th e r , more t r a d i t io n a l  co n serv a tiv e  v a lu e s , such as 
r e l i a b i l i t y  and a sen se  o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  commitment, and th e  
p re se rv a tio n  of s o c ia l  o rd e r .  A n o ta b le  e x c e p tio n  to  th e  g e n e ra l 
approval of the o f f ic ia l  p a rty  analysis is  c e r ta in ly  th a t a  considerable 
p a rt of the rank and f i l e  believe th a t ND more or less id e n tif ie s  w ith, 
and rep re se n ts  the  in te r e s t s  o f , the  m iddle o r o th e r  upper so c ia l 
c lasses . We would suggest th a t regard less whether or not these members 
iden tify  with one of these c la sse s , th is  r e f le c ts  a b e lie f  tha t th e ir  
party  cannot —or, a t  le a s t ,  does not— express the in te re s ts  of the 
lower working c la s s e s ,  so leav ing  them v u ln erab le  to  rec ru itm en t by 
PASOK and the p a rtie s  of the cannunist L e f t .<119)
5. From Opposition Back in to  O ffice
5.1 The Greek case of h is to r ic a l  compromise
Although ND emerged v ic to r io u s  from the June 1989 e le c tio n  (w ith 
44.25 per cent of the vote and 145 sea ts  in parliam ent), i t  was unable 
to form a government, not having a m ajority of the parliam entary se a ts . 
As se t  out in Table V.8 below, PASOK had kept the  bulk of i t s  1985 
supporters and secured 125 se a ts ; the C oalition  of the Left and Progress 
(SYN, consisting  of mainly the KKE Cannunist Party of Greece and the 
Euro-communist Greek Left EAR) received 13.12 per cent of the vote and 
e lected  28 deputies; C. Stephanopoulos1 DIANA managed to  get i t s  leader 
e lected  in the F irs t  D is tr ic t  of Athens, and an independent candidate 
was returned in the Department of Rodhopi in Thrace. The nego tia tions
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between the p residen t of the republic and the p o lit ic a l  p a r t ie s ,  fo r a 
c o a l i t io n  government were su c c e ss fu l. ND and SYN agreed to  form and 
support a temporary government (which las ted  from 1 July  to  7 October), 
c o n s is t in g  o f p o l i t i c i a n s  from b o th  p a r t i e s ,  p re s id ed  over by T. 
Tzannetakis, a f a i r ly  well-known ND depu ty .( 120’
Table V.8: 18 June 1989 Parliamentary E lection
Parties/C oa1itio n s number of votes % seats in parliam ent %
New Democracy 2,885,548 44.25 145 48.33
PASOK 2,553,086 39.15 125 41.67
SYN 855,564 13.12 28 09.33
DIANA 65,867 01.01 1 .33
Independent 25,131 .39 1 .33
Other 136,367 02.08 ___ ___
Total 6,521,563 100.00 300 99.99
[Source: 18 June 1989 E lection , Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1989 (in  
Greek), p. 132.]
This c o a litio n  government was made up of twenty-five members, twenty 
of them from ND, one diplomat, and four members from SYN (a ll  from i t s  
Euro-communist wing, not from the KKE). As agreed from the o u tse t, th is  
c o a l i t io n  government was to  s tay  in o f f ic e  fo r  not more than th re e  
months, which was considered the minimum time needed for the task of 
what was c a lle d  " c a th a rs is "  (measures of a "cleansing" o r rem edial 
nature) and the dem ocratisation of the coun try 's  p o lit ic a l  l i f e . ( 121}
Despite the lim ited  tasks and duration of th is  government, the fac t 
that these two an tip o d al camps c o lla b o ra te d  o f f i c i a l l y  fo r the  f i r s t  
time was in i t s e l f  of major s ign ificance. Although ND was c e r ta in ly  no 
rep lica  of the pre-coup ERE, there were s t i l l  members in both i t s  higher 
and lower ranks whose u l t r a - r i g h t i s t  a t t i t u d e s  and s tau n ch  a n t i ­
communism would have seemed enough to  prevent such a convergence.
273
B esides, i t  was not long ago th a t  Karamanlis h im self had sa id  in  a 
speech to ND's parliam entary group:
"Broadly speaking, a l l  those a re  nation-minded who believe 
in the  idea of the  n a tio n , th a t  is  in the"homeland. In 
th is  sense a l l  Greeks are  nation-minded, except of course 
those who b e liev e  in  Moscow more than they b e lie v e  in 
Greece. In a narrower sense, the nation-minded a re  those 
who never, d ire c tly  or in d ire c tly , have collaborated  with 
communism. And i t  is  those in  p a r t ic u la r  who nowadays 
co n s titu te  New Democracy. We are  the only party , the only 
camp, th a t  has never in  i t s  whole h is to ry  c o llab o ra ted  
with the L e ft" .* 122 *
S t i l l ,  the lead ersh ip 's  decision to  form th is  co a litio n  government, 
n e ither met with resen tfu l c ritic ism s  from the party  ranks, nor d id  i t  
cause any trouble or turbulence. On the contrary , i t  was viewed as an 
ad-hoc temporary governmental a llia n c e , put forward by ND only in order 
to  remove PASOK from power and to  purge p u b lic  l i f e  of phenomena of 
p o l it ic a l  decadence —such as b ribery  and embezzlement. As an ex-member 
of ND's adm inistrative  committee commented a t  the time:
" . . .c o l la b o r a t io n  between ND and SYN was a product of 
n e c e ss ity  a f t e r  the  June 1989 e le c tio n  had re s u lte d  in 
p o l i t i c a l  and governmental deadlock. But n e ith e r  befo re  
th a t e le c tio n  nor a f t e r  i t ,  nor during  the governm ent's 
co llaboration  in Tzannetakis' c o a litio n  government, has i t  
ever occured to ND or SYN to  agree to  any kind of broader 
and permanent fu tu re  c o llab o ra tio n ." ‘ 12 3’
I t  seems reasonab le  to  argue, th e re fo re , th a t  the  Greek case  of 
h is to r ic a l compromise, i f  one can c a ll  i t  th a t, does not bear even the 
s lig h te s t resemblance to  the I ta l ia n  prototype. In I ta ly , the h is to r ic a l 
compromise can be understood as the formation of a broad p o l i t ic a l  and 
social a llian ce  between the ccjimunist, s o c ia l is t ,  and popular Catholic 
forces w ithin the context of a  long-term stra tegy , for the democratic 
m o d ern isa tio n  and developm ent o f th e  c o u n try ; ( 1z 4 ) w hereas th e  
co llaboration  between ND and SYN in Greece,
" . . .w h i le  showing c a th a r s is  and dem ocratisat ion on i t s  
fro n tisp iece , had for i t s  binding nothing but the ta c tic a l
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coincidence of two d if fe re n t s tra te g ie s :  for ND, th is  was 
th e  c r e a t io n  o f th e  p re c o n d it io n s  fo r  i t s  autonomous 
re tu rn  to  power under t o t a l ly  new p o l i t i c a l  leg itim acy ; 
fo r  th e  L e f t ,  i t  was th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  of p o l i t i c a l  
re la tio n s  w ithin the broader democratic camp, so th a t i t  
could acquire a more hegemonic and in flu e n tia l p o s i t io n ...  
and perhaps the only th ing  they re a lly  had in ccnmon was 
tha t th e ir  co llabo ra tion  was a  temporary truce between two 
r iv a l  shopkeepers, so th a t  they could a p p ro p ria te  fo r 
th e m s e lv e s  th e  s p o i l s  and  th e  c l i e n t e l e  o f  an 
an tag o n is t" . ‘ 1251
Some vo ices were heard  in  favour of a broader and more permanent 
fu ture  co llabo ra tion  between the Right and the Left. I t  was argued th a t 
as an EEC-member the country  would be faced w ith sev era l se r io u s  
problems befo re  long. Most, i f  not a l l ,  of these  problems were not 
linked with the in te re s ts  of a p a r tic u la r  c la ss , but were ra th e r  of a 
more g e n e ra l c h a r a c te r ,  r e l a t e d  to  th e  o v e ra l l  developm ent and 
modernisation of Greek so c ie ty , in i t s  attempt to a tta in  the standards 
of i t s  more advanced European p a r tn e rs . This e f fo r t  would demand an 
economic ta k e - o f f ,  th a t  r e q u ire d  a s o - to -s p e a k  q u a l i t a t i v e  s t a t e  
in te rv e n tio n  and re g u la tio n , one th a t  would re in fo rc e  r a th e r  than 
boycott p riv a te  i n i t i a t i v e  and economic com petition . This ta sk  could  
best be ca rried  out by a R ight-Left c o a litio n , since by themselves alone 
ne ither the form er's neo -libera lism  nor the l a t t e r 's  s ta te  paternalism  
would be able to  cope with these problems su c ce ss fu lly .c 126 *
R egardless of whatever t r u th  th e re  may be in these  argum ents, i t  
seems th a t ND a t  le a s t  never bo thered  to  g ive i t  any c o n s id e ra tio n . 
A fte r e ig h t consecu tive  years in o p p o sitio n , the only th in g  i t  was 
in te res ted  in was how to  re tu rn  to power; we think that th is  was the 
chief reason why the c o a litio n  government was formed in the f i r s t  p lace 
—not seme broader s tra te g ic  plan for the modernisation of the country, 
which would d e f in ite ly  presuppose some kind of ideological convergence 
and a much more dram atic transform ation of ND's p o lit ic a l  id e n tity . In 
fa c t, th is  seemed to  be very much unchanged, as demonstrated when J .
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V a rv its io tis , a prominent ND deputy and m in ister of national defence in 
Tzannetakis' c o a litio n  government, did not want the carmunists to  take 
over the highly se n s itiv e  m in istry  of national defence:
"You are  asking me i f  I would approve of a communist as a 
m in i s t e r  o f n a t i o n a l  d e fe n c e .  W ell, i t  d ep en d s. I 
w o u ldn 't, of cou rse , o b je c t to  inform ing the Communist 
P a r ty  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  on every  is s u e  c o n ce rn in g  th e  
m in is t ry  o f d e fe n c e . But I  would acc ep t a communist 
m in ister or deputy m in iste r of national defence only under 
extraordinary  circum stances, and only fo r a lim ited period 
of time —for example, in a na tional-un ity  government, or 
in case of foreign invasion, or i f  Turkish troops invaded 
Cyprus, or in case of war generally , to mention ju s t a few 
instances offhand” . ( 12 7}
Nevertheless, and d esp ite  i t s  conjunctural dimensions, th is  sh o rt­
liv ed  c o lla b o ra tio n  between ND and SYN was an event th a t  had a very  
special importance per  se.  The two camps had never been able to forget 
th e ir  bloody enmity in the c iv i l  war, and since those who fought each 
other then are  s t i l l  a liv e  today, th e ir  mutual hatred  has continued to  
smoulder. In o th e r  words, t h i s  c o lla b o ra tio n  was the  b e s t p o ss ib le  
expression of true  p o l i t ic a l  dialogue and consent (never known in Greece 
b e f o r e ) ,  a s  i t  had  r e s u l t e d  from  th e  r e s p e c t iv e  change  and 
transform ation of the broader p o l i t ic a l  m entality  and a tt i tu d e  towards 
the ru les  of democratic functioning. N. Diamandouros summed i t  up very 
w e ll:
" . . . i f  1949 signa lled  the m ilita ry  end of the c iv i l  war, 
and 1974 th e  le g a l  one, th e  y ear 1989 e x p re sse s  th e  
p o l it ic a l  end of the second national schism of Greece in 
the tw entieth cen tu ry". ( 128}
5.2 ND's 1990-1993 governmental record: A ten ta tiv e  assessment
Although ND d id  b e t te r  in the  5 November 1989 n a tio n a l e le c t io n s  
than in June, i t  s t i l l  d id not manage to form a one-party government; so 
i t  co llab o ra ted  w ith  PASOK and SYN in a n a tio n a l-u n i ty  government, 
presided over by renowned e ld e rly  economist X. Zolotas. I t  was agreed
276
th a t th is  government would remain in o ff ic e  u n til  early  April 1990, when 
new e le c tio n s  would be h e ld . On th a t  occasion , f in a l ly ,  the  th ird  
e lec tion  in nine months, the v o ters gave ND almost 47 per cen t, and with 
a narrow parliam entary m ajority  the p a rty  was able to take o f f ic e .* 129 * 
The id eo lo g ica l amendments in troduced  by the "New proposal fo r  
freedom" m anifesto, and the ensuing s h i f t  towards neo-liberalism , d id  
not a ffe c t ND’s p osition  with regard to  foreign-policy  issues. The p arty  
remained fa i th fu lly  attached  to  i t s  European and pro-western stand, to  
G reece 's membership in  the  NATO a l l ia n c e ,  and the p re se rv a tio n  of 
American bases on Greek s o i l .  But concerning i t s  social and economic 
p o l ic ie s ,  ND prom ised to  implement from th e  very  o u ts e t  m easures 
considerably d iffe re n t from those of i t s  1974-1981 years in government. 
We shall try  to  give a te n ta tiv e  assessment of the extent to  which i t  
has managed to  do t h i s .* 13 01
In the public sec to r ND had premised to lim it the en trepreneuria l 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f th e  s t a t e ,  red u ce  th e  number of i t s  em ployees and 
expenses, and a t the same time provide b e tte r  c iv i l  serv ices. Indeed, as 
soon as i t  returned to  o ff ic e  i t  e stab lished  a special committee, which 
was to decide which of the public  en te rp rise s  were and had always been 
problem atic, and to  c lose them down; the p ro f ita b le  ones i t  was to  s e l l  
to the p riv a te  secto r.
The re s u lts  were fa r  frcm dazzling. The ND government not only did 
not close down any of the problem atic e n te rp rises , but only one of the 
o thers, Greek C ivil Transport EAS, i .e .  the Athens buses, was sold to 
the p riv a te  se c to r .* 131’ Moreover, while pledged in theory to  lim itin g  
s ta te  in te rv e n tio n , in  p ra c t ic e  i t  d ec la red  th a t i t  would s e t  up a 
Natural Gas Company, to  employ 6,000 people (thus increasing the number 
of public employees by almost one per cen t). As might be expected, the 
productiv ity , functioning, and serv ices of the public sector generally
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in no way changed for the b e tte r ,  although i t s  expenditures kept going 
up and up and up. ( 13 2*
In the p riv a te  sec to r, ND's proposed free-market economy remained a 
dead l e t t e r .  Instead of l ib e ra l is in g  the market as i t  had promised, the 
government maintained the s ta tu s  quo ante, i .e .  i t  kept ren t and o ther 
market p rices  under s ta te  co n tro l, and not only did not reform the tax 
system, but a c tu a lly  voted in  a law under which p riv a te  e n te rp rises  had 
to pay an ex tra  tax on th e ir  p ro f i ts  —and re tro ac tiv e ly ! Furthermore, 
i t s  p o lic ie s  on the re la tio n  between domestic and foreigh currency did  
not favour the  export tra d e , and so the expected "big  bang" in  the  
economy never happened. In overa ll terms, s ta te  control and in terven tion  
in the  economy increased  so much th a t ,  as a prominent i n d u s t r ia l i s t  
argued,
" . . .  the Greek economy has been so in tensely  deformed that 
i t  i s  im possible fo r  the  s t a t e  o r the p u b lic  s e c to r  to  
p lay  a p o s it iv e  ro le  in the  fo reseeab le  fu tu re  [fo r i t s  
re c o v e ry ]  l e t  a lo n e  to  f i n a l l y  g iv e  i t  a p ro p e r  
o r ie n ta tio n " . ( 133’
I t  therefore  appears th a t s ta te  paternalism  and in terven tion  in the 
economy continued as tra d itio n a l fea tu res of ND during the early  1990s, 
although i t  had been hoped and expected tha t the new ND government would 
l ib e ra l is e  the market and lim it the s ta te  to  a q u a lita tiv e ly  b e tte r ,  and 
simply regulatory  ro le . Although i t  is  too early  to p red ic t th a t there  
w ill  never be any such changes, i t  must be acknowledged th a t ND's 
p o lic ie s  so fa r  have been more conservative than n eo -lib e ra l. I t  remains 
to  be seen whether th is  is  due to  innate d if f ic u l t ie s  —right-w ing power 
has tra d itio n a lly  been tie d  up with the s ta te , and sta tism  has ever been 
a s a l ie n t  fe a tu re  of the  Greek economy— or i f  a t  h e a r t ND does not 
r e a l ly  b e liev e  in  a l ib e ra lism , as o u tlin e d  in i t s  February 1985 
ideological d e c la ra tio n .‘ 134 *
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6. C onclusion
The collapse of the d ic ta to r ia l  regime in 1974, the re s to ra tio n  of 
dem ocratic i n s t i tu t io n s ,  and the  re a c tiv a tio n  of Greece's A ssociation 
Agreement with the EEC, which was u ltim ate ly  to  lead to  fu ll  membership 
in the European Connunity, signa lled  the end of a 25-year period th a t 
was c h a ra c te r is e d  by th e  p o l i t i c a l  dom ination of an a u th o r i ta r ia n ,  
reactionary , p a te rn a l is t ic ,  and a t  times v io len t Right. In the realm of 
everyday p o l i t i c s  th is  meant th a t  a f t e r  1974 a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
—including the Communist p a rty , urtiich had been outlawed since 1947— 
were free  to  operate, to  openly dissem inate th e ir  p o lic ie s  and canvas 
for supporters, and to  p a r t ic ip a te  in the e lec tio n s. This meant th a t 
staunch anti-cannunism was wiped out as the ideological trade-mark of 
the post-war R ight, and would cease to  a ffe c t the p o l it ic a l  l i f e ;  in 
consequence, the ideological equilibrium  would s h if t  more to the l e f t .  
In terms of K aram anlis' New Democracy p a r ty , th is  would have to  r id  
i t s e l f  of what had been th e  most s a l i e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f i t s  
predecessor, and adopt a more modem ideological image i f  i t  wished to  
be considered  a forw ard-looking  p a r ty  w ith new horizons, in s te a d  of 
never le t t in g  the people fo rget the sin s  of i t s  p ast.
This much-needed ideological renewal did not ac tu a lly  take place, a t 
le a s t  not during  the  e a r ly  post-1974 years . In s te ad , anti-communism 
re trea ted  somewhat, while s o c ia l is t  and Marxist ideas, adopted by the 
p a rtie s  of the le f t  opposition, gradually  came to the fo re. Karamanlis, 
as the only person who could have helped h is  p a rty  acqu ire  a new 
p o lit ic a l  id e n tity , had no time to  concern himself with ideology, since 
he was to ta l ly  absorbed in e s tab lish in g  the new regime, purging public  
l i f e  from the re c a lc itra n t  elements of the u ltra -R igh t, and arranging 
fo r  th e  c o u n tr y 's  EEC e n tr y .  In  consequence, ND rem ained in  an 
ideological vacuum, unable to  p re sen t a l te rn a t iv e s  to  the o p p o sitio n  
p a r t ie s ' more modem, a t t r a c t iv e  and in sp iring  ideologies. ND did  i t s
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utmost to  c a p i ta l i s e  on i t s  fo u n d e r 's  charism a and p re s t ig e ,  and so 
managed to  o f fs e t  i t s  shortcomings in terms of ideology.
When f in a lly  Karamanlis, meaning to  give h is  party  a modem p ro f i le , 
drew up i t s  basic  ideological p r in c ip le s , i t  soon became evident th a t 
what he c a l le d  ND's ra d ic a l  l ib e ra lis m  (an ideology ly in g  somewhere 
between c la ss ic a l lib e ra lism  and soc ia l democracy) was nothing more than 
an ex p o ste rio ri  ju s t i f ic a t io n  of h is  record as ERE leader and premier. 
More sp e c if ic a lly , rad ica l lib e ra lism  consisted  of the p o lic ie s  of h is  
pre-1967 p rem iersh ip  (1955-1963), which were a  com bination of s t a t e  
paternalism  and p riv a te  in i t i a t iv e ,  w ith the accent on social w elfare 
and ju s tic e . Lacking long-term planning or concrete fu tu re  perspectives, 
and characterised  by em pirical ad-hoc handling of a f f a i r s ,  ND's p ost- 
1974 ra d ic a l- lib e ra l  rec ipe  was d if fe re n t frcm past p rac tices  only to 
the extent th a t anti-communism was not one of i t s  basic ingred ien ts.
The same could be argued w ith  re sp e c t to  the  c o u n try 's  fo re ig n  
re la tio n s  and o rie n ta tio n s . Frcm the very ou tset ND claimed tha t i t  was 
a p ro -w e s te rn  and p ro -E uropean  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty ,  and th a t  s in c e  
t r a d i t io n a l ly  Greece belonged to  the  West, th e re  was no q uestion  of 
withdrawing frcm the NATO a llia n c e  or expelling  the U.S. m ilita ry  bases 
from Greek s o i l .  The only d iffe rence  to  ERE p rac tices  was th a t Greece's 
foreign policy  was more independent and m ulti-dim ensional. So Karamanlis 
developed re la tio n s  with coun tries of the East bloc, the Arabs and the 
th ird  world, and successfu lly  steered  Greeece in to  the Eurorean Economic 
Cotmuni ty.
When Karam anlis l e f t  p a rty  p o l i t i c s  to  become p re s id e n t of the  
rep u b lic , ND's id eo lo g ica l nakedness could no longer be concealed . 
Neither was the dramatic fa i lu re  of the 1981 e lec tio n  enough to  bring 
about an ideological renewal. Unlike PASOK, which kept remodelling i t s  
p o lic ies  so th a t the c lo se r i t  came to  power the less rad ica l the image 
i t  presented, ND underwent a change in p o lic ie s  and ta c tic s  only a f te r  
C. M itso takis' e lec tio n  to  the party  leadership in September 1984. One
280
of h is  f i r s t  tasks was the drawing up of the ideological m anifesto "A 
new proposal fo r freedom", which signa lled  a s ig n ifican t break with ND's 
p a s t, and o rien ted  the party  in a more lib e ra l d irec tio n . While pro- 
Europeanism and pro-W esternism  kept th e i r  importance as ND's b a s ic  
te n e ts ,  a most im portant id eo lo g ica l change was announced when ND 
condomed s ta te  in terven tion  and paternalism , and declared that only the 
e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  a f r e e  m ark e t econom y, d e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s /  
p r iv a tis a tio n s , and g rea ter freedom fo r p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e  would c rea te  
the ideal preconditions fo r economic development.
A minor id eo lo g ica l se t-b ack  was due to  ND's K aram anliist f la n k , 
which resented the p a r ty 's  re la tiv e ly  poor performance in the June 1985 
e lec tio n , and in s is te d  th a t during i t s  second congress in February 1986 
ND reaffirm  i t s  loyalty  to  the ideological p rin c ip le s  as elaborated by 
Karamanlis in 1979. For a l l  th a t, i t  was the tenets of the m anifesto 
th a t  c o n s t itu te d  ND's id eo lo g ica l backbone u n t i l  i t  f in a l ly  resumed 
o ff ice  in A pril 1990. To avert being charged with adopting excessively 
lib e ra l p o ss itio n s , ND took pains to  p ub lic ise  the social aspects of i t s  
proposed p o lic ie s , but a t  a l l  times i t  maintained that what the economy 
needed was more personal freedom and p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e ,  and less s ta te  
in tervention  and paternalism .
The p a r ty 's  governmental record since April 1990 does not yet permit 
d e fin ite  conclusions on whether ND has f a i th fu lly  observed i t s  e lec tio n  
promises and to  what extent i t  has succeeded. Speaking p rov isionally , i t  
seems tha t ND has fa ile d . The m ajority  of lib e ra l advocates, whether ND 
members or simply supporters, consider tha t ND has not done enough to  
l ib e ra lis e  the economy, and where i t  has tr ie d , done so abortively  and 
unconvincingly; the  most negative  r e s u l t  of ND's performance i s ,  in 
th e ir  view, th a t libera lism  is  being blamed for fa ilu re s  tha t in r e a l i ty  
stem from the enforcement of the old conservative s t a t i s t  p o lic ie s .
The above c ritic ism s aside , i t  can be argued tha t ND's in sistence  on 
co n sid erin g  s t a te  in te rv e n tio n  the  scapegoat fo r a l l  e v i ls  in the
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economy, and p ro jec ting  the reduction of such s ta te  a c t iv i t ie s  as i t s  
ultim ate goal, made the pa rty  underestim ate two very important questions 
tha t a re  highly re levan t to  the Greek case —and which, in our opinion, 
should have been given more serious consideration . The f i r s t  of these is  
w hether th e  econom ic s o l u t io n  r e a l l y  l i e s  o n ly  be tw een  s t a t e  
in tervention and market economy; the second is  the question of whether 
ND, even i f  the answer to  the previous question were a ffirm ative , is  the 
most su itab le  party  to  reduce s ta te  in terven tion  and e s ta b lish  a free  
market economy.
The f i r s t  question has th eo re tic a l im plications we sh a ll not deal 
with here. Suffice i t  to  say th a t although ND had been advocating a less  
in trusive  and q u a lita tiv e ly  b e tte r  s ta te  apparatus, in r e a l i ty  the party  
was more in te res ted  in theory than p rac tic e ; although i t  accepted th a t 
the s ta te  had a c e rta in  economic ro le  to  perform, i t  never bothered to  
d e fine  when and to  what e x te n t i t  was le g itim a te  fo r  the  s t a te  to  
in te rv e n e . M oreover, th e  q u e s t io n  of how s t a t e  in te rv e n tio n  th a t  
undermines p riv a te  i n i t i a t i v e  could be abandoned in  favour of a more 
constructive policy  th a t would help and monitor c a p i ta l is t  growth, has 
never been one of the p a r ty 's  considerations.
The second q uestion  has g re a te r  p r a c t ic a l  s ig n if ic a n c e , s in ce  i t  
deals with the nature of the ND party  i t s e l f ,  and a lso  w ith the nature 
of the Greek social formation. As was pointed out in the f i r s t  chapter 
of th is  study, the  growth of the  s t a t e  preceded the development of 
in d u stria l c lasses in Greece; cap ita lism  was imported, the indigenous 
bourgeoisie never took the lead in the coun try 's in d u s tr ia lis a tio n  and 
economic development (on the con trary , i t  was the s ta te  th a t undertook 
th is  task ), and the working c la ss  played in i t s e l f  a fa r  le ss  important 
ro le  than i t s  west European c o u n te rp a r ts . O ther h i s to r ic a l  reasons 
a p a r t ,  the p a r t ie s  of the  Right (e s p e c ia l ly  in  the  post-w ar p eriod ) 
enjoyed remarkable longevity through c o n tro l lin g  the  s t a t e  mechanism, 
i . e . ,  by appropriating and se le c tiv e ly  d is tr ib u tin g  the sp o ils  e n ta iled
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in governmental power. Their main concern was not c a p i ta l is t  development 
but keeping the power positions th a t came with winning e lec tio n s , and 
th is  way accom plished by an ex ten siv e  use of v e r t i c a l ,  c l i e n te l i s t i c  
means of p o l i t ic a l  con tro l, ra th e r than by developing th e ir  ideology, 
which was la rg e ly  th a t of a  r ig id  anti-ccnmunism.
A fter 1974, ND did not much more than to  remain consistently , linked 
up w ith the  s t a t e .  The adoption  of l ib e ra l  ideas l a t e r  made only  a 
verbal d ifference ; the ideological change ( i f  change i t  re a lly  was) was 
inposed from above, leaving the r e s t  of ND almost in d iffe ren t. The p a rty  
had e le c te d  a new lea d e r, but i t s e l f  remained v i r tu a l ly  the  same. 
D esp ite  two n a t io n a l  c o n g re sse s  and smooth su c c e ss io n s  in  i t s  
leadership, desp ite  i t s  o rganisational expansion and development, i t  was 
never ND's g rassroo ts where ideology was spontaneously produced, debated 
and formulated; the rank and f i l e  ju s t accepted i t  passively , as they 
had done befo re  w ith  K aram anlis' s t a t i s t  te n e ts ,  as they had always 
done. In any case, i t  was not ideology th a t had the g rea tes t appeal to  
them, but o th e r  more t r a d i t io n a l  reasons and p ra c tic e s  ( r e l i a b i l i ty ,  
re sp o n s ib ility , o rder, se cu rity ) , which remained dominant a t a l l  times.
V acilla tin g  between i t s  tra d itio n a l s t a t i s t  a tt i tu d e s  and the newly 
adopted n eo -lib e ra l ideas, New Democracy has not been able to commit 
i t s e l f  to  a new ideology. Ever since the party  lo st i t s  p res tig io u s and 
charism atic  f i r s t  le a d e r , whose presence in  p o l i t i c s  proved s tro n g  
enough to  coun terbalance  a l l  o th e r  shortcom ings, i t  has f a i le d  to  
present a new image and p ro jec t an a lte rn a tiv e  and convincing v is io n  fo r 
the Greek socie ty  of tomorrow. In o ther words, sta tism  to  a large extent 
and c lien te lism  to  a  le sse r, have always characterised  the New Democracy 
party , which has fa ile d  to  modernise in the face of an old but never 
solved co n trad ic tio n : namely, th a t  to  transform  i t s e l f  in to  a  modern 
party  of the Right, i t  had to deny the basis of i t s  current ex istence.
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CHAPTER SIX: NEW DEMOCRACY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF LARISSA
1. Introduction
So f a r  we have examined the  o r ig in s ,  foundation and p a r t ic u la r  
c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the New Democracy party  a t  the national level —i t s  
p o l i t ic a l  personnel, organisation  and leadership , ideology, ta c tic s  in 
government and in opposition. In th is  chapter we sha ll take a c lo ser 
look a t i t s  specia l fea tu res a t the local lev e l, and so complete our 
analysis with a more sp ec ific  p ic tu re  of the party . For socio-economic 
as well as p o l i t ic a l  reasons the Department of L arissa was considered as 
the most su ita b le  fo r our fieldwork research.
L arissa  l i e s  in  the  n o r th -e a s te rn  p a r t  of T hessaly , occupying an 
area of 5,354 square kilom eters (see maps in Appendix IX); i t  is  the 
biggest department in th is  area, and the second biggest in  the country 
a f te r  Aetolia-Akarnania. I t s  population of 254,295 is  the fourth  la rg est 
in Greece, (a f te r  the Departments of A ttica , Salonica and A chaia).<1} I t  
has four c i t i e s ,  160 carm unities and 272 o ther minor se ttlem ents. The 
c ity  of L arissa i t s e l f  (pop. 102,048) is  by fa r  the most important urban 
c en tre  (w ith the  f i f t h  la rg e s t  popu la tion  in  a l l  of Greece, a f t e r  
Athens, Salonica, Piraeus and P a tras); Tyrnavos (pop. 11,118) is  the 
second la rg est urban cen tre  in the department, and the sm aller towns of 
Farsala with pop. 7,211, and Elassona with 7,146 are best described as 
semi-urban cen tres . L arissa, Tyrnavos, Farsala , Elassona and Aghia (a 
ru ra l m unicipality  with pop. 3,454) are  the respective  cen tres of the 
five  eparchies in to  which the Department of L arissa is  devided; although
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s t r i c t ly  speaking, an eparchy is  no longer an adm inistrative u n it, the 
term is  s t i l l  used fo r the  f iv e  geographical su bd iv isions of the 
Department.
The whole of Thessaly and the Department of L arissa p a rtic u la rly , 
has always been highly f e r t i l e . <Z) The l a t t e r  has the la rg est cu ltiv a ted  
acreage in  a l l  of Greece, and produces huge q u an titie s  of wheat, barley , 
l e n t i l ,  su g a rb ee t, e tc .  In the n o rth , where the  country  i s  m ainly 
mountainous, the Olympus and Ossa ranges allow  fo r c a t t l e - r a i s in g  as 
well as fo re s try ; to  the south, where the Pinios r iv e r  flows through the 
f e r t i l e  p la in s  o f L a rissa , the  on the  average r e la t iv e ly  la rg e  land 
holdings, and much-mechanized farming methods account fo r a high per- 
acre p ro d u c tiv ity . ( 3 } Alongside the we 11-developed ag ricu ltu re  there  is  
a co n sid erab le  in d u s tr ia l  s e c to r  in and around the c i ty  of L a r is s a , 
ch ie fly  concerned with processing and canning. I t s  sugar p lan t is  the 
biggest of the th ree  in the country, i t s  paper-m ill is  the only one of 
i t s  kind in Greece, and there are  a lso  fac to rie s  making lime and cement, 
carpets and fu rn itu re  as well as handicraft establishm ents (clo th ing , 
p o p u la r  a r t ,  e t c . ) .  As a r e s u l t ,  L a r i s s a  has become a l a r g e  
a d m in is tra tiv e , in d u s t r ia l ,  and tra n sp o rt  c e n tre , and is  one of the 
fa s te s t growing urban centres in the coun try .<4)
Table VI. 1 below compares the occupational backgroung of the labour 
fo rc e  in  th e  D epartm ent o f L a r is s a  and n a tio n w id e .* 5 * Speaking 
generally , and ag ric u ltu re  aside (which accounts for 41 per cent of the 
work fo rce ), labour d is tr ib u tio n  in the Department of L arissa does not 
d i f f e r  much from th a t  a t  n a tio n a l le v e l. Following the farm ers, the 
n e x t- la rg e s t  occupational group a re  craftsm en and workers (26.63 per 
cent), with ra th e r  fewer s c ie n t is ts  (7.26 per cent) and other lib e ra l 
p ro fessionals, merchants (6.75 per cen t), e tc . Overall, the sa la ried  and 
lib e ra l professions (39.29 per cent and 41.97 per cent resp ec tiv e ly ), 
are more or less balanced. The la t t e r  category, which includes the s e lf -
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Table VI. 1: Occupational Background: A Comparison Between the Country as 
a Whole and the Department of Larissa
Greece
Occupation number % number %
S c ie n tis ts /o th e r  
lib e ra l p rofessions 403,400 10.38 6,648 07.26
Managerial jobs, 
higher adm inistration 62,600 01.61 1,306 01.43
Office s ta f f 334,500 08.60 6,160 06.72
Merchants/Dea1ers 365,900 09.41 6,187 06.75
Various serv ices 325,100 08.36 5,441 05.94
Farmi ng/cat 11 e -ra  i s i ng 1,027,500 26.43 37,553 41.00
Craf t  smen/Workers 1,060,400 27.28 24,390 26.63
Unemployed 286,900 07.38 3,811 04.16
No data 21,400 .55 103 .11
Total 3,887,700 100.00 91,599 100.00
Department of L arissa
SALARIED PROFESSIONS 1,774,200 45.64 35,990 39.29
LIBERAL PROFESSIONS 1,272,300 32.73 38,446 41.97
INTRA-FAMILY LABOUR 554,300 14.26 13,498 14.74
employed fa rm e rs , i s  s l i g h t l y  l a r g e r  due to  th e  predom inance of 
ag ricu ltu ra l a c t iv i t ie s  in the area, whereas the numerical opposite is  
true a t national level —where the la rg est group is that of craftsmen 
and workers (27.28 per cen t), c lo sely  followed by fa rm in g /ca ttle -ra is in g  
(26.43 per cen t). The Table shows, th a t the social and economic 
c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the Department of L arissa combine the fea tu res of an 
im portant a g ra r ia n , as well as a co n sid erab le  urban and in d u s tr ia l  
sector— desp ite  the fac t that although i t  has access to the Aegean in 
the e a s t, i t  does not have a conmercial harbour of i t s  own tha t would 
have boosted economic development. ( 61
Under the c h if l ik  system prevalent u n til  the land reforms introduced 
by Venizelos, p o l i t ic s  was tra d itio n a lly  in the hands of the notables, 
the tzak ia  fam ilies, who owned the land and dominated the p e a sa n ts .(7)
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I t  is  not su rp rising , therefo re , tha t before World War I and even during 
th e  in te rw a r  y e a rs , th e  m a jo r i ty  o f th e  lo c a l p o l i t i c i a n s  were 
in f lu e n tia l  landowners, who had e s ta b lish e d  personal c l ie n te le s  and 
secured th e ir  parliam entary sea ts  through the extensive exp lo ita tion  of 
v e r t i c a l ,  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  r e la t io n s .  This s i tu a t io n  has not b a s ic a lly  
changed with regard to e ith e r  the conservative or the lib e ra l p a rtie s  in 
the post-w ar y ea rs , as we s h a l l  see in  more d e ta i l  below ;<8> in  the  
absence of mass-organised p a r t ie s , lawyers and doctors predominated on 
the party  p o l i t ic a l  scene, as well as landowners, who continued to  exert 
considerable influence on the e le c to ra te  to  secure th e ir  parliam entary 
s e a t .
I t  should be mentioned th a t, u n til  i t s  eventual 1949 defeat during 
the c iv il  war, the Greek L iberation Army ELAS, (which was the m ilita ry  
branch of the carm unist-led Greek L iberation Front EAM) operated frcm 
the mountainous areas of cen tra l and northern Greece, a substan tia l p a rt 
of i t  in the Olympus and Ossa ranges. For reasons outside the scope of 
t h i s  s tu d y , ELAS r e c r u i te d  i t s  fo rc e s  from among the  ind igenous 
population, deployed an in tense a c t iv i ty  in the area, and exerted great 
in fluence  on a la rg e  s e c t io n  of th e  in h a b i ta n ts .  In  consequence, 
although the Communist Party  of Greece (KKE) was outlawed in 1947, the 
United Democratic L eft EDA (formed in 1951) always had one n a tio n a l 
deputy e le c te d  in the  Department of L a rissa , even a f t e r  1974.<9) 
Moreover, although the  e le c t io n - r e s u l t  p ro f i le  of the  Department of 
Larissa much resembles the national one, the ro le  of the KKE since 1974 
has alw ays been a l i t t l e  b e t t e r  than  the  p a r t y ’s average  re c o rd  
nationwide (see Table VI. 3 below).
The 5 March 1950 national e lec tio n  was held almost immediately a f te r  
the end of the c iv i l  war, and re su lted  in a m ajority for the centre  and 
lib e ra l forces, which were to e s ta b lish  co a litio n  governments and remain 
in o f f ic e  u n t i l  1952. Not one of the  ten e le c te d  d ep u ties  in the
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Department of Larissa belonged to  the Democratic Camp (a c o a litio n  of 
the L eft, before EDA. was c rea ted ). Seven were of various lib e ra l p a rtie s  
(three of EPEK National Progressive Centre Union, another th ree  of the 
L ibera l P a r ty , and one of George Papandreou 's Democratic S o c ia l is t  
P arty ), and th ree  belonged to the People’s P a r ty .( 10 * In the following 
e lec tio n  a year la te r  (9 Sept. 1951), fiv e  out of the eleven deputies in 
the Department represented the Greek R ally, another five various lib e ra l 
p a r t ie s  (fou r EPEK, one the  main L ib era l P a r ty ) , and one the  United 
Democratic Left (EDA).'11*
Since 1952, the Department of L arissa  has been represented by eight 
deputies in the national assembly —except for the 1956 e lec tio n , when 
the Departments of L arissa and Magnesia were conflated in to  a sing le  14- 
seat e le c to ra l d i s t r ic t  (sis were a lso  the two Departments of K arditsa 
and T rik a la ) . In both 1952 and 1956 the  se a ts  were shared equally  
between the Greek Rally and the L iberals in the f i r s t  case, and between 
the N ational Radical Union (ERE) sind the  Democratic Union (a major 
c o a l i t io n  of a l l  p a r t ie s  of the  o p p o sitio n  includ ing  EDA) in the 
se co n d .'12> I t  is  noteworthy th a t with the exception of one ERE deputy 
(namely, D. I a t r id is ,  a re t i r e d  army o f f ic e r  and newcomer to p o l i t ic s  a t 
the tim e), a l l  the o thers had previously been a f f i l ia te d  with e ith e r  
Papagos’ Greek Rally or the L iberal Party . Indeed, five  out of six  of 
than were e ith e r  former MPs or candidates of the Greek R ally, whereas 
one (the  doc to r N. Papageorgiou) came from the L iberal P a rty . With 
regard to the o rig ins of ERE's p o l i t ic a l  personnel in the Department of 
L arissa, therefo re , i t  can be said  tha t th is  consisted mainly of former 
G reek-Rally d ep u ties  and p o l i t i c ia n s  —as was the case a t  n a tio n a l 
l e v e l . '13‘
Table V I.2 below presents an overa ll p ic tu re  of the a llo ca tio n  of 
parliam entary seats between the Right, the Centre, and the Left in the 
Department of L arissa during a l l  e lec tio n s a f te r  the creation  of ERE by
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C. K aram anlis (w ith  th e  s o le  e x c e p tio n  o f 1956 when, as a lre a d y  
mentionbed, the Departments of L arissa and Magnesia were confla ted ). The 
figures show qu ite  c le a r ly  th a t the e lec tio n  performance of ERE in the 
Department, follow ed a p a t te rn  very  s im ila r  to  the n a tio n a l one (as 
p re se n te d  in  s e c t io n  2 .2 .5  in  ch . 1 ). They a ls o  a t t e s t  to  th e  
excep tional perform ance of EDA in  1958, when i t  secured th ree  s e a ts  
while the p a rtie s  of the Centre fa ile d  completely. A fter the c reation  of 
the Centre Union in 1961, and the subsequent e lec tion  of violence and 
fraud in the same year, ERE's s treng th  dropped dram atically , u n til  i t  
received only two sea ts  in the 1964 national e lec tion .
Table V I.2: A llocation of Parliam entary Seats in the Department of L ari­
ssa during a l l  National E lections a f te r  the Creation of ERE
Party/co
a li t io n
Election of 
19 Feb. 1956
E lection of 
11 Mav 1958
Election of 
29 Oct. 1961
Election of 
3 Nov. 1963
Election of 
16 Feb. 1964
Right* 7 5 5 4 2
Centreb 7 — 2 3 5
L eft0 __ 3 1 1 1
Total 14 8 8 8 8
Notes: (a) This means ERE in a l l  e lec tio n s , except in 1964, which ERE 
fought in c o a litio n  with M arkesinis' Party of Progressive 
People (KP).
(b) In 1956 th is  was the Democratic Union (DE), a broad c o a litio n  
of the opposition p a r t ie s  inluding EDA; in 1958 i t  was the 
Liberal Party together with the Progressive Rural Democratic 
Union (PADE); in 1961 i t  was a Centre Union/KP c o a litio n ; and 
in 1963 and 1964 i t  was the Centre Union alone.
(c) In 1958, 1963 and 1964 th is  was EDA alone; in 1956 EDA a l l ie d  
with DE; and in 1961 i t  was a co a litio n  of EDA with the 
National Rural Party  (EAK).
The composition of ERE's parliam entary personnel did not change very 
much over the 1956-1964 period. In 1958, four of the five  deputies 
had been e lected  previously  (these were the lawyers S. E fs tra tia d is , G. 
Kakayiannis and C. Rodopoulos, and the m ilita ry  o ff ic e r  —re tire d — D. 
I a t r id is ) ;  the one newcomer was a jo u rn a lis t (C. G ram ratidis). In 1961, 
ERE ag a in  had f iv e  d e p u tie s  e le c te d  ( th e  same th re e  law yers and
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jo u r n a l is t ,  p lu s the  p hysic ian  A. M ess in is) . ( 14} In 1963 the  p a rty  
secured three seats (C. Gramnatidis, C. Rodopoulos, and C. K its id is , who 
was a  higher c iv il  servant, namely a  government-appointed p re fe c t) ;  and 
by 1964 i t  managed only two deputies, C. Rodopoulos and C. K i ts id is .( 1 5»
Concerning the party  organisation  in the Department p rio r  to  1967, 
i t  must be sa id  th a t th e re  was none during  the  whole p e rio d . In  the  
beginning, due to the special local socio-economic circumstances, i t  was 
the b ig  landowners who had m anipulated the  popular vo te  and assu red  
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c a r e e r ;  l a t e r ,  d u r in g  th e  1950s and '6 0 s , when 
in d u stria l and c a p i ta l is t  development gathered momentum —although in a 
manner tha t d if fe re n tia te d  i t  from c a p i ta l is t  development proper ( i . e . ,  
f a i lu r e  to  modernise a g r ic u l tu re ,  a weak secondary s e c to r , and the 
creation  of an unproductive, corrupt and overin fla ted  te r t ia ry  sec to r, 
as outlined in section  2.1.1 in ch. 1)— i t  was prim arily  lawyers and 
doctors who had succeeded the landowners in dominating the popular w ill 
by estab lish ing  v e rtic a l c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s . Neither the ERE nor 
the Centre Union attempted to c rea te  local organisations, and the only 
interm ediaries between the  v o te rs  and the p a r t ie s  were v arious loca l 
p o lit ic a l  barons, serving one or another deputy .1 16 ’ This a lso  explains 
why the prominent ERE deputy C. Grairmatidis was able to  abandon ERE in 
1964 and s t i l l  manage to hold on to h is  parliam entary seat as a Centre 
Union MP (see footnote 15 above).
As was a lso  the case w ith ERE, ND's e le c tio n  performance in the 
Department of Larissa followed a trend very sim ilar to that a t  national 
level during a l l  n a tio n a l e le c tio n s  held  since  1974. Furtherm ore, as 
shown by Table VI. 3 below, the Department of L arissa c losely  resembles 
the country as a whole where New Democracy and PASOK are concerned; 
the figures for these two p a rtie s  are  s lig h tly  below th e ir  national 
record , whereas th e  communist L e ft and the  u l t r a - R ig h t  a re  o v e r-
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represented —a long-lasting  consequence of the in ternecine te r ro r  of 
the 1945-1949 c iv i l  w ar.<17)
Table V I.3: Post-1974 E lection R esults in the C ity of L arissa, Kalohori, 
Department of L arissa , and Greece
Year
City of Larissa Kalohori Dept of L arissa Greece
ND PASOK LEFTC ND PASOK LEFTC ND PASOK LEFTC ND PASOK LEFTC
1974 49.31 11.97 16.78 52.39 21.22 05.17 53.66 13.37 11.88 54.37 13.58 09.47
1977 38.41 19.97 24.63 39.11 31.98 13.29 36.90 22.31 17.38 41.84 25.34 12.08
1981 31.19 46.38 19.44 33.19 52.73 12.81 36.20 45.06 16.32 35.87 48.07 12.27
1985 38.20 43.15 17.65 42.97 45.17 11.11 39.21 44.00 15.57 40.84 45.82 11.73
1989a 40.96 35.27 20.58 44.96 42.63 11.10 42.25 38.47 16.89 44.25 39.15 13.12
1989b 43.80 37.47 17.60 47.20 42.13 10.13 44.91 39.53 14.48 46.19 40.67 10.97
1990 44.20 35.89 16.99 47.23 42.07 09.70 45.04 38.39 14.45 46.89 38.61 10.28
Notes: (a) 18 June 1989, and
(b) 5 November 1989 national e lec tio n .
(c) In 1974 th is  was the United Left (EA); in 1977, the Cormunist 
Party of Greece (KKE) together with the A lliance of the Left 
and the Progressive Forces; in 1981 and 1985, KKE and the 
Euro-Connunist KKE of the In te r io r ;  and since 1989 the 
C oalition of the Left and Progress (SYN).
O verall then, as ev iden t from Tables V I.1 and 3, both  the so c io ­
economic and the p o li t ic a l  c h a ra c te r is tic s  in the Department of L arissa 
c losely  matched the national ones. This is  not to say, of course, tha t 
th is  department was and is  merely the exact image on a reduced scale  of 
the national model. N evertheless, i t  is  reasonable to argue tha t the 
views and a tt i tu d e s  expressed by the rank -and-file  party  members (which 
are dealt with in g rea te r d e ta il  below), have not only re f le c ted  ND's in 
th is  p a rtic u la r  department but may, in a more comprehensive sense, be 
seen as qu ite  typical of ND-grassroots c h a ra c te r is tic s  a t the national 
le v e l. ‘ 18}
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2. ND's P o l i t i c a l  Personnel and the C reation  and Development o f  the
Organisation in the Department of Larissa
As d iscussed  e a r l i e r  (see se c tio n  1 in  ch. 3 ), ND was a personal 
c reation  of Karamanlis him self, who in 1974 chose not to revive h is  o ld  
ERE party  but to  se t up what he claimed was an e n tire ly  new one. P rio r 
to  the existence of any kind of party  organisation  Karamanlis depended 
on a considerab le  number of p o l i t i c ia n s  who had begun th e i r  c a re e rs  
before the 1967 take-over by the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip ; he a lso  included 
in the party  l i s t s  a good many young and re la tiv e ly  unknown newcomers 
without any p o lit ic a l  past whatsoever (see Tables I I I . l ,  la , 3, and 3a, 
in ch. 3). This p a tte rn  is  p e rfec tly  c lea r a lso  in the Department of 
L arissa, as discussed below.
A fter the f a l l  of the junta in 1974 there was qu ite  simply too much 
to  do try in g  to  r e s to re  democracy to  leave room fo r any re a l  p a r ty  
organisation or id eo lo g ica l campaign — in L a rissa  as elsew here. (The 
caniTTunist p a rtie s  were free r  in th is  respect, and to a lesse r extent 
a lso  PASOK, and in  consequence were th e  o n ly  o rg a n ise d  p o l i t i c a l  
formations a t the tim e .) So the newly formed New Democracy was manned by 
the p o litic ia n s  who had belonged to  ERE before 1967, as well as seme 
newcomers who were ju s t en tering  p o l i t ic s  in 1974. Shortly before the 
November 1974 national e lec tio n , the p a r ty 's  b a llo t for the Department 
of Larissa comprised e ig h t c an d id a tes , th ree  of whom had e s ta b lis h e d  
th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c a re e rs  befo re  1967, and f iv e  newcomers: The o ld e r  
p o litic ia n s  were S. E fs tra tia d is  (lawyer and ERE deputy in 1956, 1958
and 1961), V. K arabilias (lawyer, Greek Rally deputy in 1952, and ERE- 
candidate th e re a f te r) , and V. Papazissis (doctor, Liberal Party deputy 
in 1956, and candidate for the Liberal Party in 1958 and for the Centre 
Union in 1961 and 1964).* 1 91 The newcomers were the landowners G. 
Garanis and V. Fassoulas, lawyers E. Kyriakou and D. Papagiannis, and
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c iv i l  engineer G. Souflias. ND secured five  out of the eight se a ts , and 
i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  th a t  o f th e  th r e e  e s ta b l is h e d  p o l i t i c ia n s  only 
E fs tra tia d is  was e lec ted , whereas four of the five  newcomers were sent 
to  p a rliam en t.* 201
I t  was around the more or le ss  prominent p o lit ic a l  figures in the 
area th a t some kind of party  o rgan isation  in i t i a l ly  developed. Although 
ND had e s ta b lis h e d  i t s  f i r s t  departm ental o rg an isa tio n  in L arissa as 
e a r ly  as 1975, th is  never functioned  as an im personal, b u re a u c ra tic  
in s t i tu t io n , nor did i t  perform the ro le  of intermediary between the 
h igher p a rty  echelons and the  rank and f i l e .  In s tead , p a rty  MPs and 
lo c a l p o l i t i c i a n s  kep t c r e a t in g  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  ne tw orks, and so 
c o n tro lle d  the  popular vo te  through the  s e le c tiv e  d is t r ib u t io n  of 
fav o u rs  and s p o i l s  in h e re n t  in  governm ental power. As th e  f i r s t  
president of the departmental carm ittee  in L arissa said ,
"From the moment I became p re s id e n t of the  departm ental 
com m ittee I  saw th a t  th e  p a r ty  d e p u tie s  en joyed  th e  
g re a te s t  power, keeping a t ig h t  co n tro l over the  loca l 
o rg an isa tio n s  by ap p o in ting  th e i r  own men to  key -posts .
But in  t h i s  w ay, th e y  d i s c o u r a g e d  a l l  s e r i o u s ,  
trustw orthy, and respectab le  people, who could re a lly  have 
offered a great deal i f  they had joined the p a r ty " .{21 *
Thus deputocracy and p a tro n -c lien t re la tio n s  flourished in the area 
in the early  post-1974 years almost to  the same extent as before 1967. 
The four deputies ND sent to  parliam ent in 1977 were: c iv il  engineer A. 
E fs tra tia d is , who had inherited  the p o li t ic a l  c lie n te le  of h is  bro ther 
who had d ied  in the meantime; jo u rn a l is t  C. G rairm atidis, who had 
tran sferred  h is  a lleg iance  and personal voters from the Centre Union to  
ND but was e as ily  e lected  a l l  the same;c 22 * G. Souflias, whose second 
term  in  p a rlia m e n t t h i s  was and whose p o l i t i c a l  c a re e r  i s  s t i l l  
continuing today; and lawyer E. Kyriakou, who had fa iled  to be e lected  
in 1974 and was now en tering  parliam ent fo r the f i r s t  time.
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\The creation  of the Volvi Movement sho rtly  before the 1977 e lec tio n  
was the only sign tha t there  were some members in the party  ranks who 
advoca ted  a p ro p er p a r ty  o r g a n is a t io n ,  ND's d ise n ta g le m e n t and 
independence from th e  p e r s o n a l i ty  o f i t s  le a d e r , and th e  g e n e ra l 
m odernisation  and tran sfo rm ation  of ND from a p e rs o n a lis tic  pa rty  of 
local p o l i t ic a l  barons to  a p o l i t ic a l  organisation of p r in c ip le s .( 23’ 
Nevertheless, the party  leadership proved stronger than the Movement, 
and a t the f i r s t  open Volvi congress in  L arissa in 1978 a l l  i t s  members 
were expelled frcm the party  overnight. One year la te r ,  and in view of 
the ominous r i s e  of PASOK, most of the Volvi supporters re jo ined  ND; 
th e i r  demands fo r  proper o rg a n isa tio n  and p o l i t i c a l  m odernisation  
remained to be d ea lt with a t seme fu tu re  time.
I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note tha t many of the Larissa ND members chose 
to  fo llow  the Volvi Movement in 1976, and th a t alm ost a l l  of them 
returned to the party  in 1979. Even those who did not o f f ic ia l ly  jo in  
the Volvi Movement in p rac tice  agreed with most of i t s  demands.4 24 > This 
may be one of the main reasons why the organisation  in the Department of 
Larissa never s p l i t ,  n e ith e r was there  mutual animosity among i t s  ND 
members on th is  sco re . On the c o n tra ry , as long as p e r s o n a l is t ic  
p o l i t i c s ,  dep u to c racy  and c l i e n t e l i s m  were a b le  to  f lo u r is h ,  the  
Movement's demands fo r m odernisation  were heard —as la te  as even 
shortly  before the June 1989 e lec tio n , almost ten years a f te r  the Volvi 
Movement had been dissolved.
ND, following i t s  nationwide expansion stra tegy , fought the 1981 
e lec tion  in the Department of L arissa enlarged on both i t s  r ig h t and 
le f t  wing. Out of i t s  ten  can d id a tes , two had fought the  p rev ious 
e lec tion  under the banner of the u l tr a - r ig h t  National Camp (EP), another 
two o r ig in a te d  from the Centre Union/New Forces and the Union of 
Democratic Centre (EDIK) respec tive ly , four were former ND deputies, and 
another two came from the local o rgan isation , namely iawyers N. Katsaros
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(former presiden t of the departmental adm inistrative  committee) and E. 
Groussopoulos (a member of th a t committee). In th is  e le c tio n , which ND 
f a i le d  to  win, the  p a r ty  lo s t  the  fo u rth  se a t in the  Department to  
PASOK, and had th ree  deputies e lec ted  —G. Souflias, N. Katsaros, and A. 
E f s t r a t ia d is .  The same p ic tu re  emerged from the  1985 e lec tio n ; PASOK 
remained in o ff ic e  fo r another four years, and ND again had the same 
th ree  d ep u ties  from L a r is sa . (For the  e le c tio n  r e s u l ts  in a l l  th ese  
e lec tions see Table V I.3 above.)
As already discussed, rea l power —a t lea s t during ND's f i r s t  period 
in o ffice  (1974-1981)— lay w ith prominent p a r ty -p o lit ic a l figu res, and 
i t  was around the local o ff ic e s  of the ND deputies tha t o rganisation  in 
the area began to  develop. This continued u n til  1985, when the party  
i t s e l f  made a more serious e f fo r t  to  organise properly. According to  an 
ND-candidate fo r the June 1989 e lec tio n :
"After 1981, under the leadership of E. Averoff, the party  
began to  organise. N evertheless, even sh o rtly  before the 
1985 e lec tio n  (which ND eventually  lo s t ) ,  the party  s t i l l  
s u f fe re d  from immense o r g a n is a t io n a l  w eaknesses and 
in e f f i c i e n c y . . . ,  both  of which to  some ex ten t p e r s i s t  
today". ( 2 5 >
Nevertheless, l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  a f te r  1981, and p a rtic u la rly  a f te r  1985, 
the party  began to develop i t s  g rass-roo ts organisation  and to  e s ta b lish  
the f i r s t  local branches which, as we sh a ll  see below, co ex is ted  
alongside the o ffice s  of ND deputies and p o lit ic ia n s  in  the area. By 
1989, ND had e s ta b l is h e d  96 lo c a l  com m ittees (TE) and c la im ed  a 
membership in the Department of L arissa of almost 7 ,000 .{26 ’
Before we examine the views and a tt i tu d e s  of the ND party  members in 
d e ta il , something must be sa id  concerning the party  organisation  in the 
c i ty  of L a rissa  and the v i l la g e  of K alohori, where the  fieldw ork  
research was conducted. The ND departmental committee in L arissa c i ty  
claim ed 4,828 members in  1989, se rv in g  on over fo u r te e n  lo c a l
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com m ittees. L a r is s a  and su b u rb s  c o n s i s t s  o f f o u r te e n  s e p a r a te  
ne ighbourhoods in c lu d in g  th e  c i t y  c e n t r e ,  and th e re  is  one local 
com m ittee in  each neighbourhood . A ll lo c a l com m ittees and t h e i r  
membership a re  shown in Table V I.4 below .( 27’
Table V I.4: ND Organisation in L arissa and Kalohori in 1989: Local 
Carmittees and th e ir  Membership
Number of Members
Local Corrmittee (TE) in: Men Women Total
Philippoupolis 330 150 480
Neapolis 145 55 400
Anthoupolis 200 100 300
Ag. Konstantinos ----- ----- 600
Pyrovolika ----- ----- 127
Hippocrates ----- ----- 233
Averoff 78 30 108
Ag. Georgios 130 100 230
Ambelokipoi 118 80 198
Nea Smymi ----- ---- 175
Neraida ----- ---- 209
40 Martyres 170 100 270
Haravghi ----- — 238
City Centre ----- ----- 1260
Total ----- ----- 4828
TE of Kalohori 40 10 50
Sum to ta l ----- — 4878
In the r e s t  of th is  chapter we sha ll examine in d e ta il  the personal 
sp ec ifics  of the rank -and -file  members (sex, occupation, age, party  age, 
e t c . ) ,  and a ls o  t h e i r  view s and a t t i t u d e s  concern ing  th e  p a r ty  
organisation  and i t s  p o lic ie s  (the pros and cons of the local party - 
o rganisational s tru c tu re  and functioning, p a rtic ip a tio n  in the decision­
making process, a tt i tu d e s  towards the party  MPs and leadership, and so 
fo rth ). All information and data  are based on the answers given by 158 
party  members (137 from L arissa and 21 from Kalohori), and are presented
a n a ly tic a lly  in Appendix VIII of th is  study. (28 ’ I t j n u s t  be s t r e s s e d  
how ever, t h a t  due t o  th e  p r a c t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  im posed on th e
a u th o r  w h ile  c o n d u c tin g  t h i s  r e s e a r c h ,  th e  d a ta  o b ta in e d  sh o u ld
be t r e a t e d  a s  i l l u s t r a t i v e  and be a lw ays i n t e r p r e t e d  w ith
c a u t io n  a s  t o  i t s  s t a t i s t i c a l  p r e c i s i o n  ( s e e  f o o tn o te  28 ab o v e) .
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3. The Local Party O rgan isa tion  in  L a r issa  and Kalohori
3.1 Party members' socio-economic and p o li t ic a l  p a rtic u la rs
As we noted when examining women's represen ta tion  in parliam ent and 
the c e n tra l  and departm ental committees of ND (se c tio n  3, ch. 3), 
p o l i t ic s  has remained the almost exclusive domain of men. In L arissa and 
Kalohori, however, wcmen have been much more to  the fore (Table V I.5 
below) although men s t i l l  outnumber them eas ily . As is  to  be expected, 
the women are most numerous in L arissa  (whose ra t io  to men is  almost 
1:2), given tha t in a c i ty  tra d itio n a l hab its  can more e a s ily  give way 
to  m odernisation and change. (This cannot be sa id  of K a lo h o ri.)  The 
average percentage of 30.38 is  the highest represen ta tion  of women in 
any ND party  organ we have come across so f a r . ( 2 9 *
Table V I.5: Men and Wcmen in the ND Organisation in L arissa and Kalohori 
L arissa Kalohori Total
Sex number % number % number %
Male 92 67.15 18 85.71 110 69.62
Female 45 32.85 3 14.29 48 30.38
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
The mean age of the  members (Table VI. 6) resem bles th a t o f the 
p a r ty 's  parliam entary group in 1989-1990 (see Table I I I . 8 in ch. 3), but 
with 44.12 years is  even more youthful in the g rass-roo ts o rgan isations. 
Almost one-th ird  of the party  members both in L arissa and in Kalohori 
are between 35 and 44 years o ld , the second largest group is  between 45 
and 54, and those under 35 a re  more numerous than those over 55. I t  
seems, however, th a t  the  p a r ty  does not appeal as much to  s tu d e n ts , 
young professionals or unemployed and younger people generally  (see a lso  
Table V I.7 below), as i t  does to  adu lts  with an estab lished  job. This is  
corroborated by the fac t th a t although ONNED, ND's youth organisation ,
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claimed 400 members in L arissa in August 1989, th is  fa r  from dazzling 
number, meant very l i t t l e  indeed in terms of ONNED's impact.' 301
Table V I.6: Age D istribu tion  of ND Members in Larissa and Kalohori 
L arissa  Kalohori Total
Age number % number % number %
Under 35 25 18.25 6 28.57 31 19.62
35-44 41 29.92 10 47.62 51 32.28
45-54 38 27.74 4 19.05 42 26.58
55-64 22 16.06 1 04.76 23 14.56
65-over 3 02.19 — ----- 3 01.90
No answer 8 05.84 __ ___ 8 05.06
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
Average 44 .62 41 .05 44 .12 1
An unusual p i c tu r e  em erges when we examine the  o c c u p a tio n a l 
composition of the rank and f i l e  (Table V I.7 below). Lawyers are  missing 
a l t o g e t h e r ,  and th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f d o c to r s ,  e n g in e e r s  and 
in d u s t r i a l i s t s  is  i n s ig n i f i c a n t . ‘ 31’ In s te a d , middle and low er-rank 
employees co n s titu te  the la rg est group, amounting to almost 30 per cent, 
farmers and workers together to ta l  26 per cent (in Kalohori, which is  
predominantly a g r ic u ltu ra l, farmers alone amount to 57.17 per cen t), and 
14.56 per cent are  housewives; merchants and a rtisa n s  make up sm aller 
o c c u p a tio n a l  c a t e g o r i e s  ( l i t t l e  more th a n  6 and 3 p e r  c e n t 
respec tive ly ), whereas some 9 per cent of the to ta l  did not mention any 
o c cu p a tio n , and on ly  two meimbers in  L a r is s a  sa id  th a t  they  were 
unemployed.( 3 2 ’
C o n tra ry  t h e r e f o r e  to  th e  o c c u p a t io n a l  background  o f ND's 
parliam entary group and o ther higher party  organs (see Tables I I I . 11, 
12, 13 and 16 in ch. 3), the l ib e ra l professions no longer predominate 
in the grass-roo ts o rganisation  of the Department of L arissa. I t  is
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Table V I .7: O ccupational Background o f  ND Members in  L a r issa  and
j\aionori
Occupation
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total
number %
Lawyers — ----- — ----- — -----
Doctors 1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
Engineers 4 02.92 — ----- 4 02.53
Ship' g /Industry 1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
Businessmen 10 07.30 — ----- 10 06.33
Merchants 1 .73 1 04.76 2 01.27
Landowners — ----- — ----- — -----
Farmers 9 06.57 12 57.15 21 13.29
High Rank Enp. 2 01.46 — ----- 2 01.27
Middle/Lower Eftp. 45 32.84 1 04.76 46 29.11
Workers 19 13.87 1 04.76 20 12.66
Univ. Prof. 1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
Teachers 1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
Students 2 01.46 — ----- 2 01.27
A rtisans 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
M ilitary 2 01.46 — ----- 2 01.27
Mi seellaneous 3 02.19 — ----- 3 01.90
Housewives 21 15.33 2 09.53 23 14.56
No data/unemploved 8/2:10 07.30 4 /- : 4 19.04 12/2:14 08.86
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
SALARIED PROF. 71 51.82 2 09.53 73 46.20
LIBERAL PROF. 35 25.55 13 61.90 48 30.38
HOUSEWIVES 21 15.33 2 09.53 23 14.56
NO DATA/UNEMPLOYED 10 07.30 4 19.04 14 08.86
TOTAL 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
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people engaged in business, large or small, who constitu te  the largest 
category (see Table I I I . 17), together with people from a petty-bourgeois 
or middle- and lower-class background. The party members in sa laried  
p ro fessions, although they do not c o n s titu te  the abso lu te  m ajority , 
s t i l l  amount to over 46 per cent, and are much more numerous than th e ir 
counterparts in ND's 1991 central committee and 1990 parliamentary group 
(12.99 per cent and 18.42 per cent respectively, see Tables I I I .  12 and 
16 in ch. 3). There is  then a sign ifican t imbalance between the higher, 
middle, and lower party  echelons with respect to th e ir occupational and 
social backgrounds, which is very obvious in the diagram in Figure 6.1 
below.
The horizon tal ax is rep resen ts the party  ranks, and the v e r t ic a l  
ax is marks the percentage of p ro fessions. We take our sample of the 
Larissa grass-roots (158 members) to represent the lower party ranks, 
the 70 elected presidents of ND's departmental committees in 1991 as the
Figure 6.1: D istribution of Salaried and Liberal Professions across ND
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middle, and ND’s 1990 parliam entary group (152 deputies) as the higher 
ones. (See a lso  Table V I.7 above, Tables I I I . 16, and I I I . 12 in ch. 3 
fo r the lower, middle and higher ranks resp ec tiv e ly .) The p ic tu re  we 
o b ta in  shows th a t  s a la r ie d  and l ib e r a l  p ro fess io n s  a re  more eq u a lly  
d i s t r i b u t e d  in  th e  low er and m id d le  p a r ty  r a n k s ,  b u t d iv e rg e  
considerab ly  in  the  h ig h er p a rty  echelons. Moreover, the s a la r ie d  
professions decline as we move from the lower to the higher party  ranks, 
whereas exactly  the opposite is  true  fo r the lib e ra l ones. By and large, 
then, we may consider ND as the c a tc h -a ll party  i t s  leadership claims i t  
to  be, since i t s  social base does not represent sane p a r tic u la r  c la ss  or 
c lasses, but comprises people from a  wide socio-economic background. As 
fa r  as i t s  highest echelons a re  concerned, i t  seems tha t ND is  s ta ffe d  
by people with an upper-class, bourgeois social o rig in , and th is  holds 
true  not only fo r the p a r ty 's  1990 parliam entary group but —contrary  to 
the case of PASOK— a lso  fo r  i t s  1991 c e n tra l  conm ittee (see Table 
I I I . 16 in ch. 3).
The estab lishm ent and development of the o rg an isa tio n  in L a rissa  
followed the same trend we have already id en tified  nationwide. During 
the e n t i r e  f i r s t  p e rio d  of ND in government (1974-1981) the  p a rty  
neglected almost everything to  do with i t s  organisational base; desp ite  
i t s  prelim inary and fu ll  congresses in 1977 and 1979, ND had fa ile d  to 
a t t r a c t  a s u f f ic ie n t  number of p a rty  members to  develop an a c t iv e  
o rg an isa tio n , l ik e  th a t of i t s  main r iv a l  PASOK. Table VI. 8 below 
presents an illumimating p ic tu re  of the s itu a tio n . More than 40 per cent 
of the rank-and-file  members in the Department of L arissa joined ND 
between 1981 and 1985 (tha t is ,  a f te r  the party  had ceased to  govern), 
and another 32.91 per cent did so a f te r  1985. Conversely, only 17 per 
cent of the party  members can be considered as founding members, having 
joined in the  e a r ly  years o f ND's e x is te n c e , w hile very few indeed 
joined between 1977 and 1981. The somewhat d iffe ren t p ic tu re  in
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T able VI-8: Year o f  R e g is te r in g  ND Membership
L arissa  Kalohori Total
Year of recristration number % number % number %
Before 1977 22 16.06 5 23.81 27 17.09
Between 1977 and 1981 6 04.38 8 38.09 14 08.86
Between 1981 and 1985 57 41.60 8 38.09 65 41.14
A fter 1985 52 37.96 __ ___ 52 32.91
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
Average party  age 6. 65 *• 7 7*06
Kalohori, is  explained by remembering th a t i t  is  generally  ea s ie r  to 
organise in a small v illa g e , where people more or less know each o ther 
and coniTTunicate on a more permanent and frequent b a s i s .(331
The overwhelming m ajority  of the rank and f i l e  had no previous party  
p o l it ic a l  p a rtic ip a tio n  whatsoever, as the data in Table V I.9 ind icate . 
Not one member in Kalohori and only fiv e  (3.65 per cent) in L arissa had 
previously been members of o ther p o l i t ic a l  p a rtie s  (a ll had belonged to 
Karamanlis' National Radical Union, ERE, and/or i t s  youth organisation ,
Table V I.9: Previous Party P o li t ic a l  P a rtic ip a tio n
L arissa Kalohori Total
Other party
membership number % number % number %
Yes 5 03.65 — 5 03.16
No 132 96.35 21 100.00 153 96.84
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
EREN). As regards n o n -p o litica l a f f i l ia t io n s ,  on the o ther hand, the 
data in Table VI. 10 below show that the m ajority (55.06 per cent) of 
the rank-and-file  in the area  do not belong to such organisations as 
trade unions, co-operatives, e tc . In L arissa, most of those who mention 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in n o n -p o lit ic a l  o rg a n isa tio n s  a re  trade-union members
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(21.90 per cen t), whereas the m ajority  of th e ir  colleagues in Kalohori 
(42.86 per cent) belong to  a g ric u ltu ra l unions and co-operatives. Tables 
V I.8, 9 and 10 show, there fo re , th a t the great m ajority  of ND members in 
the Department of L arissa have had no previous p o li t ic a l  p a rtic ip a tio n  
and experience, tha t they entered p o l i t ic s  ra th e r la te , and most of than 
d i r e c t ly  through th e i r  p a r ty  and not through o th e r  so c ia l o r labour 
o rg an isa tio n s .( 34 y
Table V I.10: P a rtic ip a tio n  in N on-Political Organisations
L arissa  Kalohori Total
N on-political
membership number % number % number %
Yes 57 41.61 14 66.67 71 44.94
Trade union 30 21.90 1 04.76 31 19.62
A gricultural union/co-operative 9 06.57 9 42.86 18 11.39
Btp1oyers' federat i on — ----- — ----- — -----
Professional association 15 10.95 4 19.05 19 12.03
Non-professional association 15 10.95 — ----- 15 09.49
No 80 58.39 7 33.33 87 55.06
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
L a s t ly ,  i t  sh o u ld  be rem em bered t h a t  i t  was id e o lo g ic a l  
id e n t i f ic a t io n  w ith ND as w ell as fam ily t r a d i t io n  th a t were major 
fa c to rs  im pelling  p a rty  members in the  Department of L arissa to join 
(see a lso  Table V.3 in  ch. 5 ). K aram anlis' personal charism a to  a 
g reater ex ten t, and the q u a lity  of party  o f f ic ia ls  and deputies to a 
lesse r, have a lso  played th e ir  p a rt in m otivating po ten tia l members to 
jo in  the party  (25.95 per cent and 9.49 per cent resp ec tiv e ly ), as the 
data in Table V I.11 below show.( 35 *
3G3
Table VI. 11: Major Reasons fo r  J o in in g  th e  ND Party
L a r issa  K alohori T otal
Reasons for jo ining ND number % number % number %
Personal ideological id e n tif ic a tio n 85 62.04 9 42.86 94 59.49
Family ideological id e n tif ic a tio n 67 48.91 8 38.09 75 47.47
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal 36 26.28 5 23.81 41 25.95
Organisational development of ND 20 14.60 — ----- 20 12.66
Personal q u a lity  of party  
o f f ic ia ls  and deputies 13 09.49 2 09.52 15 09.49
Counterbalancing PASOK's 
organisational performance 7 05.11 1 04.76 8 05.06
Influence of friends and/or 
re la tiv e s 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
Other 8 05.84 — ----- 8 05.06
3.2 Party members' appraisal of th e ir  local organisation
When we discussed the p a r ty 's  p o l i t ic a l  personnel, organ isation , and 
ideology in previous chapters of th is  study, we a lso  took into account 
the views and a tt i tu d e s  of the party  base, a lb e it  ra th e r broadly. In 
th is  section , we sha ll show in much more d e ta il  how today 's rank and 
f i l e  in Larissa and Kalohori view th e ir  party  organisation and how they 
perceive the basic tene ts  of i t s  ideology and various p o lic ie s . To begin 
with, le t  us re c a ll  tha t the overwhelming m ajority  —a l i t t l e  over 93 
per cent— of the rank and f i l e  both in L arissa and Kalohori acknowledge 
th a t  th e  p a r t y 's  g r a s s - r o o t s  o r g a n i s a t io n  s in c e  1981 d i f f e r s  
considerably from what i t  had been between 1974 and 1981; a mere 1.9 per 
cent think d iffe re n tly  (see Table IV. 1 in ch. 4 and Appendix V III). Of 
the m a jo rity , a l i t t l e  over 12 per cen t th ink  th a t the o rg an isa tio n  
underwent a m erely q u a l i t a t iv e  change and simply became b e tte r  a f te r  
1981; the bulk , however (alm ost 68 per cent of the p a rty  members), 
believe that during ND's f i r s t  period in government party  organisation 
was v ir tu a lly  non-ex isten t, and tha t i t  was developed only a f te r  th e ir
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party  had gone in to  opposition —and mainly in order to combat PASOK 
which was organised much more e ffe c tiv e ly .
The large m ajority of L arissa party  members claim th a t they a ttend  
ND meetings regu larly  and f a i r ly  o ften , although in Kalohori over h a lf 
of the members do not a ttend  regu la rly . The reason for th is  may be, tha t 
in a v illa g e  people ccniminicate and so c ia lis e  with each o ther on a much 
more continuous and permanent basis than in a c ity ;  o r, th a t the local 
o rg an isa tio n  in Kalohori does not perform  the ro le  provided by the 
s ta tu te s , fo r reasons we sha ll explain below.
By and large , sane 80 per cent of the rank and f i l e  claim  th a t they 
spend much time on loca l o rg a n isa tio n a l a c t i v i t i e s ,  as a g a in s t the  
remaining 20 per cent who do not. Nevertheless, the general impression 
gained fron numerous discussions with mostly ordinary members but a lso  
h igher p a rty  o f f i c i a l s  in the a rea  is  th a t th is  p ic tu re  does not 
ex ac tly  r e f l e c t  r e a l i t y ;  in ten se  o rg a n isa tio n a l a c t iv i ty  is  observed 
mainly before general e lec tio n s when new members re g is te r , most lik e ly  
in order to  e s ta b l is h  a fu tu re  personal claim  —of a c l i e n t e l i s t i c  
character, i t  is  true— in case the party  is  voted in to  o f f ic e ;* 36 * o r, 
more o fte n , ju s t  before  in tra -p a r ty  e le c t io n s , when new members a re  
taken in en masse and contrary to the s ta tu to ry  provisions, so le ly  in
Table VI. 12: Party Members* Attendance a t Organisation Meetings
L arissa Kalohori Total
Regularity of p a rtic ip a tio n number % number % number %
Yes 117 85.40 9 42.86 126 79.75
Once a week or more often 47 34 30 — —— 47 29 75
Ckice a fo rtn igh t 26 18 98 2 09 52 28 17 72
Once a month 34 24 82 5 23 81 39 24 68
Every three months or less often 10 07 30 2 09 52 12 07 60
No 20 14 60 12 57 14 32 20 25
Total 137 100 00 21 100 00 158 100 00
order to vote fo r th e i r  r e l a t iv e s ,  f r ie n d s  and acq u a in tan ces . ( 371 In 
both cases, once the e lec tio n  is  over, th e ir  p a r ty -a c tiv it ie s  are  a lso .
S ince e le c t io n s  were no t v e ry  f a r  away a t  th e  tim e of th e  
interview s, organ isational issues in general —b e tte r  co-ordination and 
com m u n ica tio n , th e  f u n c t io n in g  and e f f i c i e n c y  o f th e  lo c a l  
o rg a n isa tio n — were the  most im portant issu e s  the  m a jo rity  of the 
L arissa party  members (39.24 per cent) sa id  th e ir  organisation  had d ea lt 
w ith during  1988 (see Table VI. 13 b e lo w ).{38} The second major issue 
mentioned was information and b rie f in g  on ND’s p o l i t ic a l  programme and 
fu tu re  governmental p o l ic ie s ,  and on the p resen t p o l i t ic a l  s itu a tio n  
(37.34 per cen t and 22.15 per cen t r e s p e c t iv e ly ) .  This was c lo se ly  
fo llow ed  by e f f o r t s  made by th e  lo c a l com m ittees to  c o l l e c t  th e  
subscription fees, but a lso  by the rank and f i l e  and other supporters to 
r a is e  funds fo r f in an c in g  the  p a r ty 's  e le c tio n  campaign (32.28 per 
cen t). Additional a c t iv i t ie s  of the local o rganisations were the
Table VI. 13: Major A c tiv itie s  of the Local ND Organisation During 1988
L arissa Kalohori Total
Most important issue number % number % number %
Organisational issues (cctrmunica- 
tion /co -o rd ina tion , e ffic iency , 
new members' re g is tra tio n ) 60 43.80 2 09.52 62 39.24
Information and b rie fin g  the party  
members on ND's p o l i t ic a l  programme 58 42.34 1 04.76 59 37.34
Financial canpaign of the party 50 36.50 1 04.76 51 32.28
Dissemination and propaganda 
(inform people about ND's p o l i t ic a l  
programme, a t t r a c t  new vo ters) 36 26.28 2 09.52 38 24.05
B riefing on the current 
p o lit ic a l  s itu a tio n 34 24.82 1 04.76 35 22.15
Talks and public meetings on local 
issues (ag ricu ltu re , labour, e tc .) 22 16.06 5 23.81 27 17.09
None/Don' t  know 11 08.03 8 38.09 19 12.03
Other 6 04.38 3 14.29 9 05.70
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dissem ination of and propaganda fo r the p a rty ’s programme and p o lic ie s  
in  o rder to  a t t r a c t  new v o te rs  (24.05 per c e n t) ,  as well as p u b lic  
meetings and ta lk s  concerning issues of special local in te re s t (17.09 
per cen t).
Although p r io r  to  e le c t io n s  a l l  p a rty  o rg an isa tio n s  a re  in  f u l l  
swing, with new members appearing in the party  re g is te r ,  and sane who 
have become inactive  re tu m ig  to  the f ro n t- lin e , over 8 per cent of 
the rank and f i l e  in L arissa  and, most su rp rising ly , 38 per cent of 
those in Kalohori sa id  th e i r  o rg a n isa tio n  had d e a lt  w ith  v i r tu a l ly  
nothing important during the past year o r, a t le a s t, th a t they had no 
idea whether i t  had or no t. Notwithstanding the sp ec ific  problems and 
shortcomings concerning ND lo ca l o rg an isa tio n s  in the a rea, which we 
shall discuss below (and which to  same extent explain the ND members1 
ind iffe rence), i t  should be noted th a t the m ajority  of these members 
both in Larissa and in Kalohori admitted tha t they never attended any 
m ee tin g  o f  t h e i r  lo c a l  o r g a n i s a t io n s  (sev en  and s ix  members 
re sp ec tiv e ly ).
The d a ta  of Tables V I .14 and 15 below re v e a l, we th in k , a h igh ly  
illum inating p ic tu re  concerning the a c t iv i t ie s ,  e ffic iency  and overa ll 
development of ND’s o rgan isation  in the Department. As is  shown in Table 
VI. 14, more than 75 per cent of the p a r ty 's  rank and f i l e  think th a t 
th e ir  organisation has one or more problems, whereas only a l i t t l e  over 
a f i f t h  th ink  o therw ise . The drawbacks of major importance — i . e . ,  
in su ffic ien t financing, lack of professional cadres and d isc ip lin e  among 
the  rank and f i l e ,  poor communication between the base and the 
higher echelons of the p a rty  h ierarchy, and lack of respect fo r in tr a ­
p a rty  dem ocratic procedures in  decision-m aking— a re  p re c is e ly  the 
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f a r e l a t i v e l y  new o rg a n is a t io n  th a t  i s  no t y e t 
in s t i tu t io n a l is e d  and has to  overcome a good many m a l-p rac tic e s  and 
outmoded tra d itio n s  —they can be summed up under the label
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Table V I-14: Current Maior Problems o f  th e  Local O rganisation
L arissa  Kalohori Total
Problems of the local o raan isa tion number % number % numbei %
Financial problems 72 52.55 2 09.52 74 46.84
None/Don't know 31 22.63 4 19.05 35 22.15
Lack of professional pa rty - 
o ff ic ia ls ,  renewal in general 23 16.79 1 04.76 24 15.19
Lack of d isc ip lin ed  and p o l i t i ­
c a lly  educated party  members 14 10.22 9 42.86 23 14.56
Poor communication between base 
and higher party  organs 16 11.68 5 23.81 21 13.29
Lack of in te rnal democratic 
procedures, personal antagonisms, 
nepotism, and oaleokonmatismos 18 13.14 __ ___ 18 11.39
General in a c tiv ity /in e ff ic ie n c y 14 10.22 3 14.29 17 10.76
D iff ic u ltie s  in a t t ra c t in g  and 
reg is te rin g  new members 9 06.57 2 09.52 11 06.96
Other 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
paleokarmatismos. ( 39 * Indeed, when financ ia l shortage is  regarded as 
the most important problem (which simply means tha t party  members do not 
even pay th e ir  standard subscrip tion  fee s), i t  follows th a t th is  kind 
of local o rg an isa tio n  is  any th ing  but e f f i c ie n t ;  when p a rty  members 
themselves f a i l  to  meet th e ir  minimal ob liga tions, then the organisation  
as a whole w ill su ffe r from general ind ifference, in a c tiv ity , lack of 
professional and d isc ip lin ed  members, and poor communication between the 
higher and lower party  le v e ls .( 401
This does not mean, of course, th a t i f  there were no problems of a 
financial nature a l l  the o thers would be solved autom atically? in  the 
local organisation of Kalohori i t  is  the lack of p o l i t ic a l ly  educated 
and d isc ip lined  party  members that is  given major importance, and poor 
communication between the party  base and the higher party  organs as well 
as general ineffic iency  and in a c tiv ity  are  considered more serious than
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financ ia l shortages (which are  ranked in fourth  place, alongside the 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  of a ttra c tin g  and re g is te r in g  new members). I t  would appear 
th a t  a l l  the  c h a r a c te r i s t ic  fe a tu re s  of t r a d i t io n a l  p a rty  p o l i t i c s  
—prevalence of p a tro n -c lien t re la tio n s , the predominance of the local 
deputies, p o l i t ic a l  barons and p e rso n a lis tic  p o l i t ic s  in general, and 
the absence of any form of impersonal party  organisation in the area— 
have been indelib ly  stamped on peop le 's  minds and h ab its , and are  s t i l l  
a ffec tin g  ND's organisational functioning and fu rth er development. ( 41}
The above argument i s  supported  by the  ND p a rty  members' general 
a t t i tu d e  v is-o i-v is  th e i r  lo ca l o rg a n isa tio n s  in the  Department of 
L a r i s s a ,  as t h i s  i s  s e t  ou t in  T ab les VI. 15 and 15a b e lo w .( 42} 
Notwithstanding minor d ifferences —the m ajority  of the rank and f i l e  
in Larissa (57.66 per cent) a re  s a t is f ie d  with the overall performance 
and a c t iv i t i e s  of th e i r  lo ca l p a rty  o rg a n isa tio n s , whereas only  a 
m inority (33.33 per cent) is  in Kalohori)— the general irrpression is  
th a t members' opinions a re  divided: a l i t t l e  over h a lf of than a re  more 
or less s a t is f ie d , with the remainder only p a rtly  so (37.34 per cent) or 
not a t  a l l  (8.23 per cen t). The most widespread wish among the l a t t e r  is  
tha t they would lik e  th e ir  local organisation  to  be more ac tiv e , liv e ly  
and e ff ic ie n t;  more information and b rie f in g  on issues of p o l i t ic a l  and 
ideological in te re s t to  the rank and f i l e  comes second, and g rea te r 
emphasis on democratic p rin c ip le s  and m eritocracy in the functioning 
and decision-making w ithin the o rganisation  is  th ird . Lastly, ND members
Table VI. 15: General A ttitude  Towards the Local ND Organisation
L arissa Kalohori Total
Degree of S a tisfac tio n number % number % number %
S a tis fied 79 57.66 7 33.33 86 54.43
P artly  s a t is f ie d 49 35.77 10 47.62 59 37.34
D issa tisfied 9 06.57 4 19.05 13 08.23
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
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Table VI. 15a: Major E xp ecta tion s o f  th e  R an k -a n d -file  Party Members
L arissa Kalohori Total
Major expectations numbei % numbei % number %
More e ff ic ie n t  a c tiv i ty  and 
liv e lin e ss  of the local 
organisation 32 23.36 3 14.29 35 22.15
More information and b rie fin g s  on 
p o lit ic a l  and ideological issues 
to  rank-and-file  members 21 15.33 2 09.52 23 14.56
Ehphasis on democratic p rin c ip le s  
and m eritocracy instead of nepotism 14 10.22 1 04.76 15 09.49
Renewal of p a r ty -o f f ic ia ls , 
g rea ter professionalism 11 08.03 2 09.52 13 08.23
Other 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
would l ik e  to  see th e i r  p a r ty  employ new p o l i t i c a l  personnel of a 
p ro fe s s io n a l  and m an ag eria l k in d  and more modern methods, and to  
d is s o c ia te  i t s e l f  from the  t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  barons and th e i r  
outwcm p rac tices .
A fu r th e r  p o in t to  be made concerning the ra n k -a n d -f ile  members' 
a t t i tu d e  v is-A -v is  the  p a r ty  le a d e rsh ip  is  t h i s : 143 * although the 
m ajo rity  b e liev e  the  ND lead e rsh ip  to  d i f f e r  —e n tire ly  or in p a rt— 
from th a t of o th e r p a r t i e s ,  th e re  i s  a s ig n if ic a n t  d ivergence of 
opinions between the L arissa  and Kalohori members. As shown in Table 
VI. 16 below, only 5.84 per cent of the L arissa ND members see no 
d ifference whatsoever, as against a s ta r t l in g  42.86 per cent of th e ir  
counterparts in Kalohori who thereby prove t  house Ives to be more 
pragmatic and b e tte r  informed on th is  issue. (For a d iscussion of the 
way the ND leadership functions and makes decisions, see section  4 in 
ch. 4.) Moreover, party  members in L arissa consider the d ifferences to 
be more a m atter of va lues such as se rio u sn ess  and r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  
tra d itio n , logic, d ign ity , e tc . (a ll  of which they see as charac terising  
the ND leadership), and less a m atter of observing in te rnal democratic
310
Table VI. 16: ND Members' A tt itu d e s  Towards the Party Leadership
L arissa Kalohori Total
D ifference between the ND leade-
rsh ip  and tha t of o ther p a rtie s number % number % number %
Yes 110 80.29 7 33.33 117 74.05
Some 17 12.41 3 14.29 20 12.66
No 8 05.84 9 42.86 17 10.76
Don't know 2 01.46 2 09.52 4 02.53
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
I f  ves/scme, th is  is  because:
i t  is  characterised  by serious­
ness and re sp o n s ib ility , desc­
ent performance, d ig n ity  and 
m orality , t ra d itio n , logic , 
p re s tig e  and q u a lity 83 60.58 2 09.52 85 53.80
i t  is  dem ocratically e lec ted , 
i t s  options can be questioned, 
i t  is  not au tarch ic 49 35.77 7 33.33 56 35.44
Other 8 05.84 1 04.76 9 05.70
procedures in decision-making —whereas the Kalohori party  members think 
exactly  the opposite. All in a l l ,  for the m ajority of the party  members 
in the Department of L arissa the ND party  leadership d if fe rs  from those 
of the o th er p a r t ie s  —p a r t ic u la r ly  th a t  of PASOK and i t s  leader A. 
Papandreou (who was generally  denounced for being au tarch ic , despotic 
and une th ica l)— not so much because i t  functions dem ocratically, but 
because, in th e i r  view, i t  p re sen ts  a more congenial and fa m ilia r  
p ro f ile  tha t re f le c ts  a l l  the values they have tra d itio n a lly  considered 
as true , important, and trustw orthy.
This p o in t of view is  born out by the  p a rty  members' r e p l ie s  (in  
Table V I.17 below) concerning the sp e c ific  reasons for ND's appeal to  
the v o te r s .( 44 * Half of the rank and f i l e  (46.71 per cent in L arissa, 
and 66.67 per cent in Kalohori) believe tha t the most important reason 
for ND's appeal to  the e le c to ra te  is  the very same one th a t, in th e ir
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Table V I.17: Most Important Reasons fo r  ND’s  Appeal to  th e  E le c to r a te
L arissa Kalohori Total
Reasons fo r ND's voter-appeal number % number % number %
R e liab ility /sen se  of respo­
n s ib i l i ty ,  ND's option for 
tra n q u ility , order and secu­
r i ty ,  anti-extrem ism 64 46.71 14 66.67 79 50.00
Ideology 66 48.17 1 04.76 67 42.41
Political/econom ic programme 63 45.98 — ----- 63 39.87
Leadership 35 25.55 2 09.52 37 23.42
Organisation 25 18.25 1 04.76 26 16.46
A c tiv itie s  of ND deputies 
in th e ir  constituencies 22 16.06 1 04.76 23 14.56
Other 10 07.30 4 19.05 14 08.86
view, characterised  and d if fe re n tia te d  the ND leadership from th a t of 
the other p a rtie s  (see Table V I.16 above); the party  leadership i t s e l f  
is  given second place in Kalohori and fourth  in the Department, and the 
organisation ranks f i f th .  The ND ideology is  considered as the second 
most appealing fea tu re  (by 42.41 per cent of the rank and f i l e ) ,  mainly 
because for L arissa party  members ideological reasons have the highest 
p r io r ity  (48.17 per cen t). The p a r ty 's  p o l it ic a l  and economic programme 
ranks th ird  in importance in the Department (39.87 per cen t), although 
not a sing le  member in Kalohori thought i t  worth mentioning. Last but 
not le a s t ,  the  a c t i v i t i e s  of ND d ep u ties  and p o l i t ic ia n s  in each 
constituency are thought to con tribu te  to shaping an appealing p ro f ile  
for the party  by 14.56 per cent of the rank and f i l e .  This brings us to 
the issue of c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s  as perceived by the party  base in 
the Department, which is  discussed in what follows.
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3 .3  Party members* a t t i t u d e s  towards more general p o l i t i c a l  and
ideological issues
One of the irost s a lie n t c h a ra c te r is tic s  of Greek p o l i t ic s  p r io r  to  
the inposition of m ilita ry  ru le  in 1967 was the absence of any form of 
p a rty -p o litic a l o rgan isa tions, and the to ta l  control p o lit ic ia n s  exerted 
over th e ir  vo ters through the extensive use of c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s . 
In the e a r ly  years a f t e r  th e  r e s to ra t io n  of democracy in  1974 th is  
s itu a tio n  cannot be sa id  to  have changed much; since ND had fa ile d  to 
c re a te  a m ass-o rg an isa tio n , p a tro n -c lie n t  re la tio n s h ip s  and personal 
favours in exchange for the peop le 's  vote (ro u s fe ti ) continued to  play 
an inportant r o l e . ( 45 * That the Department of L arissa was no exception 
in th is  respect is  shown by the data in Table VI. 18 below. ‘ 46}
Table VI. 18: Maintenance of C l ie n te l is t ic  Relations Under ND Governments 
1974-1981
L arissa  Kalohori Total
Was there c lien te lism ? number % number % number %
Yes 39 28.47 15 71.43 54 34.18
No 9 06.57 1 04.76 10 06.33
In part 54 39.41 2 09.52 56 35.44
Don't know 35 25.55 3 14.29 38 24.05
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
I f  yes/in  p a r t , to  what ex ten t?
The same as before 23 16.79 14 66.67 37 23.42
A s h if t  to some degree of 
m eritocracy and the ra tio n a ­
lis a tio n  of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e 62 45.25 2 09.52 64 40.50
Other 8 05.84 1 04.76 9 05.70
I f  no, what has happened instead?
Rousfeti was abolished in 
favour of m eritocracy 7 05.11 1 04.76 8 05.06
Other 2 01.46 ----- 2 01.27
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A mere 5.06 per cent of the party  members in  the area believe tha t 
ro u s fe ti  has been ab o lish ed , and c lie n te lis m  ceased to  be of any 
importance in everyday p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  a f te r  1974 and during the whole 
f i r s t  pe riod  of ND in o f f ic e .  N otw ithstanding the r e la t iv e ly  high 
percentage of those who chose not to  give a d e fin ite  answer (38 members, 
almost a quarter of the t o t a l ) ,* 47’ the large m ajority  (nearly 70 per 
cen t) considered th a t  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  p ra c tic e s  were s t i l l  o p e ra tin g . 
However, many (40.50 per c en t) , thought c lien te lism  had begun to  lessen, 
and tha t p o l it ic a l  contacts and acquaintances no longer secured access 
to  public appointments e tc . to  the extent they had in the p as t; l i t t l e  
by l i t t l e  c r i t e r i a  of m erit were a lso  being taken in to  account now. A 
sm aller percen tage (23.42 pe r cen t) thought th a t th e re  had been no 
change a t  a l l ,  and th a t  c l ie n te l is m  a f t e r  1974 had kept i t s  f u l l  
importance from the pre-coup p e rio d .* 48’
Concerning the ex is te n ce  o f c l i e n t e l i s t i c  r e la t io n s  during  
PASOK's period in o ff ic e , i t  seems a t f i r s t  glance th a t the opinions of 
the rank and f i l e  in L arissa are  deeply divided. As Table VI. 19 below 
show s, h a l f  o f th e  p a r ty  members b e l i e v e  t h a t  p a t r o n - c l i e n t  
re la tionsh ip s continued to e x is t  to more or less the same extent as in 
the p ast, whereas one-th ird  (31.01 per cent) think d iffe re n tly . However, 
c lo s e r  exam ination of the  l a t t e r ' s  opinion rev e a ls  th a t they have 
id en tified  the remarkably d is t in c t  phenomenon, we have already described 
as "party-d irected  patronage", or "bureaucratic c lien te lism ". In o ther 
words, under PASOK government the  sp ec ia l r e la tio n s h ip  between the 
deputy and the v o te r  d is in te g ra te d  in favour of the o rgan ised  p a rty  
machine, which has now become the main patron for the d is tr ib u tio n  of 
spo ils and favours to the party  follow ers, and for control over public 
appointments.*4 9’
All in a l l ,  the overwhelming m ajority  (s lig h tly  over 80 per cent) of 
the rank and f i l e  agree tha t not only did patron-cl ien t re la tio n s
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Table VI. 19: M aintenance o f  C l i e n t e l i s t i c  R e la tio n s  Under PASOK
Governments 1981-1989
L arissa Kalohori Total
Was there clien te lism ? number % number % number %
Yes 52 37.96 17 80.96 69 43.67
No 47 34.30 2 09.52 49 31.01
In part 10 07.30 — ------------ 10 06.33
Don't know 28 20.44 2 09.52 30 18.99
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
I f  ves/in  p a r t , to what extent?
The same as before 44 32.12 17 80.96 61 38.61
A s h if t  to  seme degree of 
meritocracy and the ra tio n a ­
l is a t io n  of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e 12 08.76 . . _ 12 07.60
Other 6 04.38 _____ _____— 6 03.79
I f  no, what has happened insteac1?
Rousfeti was in s t itu tio n a lis e d  
by PASOK1s local and o ther 
organisations 46 33.57 2 09.52 48 30.38
Other 1 .73 — ------------ 1 .63
continue to e x is t during PASOK's period in government, but th a t they 
were in s titu tio n a lis e d  v ia  the organised party  machine. On the o ther 
hand , PASOK p ro u d ly  c la im e d  t h a t  i t  had s t r u c k  c l i e n t e l i s m  a 
considerable blow with the in troduction  of the so-called  l i s t  system, 
whereby i t  was the party  that decided who would stand for parliam ent. In 
other words, the e le c to ra te  could no longer match a preference-cross fo r 
one p a rtic u la r  candidate, but only vote fo r the party  as a whole; the 
l i s t s  of candidates and, most important, th e ir  order of appearance, were 
to be drawn up so le ly  by each party  leadership se p a ra te ly .( 50 ’
I t  seems that fo r most of the rank and f i l e  in Larissa the a b o litio n  
of the old preference-cross and in troduction  of the new system did  not 
serve the purpose i t s  inventors expected. ( 511 As shown in Table V I.20
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below, only 22 per cen t of them thought th a t  the new l i s t  system 
promoted p o li t ic a l  m orality  and modernised the country 's p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  
More sp e c if ic a lly , under 9 per cent believed th a t the p o l it ic a l  struggle  
in  general was inproved and r a t io n a l is e d ;  6.33 per cen t sa id  th a t 
ro u sfe ti p rac tices  were no longer q u ite  as cannon as in the past; and
Table V I.20: ND Members' Views Concerning the A bolition of the 
Preference Cross (by PASOK in 1985)
L arissa  Kalohori Total
Modem i sa t i on/
Improvement of P o lit ic s number % number % number %
Yes 19 13.87 6 28.57 25 15.82
In p a rt 10 07.30 — ------------ 10 06.33
No 102 74.45 12 57.14 114 72.15
Don't know 6 04.38 3 14.29 9 05.70
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
I f  yes/in  p a r t , why?
Personal favours a re  not 
as cannon as in the past 8 05.84 2 09.52 10 06.33
In tra -p a rty  democracy is  s t r e ­
ngthened and in s t itu tio n a lis e d 9 06.57 — ------------ 9 05.70
The p o lit ic a l  strugg le  has been 
improved and ra tio n a lise d 10 07.30 4 19.05 14 08.86
Other 5 03.65 _____ — 5 03.16
If  no, why not?
The leader has become 
omnipotent 45 32.85 6 28.57 51 32.28
Voters are  not free  to  se lec t 
the candidate of th e ir  choice 71 51.82 7 33.33 78 49.37
Deputies have no freedom of 
opinion, do not care about 
th e ir  voters 46 33.57 2 09.52 48 30.38
C lientelism  (ro u sfe ti)  has 
been in s t itu tio n a lis e d  by 
the professional and other 
organisations of the party  
in government 34 24.82 1 04.76 35 22.15
Other 7 05.11 — ------------ 7 04.43
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5.7 per cent thought th a t inner-party  democracy had been strengthened 
and in s titu tio n a lis e d . On the o ther hand, the large m ajority  (over 70 
per cent) believed exactly  the opposite; almost h a lf of the rank and 
f i l e  complained th a t, due to  the new l i s t  system, the vo ters were no 
longer able to  ind icate  the candidate of th e ir  choice. This gave the 
party  leader a position  of omnipotence (according to  32.28 per cent of 
the  ND members), and the  MPs fo r  th e i r  p a r t  were in te re s te d  only  in  
m anitesting th e ir  obedience to him (so they would be included in the 
next l i s t )  —thus losing th e ir  independence as well as th e ir  in te re s t  in 
th e ir  vo ters . This view was shared by 30.38 per cent of the rank and 
f i l e .  Last but no less important, a  l i t t l e  over o n e -f if th  of the p a rty  
members in the area (22.15 per cent) believed th a t, d esp ite  the above 
sh o rtcom ings, th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  l i s t  system  encouraged the  
transform ation of personal c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s  in to  p a rty -d irec ted  
patronage.152 *
By and la rg e  th e n , th e  m a jo r i ty  o f th e  p a r ty  members in  th e  
Department of L arissa believed th a t c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s  did continue 
to e x is t, a lb e it  to a le s se r  ex ten t, during the f i r s t  period of ND's 
governm ent; th a t  they  became i n t e n s i f i e d  d u rin g  PASOK's term and 
transform ed in to  b u rea u c ra tic  c l ie n te l is m ; and th a t  the  s i tu a t io n  
worsened fu rth e r, due to PASQK's in troduction  of the l i s t  system in 1985 
and th e  a b o l i t io n  of th e  p r e f e r e n c e -c ro s s .  However, ND was n o t 
considered blameless in the m atter, fo r i t  had fa ile d  to  provide i t s  
g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  w ith  the  necessary  procedures th a t  would 
guarantee in tra -p a rty  democracy and give the rank and f i l e  a b e tte r  say 
in the decision-making process. This is  manifested by the data in Table 
V I.21 below.( 53}
We see tha t more than h a lf of the party  members both in L arissa  and 
Kalohori (51.82 per cent and 52.38 per cent) want in tra -p a r ty  e lec tio n s  
on the e lec to ra l l i s t s  drawn up by the party  base, p r io r  to  the f in a l
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Table VI.21: ND Members* A ttitudes Towards Candidates* Nomination 
Procedure
L arissa Kalohori Total
Should th is  be the ND p reside-
n t 's  exclusive re sp o n sib ility ? number % number % number %
Yes 52 37.96 6 28.57 58 36.71
No 85 62.04 15 71.43 100 63.29
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
I f  no, what urould you personally  p re fe r?
(a) Exclusive re sp o n s ib ility  
by the p a r ty 's  g rass-roo ts 
organisation 14 10.22 4 19.05 18 11.39
(b) Formation of the e le c to ra l 
l i s t s  by in tra -p a rty  e lec tio n s 
p r io r  to the p re s id e n t 's  
decision 71 51.82 11 52.38 82 51.90
decision by the ND p res iden t. Fewer members (10.22 per cent in L arissa 
and 19.05 per cen t in  K alohori) expressed  a much more ra d ic a l  view, 
namely tha t the p arty  presiden t should have nothing a t a l l  to do with 
th e s e  l i s t s .  C o n v erse ly , and d e s p i te  th e  g e n e ra l condemnation of 
c l i e n te l i s t i c  p rac tices  and disapproval of the lis t-sy stem  in troduction, 
a considerable percentage of the rank and f i le  (almost 38 per cent in 
L a r is s a  and 28.57 p e r  c en t in  K a lo h o ri) would acc ep t t h a t ,  th u s 
themselves play no p a rt in drawing up the l i s t  of candidates.
As regards the  p a r ty  members' a t t i t u d e s  tow ards o th e r  g e n e ra l 
p o l it ic a l  and ideological issues, we have already come across most of 
them e a r l ie r  when examining ND's p o l i t ic a l  personnel, o rganisation , and 
ideology. Suffice i t  to  re c a ll  here tha t the overwhelming m ajority  of 
the rank and f i l e  viewed ND as something new in Greek p o li t ic s  (and not 
as a continuation of the p re -d ic ta to rsh ip  ERE), inspired , created , and 
in f lu e n c e d  s o l e ly  by i t s  s t r o n g  and c h a r i s m a t ic  l e a d e r ,  C. 
Karam anlis.( 54} I t  was mainly —if  not exclusively— he who was c red ited  
w ith  th e  r e -e s ta b l is h m e n t  and smooth fu n c tio n in g  of d em o cra tic
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in s titu tio n s  during the  e a r ly  post-1974 years and w ith  the  co u n try ’s 
e n try  in to  the EEC, both of th ese  being considered  as ND's m ajor 
achievements during i t s  f i r s t  term in o ff ice . While in  opposition, i t  
was the 1986 m unicipal-elect ion v ic to ry , when the party  saw th ree  of i t s  
best-known deputies e lec ted  as majors of Athens, Salonica and P iraeus, 
tha t was viewed as the p a r ty 's  g rea te s t triumph (and as s ig n a llin g  ND's 
iniTunent re tu rn  to o f f ic e ) , plus i t s  decent, res tra in ed  and constructive  
o p p o s itio n  in  p a r l ia m e n t, and th e  d em o cra tic  o rg a n is a tio n  of the  
p a r ty .‘ 55 *
However, the  q u estio n  th a t  re q u ire s  sp ec ia l exam ination a t  th is  
p o in t is  the p a rty  members' acquain tance w ith  ND's ideology, both 
because the  neo -1 ibera lism /neo-conserva tism  put forward in  1985 was 
something new and r e l a t iv e ly  unknown, and a lso  because i t  was q u ite  
d i f f e r e n t  from the so -c a lle d  ra d ic a l  lib e ra lism  th a t  had been ND's 
o f f ic ia l  ideology under the leadership  of C. Karamanlis. Most irrportant, 
i t  should be remembered th a t  n e ith e r  the ND members and su p p o rte rs  
during the p a r ty 's  early  years and u n til  i t s  f i r s t  congress in May 1979 
(when rad ical libera lism  was o f f ic ia l ly  introduced), nor the organised 
rank and f i l e  la te r  and u n til  the second congress in February 1986 (when 
the newly adopted n e o - l ib e r a l  p r in c ip le s  of th e  m a n ife s to  "A new 
proposal for freedom" were sanctioned), ever had a say in e labo rating  
and formulating the p a r ty 's  ideology. Ju st like  rad ical libe ra lism  had 
been inposed from above so le ly  by Karamanlis, so the 1985 m anifesto was 
debated and formulated by a small team of sp e c ia lis ts  of high standing 
in the party , leaving the r e s t  of ND uninformed and uninvolved.( 56}
Indeed, as Table V I.22 below shows, fewer than h a lf of the rank and 
f i l e  in both Larissa and in Kalohori (43.79 per cent and 42.86 per cent) 
sa id  they were fam iliar with the p a r ty 's  basic tenets as elaborated  in 
the 1985 ideological m an ifesto .( 57’ On the o ther hand, almost one in 
every three members (31.39 per cent in Larissa and 38.09 per cent in
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Table V I .22: Party Members* F a m ilia r ity  w ith  ND's Ideology
L arissa Kalohori Total
Are you acquainted with ND's
ideoloay (1985 m anifesto)? number % number % number %
Yes 60 43.79 9 42.86 69 43.67
In part 34 24.82 4 19.05 38 24.05
No 43 31.39 8 38.09 51 32.28
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
Kalohori) admitted they had never read ND's ideological m anifesto, while 
another considerable percentage both in L arissa and in Kalohori (24.82 
per cent and 19.05 per cent) sa id  they had only p a r t ia l  knowledge of i t .  
With the above in mind, i t  is  h a rd ly  s u rp r is in g  th a t p a rty  members' 
opinions concerning the  id eo lo g ica l id e n t i ty  o f ND vary  to  a very  
considerable ex ten t, as is  shown by Table V I.23 below .( 58 *
Table V I.23: Party Members' Views of ND's Ideological Id en tity
L arissa  Kalohori Total
ND desiqnated as: number % number % number %
Liberal party 87 63.50 9 42.86 96 60.76
C entre-right party 31 22.63 10 47.62 41 25.95
N eo-liberal party 23 16.79 — ----- 23 14.56
Conservative party 17 12.41 — ----- 17 10.76
Christian-dem ocratic party 10 07.30 3 14.29 13 8.23
Centre party 5 03.65 1 04.76 6 03.79
Popular party 6 04.38 — ----- 6 03.79
Social-democratic party 1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
Other 6 04.38 — ----- 6 03.79
What is  remarkable a t  f i r s t  glance, is  tha t the m ajority of L arissa 
party  members (63.5 per cent) think of ND as a lib e ra l party , whereas 
th e ir  counterparts in kalohori (47.62 per cent) see i t  as a party  of
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the  c e n tr e - r ig h t ;  converse ly , 42.86 per cen t of the  l a t t e r  would 
describe ND as a lib e ra l p a rty , while only 22.63 per cent in L arissa 
view i t  as a party  of the c e n tre -r ig h t. But what seems most important to  
us is  th a t ,  whereas 16.79 p er cen t of the  rank and f i l e  in  L a rissa  
designate ND a neo -libera l p a rty , not one member in Kalohori thought 
likew ise  (nor d id  any of the  l a t t e r  th ink  of i t  as a co n se rv a tiv e , 
social -dem ocratic, or popular p a rty ) . O verall, however, and desp ite  the 
confusion in  the  p a rty  members' minds on th is  issu e  (s im ila r  to  the  
confusion with regard to the p a r ty 's  top hierarchy —see sections 2 and 
3 in ch. 5), almost 40 per cent of the rank and f i l e  in the Department 
of L a rissa  as a whole do not — in p la in  defiance  of the  o f f i c i a l  
ideological d e c la ra tio n s  of th e i r  lead e rsh ip — consider ND a l ib e ra l  
party .
Another sp e c if ic  issue on which the o f f ic ia l  position  of ND is  qu ite  
d e f in i te  concerns the q u estio n  o f whether o r not ND rep re se n ts  a 
p a r tic u la r  social c la ss ; time and again a l l  ND leaders and higher party  
members and deputies have re i te ra te d  that ND is  a popular party  in the 
sense th a t i t  appeals to  a l l  and everybody, and represents no special 
i n t e r e s t s  o r c la s s  w h a tso e v e r . 159} However, our r e s e a rc h  in  th e  
Department of L a rissa  showed th a t  th is  p o s itio n  was not unanimously 
shared by the rank and f i l e ,  as shown by Table V I.24 below.( 60 * As might 
have been expected, the m ajority  (63.92 per cent) of party  members agree 
with the o f f ic ia l  ND declara tion  and deny tha t th e ir  party  id e n tif ie s  
with or rep resen ts a ce rta in  socia l c la ss ; on the o ther hand, almost 
30 per cent of the rank and f i l e  think otherwise. Most (20.25 per cent) 
of th e se  members a re  p e rsu ad ed  t h e i r  p a r ty  re p re se n ts  m ainly the 
in te r e s ts  of the  m iddle c la s s ,  ano ther 10.76 per cen t those of the  
upper-m iddle c la s s ,  and a 8.23 per cent those of the  u p p e r-c la ss  
bourgeoisie ( th is  la s t  is  meant to comprise big c a p i ta l is ts ,  shipowners, 
in d u s tr ia l is ts ,  e tc . ,  in o ther words the plutocracy, with which,
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Table V I .24: P arty Members* O pinions Concerning ND and C lass
Represen t a t i on
L a r issa  Kalohori T otal
ND and c la ss  rep resen ta tion number % number % number %
Yes 44 32.12 3 14.29 47 29.75
Middle c la ss 29 21.17 3 14.29 32 20.25
Upper-middle c la ss 16 11.68 1 04.76 17 10.76
Upper-class bourgeoisie 13 09.49 — ----- 13 08.23
Other 4 02.92 — ----- 4 02.53
No 83 60.58 18 85.71 101 63.92
Don't know 10 07.30 __ ___ 10 06.33
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
according to  PASOK's and the o p position 's  a llega tions and accusations, 
ND id e n t i f i e s  and m ainly re p re s e n ts ) .  Whether o r not they personally 
iden tify  w ith one of these socia l c lasses  l ie s  beyond the scope of th is  
s tu d y . What m a tte r s  h e re  i s  th a t  th e s e  members su b s c r ib e  to  th e  
opposition 's  accusation tha t ND n e ith er id e n tif ie s  with nor expresses 
the in te re s ts  of the lower working c la ss , which is  b e tte r  served and 
represented by PASOK and the p a r tie s  of the Left.
F in a l ly  th e r e  was th e  is s u e  of th e  rank  and f i l e ' s  p e rso n a l 
expectations from th e ir  pa rty , i f  i t  should resume o ff ice  in the near 
fu ture (as in fa c t i t  d id ). ND declared th a t i t  sought to govern again 
so as to r id  the country of PASOK and i t s  d isastrous p o lic ie s , tha t i t  
would re s to re  economic a c t iv i t y ,  boost development, e s ta b l is h  a free  
market, and encourage personal economic and p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e .  In other 
words, ND's re tu rn  to  power would b e n e f it  a l l  of the people and the 
country a t large . As shown in Table V I.25 below,*61’ 35.04 per cent of 
the rank and f i l e  in L arissa and more than h a lf in Kalohori agreed with 
these aims, and declared th a t they did not expect anything sp e c if ica lly  
for themselves: they considered a re tu rn  by ND to o ffice  as good for
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Table V I .25: P arty  Members* P ersonal E xp ecta tion s in  Case ND Resumes
O ffice
L arissa Kalohori Total
Members' personal expectations number % number % number %
Yes 89 64.96 10 47.62 99 62.66
Economic benefit 44 32.12 5 23.81 49 31.01
Social benefit 70 51.09 5 23.81 75 47.47
Other 13 09.49 — ----- 13 08.23
No 48 35.04 11 52.38 59 37.34
Total 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
the cannon w elfare. More than 60 per cent of the party  members in  the 
Department of L arissa  as a whole, however, admitted they did hope fo r  
some personal b e n e f i t  o r  an o th e r; alm ost h a lf  of them expected some 
benefit of a soc ia l kind (to  find a job or b e tte r  employment, or even to  
be given the opportunity  to  exercise  th e ir  p a r tic u la r  s k i l l s  and develop 
th e i r  p o te n t ia l  in  a s o c ia l ly  and econom ically h ea lth y  environment), 
whereas n e a rly  o n e - th ird  (31 per cen t) wanted some kind of d i r e c t  
economic benefit (a pay ra is e ,  or a decrease in in f la tio n  due to  the 
l ib e r a l i s a t io n  of the  market and the  la rg e -s c a le  p r iv a t is a t io n  of 
public en te rp rises  ND was promising). As M. Kontonassiou-Tsigani (ONNED 
president in L arissa) sa id ,
"This is  the c h a ra c te r is t ic  m entality  of many of the party  
m em bers, e s p e c i a l l y  th o s e  who r e c e n t l y  jo in e d  th e  
o rg a n isa tio n : they expect to  b e n e f it  p e rso n a lly  when ND 
resumes o ff ic e , instead  of looking fo r m eritocracy and the 
'E u ro p e a n is a t io n ' o f our p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  l i f e .  
Although se v e ra l ta lk s  have been ad ressed  to  the p a rty  
members on th is  is su e , th is  s p e c if ic  m e n ta lity  seems to  
p e rs is t ,  and most probably cannot be expected to disappear 
overn igh t". ( 62 *
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4. The N ational E le c t io n s  o f  18 June 1989
As the time fo r  the  parliam en ta ry  e le c t io n  of 18 June 1989 was 
coming c lo s e r , a l l  th e  c o u n try 's  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  in te n s if ie d  th e ir  
preparations, but e sp ec ia lly  the two big r iv a ls .  PASOK was campaigning 
for a  th ird  consecutive term in o ff ic e ; ND was about to  figh t i t s  most 
crucial b a tt le , because another defeat in f lic te d  by i t s  ch ief opponent 
was lik e ly  to put i t s  very existence in serious jeopardy.( 63} Moreover, 
for ND th is  was the f i r s t  chance to  te s t  in p rac tice  the provisions of 
the revised 1986 s ta tu te s , and espec ia lly  those that gave more power to  
i t s  rank and f i l e  (concerning, fo r  example, th e i r  o v e ra ll a c t iv e  
involvement in the campaign, and the composition of the e lec tion  l i s t s ) .  
In th is  se c tio n  we sh a ll  deal w ith  a l l  the above is su e s , as they 
manifested themselves in the Department of L arissa.
P rep ara tio n s fo r  the  e le c t io n  campaign s ta r te d  as e a r ly  as s ix  
months b e fo re  p o l l i n g  day; i t  was th e  f i r s t  tim e th e  p a r ty  had 
elaborated a d e ta ile d  and sp ec ific  plan, which i t  intended to  observe 
c lo se ly  a l l  the  way to  the  end. F i r s t  of a l l ,  a sp e c ia l e le c t io n -  
campaign commttee was se t up, consisting  of the most ac tiv e  members of 
the organisation in the area; i t  was a t a l l  times under the guidance of 
the departmental comnittee in L arissa. The Department was separated in to  
17 d is t in c t  sec to rs , each eparchy consisting  of three such secto rs and 
the c i ty  of L a ris sa  of two; head of each s e c to r  was a member of the  
departmental adm in istra tive  ccarmittee (NODE), in s tru c tin g  four to f iv e  
"p o litica l executives" (see below), who were to v i s i t  as many v illa g e s  
of th e ir  sector as possib le , to propagate and explain ND's p o l i t ic a l  
progranme. The whole e ffo r t  was to be supervised and co-ordinated by the 
NODE p r e s id e n t ,  law yer E. G ro u sso p o u lo s. ( 64 * In  o th e r  words, the  
p o lit ic a l  executives, the party  MPs and candidates and th e ir  personal 
p o l i t ic a l  en tourage, and the  v a rio u s local corrm ittees and the g rass­
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roots organisation  in  the  Department o f L a rissa  would a l l  be working 
together a t the same time. (Although th is  may well be cannon p rac tic e  
elsewhere, the concept was an innovation in Greek right-w ing p o l i t ic s .)
The new elem ent in  th e  e l e c to r a l  campaign was o f c o u rse  th e  
in s t i tu t io n  of the p o l i t ic a l  executives. According to a decision made by 
the ND presiden t alone, any member of the party  could simply go to  a 
cann ittee  (composed of four ND deputies) and ask to become a p o l i t ic a l  
execu tive .165 * But even i f  h is /h e r  app lica tion  was accepted, th is  did 
not mean automatic inclusion  in the candidate l i s t s ,  n e ith er was being a 
p o lit ic a l  executive necessary fo r such candidature. Nevertheless, being 
selected  as a p o l i t ic a l  executive was considered of major importance by 
a l l  who applied  fo r i t ,  who hoped th a t th e ir  se lec tion  would bu ild  up 
th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  image and p re s tig e , and give them an edge over o thers 
who remained more or less anonymous. ( 6 6 }
In  the  Department o f L a r is s a , a p p lic a tio n s  from 64 p a rty  members 
were approved, and only  a handful were f in a l ly  re je c te d . The new 
p o lit ic a l  executives formed small teams of 4-5 persons, to make up to  60 
speeches a month in the v illa g e s  u n til  p o llin g  day. The prime ob jec tive  
was the  w idest p o ss ib le  d issem ina tion  of ND's ideology and p o l i t ic a l  
prograrrme. The speeches were to be pre-scheduled and the departmental 
a d m in is tra tiv e  committee in  L a rissa  informed in  advance, so th a t the 
local o rganisations could be n o tif ie d , and they in turn would announce 
i t  to  the people in th e ir  area  and organise the occasion .( 67 *
For a number of reasons, the new in s t i tu t io n  of p o lit ic a l  executives 
did not perform as expected, n e ith e r in the Department of L arissa nor 
anywhere e ls e  in  the  coun try . F i r s t  of a l l ,  the absence of s p e c if ic  
c r i te r ia  in th e ir  se lec tio n  re su lte d  in a number of people being chosen 
who lacked the  s k i l l  fo r  the  t a s k ; ( 68} th e re  were cases when the 
speakers could not even answer the questions from th e ir  audience, thus 
obfuscating ra th e r  than c la r ify in g  ND's prograrrme and seriously  damaging
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the party  only a few months before the e lec tio n s . Secondly, seme local 
organisations of ND, esp ec ia lly  those under the influence of ce rta in  MPs 
o r p o l i t i c i a n s ,  r e f u s e d  to  c o - o p e r a te  and make th e  n e c e s s a ry  
preparations, so th a t many speeches were never made o r, worse s t i l l ,  
ended in fiasco . T hirdly, the m ajority  of the people in the countryside 
responded  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  e x e c u t iv e s ' a c t i v i t i e s  w ith  sk e p tic a l 
resentment, since these p rac tic e s  reminded than very much of the old 
t r a d i t i o n a l  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  m ethods and , in  a b ro ad e r  se n se , of 
deputocracy and pa 1 eokoirmatismos. <6 9 > L ast but not l e a s t ,  th is  newly 
adopted i n s t i t u t io n  caused g rievances and u n re s t w ith in  the p a rty  
i t s e l f ,  because (a) i t  was based on a decision taken by the president 
u n ila te ra lly , (b) i t  was not provided fo r by the party  s ta tu te s , and (c) 
i t  by-passed the g rass-ro o ts  o rgan isation , since the l a t t e r  had no say 
in  the  p o l i t i c a l  e x e c u tiv e s ' nom ination. As we sh a ll  see below, the 
options of the rank and f i l e  concerning the party  candidates' nomination 
were not always respected  by the party  p residen t, thus causing turmoil 
and discontent w ithin the party  ranks.
Almost two months b e fo re  th e  June 1989 e le c t i o n ,  th e  s p e c ia l  
departmental assembly duly convened in L arissa in order to  draw up the 
ND candidate l i s t  in the Department. ( 70 ’ A ll adm in istra tive-com m ittee  
members from the 96 local carrmittees, 14 rep resen ta tives of ND's youth 
o rg a n isa tio n  (ONNED), to g e th e r  w ith  the 24 members of the  p a r ty 's  
departmental committee in L arissa  (655 members in a l l ) ,  assembled on 23 
April 1989 and voted in a l i s t  of 16 candidates (excluding ND's former 
depu ties), which they sent to party  headquarters in Athens for fin a l 
s e le c tio n .( 71> Since the th ree  incumbent deputies in the Department (G. 
S o u flia s , N. K a tsaro s, and A. E f s t r a t i a d i s ) could , accord ing  to  the 
s t a t u t e s ,  a u to m a tic a l ly  s ta n d  ag a in  fo r  e le c t io n ,  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
committee and f in a lly  the party  leader were to  se lec t the remaining five  
from th is  l i s t ,  "b as ica lly  frcm among those proposed by the departmental
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assem blies". ( 72 ’ When f in a lly  the ND presiden t himself se lec ted  which 
candidates the department should f ie ld , he did not, as was expected, 
choose the  f i r s t  f iv e  l i s t e d ,  but r e je c te d  the  second and fo u rth  in  
favour of the s ix th  and seven th .4731
The tvjo excluded candidates were G. Bisbas and C. Karayiannis, both 
from the eparchy of E lassona. They enjoyed considerab le  g ra s s -ro o ts  
support, and were esteemed as among the youngest and most dynamic party  
members in the  a re a . This holds tru e  p a r t i c u la r ly  fo r  G. B isbas, a 
d e n tis t , who had twice (in  1982 and in 1986) been e lected  mayor of the 
sm all community o f L iv a d i , and became a member o f ND's lo c a l 
organisation  in 1974.474’ J . Papadimopoulos and D. Fakis who were chosen 
to be included a lso  came from Elassona, but were o lder and well-known ND 
p o lit ic ia n s  of the most tra d itio n a l kind (they could re ly  on personal 
c lie n te le s , and for th is  reason were not p a rtic u la rly  popular in the 
loca l o rg a n is a tio n ) . I t  would appear th a t  th is  was the  reason th e i r  
candidacies were p refe rred  to those of Bisbas and K arayiannis.475’
The announcement of the  f in a l  c an d id a te s ' l i s t  four weeks befo re  
p o llin g  day caused severe  rep e rcu ssio n s in  the  p a rty  ranks of the 
Department of L arissa, most important of which was the mass resignation  
of ND's loca l-o rgan isa tion  ccrrmittee in Livadi; several ONNED members in 
the area  resigned as w ell, and five  NODE members from Elassona followed 
s u i t .  The exclusion  of B isbas and K arayiannis a lso  had o th e r  s id e -  
e f f e c ts ,  among them the  re s ig n a tio n  of the  e n t i r e  local-community 
council in Livadi, and of various councils of other organ isations, such 
as the local a g ric u ltu ra l co-operative and the bu ild e rs ' trade union. 
All th is  brought ND's p re -e lec tio n  a c t iv i t ie s  to  a temporary h a lt  and 
damaged the  p a r ty 's  image to  some e x te n t. Before long, however, the 
a g i ta t io n  subsided , e s p e c ia l ly  a f t e r  B isbas ' p u b lic  declara tion  that 
everybody should se t personal ambitions and grievances aside and simply 
help the p a rty  resume o f f i c e .476’
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Once ND's c a n d id a te -lis t had became o f f ic ia l  and order was resto red  
in the p a r ty 's  Department of L arissa , the th ree  incumbent MPs and the 
five  new candidates took on the main share of e lectioneering ; most of 
the 64 p o l i t i c a l  e x e c u tiv e s  w ithdrew  from th e  p o l i t i c a l  s t ru g g le  
a ltogether, and those who did  not helped on the s id e lin e s , together with 
the various local committees and the rank and f i l e .  *77}
The main d ifference  between ND’s 1989 and e a r l ie r  e lec tio n  campaigns 
was that now the party  enjoyed a much b e tte r  g rass-roo ts o rganisation , 
both q u a n ti ta t iv e ly  and q u a l i ta t iv e ly .  In the  c i ty  of L a ris sa , fo r 
example, i t  was almost exclusively  the women's department tha t ca rried  
out the tiresome door-to-door delivery  of party  brochures and answered 
questions about ND's p o l i t i c a l  programme and s p e c if ic  p r i o r i t i e s  i f  
voted in to  o f f i c e . 178} Moreover, a l l  lo ca l o rg a n isa tio n s  in  L a rissa  
successfully  mobilised th e ir  members whenever a local candidate o r other 
higher party  o f f ic ia l  was scheduled to  give a speech. Their a c t iv i t ie s  
reached a peak during ND's cen tra l r a l ly  fo r Thessaly (which was held on 
28 May 1989 in L arissa), when party  leader C. M itsotakis gave a speech 
there in fron t of a huge aud ience.*791
In  th e  v i l l a g e s ,  how ever, th e  p a r ty  a p p a r a tu s  and lo c a l  
organisations were much less a c tiv e . The pace was se t mainly by ND's 
incumbent depu ties  —S o u flia s , K atsaros and E f s t r a t i a d i s . With long 
parliam entary careers behind them (Souflias was f i r s t  e lected  in 1974 
and continually  th e re a fte r , E fs tra tia d is  in 1977, and Katsaros in 1981), 
they had w ell-estab lished  personal c l i e n te l i s t i c  networks and re l ie d  on 
them ra th e r than on the local party  o rgan isations. In fa c t, they had 
themselves manoeuvred to  prevent the formation of local o rganisations in 
several v illag es  where, according to the s ta tu to ry  regu la tions, there 
were enough members to warrant i t . (80) Instead , they arranged fo r these 
members to  e n ro ll in L a ris sa , so th a t through them they could more 
e a s ily  co n tro l the more in f lu e n tia l  c i ty -c e n tre  o rgan isa tion , and so
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a lso  the  departm en ta l a d m in is t r a t iv e  com m ittee (NODE), which was 
responsible fo r re a lly  important d e c is io n s .(81 *
All in a l l ,  therefo re , the p re -e lec tio n  campaign revolved around the 
p o li t ic a l  o ff ice s  of the ND deputies and candidates in L arissa and th e ir  
branches in  the  m ajor p ro v in c ia l  c i t i e s ,  and proceeded  a lo n g  th e  
t r a d itio n a l, p re -d ic ta to rsh ip  p o li t ic a l  p a tte rn .* 82} As po llin g  day was 
drawing c lo se r, people swarmed in to  these o ff ice s , in p a tien tly  w aiting 
th e ir  tu rn  to  see the MP or candidate p riv a te ly , in order to  express 
th e i r  own and th e i r  wider fa m ily 's  support in a n tic ip a tio n  of some 
fu tu re  favour fo r themselves or th e ir  friends and re la tiv e s . Moreover,
i t  was these o ff ice s  —in co llabora tion  with the MPs' and candidates1
tru s ty  "watchmen" in the v illa g e s— tha t organised the p o lit ic ia n s ' p re­
e le c tio n  prograrrme (speeches, in te rv iew s w ith the p re s s , rad io  and 
te lev is io n , e tc . ) .  The party  organisation played only a secondary ro le . 
As one ND parliam entary candidate put i t ,
" I f  a deputy wants to  make a p o l i t i c a l  speech in some 
v illa g e , he doesn 't inform or re ly  on the respective local 
o rgan isation  there  ( i f  one e x is ts  a t a l l )  but h is /h e r  own 
p ersonal prot£g&s. The loca l p a rty  o rg an isa tio n s  have
r e c e n t l y  begun to  co m p la in  a b o u t t h i s ,  b u t t h a t ' s
paradoxical because they don 't re a lly  seem to want these
'watchmen' to disappear a lto g e th e r, but content themselves 
to  e x is t and act in p a ra lle l  with than".*83’
One l a s t  bu t im p o rtan t p o in t i s  t h a t ,  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  r e ­
appearance of c l i e n te l i s t i c  p rac tices  and the reac tiva tion  of patronage 
networks, personal antagonisms among the ND party  candidates a lso  came 
to the fo re , se riously  damaging ND's c o llec tiv e  e ffo rt as well as the 
p a r ty 's  public  image. Not only was each and every candidate try ing  to 
e s tab lish  personal re la tio n sh ip s  with the e lec to ra te  so as to secure as 
many preference-votes as possib le  to guarantee him a parliam entary sea t; 
but they were a l l  a lso  carpeting  against th e ir  colleagues, and adopted 
every possib le  s tra teg y , f a i r  or foul. Personal success was paramount,
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and best served by fa i lu re  of the o thers . So, i f  a candidate could not 
a t t r a c t  personal vo tes, he would try  h is  best to  stop people from voting 
fo r h is  com petito r. (This happened, fo r  example, in  the  eparchy of 
Elassona, where the in tense struggle  between Papadimopoulos and Fakis 
—who both came from there  and contended fo r the votes of more or less 
the same people— accounted fo r the fa ilu re  of both of them.) On the 
other hand, those candidates not included in the party  l i s t  had reasons 
of th e ir  own to hope, i f  not d ire c tly  to  work fo r, the fa i lu re  of those 
who were, since an eventual defeat of a  l is te d  candidate could open up 
the road again for th e ir  own fu tu re  entrance in to  p o l i t i c s . (84 *
The most intense b a t t le  between two ND p o lit ic ia n s  was fought out by 
the c iv il  engineer G. Souflias and the lawyer N. Katsaros. Souflias was 
one of the newcomers Karamanlis had included in the party  l i s t  in 1974; 
he had been e le c te d  c o n tin u o u s ly  ev e r s in c e ,  and a ls o  se rv ed  as 
undersecretary of in te rn a l a f f a i r s  (1977-1980) and as undersecretary  of 
c o -o rd in a tio n  (1980-1981) in  K aram anlis and R a il i s  governm ents 
re sp ec tiv e ly .( 85’ He was esteemed by both h is  party  colleagues and by 
h is p o lit ic a l  opponents fo r h is  mild, technologically  modem demeanour; 
during ND's years in opposition  he presided over the special committee 
for planning and e labora ting  d e ta iled  governmental policy  proposals, a 
h igh ly  com plicated and d i f f i c u l t  ta s k  he c a r r i e d  ou t w ith  marked 
success. (8 6 *
The lawyer N. Katsaros was a newcomer to p o l i t ic s  when f i r s t  e lec ted  
in 1981.(87 } Without any prev ious p o l i t i c a l  experience, he i n i t i a l l y  
b u ilt  up h is  career through the party  organisation; in the la te  1970s he 
was presiding over the L arissa  NODE, and i t  was sho rtly  before the 1981 
e lection  when he le t  i t  be known he would be ready to stand. At tha t 
time h is candidacy seamed to  pose a p o ten tia l th rea t to Souflias who 
strongly opposed i t  and, since he exercised a b e tte r  control over ND's 
o rg an isa tio n  in L a r is sa , a c tu a l ly  managed to  arrange fo r  K a tsa ro s '
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exclusion from the l i s t .  When one of the other candidates withdrew from 
the campaign, however, Katsaros could by-pass the formal procedures and 
move in to occupy the vacant place a t  the la s t  moment. He was e lected . 
Notwithstanding h is  debt to  the party  organisation , however, Katsaros 
th e re a f te r  c o n so lid a te d  h is  p o l i t i c a l  c a re e r  and secu red  h is  r e -  
e le c tio n  by s e t t in g  up and tak in g  f u l l  advantage of c l i e n t e l i s t i c  
r e la t io n s ,  w hile  f a i th f u l ly  suppo rting  the p a rty  lead ersh ip  a t  a l l  
tim es.*88 * Ever since 1981, then, personal re la tio n s  between the two men 
had been coldly formal, charac terised  by mutual h o s t i l i ty  and d is tru s t .  
For S o u flias  as one o f the  most se n io r  and founding-members of ND, 
Katsaros presented a th rea t to  both h is  supremacy in the Department of 
L arissa, and to  h is  p riv ileged  p osition  w ithin the party  and a fu ture ND 
government. Katsaros, fo r h is  p a rt, was strugg ling  against h is  r iv a l fo r 
ex ac tly  the same reasons: i f  he could increase  h is  vo te-appeal and 
receive more preference votes in the e lec tions than Souflias, th is  would 
seriously  undermine the l a t t e r 's  local standing on the one hand, and on 
the other most probably bring with i t  a much more important post w ithin 
the party  and a fu tu re  ND government. ( 8 9 }
While ND was in opposition, the personal d ifferences and antagonisms 
between S o u flia s  and K atsaros remained la te n t ,  the  f i r s t  and most 
important aim being to oust PASOK from power and the re tu rn  of ND. The 
1985 e le c tio n  (won by PASOK) d id  not change th is  s i tu a t io n ,  because 
PASOK's in tro d u c tio n  o f the  l i s t  system had made com petition among 
c a n d id a te s  p o i n t l e s s .  But th e  June 1989 e le c t io n ,  and th e  r e -  
introduction of the preference-vote system, f in a lly  presented Souflias 
and Katsaros with the opportunity  to  compete for supremacy in th e ir  area 
and to fu rther streg then  th e ir  standing w ithin ND.
Their mutual h o s t i l i ty  became increasingly  intense and reached i t s  
peak in the la s t  month of the campaign. Their p o l it ic a l  o ffice s  were 
feverish ly  try ing  to  e s ta b lish  u n o ffic ia l a llian ces  with, and so gain
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the support o f, various ND p o l i t ic a l  executives and candidates not on 
the l i s t ,  and a t  the same time they did  a l l  they could to  sabotage the 
speeches and o ther p o l it ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s  organised by the r iv a l o ff ic e . 
Souflias c a p ita lis e d  on h is  s ta tu s  of modem technocrat as well as on 
h is  h igh  rank w ith in  ND, w hile  sim ultaneously  r e - e s ta b l is h in g  h is  
personal re la tio n sh ip s  with the v o ters whom he had had to  neglect while 
he was k ep t in  A thens to  e la b o r a te  ND's governm ental programme. 
Katsaros, on the o ther hand, was chasing a f te r  every possib le  vote in 
o rd e r  to  in c re a s e  h is  c l i e n t e l e ,  and was p la y in g  th e  p a r t  o f  a 
p o lit ic ia n  loved and esteemed by a l l  the people.
The strugg le  was very c lose ly  fought, how close became evident once 
the v o tes  were counted: S o u flia s  again  came f i r s t ,  and had 19,110 
p refe ren ce  v o tes  (only s l ig h t ly  improving h is  1981 reco rd  of 18,176 
v o te s ) , whereas K atsaros in  second p lace  had more than doubled h is  
p refe ren ce  v o tes  (from 8,998 to  18,105). The ex ten t to  which the  
p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g le  was m onopolised  by th e se  two c o n te s ta n ts  i s  
demonstrated by the th ird  and fourth  ND candidates elected : N. Mammonas 
and A. E fs tra t ia d is  received 8,921 and 7,165 votes respec tive ly . PASOK 
re su lts  in the Department of L arissa  were completely d if fe re n t, given 
that i t s  candidates had no c l i e n te l i s t i c  networks to re ly  on, and i t s  
g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  in  e f f e c t  channelled  and d is t r ib u te d  the 
people 's vote more equally among the candidates. Three PASOK deputies 
were e lec ted  in the Department of L arissa  (G. Adamopoulos, J . Floros and 
N. Farmakis), who received 14,931, 14,506 and 11,947 preference votes 
re sp e c tiv e ly .( 9 0 *
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5. C onclusion
We chose to  conduct our fieldw ork  re sea rch  in the Department of 
L arissa  because i t s  s o c ia l ,  economic, and p a r t ic u la r ly  i t s  p o l i t ic a l  
features largely  r e f le c t  those of the country as a whole. In a l l  the 
above respec ts , and notw ithstanding minor d iffe re n tia tio n s , we believe 
the Department of L arissa to  c o n s titu te  perhaps the most ideal place to 
study ND, since, apart from providing in te re s tin g  i l lu s tra tio n s  a t the 
lo c a l l e v e l ,  one i s  p e rm itte d  to  make more g e n e ra l assum ptions 
concerning ND' c h a r a c te r i s t i c s ,  fu n c tio n in g  and n a tu re  w ith in  the 
n a tio n a l co n tex t. In our case , however, the  resea rch  d a ta  should be 
regarded with caution, because (a) we cannot a ltogether vouch for the 
obtained rep re sen ta tiv en ess  of our sample, and (b) we were prevented  
from carp ie ting  our work.
In an a rea  l ik e  th a t  of L a ris sa  where, due to  i t s  socio-econom ic 
conditions, inpersonal bureaucra tic  s tru c tu res  were lacking a ltoge ther 
and c l i e n t e l i s t i c  r e la t io n s  have t r a d i t io n a l ly  been in tense, ND —at 
least in the early  years of i t s  existence— followed i t s  overall p a tte rn  
in terms of p o lit ic a l  personnel: i t  re lie d  on already well-known ex-ERE 
p o lit ic ia n s  as well as a good many newcomers. While in government, the 
party  fa ile d  to organise in the area (as elsewhere), and secured popular 
backing through th e  p a tro n a g e  netw orks of i t s  d e p u tie s  and p a r ty  
no tab les in the reg io n , and through the charism atic  p e rso n a lity  and 
inmense p res tig e  of i t s  then leader, C. Karamanlis.
The re a l  o rg a n isa tio n a l e f f o r t  began a f t e r  ND had lo s t  o f f ic e  in 
1981, under A veroff's and la te r  under Mitsotakis* leadership. The party  
eventually developed a remarkable g rass-roo ts o rganisation , which l i t t l e  
by l i t t l e  s ta r te d  to  p lay  a  la rg e r  ro le  in d issem inating  p o l i t i c a l  
propaganda and m obilising supporters during e lec tio n  campaigns. Although 
i t  appeared la te  on the scene, the  p a rty  o rg an isa tio n  as such had
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another important consequence: i t  meant the introduction of bureaucratic 
p rin c ip le s  and co llec tiv e  ac tion , elements and procedures with which the 
overwhelming m ajo rity  of the  p a rty  members in  the Department were 
to ta l ly  unfam iliar.
Although the organisation  developed remarkably in s ize , th is  was not 
accompanied by a s im ila r  q u a l i ta t iv e  p ro g ress . P arty  members in  the 
Department of L arissa are  not p a r tic u la r ly  proud of th e ir  o rganisation , 
and do not consider i t  ND's most s t r ik in g  success. In f a c t ,  q u ite  a 
number o f them co m p la in  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  g e n e ra l  i n a c t i v i t y  and 
ineffic iency , bad communication w ith  the  h igher p a rty  organs and the 
lea d e rsh ip , a lack of p ro fe s s io n a l and experienced higher members as 
well as d is c ip l in e  in the  ranks, and, most im portan t, th a t  in te rn a l 
dem ocratic procedures a re  n e ith e r  in s t i tu t io n a l is e d  nor re sp ec ted . 
Moreover, i t  seems th a t a t  local level the organisation  operates more in 
an execu tive  manner, in  the  sense th a t no d iscu ssio n s  — le t  alone 
d e c is io n s— concerning the  e la b o ra tio n  of id eo lo g ica l issues, o r the 
p a rty ’s p o l i t ic a l  s t ra te g y , o r i t s  governmental p o l ic ie s ,  take p lace  
th e re .
This la s t point brings us to  the members' a tt i tu d e s  to th e ir  p a r ty 's  
ideology, where one encounters the same confusion and uncertain ty  that 
ch arac te rises  the view of the p a r ty 's  hierarchy a t the top, exactly  
because the g rass-roo ts were le f t  to contribu te  nothing whatsoever to 
ND's basic  positions; instead , ND's ideological tenets were imposed by 
the  top ready-made. So, whereas most p a rty  members d esc rib e  ND as a 
lib e ra l pa rty , i t  is  lik e ly  th a t they have only a vague idea of lib e ra l 
te n e ts .  Poorly informed i f  not a c tu a l ly  m is-inform ed, they showed 
them selves u n fa m ilia r  w ith  th e  b a s ic  co n cep ts  and id ea s  o f ND's 
ideology, espec ia lly  in the countryside where ND was characterised  in 
the s im p lis tic a lly  tra d itio n a l manner as a party  of the c e n tre -r ig h t.
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One v e ry  im p o rtan t p o in t  has emerged in  r e s p e c t  of th e  p a r ty  
members' a t t i tu d e s  towards ND, and the  ex ten t to  which i t  was the 
p a r ty 's  ideology th a t motivated them to  jo in  in the f i r s t  p lace. Taking 
in to  account, ( i)  th a t most members consider ND as something completely 
new in Greek p o l i t ic s ,  having no re la tio n  with the pre-coup ERE; ( i i )  
th a t a g re a t many of them jo ined  the  p a rty  drawn by the  ch arism atic  
p e rso n ality  of i t s  leader; and th a t ( i i i ) ,  there  was much and widespread 
confusion among the rank and f i l e  as to  ND's exact ideological id en tity , 
one must conclude tha t a l l  these people were not so much a ttra c te d  by 
ND's lib e ra l p rin c ip le s , rad ica l or neo -libera l or whatever, but that 
apart from Karamanlis' personal appeal, on the p o sitiv e  side i t  was the 
tim e-honoured va lues the  co n serv a tiv e  camp has always rep resen ted  
—r e l i a b i l i t y ,  a  sense of r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  so c ia l  o rder and ju s t ic e ,  
secu rity , anti-extrem ism , d ign ity  and tra d itio n a l m orality— that in the 
la s t  analy sis  motivated and un ified  ND vo ters and supporters, whereas on 
the negative i t  was anti-communism th a t completed th is  task.
C lientelism , which h is to r ic a l ly  has been a sa lie n t c h a ra c te r is tic  of 
the whole Thessaly area, cannot be said  to  have disappeared a ltogether 
during the post-1974 years. Despite ND's organisational enlargement and 
the p ro life ra tio n  of local party  branches throughout the Department of 
L arissa, the party  mechanisms were never transformed in to  an impersonal 
bureaucratic  body th a t would ac t autonomously and have a decisive  say 
c o n c e rn in g  a l l  p a r ty  a f f a i r s  in  th e  D ep artm en t; th e  lo c a l  ND 
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  who had c re a te d  and h eav ily  r e l ie d  on th e i r  personal 
c lie n te le  fo r e le c to ra l success and communication with the e le c to ra te , 
always had the upper hand. In consequence the individual did not so much 
come in to  p o l i t ic s  through in s t itu t io n a lis e d  mass s tru c tu re s , but to  a 
c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t  th ro u g h  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  n e tw o rk s ; th e  p a r ty  
organisation  meanwhile acted in a p a ra lle l  and ra th e r au x ilia ry  fashion,
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con tro lled  and administered by the MPs, the local p o lit ic ia n s , and o ther 
party  notables.
The l a s t  p o in t  to  be made concerns p e rso n a l an tagonism s and 
ideological d ifferences in the Department of L arissa. Contrary to  the 
case elsewhere, where personal r iv a lr ie s  and/or a llian ces  were e ith e r  
interwoven w ith  o r d e l ib e r a t e ly  h idden  behind  a l le g e d  and r a th e r  
f i c t i t i o u s  id eo lo g ica l d if fe re n c e s , in  L arissa  they were fought out 
venomously on a purely personal lev e l. The reason for th is  was th a t the 
most important aim of the ND p o lit ic ia n s  in the department has always 
been, not simply to ensure e lec tio n  to parliam ent, but a lso  to a t t r a c t  
as many personal votes as possib le  so as to re in fo rce  h is /h e r  p osition  
w ith in  the  Department and the  p a r ty . The backing of a s tro n g  and 
numerous p o p u la r su p p o rt would l a t e r  be t r a n s la te d  in to  a b e t te r  
b a rg a in in g  p o s i t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  th e  h ig h e r  p a r ty  e c h e lo n s ,  and 
p a rtic u la rly  the leadership , when i t  came to disposing of in f lu e n tia l 
party  and/or s ta te  posts which, in tu rn , would help the MP s a t is fy  and 
fu rther increase h is /h e r  p o l i t ic a l  c lie n te le .
At th e  lo c a l l e v e l ,  th e n , c l i e n te l i s m  in te n s i f i e d  p e rso n a l 
antagonisms and v ic e -v e rsa . I t  was p o l i t i c a l  su rv iv a l f i r s t ,  and the  
ouster of immediate r iv a ls  as a c lose second, tha t more or less drew ND 
p o lit ic ia n s  in to  th is  v icious c ir c le .  The s itu a tio n  is  very lik e ly  to 
continue unabated in the near fu tu re , unless bureaucratic and impersonal 
procedures are  f in a lly  respected and in s titu tio n a lis e d , and the g rass­
ro o ts  o rg an isa tio n  is  given some re a l r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  so th a t i t  can 
perform i t s  ro le  w ithout th a t  in te rfe re n c e  th a t so f a r  has been the 
cause of i t s  re la tiv e  stagnation and inefficiency .
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GREEK RIGHT
1. Introduction
In c h a p te r  1 o f t h i s  s tu d y  we examined in  d e t a i l  th e  s o c i a l ,  
p o l i t ic a l ,  and economic conditions dominant in Greece from the end of 
the World War I I  u n til  the inposition  of the seven-year m ilita ry  ru le  in 
1967. W ithin th is  c o n te x t, we have shown how the Greek Right was 
in i t i a l ly  reco n stitu ted  —under P. T sa ld aris ' Popular Party  and under 
Marshal Papagos1 Greek R ally  p a r ty — and have then focused on the  
National Radical Union (ERE), which was founded by C. Karamanlis in 1955 
and led  by th e  same man fo r  e ig h t  c o n se c u tiv e  y e a rs  u n t i l  h is  
resignation  from the prem iership in 1963. I t  was shown th a t ERE was the 
d irec t successor of the Greek R ally, and a lso  th a t i t  dominated not only 
in the government but in p o l i t ic s  in general, during the whole period 
from i t s  form ation u n t i l  the  c o lla p se  of dem ocratic in s t i tu t io n s  in 
1967.
For the s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic developm ents, as these  
emerged a f te r  the d is in te g ra tio n  of the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  in 1974 
and the r e s to ra t io n  and c o n so lid a tio n  of dem ocratic r u le ,  we have 
presented a much more d e ta ile d  and ana ly tica l account. Once more, our 
analysis centred on the reco n stitu tio n  of the conservative canp. We saw 
th a t i t  was again C. Karamanlis who founded the  New Democracy p a r ty  
(ND), which took and has co n sis ten tly  kept the lead in represen ting  the 
righ t-w ing  p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s ; and we examined the p a r ty ’s p o l i t i c a l  
personnel, i t s  organ isation  and ideology, i t s  p o lic ie s , s tra te g ie s , and
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ta c tic s  in  government (1974-1981) and in opposition (1981-1989) a t both 
national and local lev e l, over the six teen-year period from 1974 u n til  
ND resumed o ff ic e  in 1990.
This l a s t  ch ap te r w ill  conclude our study by p re sen tin g  a more 
system atic account of the course and development of the Greek Right. The 
analysis w ill be in two p a rts : concerning the narrower party  leve l, we 
shall try  to  describe  and explain ND's s im ila r it ie s  with and d ifferences 
from ERE, and so id e n tify  s p e c if ic  elem ents of c o n tin u ity  w ith  i t s  
predecessor, and/or the extent to  which ND has managed to transform and 
d isso c ia te  i t s e l f  from ERE's p rac tices  and c h a ra c te r is tic s  and present a 
d if fe re n t, more modem and European-like p o l it ic a l  outlook. ND's exact 
p o l it ic a l  id e n tity  w ill be fu rth e r e lucidated by comparisons with other 
major Greek p a r t i e s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  w ith  PASOK), and w ith  i t s  West 
European coun terparts. With respect to the wider so c io -p o litic a l leve l, 
we sh a ll  c o n sid e r the major changes and tran sfo rm ations th a t have 
appeared and gained momentum since 1974, the extent to  which the party  
t r ie d  to respond to  these developments, as well as ND's re la tio n sh ip  
with party  p o l i t ic s  and socie ty  in general since 1974.
2. C on tinu ities and Change in Greek Conservative P o lit ic s
2.1. The party  leve l: From ERE to ND
One o f th e  s a l i e n t  f e a tu r e s  th a t  c h a r a c te r i s e s  ERE and ND is  
p rec ise ly  th a t both of then are  leg itim ate  creations of C. Karamanlis. 
However, although he had been appointed to the premiership by the King, 
and in d ire c tly  so to  the Greek Rally leadership a f te r  Papagos' death in 
1955 when he founded ERE, i t  was under very d iffe ren t circumstances that 
he was welcomed to  Greece as a p o l i t i c a l  sav iour in 1974 to  re s to re  
democracy, supervise the process of democratic consolidation, and crea te
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the New Democracy party . As i t  had done during the years of h is  f i r s t  
p rem ie rsh ip  (1955-1963), h i s  m a s te r fu l ,  f a th e r - f ig u re  p e rs o n a lity  
(inevitab ly  au th o rita rian  a t  times) loomed heavily  a f te r  1974 as w ell. 
However, not only had h is  in ten tions and b e lie fs  been changed by the 
changing circumstances (as he him self adm itted), but there was a host of 
o th e r d if fe re n c e s  co n ce rn in g  th e  c r e a t io n ,  p o l i c i e s ,  and o v e ra l l  
performance of ND which accounted fo r the l a t t e r  beeing a more modem 
id en tity , not merely the ERE under another name.( 1 *
Karamanlis manned h is  newly formed p arty  with a considerable number 
of h is  c lo se s t  pre-coup a s s o c ia te s ,  former MPs, and prominent ERE 
members. The p a r t ic ip a t io n  of th ese  p o l i t i c ia n s  dem onstrates q u ite  
c lea rly  that there was indeed sane kind of re la tio n sh ip  and con tinu ity
between ND and ERE, e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  th e  co re  of th e  f i r s t  ND
governments consisted almost exclusively  of these former EKE members. 
However, the percentage of the "old guard" was considerably lower in the 
ND ranks than i t  had been fo r the ERE or the Greek Rally when they were 
formed. Moreover, more than h a lf  of the ND parliam entary candidates and 
eventually i t s  deputies were newcomers to p o l i t ic s ,  who gave the party  a 
more l ib e r a l ,  modern, you th fu l and te c h n o c ra tic  image, and came to  
predominate w ithin i t s  ranks as time went by. Last but not le a s t ,  i t
should be stressed  th a t the Centre Union/New Forces (EK/ND), the ch ief
riv a l of ND in the early  post-1974 period , was much more c losely  re la te d  
to i t s  pre-coup predecessor (the Centre Union) than ND was to  the ERE, 
whereas PASOK re a lly  did make a spectacular break with the p ast, not 
only in respect of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  personnel but a lso  in terms of g rass­
roots organisation and ideology. I t  quickly made i t s  presence f e l t ,  when 
only three years la te r  (in  1977), i t  doubled i t s  vote and so managed a 
qu ite  numerous parliam entary rep resen ta tion .
The massive influx of newcomers in to  the ND ranks was not, however, 
accompanied by a corresponding d if fe re n tia tio n  with respect to the party
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personnel's  soc ia l and occupational background. Of course, ND deputies 
were on th e  av e rag e  younger and b e t t e r  ed u ca ted  than  t h e i r  ERE 
counterparts, but i t  was s t i l l  male lawyers, doctors, and other s e l f -  
employed ( l ib e ra l)  p ro fessionals of bourgeois o rig in  who continued to 
outnumber MPs with a sa la r ie d  occupation or frcm a low er-class social 
background. In th is  resp ec t, ND d iffe re d  from ERE only quantatively  (in 
the  l a t t e r  th e  s a la ry -e a rn e rs  were rep re sen ted  hard ly  a t  a l l ) ,  and 
resembled much more the B ritish  Conservatives in  1974, when lawyers and 
doctors, as well as in d u s tr ia l is ts  and higher adm inistrative  employees 
c o n s t i tu te d  th e  two l a r g e s t  groups w ith in  th e  B r i t i s h  p a r t y 's  
parliam en ta ry  g ro u p .( 2 * With re sp e c t to  PASOK, which brought in to  
p o l i t ic s  and re l ie d  predominantly on newcomers, the sa la ried  occupations 
were b e tte r  represented and so were p o lit ic ia n s  from a lower, working- 
c lass background, although the self-employed were s t i l l  in the m ajority.
In l in e  w ith  i t s  p redecesso r (and a lso  w ith  PASOK, a lb e i t  fo r  
d iffe re n t reaso n s)13 ND always polled  more votes in the semi-urban and 
ru ra l a re a s  than in the  urban c e n tre s , m ostly  due to  t r a d i t io n a l  
c l i e n te l i s t i c  p ra c t ic e s ,  which have never been abandoned a lto g e th e r . 
Furthermore, ND (lik e  the ERE before i t )  can be considered as a catch­
a l l  party , in the sense th a t i t  appealed to  every social c la ss  in Greek 
society  a t  a l l  times; nevertheless, the highest socio-economic groups 
tend to  vote more fo r ND than PASOK, and v ice versa fo r the lowest ones, 
with the two p a r t ie s  sharing the m iddle-class vote almost equally. Last 
but not le a s t ,  e sp ec ia lly  a f te r  1985 when ND switched i t s  ideological 
o rien ta tio n  towards neo-conservatism, i t  is  lik e ly  people employed in 
the p r iv a te  s e c to r  of th e  economy w ill  tend to  vo te  fo r ND, whereas 
th e ir  counterparts in the public  sec to r w ill be more inclined to  the 
p a rtie s  of the L e f t . (4)
In the course of democratic re s to ra tio n  a f te r  1974, there was not a 
great deal of room for developing any party  organisation  or ideology, a t
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le a s t in respect of ND which was most involved in rebuild ing  democracy. 
(The communists t r a d i t io n a l ly  enjoyed a very  w ell s tru c tu re d  p a rty  
machine, of which they could now take fu l l  advantage, and PASQK was able 
to  develop one of i t s  own r ig h t from the s t a r t . )  A fter seven years of 
m i l i t a r y  r u l e ,  th e  overw helm ing m a jo r i ty  o f th e  Greeks opted fo r 
p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  and peacefu l t r a n s i t io n  to  democracy, not fo r  
p o lit ic a l  experimentation. Consequently, ND could secure two consecutive 
terms in  government, drawing much of i t s  e le c to ra l  support from the 
immense p res tig e  of i t s  leader (who was considered the only man capable 
of stand ing  between democracy and the  re tu rn  of the  tan k s ) . Another 
c o n s id e ra b le  p a r t  o f i t s  e l e c t o r a l  s t r e n g h t  d e r iv e d  from  th e  
p e rso n a lis tic  re la tio n s  and c l i e n te l i s t i c  p rac tices  exercised a t local 
level by most of the p a r ty 's  prominent members, who e ith e r  had already 
estab lished  such re la tio n sh ip s as foimer ERE deputies, or who inherited  
p o lit ic a l  c lie n te le s  frcm close re la tiv e s  who had meanwhile re t i r e d  frcm 
p o l i t ic s .  The lead e r 's  national p re s tig e  and local c lien te lism  were both 
employed by ND as a su b s titu te  fo r i t s  lack of organ isation , and to make 
up for i t s  in a b il i ty  to  m obilise the e le c to ra te  and r a l ly  mass support 
through other means. ( 5}
In th is  respec t, then, ND did not, a t  le a s t during i t s  early  years, 
d i f f e r  much from i t s  p red ecesso r. Although the  ERE d id  have fu l ly  
elaborated party  s ta tu te s , they remained a dead le t t e r  a t a l l  times; 
moreover, i t  a lso  made ex ten siv e  use of c l i e n t e l i s t i c  r e la t io n s  and 
se lec tiv e ly  d is tr ib u te d  spo ils  to i t s  supporters in an e ffo r t  to remain 
in o f f ic e .<6) As a l l  o ther p a rtie s  a t  the time (apart from EDA), ERE was 
a c l i e n te l i s t i c  party  of p e rso n a litie s  and notables, gathered around an 
all-pow erful and v ir tu a lly  uncontrolled party  leader.
As became o b v io u s  n o t lo n g  a f t e r  1974, p a r t i e s  r e ly in g  on 
c l i e n te l i s m  and p a tro n ag e  cou ld  no t su rv iv e  under th e  d i f f e r e n t  
conditions in the newly estab lished  p o li t ic a l  system. Once fears of the
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re tu rn  of the tanks were la id  to  r e s t ,  and once Karamanlis would be able 
to leave h is  p a rty  fo r the presidency of the republic (something he had 
in mind ever since he returned to  Greece), ND would be obliged to  deal 
with the l e f t i s t  ideas th a t were s te a d ily  gaining momentum in reaction  
to  the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  (at a l l  times considered as a "right-wing" 
d ic ta to r s h ip ) ,  and w ith  the  r a d ic a l is e d  masses demanding more rap id  
progress and "change" ( le f t  large ly  unspecified), a  demand th a t had been 
brought in to  p o l i t ic s  fo r the f i r s t  time through m ilita n t and powerful 
o rganisations estab lish ed  mainly by PASOK.
Karamanlis was p e rfe c tly  aware of these new developments, and did 
a l l  he c o u ld  to  a s s u re  th e  s u rv iv a l  o f h is  p a r ty  a f t e r  h is  own 
d ep artu re . Since i t  is  extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  to  transfo rm  a p a rty  of 
notables in to  an organ isation  based on p o li t ic a l  p rin c ip le s , he had to 
move slowly and c a u tio u s ly  and, judging ex p o s te r io r i , he succeeded. 
When he l e f t  f in a l ly ,  ND had e s ta b lis h e d  i t s  f i r s t  departm ental and 
local o rgan isa tions , i t  already numbered several thousand members, and 
i t  had organised one prelim inary and one fu ll congress, thus becoming 
the f i r s t  conservative p arty  to  have done so in  Greek p o li t ic a l  h is to ry . 
I t  a lso  survived Karamanlis' departure by duly e lec tin g  a new leader, 
and i t  n e ith e r s p l i t  up nor d is in teg ra ted  a f te r  i t  had lo s t the 1981 
e lec tion  to PASOK.
Ever s in ce  then , and w hile in  o p p o sitio n , ND has developed i t s  
o rganisation fu rth e r; i t  has held another national congress, and i t  has 
upgraded th e  r o l e  of i t s  rank  and f i l e  by draw ing them in to  th e  
procedure fo r the e lec tio n  of the party  leader, and the nomination of 
ND's pair 1 iamentary candidates. In the course of the 1980s i t s  loca l, 
p ro fe s s io n a l, and o th e r  o rg a n isa tio n s  p r o l i f e r a te d ,  th e i r  membership 
grew unprecedentedly, and the c l i e n te l i s t i c  c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the early  
p o s t-1974 ND, so much remini scent of the pre-coup ERE's, began to fade 
and slowly made room for those of a mass party . ‘ 7 *
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I t  is  f a i r  to  conclude tha t today ND is  no longer a c l i e n te l i s t i c  
p a r ty ,  but i t  i s  e q u a lly  t ru e  to  say th a t  i t  has n o t y e t been 
transformed in to  a rea l mass party . Of course, s ta tu te s , regu la tions and 
various provisions concerning organ isational a f fa ir s  a l l  e x is t,  but a t  
the same time are  not fu lly  respected. At the local leve l, p e rso n a lis tic  
p o lit ic s  and c l i e n te l i s t i c  p ra c tic e s  have not d issap eared  a l to g e th e r ,  
and continue to e x is t side by side with the a c t iv i t ie s  and functioning 
of the g rass-roo ts organisation  —a t times in a ccrrplementary, a t  o ther 
times in co n flic tin g  manner. At the national leve l, the party  leader 
remains largely  unchecked, i f  not to  the same extent as in the p a s t, and 
th e  top p a r ty  o rgans more o f te n  th an  n o t m erely  rubberstam p  h i s  
d e c is io n s .(8}
In terms of p a rty  o rganisation , ND was as much a la te  developer as 
were most o ther conservative p a r tie s  in Europe. I t  is  a lso  true  th a t the 
p a rty  d id  in  fa c t  o rg an ise  more e f f e c t iv e ly  when i t  had to  meet the  
challenge from PASOK. The la t t e r  had frcm the very ou tse t e stab lished  a 
w el1-s tru c tu re d  o rg a n isa tio n , and i t  was through th is ,  not through 
c l ie n te l i s t ic  means, th a t i t  mobilised i t s  supporters and brought than 
into p o l i t ic s . Notwithstanding c e r ta in  p o p u lis t ic  elem ents in PASOK1 s 
p o lit ic a l  d iscourse, i t  has been argued th a t there has been some kind of 
organic complementarity between charism atic leadership a t  the cen tre  and 
organisational local activism , in the sense tha t they have both acted as 
channels for ra lly in g  mass support and advancing the p a r ty 's  ideology 
and p o l i c i e s . (9) In  o th e r  words, the  re la tio n s h ip  between the  PASOK 
president and the p arty  organisation was (and s t i l l  is)  a complementary 
one, since the specia l position  and powers of the president have never 
been questioned.
The r e la t io n s h ip  between the New Democracy p a rty  leader and the  
organisation is  very d if fe re n t, given tha t no ND leader since Karamanlis 
has enjoyed the  in s t i tu t io n a l  autonomy of A. Papandreou in  PASOK.
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Consequently, more power to  the o rgan isation  would autom atically  mean 
fewer p rerogatives fo r the leader, whereas more power to  the leader (as 
i s  th e  c a se  today ) means a f e e b le ,  m uzzled, and r e l a t i v e l y  weak 
organisation ; i t  means, moreover —ap art frcm helping to m obilise vo ters 
p r io r  to  e le c t io n s — the  ND g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg a n isa tio n  has f a i l e d  to  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e  p ro c e d u re s  th a t  would guaran tee  c ro ss-checks and 
con tro ls , communication, and m obility  from the bottom to  the top of the 
party  hierarchy and v ice  versa . This la s t  poin t is  corroborated by a 
comparison of the soc ia l and occupational background of ND's rank and 
f i l e  with th a t of the top party  members; represen ta tion  of both s e l f -  
employed and sa la r ie d  occupations is  much more balanced a t  g rass-ro o ts  
leve l than th e  h ig h e s t p a r ty  echelons (parliam entary  group, c e n tra l  
committee). The o v e ra ll p ic tu re  of the social composition of ND's lowest 
ranks much resem bles th a t  of Greek so c ie ty  a t  la rg e , in sp e c ta c u la r  
con trast to  the so c ia l and occupational backgrounds a t the highest party  
le v e l.
As with i t s  o rgan isa tion  during the early  years of i t s  ex istence, ND 
a lso  fa ile d  to  develop a  sp ec ific  ideology of i t s  own, thus leaving the 
realm of ideas dominated by PASOK and the p a r tie s  of the L eft. For a 
considerable time much uncerta in ty  concerning the exact id e n tity  of the 
party , fu rth e r b lu rred  by Karamanlis' claims th a t ND stood ou tside  and 
above the m isleading lab e ls  of Right, Centre and L eft, and th a t i t  was 
the so le party  to  id en tify  only with the true  in te re s ts  of the nation  a t 
a l l  t i m e s . ( 1 0 } A p a rt from  e le m e n ts  o f l a t e n t  p a te r n a l i s m  and 
au thoritarian ism  very much rem iniscent of ERE's record in th is  respect 
( i f  ND was re a lly  the only party  to id en tify  with the in te re s ts  of the 
nation, what was the ro le  of the o ther p a r tie s  in a democratic regim e?), 
one might see the negation of ideology as a d e lib e ra te  p rin c ip le , with 
the p a r ty 's  stance and p o lic ie s  d ic ta ted  in every instance and in ad-hoc 
manner by the national in te re s t .  This ideology Karamanlis dubbed rad ica l
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l ib e ra lism  (ly in g  somewhere between c la s s ic a l  l ib e ra lism  and so c ia l  
dem ocracy), and s in c e  i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  d e f in i t io n  has nev er been 
undertaken, i t  must be deciphered from actual p rac tice  during ND's f i r s t  
period in o ff ic e  (1974-1981) . i 11 *
Leaving the p a r tic u la rs  aside (a d e ta ile d  analysis was presented in 
ch. 5, section  2 .2 ), ND government p o lic ie s  were indeed very s im ila r to 
those of i t s  predecessor; namely, the party  coped with the day-to-day 
problems in an em p iric ist manner, without long-term planning, without 
concrete fu tu re  ta rg e ts , aiming vaguely a t re v ita lis in g  the economy and 
ra is in g  the  s tan d ard  of l iv in g . In  o th e r  words, ra d ic a l l ib e ra lis m  
consisted  of w e ll- tr ie d  ERE p o lic ie s  which were a combination of s ta te  
paternalism , s ta te  in te rven tion , and p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e ,  with the accent 
on so c ia l w e lfa re  and ju s t ic e .  A ll in  a l l ,  ND's post-1974 r a d ic a l -  
l ib e ra l  re c ip e  d if f e r e d  from p a s t p ra c t ic e s  only to  the ex te n t th a t  
anti-corrmunism was no longer one of i t s  basic ingredients.
This ideological defic iency  could not continue to be glossed over 
when ND occupied the  o p p o sitio n  benches. The strong  lead ersh ip  and 
personal a u th o r i ty  of Karam anlis had been ab le  to  compensate fo r the 
absence of pa rty  organ isation  and ideology,( 12} but a f te r  h is  departure 
ND was dismayed to  discover tha t i t  had no p o lic ie s  to p ro jec t, not even 
slogans th a t could appeal to the e le c to ra te . Just as ERE in the ea rly  
1960s, when i t  lo s t power to  the George Papandreou's Centre Union, kept 
accu sin g  th e  l a t t e r  th a t  he was s u r re n d e r in g  the  c o u n try  to  th e  
communists, the ND, under A veroff's leadership, kept scaremongering tha t 
PASOK meant to e s ta b lish  a  p ro le ta rian  d ic ta to rsh ip  and lead the country 
e ith e r  towards th ird-w orld  underdevelopment or behind the iron c u rta in .
A fter a tra n s it io n a l period of dangerous f l i r ta t io n  with the u l t r a -  
R ight, which s e r io u s ly  harmed the  more l ib e r a l  and modern id e n t i ty  
Karamanlis had t r ie d  to  inpose on ND in 1974, C. M itsotakis was e lec ted  
to the party  leadership . He was a prominent party  MP a t the time and a
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former m in ister, who o rig in a ted  from the pre-coup lib e ra l canp. At the 
same tim e he was a c o n tr o v e r s ia l  p e r s o n a l i ty ,  s tig m a tised  as the  
p o l i t i c i a n  c h ie f ly  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  th e  e v en ts  th a t  led  to  th e  
d is so lu tio n  of th e  C entre  Union in  1965, and so u ltim a te ly  to  the 
im p o sitio n  o f th e  m i l i t a r y  d i c t a to r s h ip .  W ith r e s p e c t  to  ND's 
ideo log ica l o r ie n ta t io n ,  M itso ta k is ' e le c tio n  s ig n a lle d  the  p a r ty 's  
departu re  from i t s  K aram anlis t r a d i t i o n  and a s h i f t  tow ards neo­
conservatism. As had been the case with the rad ica l lib e ra l values of 
Karamanlis, the new ideas adopted by ND were conceived, formulated, and 
inposed from above by the leader, some of h is  c lo sest assoc ia tes , and 
ND's think-tank (th e  non-conm itted  Centre fo r P o l i t ic a l  Research and 
Inform ation). The d if fe re n c e  was th a t they were th e o re t ic a l ly  well 
thought out and properly  defined, and published in manifesto form as 
ND's ideological d ec la ra tio n , which became widely known as the "A new 
proposal for freedom".
ND's re -o rien ta tio n  as regards i t s  ideological p rin c ip les  was not, 
of course, exclusively  due to  i t s  new leader. With a man a t i t s  helm who 
had a long tra d itio n  as a l ib e ra l ,  the party  was very lik e ly  to  move 
closer to liberalism , and indeed M itsotakis has lo s t no opportunity to 
re i te ra te  that he him self was a staunch lib e ra l and that ND is  a lib e ra l 
party . But the new ideological declara tion  went a  great deal fu rth e r. 
Dismissing ND's old  governmental record a ltoge ther, and most probably 
respond ing  to  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  tre n d  of neo -conservatism  and in 
p re p a ra tio n  fo r  f u tu r e  a t t a c k s  on PASOK (w hich, w hile  in  power, 
continued to enforce in te rv en tio n is t p o lic ie s  ju s t as ND had done), the 
party  now discovered th a t  excessive  s ta te  in te rv e n tio n , ta x a tio n  and 
regulation were bad, and freedom of choice and p riva te  in i t ia t iv e  were 
good.
I t  would seem th a t in  i t s  a tten p t a t ideological transform ation ND 
was m o tiva ted  much by th e  c o n se c u tiv e  governm ental and e le c to ra l
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successes of Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. and presiden t Reagan in the 
U.S. during the 1980s. Moreover, in almost a l l  of the European countries 
i t  was some brand of neo-conservatism  th a t  was dom inating p o l i t i c s ;  
Spain and Greece, both governed a t  the time by s o c ia l is t  p a r tie s , were 
the only exceptions, th e ir  conservative forces s t i l l  having "to develop 
a  'modern' id e n tity  to  challenge the L e f t" .113} Thus ND hoped th a t the 
adoption  of n eo -conserva tive  p r in c ip le s  would give th e  p a rty  a more 
modern and European p ro f i le , and a good opportunity to  ccmpete in the 
realm of ideas, which i t  had abandoned to left-w ing domination since 
1974; in o ther words, i t  was expected th a t, as had happened in B rita in , 
neo-conservatism  would enable the party  to  se t the agenda of p o lit ic a l  
debate in the country ra th e r  than only acting  to in i t ia t iv e s  frcm i t s  
opponents. 114}
N evertheless, the e lec tio n s of 1985 showed th a t the party  fa ile d  in 
i t s  o b jec tiv es. As might have been expected, i t  proved very d i f f ic u l t  to  
convince the e le c to ra te  (not to  mention i t s  own members and voters) of 
i t s  s in c e r ity , since nobody ever bothered to explain whether ND had been 
r ig h t or wrong to  enforce s ta te  in te rv en tio n is t p o lic ie s  while in power. 
Also, while corruption  and ineffic iency  in the public sec to r, as well as 
the  need to  m odernise the  a d m in is tra tio n  in  general (and coping with 
unemployment, in f la t io n ,  payment d e f i c i t s ,  e tc . )  were considered  the 
most important issues by the m ajority  of the Greek v o ters , PASOK was 
c red ited  with being re lia b le  and capable of dealing with these problems, 
and was r e - e le c te d  fo r  a  second term in o f f ic e .  As a  r e s u l t  ND was 
tem porarily plagued by in te rn a l party  turmoil and d issen t. Many members 
considered the p a r ty 's  s h i f t  to  neo-conservatism as a major break with 
i t s  Karam anlis t r a d i t io n ,  and as such c h ie f ly  re sp o n sib le  fo r ND's 
e lec tio n  d efea t. N evertheless, the party  adhered to i t s  newly-adopted 
p rin c ip le s , but when i t  succeeded in resuming o ff ice  in 1990, th is  was
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due more to  p o p u la r d is c o n te n t  w ith  PASOK than  to  some p o s i t iv e  
acclamation of i t s  programme.
All in  a l l ,  and w ith  re sp e c t to  id eo lo g ica l (and o rg a n is a tio n a l)  
issues, ND (lik e  ERE) showed considerable weakness, i t s  shortcomings in 
th a t  r e s p e c t  n e a r ly  alw ays b e in g  c o u n te rb a la n c e d  by th e  personal 
a u th o r i ty  o f th e  le a d e r  on th e  one hand, and by some s e le c t iv e  
d is tr ib u tio n  of governmental sp o ils  on the o ther. Like ERE, ND regarded 
i t s e l f  as the  n a tu ra l p a rty  of government, and i t  was only when i t  
found i t s e l f  in  oppo sitio n  th a t  i t  began to  pay a t te n t io n  to  i t s  
ideological id en tity , but did so ra th e r  h a s ti ly  and unconvincingly. As 
has been shown, a t  g rass-roo ts  level ND not only fa ile d  completely to  
convince i t s  own members of the  n e c e ss ity  to  adopt neo -conservative  
doctrines and th e ir  respective  values, but i t  confused then fu rther as 
to the exact form of the libera lism  i t  was advocating. Since i t  resumed 
o ffice  in 1990 and u n til  the time of w riting , ND attempted to  enforce 
po lic ies  fo r the disentanglement of the s ta te  from the economy through 
p riv a tisa tio n s  in such a dubious and amateurish manner th a t the stormy 
and vociferous opposition from i t s  own ranks, and from trade  unions and 
other organisations a f f i l ia te d  to the party , in  many cases forced i t  to 
re tre a t .  Where i t  stood firm, the re s u l ts  were fa r  frcm dazzling.
Confining our analysis s t r i c t l y  to  the party  leve l, i t  may be argued 
th a t ND is  undoubtedly the  h e ir  o f co n serv a tiv e  tra d itio n  in Greece. 
Whether under the banner of T sa ld a ris1 Popular Party, or Papagos1 Greek 
Rally, or Karamanlis' ERE, the conservative forces remained p re tty  well 
united during the pre-coup period, led by powerful and a t  times popular 
leaders, and for most of the time in government. The Greek Rally was 
nothing more than a reco n stitu tio n  of the Popular Party, and the ERE in 
i ts  turn was l i t t l e  more than the Greek Rally under Karamanlis. In o ther 
words, ND's d ir e c t  p redecesso r was a p o l i t i c a l  form ation , the  only 
source of power and leg itim ation  of which lay with the personality  of
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the  lead er. I t  lacked a g ra s s - ro o ts  o rg an isa tio n  and so r e l i e d  on 
c lien te lism  to  draw e le c to ra l support, and i t  a lso  lacked a d is t in c t  
ideology of i t s  own. Strong leadership  a t  the cen tre , c lien te lism  a t  the 
lo c a l l e v e l ,  and s e l e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f governm ental s p o i l s  
nationwide, a l l  made fo r ERE's un ity , longevity, and consecutive re -  
e lec tion  to o ff ice .
A fter the f a l l  of the jun ta , ND inherited  the p o lit ic a l  tra d itio n  of 
ERE, in the  sense th a t i t  u n if ie d  and rep resen ted  the co n serv a tiv e  
forces a f te r  1974. N evertheless, i t  was not a simple reco n stitu tio n  of 
i t s  predecessor, i t  was not the ERE under another name. Although i t s  
re la tio n sh ip  to  the l a t t e r  was m anifest in respect of both i t s  founder 
and a considerable p a rt of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  personnel, the d ifferences were 
equally evident; renewed to  an unprecedented extent due to  the massive 
influx of p o lit ic ia n s  without previous experience, i t  pro jected  from the 
very ou tse t a more lib e ra l and modem version of conservatism. At the 
same time tendencies could  be d isce rn ed  towards a dem ocratic p a rty  
organisation, the disentanglorient of the party  from the pe rsonality  of 
i t s  leader, as well as towards an e laboration  of a sp ec ific  and c le a r-  
cut ideological id en tity .
Looking back over the years tha t followed, i t  can be said  th a t ND 
went a long way towards these ends; fo r a l l  th a t, the party  is  s t i l l  in 
a period of tra n s itio n , and the process of i t s  transform ation in to  the 
type of non-personal is  t i c  mass pa rty  as p rev a ils  in most West-European 
party  systems is  yet to  be accomplished. In order to obtain a conplete 
p ic tu re  of the p a r ty 's  id e n t i ty  and a b e t te r  understanding  of i t s  
s im i la r i t i e s  w ith and d if fe re n c e s  from i t s  p redecessor, our analysis 
must a lso  take in to  account the to ta l ly  d iffe re n t social environment and 
the respective  p o li t ic a l  developments th a t obtained a f te r  1974, compared 
to  the pre-coup s o c io - p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t y .  This w ill  show th a t  ND's 
p o lit ic a l  id en tity  has been la rge ly  a ffec ted  by these developments, and
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th a t i t s  overall course and transform ation can best be explained w ithin 
th a t context.
2.2. The so c io -p o litic a l leve l: From pre-coup repressive parliam entarism  
to  the post-1974 open democratic regime
A. As shown in ch. 1 of th is  study, the p o l i t ic a l  system estab lished  in 
Greece a f te r  the end of the c iv i l  war in  1949 and u n til  the imposition 
of the m ilita ry  coup in 1967 was, of course, th a t of a parliam entary 
democracy, although very d iffe re n t from tha t p reva iling  in o ther West 
European s ta te s . I t  was au th o rita r ian , a  "police" or "guided democracy", 
imposed by the v ic to rs  of the c iv i l  war —namely the throne, the army 
and the bourgeois p a r t ie s  in parliam ent— who fought together against 
the communist forces led by EAM/ELAS (with the army the dominant, and 
parliament the weakest p a rtn e r). However, the main re sp o n s ib ility  for 
the p re to r ia n  s t a t e  co n so lid a ted  a f t e r  the c iv i l  war l ie s  w ith  the 
right-w ing p a rtie s  (the Greek Rally and ERE), since i t  was they that 
held o ffice  for most of th is  period. The lib e ra l forces came to power 
ra re ly  and only fo r very short in te rv a ls ; the re s t  of the time they were 
excluded by a v a r ie ty  of lega l and i l le g a l  means o r sy s te m a tic a lly  
persecuted by the s ta te  machine as fe llo w - tra v e lle rs .115 *
I t  was w ith in  th is  s o c io -p o l i t ic a l  con tex t th a t the  form ation , 
sp e c if ic  fe a tu re s  and o v e ra ll  performance of ERE was examined. More 
sp e c if ica lly , i t  was argued tha t ERE operated in —but to  a  great extent 
a lso  shaped and supported— a p o l i t i c a l  system which excluded i t s  
opponents from any p o li t ic a l  p a rtic ip a tio n  whatsoever, or incorporated 
them through c lie n te lis m  in a v e r t i c a l ,  heteronomous and dependent 
manner.116’ To put i t  d if fe re n tly : w ithin the post-war au th o rita r ian , 
"police-dem ocracy" regim e, ERE was a p e rs o n a l is t ic  and c l i e n te l i s t i c  
p a rty  of n o ta b le s , which s y s te m a t ic a l ly  used e x c lu s io n is t  a n d /o r  
in co rp o ra tiv e  means of p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l in o rder to  gain e le c to ra l
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su p p o rt and rem ain in  governm ent. The n e u t r a l i s i n g  of p o l i t i c a l  
opponents and deporting them to  remote concentration canps, as th a t of 
h y s te ric a lly  anti-ccm nunist propaganda, the in tim idation of the populace 
(e sp e c ia lly  in the ru ra l  a re a s ) ,  and the  r ig g in g  of e le c t io n s ,  was 
a ss is te d  by the supposedly neu tra l throne, the armed forces, and a host 
of q u a s i- te r ro r is t ,  p a ra -s ta te  and p ara -m ilita ry  organisations.
I t  should be s tressed  th a t w ith respect to  ra lly in g  mass support and 
bringing people in to  the p o l i t ic a l  arena, ERE did not g rea tly  d i f fe r  
from the o th e r bourgeois p a r t i e s  and p a r t ic u la r ly  not from i t s  main 
r iv a l during the early-1960s, the lib e ra l Centre Union (EK). In terms of 
p a rty  o rg a n isa tio n , they were both  p e r s o n a l is t ic  and c l i e n t e l i s t i c  
p a r t ie s  of n o tab les  and lo ca l p o l i t i c a l  barons, led  by powerful and 
charism atic leaders, and a lto g e th e r lacking impersonal and bureaucratic  
organisational s tru c tu re s . Let us point out once more th a t —as i t  has 
been th e  case  in  th e  tu rn  o f th e  c e n tu ry — bo th  p a r t i e s  r e l i e d  
extensively on th e ir  respec tive  p o l i t ic a l  barons' broad c lie n te le s , and 
secured vo tes by the  p r o l i f e r a t io n  of patronage netw orks. A ll these  
p r a c t ic e s  were th e  rem n an ts  o f o l i g a r c h i c  p a r l ia m e n ta r is m  and 
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  p e r s o n a l i s t i c  p a r ty  p o l i t i c s ,  and came to  be c a lle d  
paleokorrmatismos. The only d iffe rence  with the s itu a tio n  p reva iling  in 
the la te  19th and early  20th cen tu ries is  tha t the p o l i t ic a l  barons no 
longer enjoyed the autonomy of the local fam ilies of notables v is -a -v is  
the n a tio n a l le a d e rs . In th a t  sense , the t r a d i t io n a l  d e c e n tra lis e d  
c lien te lism  had been transformed in to  somewhat more c en tra lised  forms of 
party - and s ta te -o rie n ted  patronage. ( 171
The organisational s im ila r i t ie s  apart, the ideological o rien ta tio n  
of the ERE and the Centre Union exhib ited  qu ite  a few cannon elements. 
When in o ff ic e , both p a r t ie s  adopted and enforced p a te rn a lis t and s ta te -  
in te rv e n tio n is t  p o l ic ie s  in  th e  economy; co n ce rn in g  in te r n a t io n a l  
re la tio n s , both p a r tie s  accepted and never questioned Greece's position
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w ithin the NATO a llian c e  and, in general, the western world. Moreover, 
they both counted staunch supporters of the King in th e ir  ranks but were 
not ro y a lis t  p a r t ie s , and they both adhered lawfully to  co n stitu tio n a l 
monarchy.
This is  not, of course, to  say th a t ERE and EK were sinp ly  two sides 
of the same coin. ERE expressed and represented the forces of the wider 
conserva tive  camp, whereas EK was h e ir  to  the l ib e ra l  t r a d i t io n  and 
represented the republican forces. Although Karamanlis' ERE was not a 
ro y a lis t  party , i t  was c lo se ly  a f f i l ia te d  with the Crown, as were i t s  
p redecessors and p a r t i c u la r ly  the  in ter-w ar People's P a rty ;* 18} a f te r  
the Asia Minor debacle in 1922 i t  was in  the forefront of the monarchist 
movement, i t s  p o lic ie s  and ideology being defined mainly in opposition 
to  those of i t s  main r i v a l ,  the  L ibera l P arty . The ERE c e r ta in ly  
in h e rite d  th is  p ro - ro y a l is t  t r a d i t io n ,  which rea ffirm ed  i t s  s tro n g  
existence in the party  ranks when during the 1965 p o lit ic a l  c r i s i s ,  and 
the subsequent c la sh  between the  C entre Union and the  King, the  ERE 
openly id en tifie d  with the in te re s ts  of the la t te r .  Furthermore, lik e  
i t s  ancestors the ERE was very c lo se ly  id en tified  with the s ta te ,  and 
extensively employed i t s  mechanisms to consolidate i t s  power and expand 
i t s  c l ie n te l i s t ic  networks. ‘ 19 *
Another important d ifference  between the two p a rtie s  was a lso  tha t 
the lib e ra l EK took a more modem and progressive position  concerning 
broader social and economic issues. This became very evident during the 
early  1960s, when p o li t ic a l  and economic developments brought new and 
more r a d ic a l i s e d  fo rc e s  —modern businessm en, h ig h e r  em ployees, 
s c i e n t i s t s ,  s tu d en ts  and i n te l l e c tu a l s — to the p o lit ic a l  foreground, 
who demanded g re a te r  and bo lder changes and m odernisations in  the 
econony, but a lso  liqu ida tion  of the post-war "police democracy" and an 
opening up and dem ocratisation of the p o l it ic a l  system. Their appearance 
coincided w ith the r i s e  of the  EK which id e n tif ie d  w ith  and adopted
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these demands. I t  was only then th a t basic  d ifferences between the ERE 
and EK came in to  sharp focus. The former employed a l l  the means a t i t s  
disposal to suppress the popular demands and preserve the au th o rita rian  
s t a tu s  quo ( th e  r ig g in g  o f th e  1961 e le c t io n  r e s u l t s ,  and th e  
assassina tion  of MP G. Lambrakis two years la te r  by members of para- 
s ta te  o rganisations, c o n s titu te  the most s tr ik in g  examples of the ERE's 
unscrupulous p ra c tic e s ) ; whereas the Centre Union stood staunchly not 
only against i t s  party  r iv a l ,  but a lso  against the "police-democracy" 
regime as such, and pledged to  modernise soc ie ty  and p o l i t ic s ,  and so to 
e s tab lish  a more lib e ra l and open democracy.
During the EK's short term in government from February 1964 to Ju ly  
1965, the incorpora tive  means of p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l were not a ffe c te d  
n o tic ea b ly , but the  p e rsec u tio n  and exclu sion  of p o l i t ic a l  opponents 
ceased, e ffo r ts  were made to  heal the wounds of the c iv i l  war, and a 
process was se t in motion towards the l ib e ra lis a tio n  of the p o l i t ic a l  
system. But the new p o l i t ic a l  clim ate was not allowed to  la s t  fo r long. 
The p i l la r s  of the post-war establishm ent —i . e . ,  the throne, the army, 
and th is  time only the ERE fac tion  in parliam ent, not a l l  of i t  as had 
been the case befo re— were alarmed to  see th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  power 
positions seriously  threatened. ERE took the f i r s t  step , by supporting 
in parliament a government formed by EK deputies who had defected from 
th e ir  party , and i t  was hoped th a t th is  would erode the popular support 
for G. Papandreou and the Centre Union, so th a t the ERE stood a b e tte r  
chance in the next e lec tio n s . But m atters had reached a deadlock. Since 
the mechanisms of exclusion  and in co rp o ra tio n  could no longer cope 
e ffec tiv e ly  with the popular th rea t from below, the system had e ith e r  to 
be re a r tic u la te d  thoroughly and opened up (which the Centre Union had 
fa i le d  to  do), o r i t  had to  be re in fo rc e d  by the  to ta l  a b o li t io n  of 
parliam entary ru le . The armed forces opted fo r the second a lte rn a tiv e ,
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and the colonels stepped in and estab lished  a m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  in 
April 1967.( 201
To summarise: Greece's post-1949 p o l i t ic a l  regime estab lished  by the 
v ic to rs  in the c iv il  war (the throne, the army, and parliam ent, but the 
r ig h t-w in g  fo rc e s  in  p a r t i c u l a r )  was an a u th o r i t a r i a n  system  of 
re p re ss iv e  parliam entarism  o r "guided democracy". Party p o l i t ic s  were 
allowed to continue openly, except fo r the Communist Party  of Greece 
(KKE) which had been ou tlaw ed ; th e  peo p le  were b rough t in to  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  game by the  use o f a com bination of in co rp o ra tiv e  and /o r 
exclusion ist mechanisms of p o l i t ic a l  con tro l.
Within th is  system, ERE was the leading rep resen ta tive  of the Right. 
Under an au to c ra tica lly  powerful leader, i t  was a conservative pa rty  of 
no tab les  and loca l p o l i t i c a l  barons. I t  t r i e d  to  compensate fo r  i t s  
to ta l  lack of any b u rea u c ra tic  o rg a n isa tio n a l s tru c tu re s  by h eav ily  
re ly ing  on c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s  and patronage networks, as well as on 
s e le c tiv e  d is t r ib u t io n  of governmental sp o ils  so as to  r a l l y  mass 
support and remain in o f f ic e ;  and to  conceal i t s  lack of any re a l 
ideology by transform ing  i t s  t r a d i t io n a l  a n t i - l i b e r a l  stance in to  an 
anti-carm unist h y ste ria  th a t did not stop a t persecuting and excluding 
from p o lit ic a l  p a rtic ip a tio n  every type of p o l i t ic a l  opponent, whether 
l e f t i s t  or l ib e ra l .
In overall terms, and in lin e  with the p o l i t ic a l  regime which was 
more re p re ss iv e  than i t  was p a rliam en ta ry , more e x c lu s io n is t  than 
incorporative, and more a u th o rita rian  than democratic, ERE's id en tity  
and p o l i t i c a l  perform ance p ro je c te d ,  by and la rg e , a v e rs io n  of 
au th o rita rian  conservatism: ‘21 * the p a rty  persecu ted  and excluded i t s  
opponents ra th e r more than i t  re lie d  on patronage networks, i t  was more 
anti-carm unist than p a te rn a lis t ic  and, la s t but not le a s t , i t  was much 
more au th o rita rian  than conservative.
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B. The reg im e e s t a b l i s h e d  in  th e  c o u n try  in  1974, a f t e r  th e  
d ic ta to rsh ip  had handed power back to  the p o lit ic ia n s , was again th a t of 
a parliam entary democracy, but i t s  re la tio n  to the pre-coup one was as 
d if f e re n t  as n ig h t and day. This tim e i t  was a f u l l  and com petitive  
parliam entary democracy, by fa r  the most open th a t the country has known 
in  modern h i s to r y .  The whole p o l i t i c a l  system  underw ent a  m ajor 
l ib e ra lisa tio n  and democrat i sa t ion, and can now be leg itim ate ly  compared 
to  most o ther West European parliam entary regimes.
This fundamental change in  the  p o l i t i c a l  system a ffe c te d  every 
aspect of so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  This included , of course , the  
reappearance and performance of the p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  and p a rtic u la rly  
ND, which con stitu ted  a lib e ra l reform of the Greek Right, not sinply  a 
regrouping of EE® under a d iffe re n t label (as has been argued already in 
the previous sec tio n ). What m atters most of a l l  is  the huge d ifference  
between the two p o l i t ic a l  systems, ra th e r  than th a t between the pre-coup 
and post-1974 p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  Since the  p a r t ie s  a re , in  a way, a 
re fle c tio n  of the system, and since th e ir  fu ll  understanding (especially  
of the ERE-ND re la tio n s h ip )  presupposes a thorough knowledge of the 
p o s t-1974 p o li t ic a l  regime and the way in which i t  was estab lished , the 
focus in the re s t  of th is  section  w ill be on the post-1974 p o li t ic a l  
system, and the  sp e c ia l c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  th a t allow  us to  id e n tify  
elements of change (but a lso  of con tinu ity ) a t the party  l e v e l . '22’
To begin w ith , we must s t r e s s  once more th a t the  t r a n s i t io n  from 
d ic ta to rsh ip  to  democracy, and the subsequent consolidation of an open 
and democratic regime was ca rried  out by one sing le  man as leader of one 
single party , namely Karamanlis and h is  Nea Dimokratia. Moreover, i t  
should be remembered th a t (a) a l l  these developments took place w ithin a 
very  sh o r t p e rio d  o f tim e , and (b) bo th  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  and th e  
consolidation processes were e n tire ly  successful.
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The p o s t-1974 p o li t ic a l  system, then, was se t up on a very d iffe re n t 
foundation. The army, which had been the dominant partner in the pre­
coup t r i - p a r t i t e  a l l ia n c e  (a rm y-th rone-parliam en t) th a t upheld the 
system of rep ressive parliam entarism , was soon sent back to  barracks and 
ceased to play a dominant p o l i t ic a l  ro le . The Comriunist Party of Greece 
was legalised  and allowed to  operate in to  the open; conrnunism was no 
lo n g er c o n s id e re d  an enemy to  th e  n a tio n  bu t on ly  to  dem ocracy. 
Concerning the monarchy, Karamanlis ca lled  a  national referendum, which 
gave a c le a r  m ajority  fo r the repub lic . Whereas almost a l l  o ther p a r tie s  
stood public ly  against the in s t i tu t io n  of the monarchy and urged th e ir  
supporters to  vote accordingly, the ND leader kept h is  party  o f f ic ia l ly  
out of th is  controvercy, and in structed  h is  party  colleagues to keep 
th e i r  personal opin ion  on the  m atte r to  them selves. ND's n e u tr a l i ty  
d u rin g  t h i s  referendum , th e r e f o r e ,  marked th e  end of th e  c lo s e  
id e n tif ic a tio n  of the Greek Right with the Crown, while a t  the same time 
the  p a r ty , whose co n serv a tiv e  t r a d i t io n  meant th a t  i t  numbered many 
ro y a lis ts  among both i t s  leading members and i t s  vo ters , put th is  thorny 
issue aside and remained united .
The new 1975 co n s titu tio n , then, which was elaborated and voted for 
exclusively  by ND, was designed to  e s tab lish  a p res id en tia l democracy 
—that is ,  a p o l i t ic a l  system where the main power lay with parliam ent, 
on the one hand, and on the o ther with the president of the repub lic , 
who was vested with broad and very inportant powers, including the rig h t 
to d isso lve parliam ent i f  he f e l t  th a t i t  no longer re fle c ted  the true  
mood of the people. However, as long as Karamanlis was the leader of ND, 
the  r e a l  power lay  w ith  p a r l ia m e n t, o r  more a c c u ra te ly  w ith  the  
governing party  and i t s  leader and prem ier, since the president (elected  
so le ly  by ND deputies who duly followed th e ir  leaders ' in stru c tio n s) was 
one of K aram an lis1 c lo s e s t  a s s o c ia t e s ,  who would never th in k  of 
e x e rc is in g  th e  s p e c ia l  powers vo uchsafed  him a g a in s t  h i s  p a r ty .
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E ssen tia lly , then, the post-1974 p o li t ic a l  system was, so to speak, a 
"p rim e-m in is te ria l"  democracy, in  the  sense th a t a t  le a s t  the  most 
important powers ( i f  not a l l )  lay with the premier. This s i tu a tio n  was 
form alised  by PASOK's 1986 c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform , which deprived the 
president of the republic  of a l l  inportant powers he alone had enjoyed 
under the 1975 co n stitu tio n .
All in a l l ,  the  post-1975 p rim e -m in is te r ia l democracy was more 
c e n tra l is e d  and o lig a rc h ic  a t  i t s  top than was the  pre-coup p o lic e -  
democracy regim e,123 ’ but —and th is  is  the main d ifference— much more 
open, free , cortpetitive and democratic in a l l  o ther respec ts: p o l i t ic a l  
and c iv il  r ig h ts  were guaranteed and p ro tec ted ; freedom of the p ress , of 
o p in io n , o f th e  t ra d e  un ions was du ly  re s p e c te d ;  e le c t io n s  were 
conducted f a i r l y  and h o n e s t ly ,  and a l l  p a r t i e s ,  in c lu d in g  th e  
conmunists, were free  to  e x is t in the open, to  canvass support, and to  
compete fo r power; most im portant of a l l ,  th i s  new p o l i t i c a l  system 
showed that i t  could survive changes and a lte rn a tio n s  in governmental 
power, something in which the pre-coup regime had fa iled  conpletely .
The profound change of the p o l i t ic a l  system could not but a ffe c t the 
re la tio n s  of domination as w ell. The most evident d ifference  has been, 
of course, the elim ination of exclusion ist methods; p o l i t ic a l  d issen t 
ceased  to  be banned, id e o lo g ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  and p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  
preferences were accomodated and respected, and nobody was persecuted 
or discrim inated against because of h is  p o l i t ic a l  b e lie fs . However, the 
most inportant issue the new regime was faced with was to  enploy the 
p o lit ic a l  transform ation inagurated in 1974 fo r the creation  of a new 
system, free  of incorporative, p e rso n a lis tic  and c l i e n te l i s t i c  elements 
—a p o lit ic a l  system of the West-European kind, where mass p o l i t ic s  and 
h o riz o n ta l, b u rea u c ra tic  and impersonal o rg a n isa tio n s  would f i n a l ly  
d isrupt and in the end rep lace the old v e r tic a l networks.
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W ithin th is  open, n o n -e x c lu s io n is t and com petitive  system, New 
Democracy emerged as the standard bearer of the conservative p o lit ic a l  
tra d itio n , but i t  a lso  proved th a t i t  had undergone a  decisive break 
with i t s  a u th o rita rian , ro y a lis t  and reactionary  p ast. I t  was indeed a 
new party  in many respec ts , a party  of the modem and moderate Right. On 
the  p o s it iv e  s id e , i t s  la rg e ly  new p o l i t i c a l  personnel p ro jec te d  a 
l ib e ra l  co n serv a tiv e  id e n t i ty ,  and i t s  ideology became defined  as 
ra d ic a l lib e ra lism ; i t  promised to  follow  a programme of bourgeois 
m odernisation and committed i t s e l f  to  lead ing  the country  in to  the 
European Community. On the negative side  —which emerged when ND tr ie d  
to  re a lis e  i t s  policy  programmes— th is  overall p ro jected  modernity did 
not come up to  expectations. The party  once more enforced the old s ta te -  
in te rv en tio n is t and p a te rn a lis t  p o lic ie s  to  cope with almost a l l  social 
and economic i s s u e s ,  r e l i e d  and c a p i t a l i s e d  e x te n s iv e ly  on th e  
personality  of i t s  leader, and to ta l ly  neglected to construct i t s e l f  an 
ideological id en tity  and an o rgan isational s tru c tu re .
Karamanlis was aware from e a r ly  on th a t  ND would not su rv ive  h is  
eventual departure (which he and alsmost everybody e lse  expected as a 
foregone co n clu sio n ), u n less  i t  developed from a p a rty  of n o tab les , 
which would alw ays r e q u ir e  a c h a r is m a tic  p e r s o n a l i ty  to  keep i t  
together, in to  a modern party  of p rin c ip le s . For a l l  th a t, he fa ile d  to 
inp rin t upon h is  party  a concrete se t of ideological p rin c ip les  and to 
e s ta b l is h  the foundations of an o rg a n isa tio n a l s t ru c tu re . He only 
confused ND's ideology fu rth e r when he tr ie d  to  define i t s  p rin c ip le s , 
and concerning the p a rty  o rg a n isa tio n , in s tead  of l e t t in g  i t  grow 
g radua lly  and d em o cra tica lly  from the bottom, he t r ie d  in a ra th e r  
au th o rita rian  manner to  c rea te  i t  from above. For a l l  th a t, "the package 
of new ideology, o rganisation  and programme imprinted by Karamanlis upon 
h is  party  has been unevenly and incompletely digested and assim ilated  
(or even d e lib a ra te ly  subverted) by the lower echelons", {24 * same degree
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of in s t itu tio n a lis a t io n  of bureaucratic , o rganisational procedures was 
achieved: ND did survive i t s  founder's departure, e lected  a new leader, 
and rerained  united .
D uring th e  p a r t y 's  term  in  o p p o s i t io n , th e  p ro c e ss  tow ards 
organisational development gained momentum, but ideological issues s t i l l  
rerained neglected. As a r e s u l t ,  the p a r ty 's  id en tity  and performance 
was unduly coloured by the arch-conservative personality  of i t s  then- 
leader E. Averoff, and tem porarily began to reserible the ERE. H ysterical 
anti-com m unism  became ND's m ain s lo g a n ,  and th e  p a r t y 's  m ost 
re c a lc itra n t, u ltra -R igh t elements, both in terms of persons and ideas, 
came to  the  fo re . In  the  end, the  r e le n t le s s  challenge  from PASOK 
—which continued to  in c re ase  i t s  p o llin g  f ig u re s , dominated in  the 
rea lm  o f id e a s ,  and i t  had  d e v e lo p e d  a w e l l - s t r u c t u r e d  m ass 
organisation— motivated ND to  e le c t the lib e ra l C. M itsotakis fo r i t s  
new lead er. He held  a  second p a rty  congress, which re s u l te d  in  the  
upgrad ing  o f i t s  g r a s s - r o o t s  o rg a n is a t io n  and th e  a d o p tio n  o f a 
concrete, neo-conservative T hatcherite  ideology.
The main p o in t  h e re  i s  t h a t ,  d e s p i te  a l l  th e se  developm ents, 
p rev iously  q u ite  un th inkab le  fo r  a rig h t-w in g  conservative  p arty , ND 
c o m p le te ly  f a i l e d  to  t r a n s f o r m  i t s e l f  i n t o  an im p e r s o n a l ,  
b u re a u c ra tic a lly  o rgan ised  p o l i t i c a l  o rgan isation . To use a d iffe re n t 
terminology: i t  fa iled  to  become an in teg ra tiv e  p o li t ic a l  force of the 
R igh t.( 25} Whether under Karamanlis' leadership or th a t of M itsotakis, 
the e f f o r t s  fo r m odernising ND may have been p e r fe c t ly  genuine and 
sincere, but they a l l  were abo rtive . In terms of ideology, both rad ica l 
l i b e r a l i s m  o r  n e o -c o n s e rv a t is m  w ere im posed from  above in  a 
p e rs o n a l is t ic  manner by the  p a rty  leader and a small group of c lo se  
a sso c ia te s ;  not d iscu ssed , e lab o ra ted  and form ulated by the p a rty  
o rg an isa tio n , they remained vague and c o n tro v e rs ia l .  There were deep 
disagreements a t the higher party  echelons, e spec ia lly  over the post-
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1985 adoption of the neo -libera l p rin c ip le s , and a t g rass-roo ts level 
there is  s t i l l  uncertain ty  and considerable confusion as to exactly  what 
the party  stands fo r. In terms of o rgan isation , on the o ther hand, ND 
has a c q u ire d  on ly  a minimum of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d ,  b u re a u c ra t ic  
procedures, since the respective  provisions and regulations of the party  
s ta tu te s  have not been respected. I t  was only the parliam entary group 
th a t, three times in a l l ,  e lected  the new leader, and the o ther higher 
party  organs were le f t  to play a secondary, merely decorative ro le ; the 
rank and f i l e ,  although q u ite  numerous and m ilita n t, served mainly as a 
mechanism fo r  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p a r ty  propaganda and fo r  th e  
m o b ilisa tio n  of v o te rs  and sup p o rte rs  during  p o l i t i c a l  r a l l i e s  and 
demonstrations.
What a l l  of th is  amounts to is  that ND, ever since i t s  foundation 
and u n til today, remains a party  with something of a s p l i t  id en tity : 
c h a ra c te ris tic s  of con tinu ity  with i t s  d ire c t predecessor, as well as 
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of change and d ep artu re  from tra d itio n a l conservative 
p rac tices coexist side  by side . ND can be seen as n e ith e r a complete 
tran sfigu ra tion  o f, nor a mere f a c e - l i f t  of the tra d itio n a l Greek Right. 
Nobody can deny th a t ND has g rea tly  contributed to the consolidation of 
democracy by estab lish in g  the post-1974 democratic and non-exclusionist 
p o l i t i c a l  regim e; th a t i t  has in troduced  new personnel in to  Greek 
p o lit ic s ;  tha t i t  endeavours to  p ro jec t a modern, cen tre -rig h t moderate 
image, and an ideology o ther than ERE's pro-royalism  and anti-communism; 
th a t i t  a ttem pted to  c re a te  a mass-organ i s a t  ion, and has held  one 
prelim inary and two fu ll  national congresses; and th a t, la s t  but not 
l e a s t ,  i t  has in  f a c t  re s p e c te d  th e  r u le s  o f democracy and du ly  
t r a n s fe r r e d  power to  PASOK when i t  l o s t  in  th e  e le c t i o n ,  thus 
contributing fu rth e r to the post-1974 regim e's consolidation and w ell- 
functioning. In a l l  these respec ts , ND has presented a to ta l ly  d iffe re n t
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p ic tu re  from th a t of i t s  d ire c t predecessor, and has c e rta in ly  shown 
i t s e l f  as a  new expression of the coun try 's  conservative forces.
On the o ther hand, our analysis of the party  a lso  shows elements of
con tinu ity  th a t t i e  ND d ire c tly  to  the ERE. Aside from the fac t th a t
Karamanlis founded and led both the ERE and ND, the l a t t e r  p a rty , while
in o ff ic e , re l ie d  heavily  on the resources of the s ta te  machinery and
used them for party  purposes; moreover, i t s  handling of most social and
economic issues d id  not d if f e r  much from ERE's p a te rn a lis t ic  and s ta te -
in te rv e n t io n is t  approaches. Furtherm ore, i t s  f a i lu r e  to  e la b o ra te  a
concrete ideology, is  large ly  responsible  for ND not having managed so
fa r  to  ge t r id  i t s e l f  of the  most re a c tio n a ry , u l tra -c o n s e rv a tiv e
members in i t s  ranks, who n o s ta lg ica lly  asp ire  to  the pre-coup social
repression  and au thoritarian ism . Most inportant of a l l ,  ND's fa ilu re  to
a r t ic u la te  and formulate a coherent ideology, and to c rea te  an e ffe c tiv e
mass o rg a n isa tio n  has meant th a t the  p a rty  s t i l l  rem ains more an
a sso c ia tio n  of c e r ta in  lead e rs  and p ro fe ss io n a l p o l i t i c ia n s ,  than a
mass-organised, in teg ra tiv e  p o l i t ic a l  in s t i tu t io n . In consequence, a l l
the c h a ra c te r is tic s  of p e rso n a lis tic  and in c lu s io n is t p o l i t ic s ,  (undue
dependence on the leader whose broad powers are well beyond constructive
c ritic ism  and con tro l, d isrespec t and v ir tu a l defiance of organisational
procedures and democratic inner-party  p o l i t ic s ,  and the survival and use
of c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s  and patronage networks for gaining e lec to ra l
support) c o -e x is t  and con tinue  to  o p e ra te  a longside  more ho rizon ta l,
impersonal, but not yet in s t itu tio n a lis e d  p o lit ic a l  mechanisms.|It m ust 
be s t r e s s e d  how ever, t h a t  th e  p e r s o n a l i s t i c  and  c l i e n t e l i s t i c
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  p r e s e n t  in  ND to d a y  a r e  by no means a s  s t r o n g
and e x te n s iv e  a s  in  th e  c a se  o f ERE.
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3. General co n c lu s io n
The c h ie f  o b je c t iv e  o f t h i s  work was to  s tu d y  th e  o r ig in s ,  
com position  and p a r t i c u l a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  in  term s of p o l i t i c a l  
personnel, ideology and organ isation  a t  the national and local level of 
the conservative p o li t ic a l  forces in Greece as they appeared under the 
banner of the p a rty  of Nea Diwokratia a f te r  the end of the seven-year 
m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  and the re s to ra tio n  of democracy in 1974. In order 
to  provide a  f u l l  and more comprehensive p ic tu re  of ND's s p e c if ic  
fea tu res and a lso  the extent to  which the la t t e r  re f le c ted  p a tte rn s  of 
con tinu ity  and/or change from the p a s t, we a lso  took in to  account the 
h is to r ic a l process by which the p a rty  came in to  being, extending our 
a n a ly s is  to  ND's p redecesso rs and e sp e c ia lly  to  the National Radical 
Union (ERE), which had dominated Greek p o li t ic s  fo r more than a decade 
before the inposition  of the d ic ta to rsh ip  in 1967.
Our ex am in a tio n  o f th e  ERE and ND, and th e  com parisons th a t  
e lucidated the question of whether ND was something completely new in 
Greek p o l i t ic s  (as claimed by i t s  founder) or merely the ERE in a new 
guise (as most of i t s  c r i t ic s  argued) was not r e s tr ic te d  to these two 
p a rtie s  but extended to  the broader social and p o li t ic a l  systems —very 
d iffe ren t from one another— in which they were respec tive ly  created  and 
w ith in  which they opera ted . Thus we took in to  account the s p e c if ic  
social and economic developments th a t contributed to the formation of 
these p a r tic u la r  p a r ty -p o lit ic a l  id e n ti t ie s  and a ffected  th e ir  general 
p a rty -p o lit ic a l  performance. We a lso  took into account and emphasised 
the sign ificance  of the respective  p o li t ic a l  fea tu res dominant w ithin 
each system, arguing th a t a b e tte r  p resen ta tion  and fu l le r  understanding 
of the p a r tic u la r  c h a ra c te r is tic s  and sp ec ific  course of the Greek Right 
must be considered in th is  context. I t  was f in a lly  argued th a t ,  in a 
narrower sense, there  has been s ig n if ic a n t in te rre la tio n  between the two
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p a rtie s  on the one hand, and the respective  p o lit ic a l  systems w ithin 
which they emerged and operated on the o ther; and, in a more general and 
broader sense, th a t the course and transform ation of the Greek Right has 
been g rea tly  a ffec ted  by the country’s overall economic and p o l i t ic a l  
development, and followed a  very s im ila r course.
Our analysis showed, f i r s t ,  th a t ERE emerged and operated w ithin a 
rep ressive  parliam entarian , so c io -p o litic a l system characterised  by both 
exclusion is t and incorporative means of p o l it ic a l  con tro l. In terms of 
the p reva iling  r e la t io n s  o f p o l i t i c a l  dom ination th is  meant th a t  a l l  
those openly opposing th is  system or simply unw illing to comply with i t s  
terms were excluded from p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n  through the  use of 
r e p r e s s iv e  and a u th o r i t a r i a n  means. The r e s t ,  w h ile  a llow ed  to  
p a rtic ip a te  in p o l i t ic s ,  were incorporated in a v e r t ic a l ,  p e rso n a lis tic  
and dependent manner through c lie n te lis m , not independently  through 
b u r e a u c r a t ic a l ly  im personal i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Secondly , ERE was both 
affected  by and i t s e l f  shaped and fu rth er strengthened th is  system, not 
only by refusing  any reform, but a lso  by taking the fu l le s t  advantage of 
the exclusion ist and incorporative mechanisms. We concluded th a t ERE was 
an a u th o rita rian  conservative party , lacking in a coherent ideology and 
an e ffec tiv e  mass organ isation , which re lie d  on p e rso n a litie s  and local 
p o lit ic a l  barons who estab lished  and used patronage networks to r a l ly  
e lec to ra l support.
With respect to  ND, we argued th a t i t  was se t up and operated in an 
open, fu l ly  com petitive  and dem ocratic system. P o l i t ic a l  d issen t was 
le g itim ise d , because the  system could surv ive  re g a rd le ss  of whether 
people wished to  p a r tic ip a te , remain neutral or openly oppose i t .  I t  was 
also  shown th a t ND was both a ffec ted  by th is  modern p o li t ic a l  r e a l i ty ,  
and i t s e l f  g rea tly  contributed  to i t s  fu rther shaping and in s t i tu t io n a l  
s tren g th en in g . Our exam ination of the p a rty  has shown ND as a more 
lib e ra l, modem and moderate version of the Greek Right, both in terms
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of ideology, which i t  t r i e d  to  e la b o ra te  in  a p o s i t iv e  and coherent 
manner, and in terms of i t s  attempted mass organisation  to r a l ly  mass 
support; but while these respective  processes towards modernisation have 
been se t in motion, they a re  fa r  from complete.
Our p ic tu re  of the p arty  and i t s  sp ec ific  fea tu res can be fu rth e r 
e lucidated  by the t ra je c to r ie s  of economic and p o l i t ic a l  development in 
G reece. I t  has been w id e ly  a cc ep ted  th a t  th e  c o u n tr y 's  economic 
development, d id  no t fo llow  the W estern European tre n d  but took a 
d i s t i n c t i v e  c o u rs e  o f  i t s  own, r e s u l t i n g  in  e le m e n ts  o f bo th  
modernisation and underdevelopment. Without going in to  d e ta i l ,  l e t  us 
point out th a t ,  (a) i t  was the s ta te  and not a p a r t ic u la r  soc ia l c la ss  
tha t took the lead in the coun try 's  in d u s tr ia lis a tio n ; and (b) th a t the 
outcome of th is  developm ental p rocess has been th a t large c a p i ta l is t  
in d u stria l u n its  d id  not become dominant but always co -ex isted  side-by- 
side with the underdeveloped, backward economic secto r (fo r example, a 
vast mass of a r t is a n a l ,  h ighly  in e ff ic ie n t family concerns) . {26}
Sim ilar trends may be observed concerning the course of p o l i t ic a l  
development. Contrary to  what happened in most of the developed West 
European s t a t e s ,  where th e  p ro c e ss  o f economic developm ent and 
in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n  preceded th a t of s t a te  expansion, in  Greece the  
opposite is  true : parliam entarism  and democratic in s ti tu tio n s  in general 
emerged and f u n c t io n e d  lo n g  b e fo r e  t h e r e  was any l a r g e - s c a l e  
in d u s tr ia l is a t io n .{27’ In the sphere of the means of p o l i t ic a l  control 
and the re la tio n s  of domination, th is  meant th a t in Western Europe the 
process from o lig a rch ic  to  mass p o l i t ic s  followed and was a ffec ted  by 
that of the reformed and already modernised labour and o ther economic 
re la tio n s ; as a r e s u l t ,  the people there were no longer w illin g  to  le t  
themselves be incorporated in to  p o l i t ic s  through tra d itio n a l c lien te lism  
when the l a t t e r  had been seriously  eroded due to  economic development, 
m odernisation and p ro s p e r i ty .  This meant th a t the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s
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could no longer remain c o te r ie s  of p e rso n a litie s  and local barons. They 
too had to  modernise and e s ta b lish  o ther means for ra lly in g  mass support 
and running fo r o ff ice  —they had to develop concrete ideologies and to 
c rea te  powerful impersonal and bureaucratic  mass-organi sa t ions.
In Greece, th is  p o l i t i c a l  development d id  not occur. Although 
n in e te e n th -  and e a r ly  tw e n tie th -c en tu ry  o lig a rc h ic  parliam en tarism  
became transformed in the post-war period in to  a reactionary , rep ressive 
and au th o rita rian  regime, and a f te r  the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  took i t s  
present form of democratic parliam entarism  proper, the processes of the 
transform ation of re la tio n s  of p o l i t ic a l  domination, or of the p o l i t ic a l  
c u ltu re  in  more general term s, were f a r  le s s  sp e c ta c u la r . In o th e r 
words, a l l  the p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  tha t emerged a f te r  1974, although they 
t r ie d  to adopt and p ro jec t concrete ideological outlooks and to c rea te  
impersonal and bureaucratic  s tru c tu re s , u ltim ately  did so only in p a rt. 
Of course, th e ir  success varied , since some p a rtie s  managed from the 
s ta r t  to  e laborate  a very d is t in c t  ideology and a strong organisation 
(e.g . PASOK), o thers met with more lim ited success (e.g . ND), and others 
again  (e .g . EK/ND) f a i le d  com plete ly . ( 28 * In e f f e c t ,  elem ents and 
p rac tices  rem iniscent of the pre-coup trad itio n a l p o l it ic a l  cu ltu re  did 
not d issapear a lto g e th e r, but re-emerged and co-existed with elements of 
p o l i t ic a l  m odernisation. So ND’s pro-republican, l ib e ra l ,  c en tre -rig h t 
ideology q u ite  o fte n  had p r o - r o y a l i s t ,  anti-com m unist, and u l t r a ­
conservative overtones, whereas i t s  ill-developed, m al-functioning and 
n o n - in s t i tu t io n a l is e d  mass o rg a n isa tio n  operated  s id e -b y -s id e  w ith 
c l i e n te l i s t i c  networks. PASOK, although i t  projected a much more modern 
id eo lo g ica l and o rg a n is a tio n a l id e n t i ty ,  soon proved that i t  was the 
charism atic pe rsonality  of i t s  leader, coupled with generous doses of 
populism of the  L atin  American kind, th a t mainly accounted fo r  the 
m obilisation of the masses and i t s  e lec tio n  successes. ( 29}
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Just as the country’s economic and p o l i t ic a l  development took forms 
o ther than the Western European model th a t were characterised  by the co­
e x is te n c e  of both  t r a d i t io n a l  and m odernising elem ents, so d id  the 
course  and trains format ion of the  Greek R igh t, and of the  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r tie s  in general. Ever since i t s  foundation, New Democracy presented 
and s t i l l  p resen ts  o ld  t r a d i t io n a l  elem ents th a t  evidence c o n tin u ity  
with the p a s t, as well as new and modem fea tu res th a t mark i t s  break 
w ith  t r a d i t i o n a l  p r a c t ic e s  and i t s  t r a n s i t i o n  tow ards p o l i t i c a l  
modernisation. In terms of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  personnel, the in troduction  of 
a good many newcomers to p o l i t ic s  d if fe re n tia te d  ND from ERE, but i t s  
leadership showed d is t in c tiv e  con tin u ity  with i t s  predecessor. In terms 
of ideology, the adoption of l ib e ra l ,  c en tre -rig h t or neo-conservative 
ideas showed th a t  ND d id  t r y  to  a r t i c u l a t e  a coherent ideology th a t 
would appeal to  the e le c to ra te , but the fac t th a t the p a rty ’s overa ll 
outlook has always been and s t i l l  is  dependent on, influenced and shaped 
by th e  p e r s o n a l i ty  o f i t s  le a d e r  has h in d e re d  e f f o r t s  tow ards 
modernisation and perpetuated ND’s s im ila r i t ie s  with ERE. In terms of 
p a rty  o rg a n is a tio n , the  c re a tio n  and development of bureaucratic  and 
horizontal s tru c tu re s , tha t is  of an e ffe c tiv e , non-personalistic  mass 
organisation , has not yet been completed, so tha t ND continues to  have 
to  re ly  on c lien te lism  and various p a r ty -p o lit ic a l p e rso n a litie s  with 
ex tensive  patronage netw orks. In sum, ND p re se n ts  a s p l i t  id e n t i ty ,  
exh ib iting  both elements of p o l i t ic a l  modernity and tra d itio n  —o r, as 
said of the transform ation of the conservative forces and the c rea tion  
of ND, "as one should expect from such a tran sfo rm a tio n , the animal 
exh ib its the d isq u ie tin g  fea tu res of a cross-breed m utant". ( 301
We do not pretend to  be ab le  to  p red ic t ND's fu tu re  course. Whether 
the party  w ill move towards p o l i t ic a l  modernisation of the West-European 
kind and reform i t s e l f  to become a party  of the moderate and lib e ra l 
R ight, o r wheher i t  w ill  re g re ss  to  the  o ld  pa 1 eokommatismos and
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tra d itio n a l p o l i t ic s  is  a m atter fo r speculation; there  is  a host of 
fac to rs  both w ithin the party  and in the broader p o l i t ic a l  context tha t 
may p r e c i p i t a t e  th e  one outcome o r th e  o th e r .  What can be s a id  
te n ta tiv e ly  and p rov isionally  w ith respect to the p o s t-1974 p o l i t ic a l  
system  of open and d em o cra tic  p a r lia m e n ta r ism  (o r  th e  "p rim e- 
m in is te ria l " democracy, the c h a ra c te r is tic s  of which we have presented 
above), is  th a t  i t  i s  approaching a c r i t i c a l  p o in t. I t  has coped 
successfu lly  with the liqu ida tion  of the d ic ta to rsh ip , with tra n s it io n  
to  democracy and a lso  with the establishm ent, respect and consolidation 
of democratic in s t i tu t io n s ;  but i t  has u ltim ately  fa ile d  in dealing with 
the mounting and pressing  economic and social prolems. In o ther words, 
i t  has f a i l e d  to  s e t  th e  c o u n try  on th e  road  tow ards economic 
development and soc ia l m odernisation. Greece has been a fu ll  EEC member 
since 1981, but i t s  economy has not yet transformed the public sec to r by 
purging i t  of corruption and bureaucracy, upgraded the q u a lity  of i t s  
s e r v ic e s ,  c re a te d  c r i t e r i a  o f m e r ito c ra c y  fo r  s t a t e  employment, 
permanently ab o lish ed  c l i e n t e l i s t i c ,  ro u s fe ti  p ra c t ic e s ,  e s ta b lis h e d  
g e n u in e  r e s p e c t  f o r  c i v i l  r i g h t s ,  more l i b e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
democratisat ion of p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s , e tc .
G reece 's p r im e -m in is te r ia l  democracy rem ains dependent on th e  
p e rs o n a lity  of the  prem ier, w ith  p a r ty  p o l i t i c s  in post-1974 Greece 
overwhelmingly a ffe c te d  and in fluenced  by the  immense p re s t ig e  of C. 
Karamanlis and the  d azz lin g  charism a of A. Papandreou. Although C. 
M itso tak is  enjoys n e ith e r  such p re s t ig e  nor such charism a, the  fa c t 
th a t, o rig in a tin g  from the broader l ib e ra l camp, and as an apostate  from 
h is party  who is  considered the p o lit ic ia n  ch ie fly  responsible fo r the 
imposition of the d ic ta to rsh ip , he nevertheless managed to become the 
leader of one of the  two la rg e s t  p a r t ie s  and the c o u n try 's  prime 
m inister, can leave no doubt of h is  ex tra-ord inary  s k i l ls .
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Today 86-year Karamanlis is  serving h is  second five-year term in the 
presidency of the republic; i t  w ill end in 1995, and the co n stitu tio n  
does not allow  fo r a th i rd  one. M itso tak is  a t  75, is  p rem ier, and 
74-year Papandreou is  lead er of the  o f f i c i a l  oppo sitio n  (the  e a r ly  
e lections held on 10 Oct. 1993 changed th is  p ic tu re  somewhat; PASQK won 
and Papandreou became once more the prem ier, whereas ND lo s t ,  M itsotakis 
resigned  from the ND lead e rsh ip  and the  p a rty  is  now moving towards 
e lec ting  i t s  fourth leader). I t  does seen lik e ly  th a t, alongside the 
challenges fo r so c ia l change and m odern isation  se t  from above by the 
in te rn a tio n a l environment (mainly by the  EEC and the need fo r  the 
cou n try  to  respond  s u c c e s s f u l ly  to  e f f o r t s  a t  b ro ad e r European 
u n if ic a t io n ) ,  and by the  n a tio n a l environment (the  above-mentioned 
social demands fo r more rap id  change and m odernisation), the eventual 
retirem ent of these th ree  p o lit ic ia n s  may well in i t ia te  processes and 
procedures tha t w ill a lso  lead to  changes w ithin the p o l i t ic a l  p a r tie s . 
When th is  happens, ND w ill  be expected to  show whether is  in i t s e l f  
capable of f in a lly  accomplishing i t s  transform ation and become a fu lly  
democratic and modem conservative p arty , s im ila r to i t s  West-European 
counterparts.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1: A f te r  th e  end o f th e  c i v i l  war in  1949, th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
co n se rv a tiv e  p o l i t i c a l  fo rce s  were r e c o n s ti tu te d  under P. T sa ld a ris ’ 
Popular Party . In 1951, the Greek Rally under Marshal Papagos took the 
lead in represen ting  the Right, by absorbing the g rea tes t p a rt of i t s  
p redecesso r's  p o l i t ic a l  personnel; and a f te r  Papagos* death, in 1955, 
h is  successor C. Karamanlis founded the ERE, which was v ir tu a lly  the 
Greek R a lly  under a new la b e l.  The ERE stayed  in o f f ic e  fo r  e ig h t 
consecutive years u n til  1963, was in opposition for another two, and 
a f t e r  1965 i t  su p p o rte d  m in o r ity  governm ents and p a r t i c ip a te d  in  
c o a litio n s  u n til  the im position of the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  in 1967; 
but most im portantly (as argued in ch. 1 of th is  study), ERE id en tifie d  
w ith the most backward, u l t r a - r ig h t i s t  and reactionary  elements of Greek 
so c ie ty  a f t e r  the  c iv i l  war th a t  follow ed hard  on the  h ee ls  of the  
coun try 's  lib e ra tio n  from the German occupation, and i t  is  the ERE which 
is  considered as ch ie fly  responsib le fo r the consolidation of the post- 
1949 au th o rita r ian , rep ress iv e , and exclusion ist p o l i t ic a l  system.
2: For an approach to  ND's id en tity  which is  almost a hagiology of 
Karamanlis and h is  p a rty , see fo r instance Lambrias P ., For Democracy, 
Athens: a u th o r 's  p u b lic a tio n , 1977 (in  Greek); fo r  an opposite view, 
openly lib e llo u s , see K atris  J . ,  "New Democracy: ERE-originated, neo- 
R ig h tis ts  and m onarchists", in the p o l i t ic a l  review A n ti, Period B ', no. 
13, 22 Feb. 1975 (in  Greek), pp. 7-8.
3: In  th is  s tudy , the  terms R igh t, Centre and L eft a re  used to  
d e n o te  o n ly  th e  t h r e e  m ain p o l i t i c a l  camps o r  f a m i l i e s ;  se e  
Mavrogordatos G., "The emerging party  system", in Clogg R. (ed), Greece 
in  th e  1980s, London: M acm illan , 1983, pp. 70-94. I t  shou ld  be 
rem em bered, how ever, t h a t  — m ain ly  due to  th e  p o s t - c i v i l  war 
a u th o rita rian  and reactionary  record of the conservative p a rtie s  (and 
p a r t ic u la r ly  th a t of ERE, as argued in ch. 1)— the  term Right has 
acquired and is  s t i l l  burdened by n eg a tiv e , derogato ry  co n n o ta tio n s, 
implying (beyond conservatism) a sense of in ju s tic e  and oppression. So, 
by id e n tify in g  ND w ith  ERE, the oppo sitio n  launched the  slogan "The 
people d o n 't forget the record of the Right" (in  Greek th is  rhymes), and 
most o ften  attacked  ND on the grounds of th is  past record, ra th e r than 
on ND's own post-1974 performance.
4: Issues relevan t to  PASOK have received broad coverage by not only 
Greek but a lso  by B ritish  and American an a ly sts , and there is  a vast 
bibliography, inc lud ing  Anglo-American Ph.D. th e se s , g iv ing  d e ta i le d  
d e sc r ip tio n s  of PASOK, and v a rio u s  an a ly ses , arguments and co u n te r­
arguments of sp ec ific  fea tu res (e .g .,  whether i t  is  s o c ia l is t  or so c ia l-  
democratic, a mass or a p o p u lis t, a c lass-rep resen ting  or a c a tch -a ll 
p a rty ). A good number of these w ritings has been taken in to  account in 
the present study to draw comparisons and complement our own p ic tu re  of 
ND, and fu ll  references can be found in the bibliography out of these 
pages. By c o n tra s t, the Greek bibliography on ND is  very sparse, and the 
most comprehensive of the very few a r t ic le s  in English was w ritten  by J . 
C. Loulis (ND's s c ie n t if ic  counsellor a t the time and therefore  c lo sely  
a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  p a r t y ) :  "New Dem ocracy: The new fa c e  o f 
conservatism", in Penniman H. R. (ed ), Greece a t the P o lls: The National
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Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American E nterprise  
In s t i tu te  fo r Public Policy  Research, 1981, pp. 49-83.
5: For most da ta  concerning ND congresses, g rass-ro o ts  o rgan isation , 
and ideology I  am g re a t ly  indebted  to  G. Malouhos, one-tim e ju n io r 
o ff ic e r  in  ND's p ress o ff ic e ; fo r the p a rty  p u b lica tio n s, e sp ec ia lly  the 
e a r l ie s t  ones and a lso  seme very ra re  documents published by ERE in  the 
1950s, I  was much helped by P. Bakoyiannis, p a rty  deputy a t  the time, 
who was a ssassina ted  on 26 September 1989 in Athens by the so -ca lled  "17 
November" t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isation . Full references of the names of the 
interviewees and th e ir  p o sitio n s  in  the ERE and/or ND ranks can be found 
in the footnotes to  each chapter. We decided not to  in terview  higher 
party  members and MPs because the more prominent among them had already 
given numerous interview s to  the d a ily  p ress and o ther mass media, or 
published books on the su b jec t, so th a t th e ir  views on a wide range of 
p a r ty -p o lit ic a l issues was already known.
6: The r e s u l t  o f  a p i l o t  s tu d y , conducted  in  L a r is s a  betw een 
Septem ber and O ctober 1988, when some tw en ty  p a r ty  members were 
interviewed, was the  b a s is  fo r  the  f in a l  q u e s tio n n a ire  form ulated  in 
London in e a rly  November of the same year.
7: For more d e ta i l s  on th is  fieldw ork  re sea rch  see ch. 6, and 
espec ia lly  footnote 28 to  the same chapter. A copy of the questionnaire , 
the answers of the party  members, as well as a l i s t  of the names of the 
interviewees in the Department of L arissa , a re  given in  Appendix VIII of 
th is  study.
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CHAPTER ONE
1: See M ouzelis N. , Modern Greece: F acets of Underdevelopment, 
London: Macmillan, 1978, 2nd ed itio n , December 1979, p. 14, (h e reafte r 
Mouzelis a . ). (H enceforth, a l l  q u o ta tio n s  core in  our own t r a n s la t io n  
from the o rig in a l Greek, unless otherwise s ta te d ) .
2: Ib id , p. 22.
3: See Kaklamanis G. S ., On the S tructu re  of the Modem Greek S ta te , 
Athens: au th o r’s p u b lica tio n , 1986 (in  Greek), p. 99.
4: For more d e ta i ls  see Mouzelis a . , pp. 22-7.
5: See M o u z e lis  N . , P o l i t i c s  in  th e  S e m i-P e r ip h e ry :  E a r ly  
P arliam entarism  and L ate I n d u s t r i a l i s a t io n  in  the Balkans and L a tin  
America, London: Macmillan, 1986, p. 4, (henceforth Mouzelis b . ).
6: See Diairandouros P. N ., "Greek p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re  in tra n s it io n : 
H isto rica l o rig in s , evo lu tion , current trends", in Clogg R. (ed), Greece 
in the 1980s, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 47-8, where he argues:
" . . . t h e  im position  of p o l i t i c a l  in s t i tu t io n s  which were 
u lt im a te ly  th e  p roducts of c a p i t a l i s t  so c ia l form ations 
with powerful middle c la sses  upon a p re -c a p ita l is t  social 
order which lacked the  s tru c tu re s  to  receive them created 
in Greece a  ten se  and s t e r i l e  sym biotic re la t io n s h ip  
betw een s t a t e  and s o c ie ty  th a t  was to  have l a s t i n g  
consequences on th e  modern Greek p o l i t i c a l  system" (in  
English o r ig in a lly ) .
See a lso  Mouzelis N ., "Modem Greece: Development or underdevelopment?", 
in Monthly Review, vo l. 32, no. 7, December 1980, pp. 13-25, (henceforth 
Mouzelis c . ), where (p. 20) he observes:
"The Greek p a t t e r n  in d ic a te s  a weak, a tro p h ie d  c i v i l  
soc ie ty , which is  incapable of ac ting  as a  bulwark against 
s t a te  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  o r a s  a s o l id  b ase  fo r  b o u rg eo is  
l ib e r t ie s  and cu ltu re"  (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
7: See Mouzelis c . , p. 21, op. c i t .
8: As reg ard s the  im portance of the  ro le  of the  s t a te  a t  t h i s  
period, one should not exaggerate; i t  was by no means a to ta l i ta r ia n  
s ta te .  I t  played a predominant ro le  along w ith, for example, foreign 
powers' in te rfe ren ce , diaspora c a p ita l , e tc . For the s ta te s ' moderating, 
a r b i t e r ’s ro le  see  M ouzelis N ., " N e o - lib e ra lism  and developm ent: 
R e a litie s  and myth", in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 6 September 1987; 
and a lso , by the same author, "How useful is  s ta te  in tervention?", in 
the weekly newspaper To Vima, 25 October 1987, (both in Greek).
9: See Mouzelis c . , and a lso  h is  "Capitalism  and the development of 
the Greek s ta te " , in Scase R. (ed), The S ta te  in Western Europe, London: 
Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 241-73.
10: See Thucydides, "Greek p o l i t ic s :  Myth and re a li ty " , in P o li t ic a l  
Q uarterly , vo l. 41, no. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1970, pp. 455-66.
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11: See Mouzelis a . , p. 21, op. c i t . , and a lso  h is  '’C on tinu ities and 
d isc o n tin u itie s  in Greek p o l i t ic s :  From E leftherio s Venizelos to  Andreas 
Papandreou", in Les Temps Modernes, Athens: Exantas, 1986 (in  Greek), 
pp. 149-62.
12: See Mouzelis a . , p. 16, and a lso  Mouzelis b . , where the author 
speaks about "o ligarch ic  parliam entarism ", p. 182.
13: See B akoy iann is P . ,  Anatomy o f Greek P o l i t i c s , Athens*. 
Papazissis, 1977 (in  Greek), pp. 96-7, who argues:
"The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a tu r e  o f th e  p a r t i e s  o f th a t  
p e r io d . . .  was th e i r  pe rsonal c h a ra c te r . T heir d i f f e r in g  
elem ents were shaped from the  p a r t ic u la r  c h a ra c te r is tic s  
of th e ir  leaders ' p e rso n a lity " .
See a lso  D afnis G ., The Greek P o l i t ic a l  P a r t ie s :  1821-1961, Athens: 
Galaxy, 1961 (in  Greek), p. 79.
14: See Mouzelis a . , p. 16.
15*. See Voumas T ., H istory of Modem Greece, Athens: T o lid is  Bros, 
1977, six  v o ls, (in  Greek), vo l. I ,  pp. 9-10; and a lso  Mouzelis a . , p. 
106.
16: See M ouzelis N. and A t ta l id e s  M. , "C lass s t r u c tu r e  and 
development in Greece", in Archer M. S. and Giner S. (eds), Contemporary 
Europe: C lass, S ta tus and Power, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971, 
pp. 162-97.
17: See M anessis A ., "The ev o lu tio n  of p o l i t i c a l  in s t i tu t io n s  in 
Greece", (in  Greek), in Les Temps Modernes, op. c i t . , pp. 15-9.
18: See Mouzelis N ., "C ontinu ities and d is c o n tin u i t ie s . . ." ,  op. c i t .
19: I b i d . See a ls o  th e  same a u th o r 's  "C lass and c l i e n t e l i s t i c  
p o l i t ic s :  The case of Greece", in Sociological Review, August 1978, pp. 
471-97.
20: These were D. Gounaris, P. T sa ldaris , P. Protopapadakis, S. S ta is  
and I .  S is s in is ;  see Diamandopoulos T ., "Major stages in the h is to ry  of 
the conservative camp", in the q u a rte rly  review Nea Koinonioloqia, no. 
5, Spring 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 16-21.
21: I . e . ,  tzak ia  fam ilies who headed respective personal p a r t ie s ;  see 
Diamandopoulos T ., op. c i t .
22: Due to  a disagreement with King Constantine over the coun try 's  
entry in to  World War I .
23: King Constantine, by appointing D. Gounaris to the prem iership, 
in d ir e c t ly  a lso  appoin ted  him to  the  lead ersh ip  of the conservative- 
r o y a l is t  camp; see a lso  D afnis G. , op. c i t . , pp. 126-7. The same 
p rac tice  was followed fo rty  years la te r ,  when (as we sha ll see below) 
King Paul appointed C. Karamanlis to  the premiership.
24: The designation Right was introduced and estab lished  much la te r ,  
in 1950, when EPEK (National Progressive Centre Union) and the L iberal 
Party won the national e lec tio n s  and formed a c o a litio n  government. At 
th a t  tim e th e  new spaper E le f th e r i a  c a l le d  th e se  p a r t i e s  " c e n tre
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p a rtie s " ; by c o n tra s t, then, the People 's Party became the Right. I t  was 
d u rin g  th e  p o s t-w a r p e r io d  th a t  t h i s  name of th e  R igh t a c q u ire d  
negative, derogatory connotations, comprising —beyond conservatism— a 
sense of in ju s t ic e  and opp ression , and f in a l ly  becoming o ffen s iv e  
a ltoge ther, even to  conservative people. In th is  study the terms Centre 
and Left w ill be used only in the sense of ind icating  the place of a 
party  in the p o l i t ic a l  spectrum. In add ition  to  th is ,  the term Right 
w ill a lso  denote the  power complex th a t  includes the  s u p ra -s ta te  o r 
p a ra - s ta te  o rg a n isa tio n s  th a t ,  to g e th e r w ith  the  monarchy, army and 
fo re ign  in te r fe re n c e  u l t im a te ly  r e s u l te d  in  what has been c a l le d  
"d u a lis tic  power" in post-war Greece (see below, th is  chap ter). For the 
meaning and use of the terms Right and Left see E fth in i, no. 136, April 
1983, a r t ic le s  by Kassimatis G ., Pesmazoglou J . ,  Vlachos G ., Lambrias 
P ., Tsouderou V ., Daskalakis G ., Georgakopoulos L ., Metaxas A., Foteas 
P ., T ournav iti N ., Makris N. , Makrakis M., Aron R ., K o estle r A ., 
Duverger M., Pingaud B ., P rezzolin i G. and Quarantotto C ., and Toumier 
M., (a ll in Greek).
25: See Meletopoulos M., "Genealogy of the Greek Right, 1909-1989", 
in the  q u a r te r ly  review  Nea K oinon io loq ia , no. 5, Spring 1989 (in  
Greek), pp. 22-32.
26: See Diamandopoulos T .,  "The b a s ic  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f th e  
conservative cairp", ib id , pp. 11-3.
27: See Trombetas T. P ., "Consensus and cleavage: Party  alignment in 
Greece, 1945-1965", in Parliam entary A ffa irs , vo l. XIX, no. 3, Sumner 
1966, pp. 295-311.
28: A good p ic tu re  of the id en tity  of the Greek conservative camp of 
th is  period (1922-1936) is  given in the famous a r t i c le  w ritten  by G. 
Vlachos, publisher of the newspaper Kathim erini, prominent ro y a lis t  and 
a n ti-V e n iz e lis t:
"The P e o p le 's  P arty  i s  the  p a rty  which w ill  re sp e c t the 
law even to  the detrim ent of the country, the p a rty  of old 
h a b its ,  o ld  methods, o ld  t r a d i t io n s ,  [the  p a rty  of] 
parliam en tarism , the  id e a ls  of housekeeping, [the  p a rty  
of] order, with a l l  the p ro p erties , pros and cons of these 
c h a r a c te r i s t ic s .  The P e o p le 's  P arty  w ill  probably  not 
a c c o m p lish  g r e a t  t h in g s ,  b u t i t  w i l l  n o t c a u se  a 
c a ta s tro p h y . I t  w ill  no t i n i t i a t e  g re a t p o l ic ie s  but i t  
w ill a lso  not have to  pay fo r  the  b ig  and unbearable 
consequences th a t such p o lic ie s  bring in th e ir  wake".
See the newspaper K athim erini, 22 June 1932.
29: I t  is  tru e  th a t Greece has never experienced a t o t a l i t a r i a n  
regime of a fa s c is t  o r a nazi type. Although the Metaxas d ic ta to rsh ip  
resembled the  f a s c i s t  type, i t  cannot be c h a ra c te r ise d  as fascism  
proper. The Colonels' d ic ta to rsh ip  (1967-1974), as well as other post­
war m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip s  in some of the countries in Latin America and 
elsewhere, should be considered as bureaucratic  au th o rita rian  regimes. 
For d e ta ils  see Mouzelis b . , pp. 177-83.
30: This means the use of p o l i t ic a l  con tro ls tha t aim a t  excluding 
the popular forces from p a rtic ip a tin g  in the p o l i t ic a l  process, a t  the 
same time as in co rp o ra tin g  o th e r  fo rces  in v e r t i c a l ,  non-autonomous 
(e .g . c l i e n t e l i s t i c )  fash io n . For an e la b o ra tio n  of the  term see 
Mouzelis b . , pp. 170-7.
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31: For a d e ta i le d  exam ination of th ese  events see  Linardatos S . , 
Towards the 4th of August Regime, Athens: Papazissis , 1975 (in  Greek).
32: The People's Party opposed the Metaxas' d ic ta to rsh ip , although i t  
had tra d itio n a l links with the l a t t e r  (in  the sense th a t many of i t s  
members c o l l a b o r a t e d  and p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  th e  d i c t a t o r s h i p 's  
governments); see Voumas T ., op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  pp. 455-9.
33: See Papandreou A ., Democracy a t  Gunpoint, Athens: K aranass is , 
1974 (in  Greek), pp. 67-8.
34: See Voumas T ., op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  pp. 455-9.
35: Ib id , vo l. IV, (The C iv il War). See a lso  R ichter H ., 1936-1946: 
Two R evolutions and C oun ter-revo lu tions in  G reece, A thens: Exantas, 
1975, two vo ls, (in  Greek).
36: See Voumas T ., vo l. IV, (The C ivil War), op. c i t . ? there  is  a 
vast bibliography about the Greek c iv i l  war mostly presenting  the fa c ts  
through a le f t  or l e f t i s t  prism. A good work from the o ther side is  tha t 
of A veroff-Tositsas E ., F ire  and Axe. Athens: E stia , 1974 (in  Greek).
37: See Tsoukalas C ., "The ideological inpact of the c iv i l  war", in 
Ia tr id e s  J .  O. (ed ), Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in C r is is , Hanover 
and London: U niversity Press of New England, 1981, pp. 319-41.
38: Ib id .
39: I b id . See a lso  Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, A thens: Nea 
Synora, 1981 (in  Greek), p. 103, where he argues tha t
" . . i f  anti-corttnunism as a p o l i t i c a l  p e rsp e c tiv e  was the  
coirmon denominator of the whole 'f r e e  w orld ', in Greece i t  
imbued every element of social as well as cu ltu ra l l i f e ,  
and th i s  shou ld  be c o n s id e re d  a s  th e  m ajor p o l i t i c a l  
v ic to ry  of the Right in Greece".
40: See Mavrogordatos G ., "The emerging party-system ", in Clogg R. 
(ed ), op. c i t . , p . 74, and W ittner L. S ., American In te rv e n tio n  in 
Greece: 1943-1949, New York: Columbia U niversity  Press, 1988, pp. 291-2.
41: See Mouzelis a . , p. 25.
42: For more d e ta ils  ib id , and a lso  Mouzelis N. and A tta lid es M., op. 
c i t .
43: See Mouzelis N. and A tta lides M. , op. c i t . , and a lso  Bakoyiannis 
P ., op. c i t . , p. 51, who argues th a t " . . . t h e  Greek bourgeoisie remained 
and functioned outside the Greek te r r i to ry :  i t  was a 'bourgeois c la ss  of 
the e x te r io r '" .
44: As M aritsas D. argues, " . . . i n  Greece we have not had industry  but 
only fac to rie s" . See h is  unpublished paper "The Problem of Inform atics 
Know-How Transfer to  Greece (or New B ottles fo r the New Wines)", Patras 
U niversity , Conputer Technology In s t i tu te ,  P a tras , October 1986. Along 
these lin es  another scholar added:
"In Greece, in p a r t ic u la r ,  the  working c la s s  has never 
managed to  play the ro le  of a social vanguard; since, very 
sinp ly , there has never been a numerous and so lid  working
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c la s s ,  due to  the  re s p e c tiv e  lack of in d u s tr ia l  in f r a ­
s t ru c tu re .  There were workers in Greece, but th e re  has 
never been a working c la ss  proper".
See Kargakos S ., "Proposals fo r a d if fe re n t le f t" ,  in P o litik a  Themata, 
no. 765, 26 January 1990, p. 21.
45: See Mouzelis N ., "Capitalism  and the development of the Greek 
s ta te " , in  Scase R. (ed ), op. c i t . ; see a lso  the "Report on Greece" of 
th e  T w e n tie th  C e n tu ry  Fund (1947) w here i t  i s  s t a t e d :  "The
in d u s tr ia l is ts  and the entrepreneurs a re  not w illing  to  invest money in 
en te rp rises  vhich premise le ss  than 40% p ro f i t ,  since they can make that 
p ro f i t  through speculation in foreign currency"; c ite d  in Tsoukalas C ., 
The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , pp. 86-7.
46: See Vergopoulos C ., "The emergence of the new bourgeoisie: 1944- 
1952", in Ia tr id e s  J .  O. (ed ), op. c i t . , pp. 298-318.
47: C ited ib id .
48: Ib id .
49: See W ittner L. S ., op. c i t . . p. 105.
50: See Vergopoulos C., op. c i t . , p. 318.
51: See M a th io p o u lo s  V ., G e s c h ic h te  d e r  S o c ia le n  F ra q e  in  
G riechenland, p . 164, c i te d  in  Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. 
c i t . , p . 87. As M ouzelis N. a rg u e s , " . . . c o n t r a r y  to  i t s  w este rn  
c o u n te rp a r ts , in  Greece th e re  i s  le s s  such o rgan ic  com plem entarity 
between the c a p i ta l is t  and n o n -c a p ita lis t sec to rs" , and he gives another 
example o f  unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f w e a lth , namely th a t " . . . a f t e r  
deduction of taxes and soc ia l secu rity  b en efits , 9.5% of the national 
income goes to  the  40% of th e  lowest income groups, whereas 58% is  
c h a n n e lle d  to  th e  17% in  th e  top  income b ra c k e ts "  ( in  E n g lish  
o r ig in a l ly ) ;  see M ouzelis N. , "C ap ita lism  and the  development of the 
Greek s ta te " , in Scase R. (ed), op. c i t . , pp. 241-73; see a lso  Mouzelis 
c.
52: Between 1944 and 1952, 23 d i f f e r e n t  governments a lte rn a ted  in 
o f f ic e ;  see E vert M ., K aram an lis: The R eform er, A thens: a u th o r 's  
pub lication , 1987 (in  Greek), p. 9.
53: Ib id , pp. 24-5.
54: Ib id , p. 81.
55: Ib id , p. 81.
56: See New Economy, June 1956, a u th o r 's  u n d e rlin in g s , c i te d  in 
Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 117. See a lso  Macridis R. 
C ., "E lections and p o l i t ic a l  modernization in Greece", in Penniman H. R. 
(ed ), Greece a t  the  P o lls :  The N ational E lec tio n s  o f 1974 and 1977, 
Washington and London: American E nterprise  In s t i tu te ,  1981, p. 3, where 
he w rites:
"However, given the  p a r t i c u la r  c h a ra c te r  of investm ent 
—mostly from the United S ta te s — th is  rem arkable growth 
did not always correspond to  the needs of the country: i t  
was concentrated in  a few manufacturing firm s, tourism and
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c o n s tru c tio n , and in  general in e n te rp r is e s  l ik e ly  to  
provide high short-term  retu rns" (in English o r ig in a lly ) .
57: As Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 121, says:
" . . . t h e  re a l causes of in d u s tr ia l  s tag n a tio n  were more 
social and psychological ra th e r  than economic. The fea r of 
in s e c u r i ty ,  even i f  i t  was u n j u s t i f i e d ,  e x e r te d  an 
im portant in fluence  to  the  re s id e n ts  of a  country  which 
had ju s t passed a g rea t ordeal".
58: For exanple, in 1955 there  were 10,150 tra c to rs  in  a g ricu ltu re  as 
compared to  38,000 in 1963, an increase of 274.4%; see Evert M., op. 
c i t . , pp. 39-44, who nevertheless acknowledges tha t th is  modernisation 
was lim ited both in quantative and q u a lita tiv e  terms. As Mouzelis N. 
argues, a g ric u ltu ra l modernisation in  Greece was unsuccessful, since i t  
n e ither led to  a  considerable ra is e  of p roductiv ity , nor was i t  ever 
a r t ic u la te d  w ith the  in d u s tr ia l  s e c to r  in  such a way as to  c re a te  a 
local market fo r in d u stria l goods and boost in d u stria l development; for 
a more concrete elaboration  of these po in ts , see h is  "The s ta te  in la te
development", in the bi-annual Greek P o litic a l Science Review, no. 1,
January 1993 (in  Greek), pp. 53-89.
59: See Vaitsos K. and Y iann itsis  T ., Technological Transformation 
and Economic Development, Athens: Gutenberg, 1987 (in  Greek), p. 17, 
figure  2: in 1950 the a g ric u ltu ra l sec to r represented 28.5% of the gross 
national product, the in d u s tr ia l sec to r 20.2%, and the te r t ia ry  sec to r 
51.3%; whereas in  1960 the  percen tages were 22.8%, 25.7%, and 51.4% 
respective ly .
60: See Bakoyiannis P ., op. c i t . , p. 63.
61: See Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 115: of the
urban popu la tion , 62.1% was concen tra ted  in the  Athens and Salon ica  
aggl omerat i ons.
62: See Tsoukalas C ., "The Ideological impact of the c iv il  war", in 
Ia tr id e s  J . O. (ed), op. c i t . , p. 322. I t  is  c h a ra c te r is tic  tha t the 
Greek c iv il  serv ice grew from 63,000 c iv i l  servants in 1944, to  132,000 
in  1970. See a l s o  V erg o p o u lo s C . , "The em ergence o f  th e  new 
bourgeoisie", in Ia tr id e s  J . O. (ed ), op. c i t . , p. 310.
63: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 116; there  were 
a lso  a number of people who were not re g is te re d . W ithout g iv in g  any 
concrete figu res, the author estim ates tha t over h a lf  of than were a lso  
absorbed by the te r t ia ry  sec to r.
64: For more d e t a i l s  s e e  M o u ze lis  N. , "The s t a t e  in  l a t e  
development", op. c i t . , pp. 53-89.
65: I t  is  p e rfec tly  true  th a t the government re a lly  did attempt to 
so lv e  some o f th e se  p rob lem s. W ith re s p e c t  to  th e  fa rm e rs ' co­
operatives, they tr ie d  to  support but a lso  wanted to  control them. An 
American a n th ro p o lo g is t  d e s c r ib e s  the  governm ent's o r ie n ta t io n  as 
follows:
"Because th e  id e a  o f  c o -o p e r a t iv is m  was v e ry  much 
rem in iscen t of c o lle c tiv ism  on the communist model, the 
government investigated  very thoroughly before granting a
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loan, ju s t  to  make sure th a t behind th is  idea there  were 
no subversive fo rces".
See Sanders A. T ., Rainbow in the Rock, c ite d  in Tsoukalas C ., The Greek 
Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 125.
66: See S e ra fe tin id is  M., The Breakdown of Parliamentary Democracy in 
Greece: 1947-1967, Ph.D th e s is , London School of Economics, 1979, p. 
284.
67: See Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p . 125. I t  is  
c h a ra c te r is tic  th a t in a 1957 pub lication  of ERE (Twelve Months of C. 
Karamanl i s Government), in ch. 6 (in  Greek), p. 43, (The Workers* and 
Employees1 P osition  Inproved) has these lin e s :
"For the workers' r e l i e f ,  on the one hand, the emigration 
of workers to  Belgium was f a c i l i ta te d  (1,767 have already 
emigrated there) and, on the o th e r, an e f fo r t  was made for 
the Unemployment O ff ic e 's  b e tte r  operation” .
68: See Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 126.
69: See Bakoyiannis P ., op. c i t . , p. 64.
70: See V aitsos K. and Y iannitsis T . , op. c i t . , p. 18.
71: See Mouzelis N ., "Capitalism  and the development of the Greek 
s ta te " , in Scase R .(ed), op. c i t . , p. 253.
72: Ib id , p. 254.
73: See Vergopoulos C., "The emergence of the new bourgeoisie", in 
Ia tr id e s  J .  O. (ed), op. c i t . , p. 299.
74: In footnote 24 above, i t  was explained th a t the term Right was 
estab lished  in 1950. To th is  we should add an important fa c t, namely 
th a t the  terms R ight and L eft a re , in  Greece, d e fin ed  and shaped 
h is to r ic a l ly  and not so c ia lly ; people who fought with EAM were L eft, and 
people who were on the  s id e  of the  government were R igh t. Hence the
phenomenon of fam ilies where the fa th e r was Left and the son Right, o r
one b ro th e r  L e f t  and th e  o th e r  R ig h t, sim ply  because  they  found 
themselves —in most cases by sheer luck— in r iv a l camps.
75: See M ouzelis N . , " C a p ita lism  and d i c t a to r s h ip  in  post-w ar
Greece", in New Left Review, March-April 1976, pp. 57-104.
76: See Petropoulos J .  A ., "The t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  of 
Greece during the Axis occupation", in Ia tr id e s  J . O. (ed ), op. c i t . , 
pp. 27-36.
77: See Mavrogordatos G ., "The emerging party-system ", in Clogg R.
(ed), op. c i t . , p. 183, and W ittner L ., op. c i t . , pp. 36-7.
78: See Mavrogordatos G ., "The emerging party-system ", in Clogg R.
(ed), op. c i t . , pp. 185-6.
79: President Truman pledged the United S ta tes support to  Greece as a 
country whose ex istence was threatened " . . .b y  te r r o r i s t  a c t iv i t ie s  of 
several thousand aimed men led by communists". See Katephores G ., The 
Barbarians' L eg is la tio n , Athens: Themelio, 1975 (in  Greek), p. 62.
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80: According to  the  h is to r ia n  Vournas T ., "Americanocracy then 
became estab lished  in  Greece, which acquired an o f f ic ia l  character in 
September 1951 when the country entered the NATO a llian c e" , op. c i t . . 
vo l. IV, (The C iv il War).
81: On the B ritish  in te rference  in Greek p o l i t ic s ,  see e sp ec ia lly  the 
report of the B ritish  Ambassador to  Greece in 1957, S ir  Roger A llen, who 
sta ted :
"As a  r e s u l t  o f the  Truman D octrine we l e f t ,  l i t t l e  by 
l i t t l e ,  the re sp o n s ib ility  to  the Americans. The B ritish  
navy, army, a ir - fo rc e  and po lice  missions were withdrawn 
one by one. The B r i t i s h  embassy d id  n o t ap p o in t and 
dism iss Greek governments any longer. The American period 
had begun. . . " .
See h is  "F irs t Impressions from Greece", S ir Roger Allen to  Mr. Sellwyn 
Lloyd, no. 192, C o n fid e n tia l, Athens 24 September 1957, ( in  Greek), 
published in the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 19 February 1988. See a lso  
Kanellopoulos P ., My L ife , Athens: Y ia lle l is ,  1985 (in  Greek), p. 92, 
vdiere he s ta te s  th a t " . . .o n  the 22nd of November [1945], I was forced to 
r e s ig n .  B r i t i s h  in te r v e n t io n  was so b lu n t th a t  i t  fo rce d  Regent 
Damaskinos to  resign  as w ell".
82: For the l ib e ra l/c e n tre - r ig h t governments of the 1950-52 period 
and American in te rfe ren ce , mainly through U.S. Ambassador J . Peurifoy, 
see W ittner L ., op. c i t . , pp. 283-91; and Roumbatis P. J . ,  Tangled Webs: 
The US in  G reece: 1947-1967, A thens: O dysseas, 1987 ( in  G reek ), 
espec ia lly  chapter IV, pp. 99-110. See a lso  N. C ., "P o litic a l changes in 
Greece", in The World Today, vo l. V III, January 1952, pp. 26-38.
83: See Samatas M., Greek Bureaucratism: A System of S oc io -po litica l 
Control, Ph.D th e s is , New School for Social Research, 1986, pp. 166-7.
84: See A liv izatos N ., The P o lit ic a l  In s ti tu tio n s  in C ris is : 1922- 
1974, A thens: Themelio, 1986 (in  Greek); see e sp e c ia lly  P a rt I I :  
Freedoms and Suppression during the Postwar Period: D ia lectics between 
C onstitu tion and Para-C onstitu tion , pp. 447-600.
85: See Samatas M., op. c i t ♦, pp. 166-7.
86: Ib id , p. 172. A most cannon penalty  imposed by the courts a t  tha t 
time was the defendent's deportation  to  remote concentration camps. The 
following Table g ives the  numbers of deported  people from 1951 u n t i l  
1967, and shows th a t  under th e  1952 C o n s t i tu tio n  and u n t i l  th e  
im position  of th e  1967 m il i ta ry  d ic ta to r s h ip , th e re  were a to ta l  of 
1,722 deporta tions, 1,310 by Public Security  Conmittee decision and 412 
by court decision:
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1951-1967 D ep ortation s
Year By Public Security  Conmittee’s Decision By T ria l
1951 128 6
1952 63 5
1953 163 8
1954 153 18
1955 135 13
1956 75 14
1957 119 18
1958 133 11
1959 62 11
1960 55 9
1961 47 84
1962 113 63
1963 74 62
1964 32 28
1965 35 28
1966 30 23
1967 (u n til 21/4) 21 7
Source: A liv izatos N ., op. c i t . , pp. 580-1.
87: See A liv izatos N ., op. c i t . . Part I I ,  pp. 447-600.
88: See Manessis A ., op. c i t . , p. 24.
89: See V egleris P ., "Greek E lectoral Law", in Penniman H. R. (ed), 
op. c i t . , pp. 21-48; a f te r  1926 (and u n til  June 1989) no two consecutive 
e lections have been c a rr ied  out under exactly  the same e le c to ra l system.
90: See N ikolakopoulos E . , P a r t ie s  and P arliam entary  E lections in 
Greece: 1946-1964, Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 1985 (in  
Greek), pp. 210-29.
91: We sha ll re tu rn  to  these events below, when we sha ll show the
e le c to ra l  perform ance of th e  ERE p a r ty . For the  1961 e le c t io n s ,  see
Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , pp. 255-81; Voumas T ., op. c i t . , vo l. V, 
pp. 157-60; Papandreou A., op. c i t . , pp. 155-67; and a lso  Karanikolas D. 
G., Rigged E lections in  Greece: 1844-1961, Athens: au th o r 's  pub lica tion , 
1963 (in  Greek), pp. 429-70.
92: See W ittner L ., op. c i t . , p. 4; and a lso  Canpbell J .  and Sherrard
P ., Modem Greece, London: Ernest Benn, 1968, p. 185.
93: See Couloumbis T ., Greek P o li t ic a l  Reactions to  American and NATO 
Influences, New Haven: Yale U niversity  Press, 1966.
94: See W ittner L ., op. c i t . , pp. 291-2.
95: See Paraskevopoulos P ., George Papandreou, Athens: Typos, 1988 
(in  G reek); and a ls o  P a p a d im itr io u  N ., From th e  C en tre  Union to  
Apostasy, Athens: Roes, 1986 (in  Greek).
96: See M acrides R. C ., Greek P o l i t ic s  a t  the  C rossroads: The 
S o c ia lis t Experiment, Athens: E llin ik i Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in  Greek), p. 
46.
97: See Mouzelis a . , p. 27.
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98: See Markesinis P. S ., "The Greek Crown and I t s  M inisters", in 
Parliamentary A ffa irs , vo l. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1972-73, pp. 57-69.
99: C ited  in  Campbell J .  and Sherrard  P .,  op. c i t ♦, p . 291. In 
Papandreou A ., op. c i t . , pp. 365-8, we find  the k in g 's  proclamation to 
the Greek people, addressed on 13 October 1967. There, he sa id , among 
o ther th ings:
"I a lso  declare  th a t there  w ill be no accomriodation with 
the  com m inists, who seek the  ru in a tio n  of the  country .
During the  l a s t  tw en ty -fiv e  y ears  the  ccnmunist m inority 
has sought the  overthrown o f our so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  by v io le n t  and in s id io u s  means. I t  has 
brought d e s tru c tio n  and d e so la tio n , i t  contam inates the 
youth of the  country  and in p e r i ls  the  very  e x is te n ce  of 
our race".
100: See Manessis A ., op. c i t . , p. 26, where he notes:
"After the c iv i l  war, the ro le  of the Parliament and, more 
sp e c if ic a lly , of the parliam entary m ajority  remained 
secondary: the rea l power-blocks were the Monarchy and the 
Army, both in  c lo se  r e la t io n s  w ith  the  USA (th e  l a t t e r  
p a r tic u la r ly  through the NATO a llia n c e )" .
101: See Mouzelis a . , pp. 131-3.
102: Ib id .
103: See Veremis T ., "The Army in  P o l i t ic s  in the  Post World War 
P eriod", in  Les Temps Modernes, op. c i t . , pp. 135-48. According to  
W heeler M. , "Greek P o l i t i c a l  P e r s p e c t iv e s " ,  in  Government and 
Opposition, vo l. 3, no. 3, Sumner 1968, pp. 339-51:
"The Army's ro le  in  modern Greek h is to ry  was not always 
conservative. I t  played a major p a rt in the overthrow of 
the Monarchy and the establishm ent of the Greek Republic 
(1924-1936). I t  was w ith the Metaxas' d ic ta to rsh ip  and the 
d ism is sa l  o f th e  re p u b lic a n  o f f i c e r s ,  th a t  th e  Army 
acquired a c le a r ly  co n serv a tiv e  o r ie n ta tio n "  ( in  English 
o r ig in a lly ) .
See a lso  Mouzelis a . , pp. 131-3.
104: According to  the agreement, the two leaders would try  to overcome 
the deadlock of the p o l i t ic a l  s i tu a tio n  by leading the country to  new 
e le c tio n s . For more d e ta i l s  see Vournas T . , op . c i t . , v o l. V, pp. 
269-93; see a lso  Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , pp. 265-75.
105: See Bakoyiannis P .,  op. c i t . , pp. 84-5; see a ls o  Meynaud J . ,  
P o litic a l Forces in Greece, Athens: Byron, 1966 (in  Greek), pp. 261-4. 
We shall re tu rn  to  these events la te r  in th is  chapter.
106: For th is  sec re t organ isation  see, among o thers , Papandreou A., 
op. c i t . , pp. 131-4.
107: See Mouzelis a . , pp. 116-7. See a lso  Dimitrakos D ., M itsotakis
C.: A P o lit ic a l  Biography, Athens: Papazissis, 1989 (in  Greek), vo l. I ,  
p. 340.
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108: See Theotokis I .  S ., P o li t ic a l  Reminiscences, Athens: E£>talofos 
AVEE, 1980 (in  Greek), p. 135.
109: EDA (United Democratic L eft) was c re a te d  in August 1951 and 
served prim arily  to  sh e lte r  and acccmodate the persecuted supporters of 
th e  o u tla w e d , s in c e  1947, Communist P a r ty  (KKE). F or a  more 
comprehensive account see Meynaud J . ,  op. c i t . , pp. 192-229. See a lso  
Bakoyiannis P ., op. c i t . , pp. 218-9.
110: EDA managed to  get such a high percentage of the vote fo r mainly 
two reasons: f i r s t ,  the growing in eq u a litie s  and unbalanced p ro sperity  
had re s u lte d  to  popular d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  and u n re s t ;  and second, the  
L iberal p a r tie s , due to  continuous quarre ls  and s p l i t s ,  d id  not provide 
a re l ia b le  and promissing a lte rn a tiv e  to  ERE and, moreover, they had 
t i r e d  the e le c to ra te  with th e ir  ceaseless squabbles.
I l l :  The links between IDEA and CIA are  today well documented. Suffice 
i t  to  say tha t the d ic ta to r , G. Papadopoulos, was a  leading IDEA-member 
and h is  name is  found in CIA pay ro lls  since 1952? see W ittner L ., op. 
c i t . , p. 300. And as Papandreou A. op. c i t . , p. 337, says,
"Papadopoulos, a long time friend  of the CIA and the KYP's
[ th e  G reek  c o u n t e r p a r t ]  l i a i s o n  o f f i c e r  to  t h a t  
o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  was th e  c h o se n  in s t r u m e n t  o f  p l a n
"Prometheus". [This plan was se t in motion in April 1967 
f o r  th e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  s e v e n - y e a r  m i l i t a r y  
d ic ta to rsh ip .]  To my knowledge, he has the d is tin c tio n  of 
being the f i r s t  in te l l ig e n c e  agent to  become a European 
d ic ta to r .  And h is  coup was made i l l u s t r i o u s  by the  fa c t  
th a t i t  was the  f i r s t  su ccessfu l m il i ta ry  putch in  the  
European continen t".
112: See W ittner L ., op. c i t . . p. 299. The author goes on to  argue
that
" . . . th e  Greek Central In te llig en ce  Agency, KYP, engaged 
in widespread w iretapping, m ail-tampering and p o l i t ic a l  
surveillance operations which extended to  a l l  government 
agencies in c lud ing  th e  Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice"? and he 
concludes th a t KYP " . .  .was organized, funded and advised 
by CIA" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
Ib id . , p. 305.
113: TEA were f i r s t  in s t i tu t e d  by J .  R a l l is  (who was the  Prime 
M inister during the Axis occupation and co llabo ra to r with the Germans), 
and were reorganised by the Sophoulis' l ib e ra ls  in 1947.
114: See Voumas T ., op. c i t . , vo l. V, pp. 160-2, Papandreou A., op. 
c i t . , pp. 134-46 and Roufos R. ("A then ian"), In s id e  the  C o lonels ' 
Greece, London: Chatto and Windus, 1972.
115: For a d e ta ile d  exam ination of most of these  o rgan isations see 
Lendakis A., The P a ra -s ta te  O rganisations and the 21st of A p ril, Athens: 
K astan io tis , 1975 (in  Greek).
116: Ib id , p. 153.
117: See Bakoyiannis P ., op. c i t . , p. 74. For the ro le  of shipping, 
finance, and merchant cap ita l during th is  period, see S e ra fe tin id is  M.,
381
op. c i t . For the  "power-dualism" see a ls o  Tsoukalas C ., The Greek 
Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 86 and Katephores G., op. c i t . , p . 48.
118: As Tsoukalas C. observed, "The co n serv a tiv e  camp, in s tea d  of 
r id d in g  i t s e l f  o f th e  M etaxas, th e  German, and th e  c i v i l  war 
inheritance, on the contrary  rein fo rced  i t " ;  see The Greek Tragedy, op. 
c i t . , p. 135. See a lso  footnote 213 below.
119: A fter D. Gounaris' death, and during the turbulent period from 
th e  A sia  Minor d e b a c le  u n t i l  th e  1936 im p o s itio n  o f th e  M etaxas 
d ic ta to rsh ip , P. T saldaris became the new party  leader —and a lso  the 
coun try 's  prime m in iste r frcm 1933 u n ti l  1935.
120: "They [the Americans] ca lled  T sa ldaris , who was Prime M inister 
and the leader of the parliam entary m ajority , and informed him th a t they 
would stop  economic a id  u n less  he res ig n ed  in  favour of Sophoulis' 
l i b e r a l  c o a l i t i o n ,  which had been c re a te d  w ith in  24 h o u rs" ; see  
Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 94. See a lso  Dimitrakos
D ., op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  p. 280, and Theotokis I .  S ., op. c i t . , p. 127.
121: See Roumbatis J . ,  op. c i t . , pp. 99-110 , and Linardatos S ., From 
the C ivil War to  the D ic ta to rsh ip , Athens: Papazissis, 1977, five  vo ls, 
(in  Greek), vo l. I ,  pp. 97-159 (henceforth Linardatos a . ).
122: See Canpbell J .  and Sherrard P ., op. c i t . , p. 250. For Papagos1 
l i f e  and personality  see a lso  Papandreou A., op. c i t . , pp. 126-34, and 
Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  pp. 281ff.
123: See M eletopoulos M., "Genealogy of the  Greek R igh t" , in  the 
q u a rte rly  review Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in  Greek), p. 
27.
124: See Meletopoulos M., "The leaders of the Greek R ight", ib id , pp. 
34-7. I t  is  noteworthy th a t the only discordance w ithin the party  was in 
la te  1954, when S. M arkesinis, the main consultant of Papagos, l e f t  the 
p a rty  because the  l a t t e r  had accused him of b ind ing  the  country  to  
detrim ental c o n tra c ts  w ith  two b ig  West German e n te rp r is e s .  Together 
w ith Markesinis 22 deputies l e f t  the party  a lso , in th is  f i r s t  a lb e it  
not very serious, s p l i t  w ithin the conservative canp. Markesinis founded 
a new p a r ty , the  P a rty  of P rog ress ive  People (KP), w ith  which he
contested a l l  the following e lec tio n s u n til  1964, e ith e r  alone (1956,
1963) o r in  c o a l i t io n  both  w ith  the  ERE (1964) and w ith  the  L iberal 
p a r tie s  (1958, 1961).
125: One must not forget th a t the c iv i l  war had ended very recen tly , 
and th a t such a task was p a r tic u la r ly  d i f f ic u l t .  On the o ther hand, the 
Cornmunist P arty  bears i t s  own re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  keeping th is  wound 
open, due to  i t s  underground o rg a n isa tio n , i t s  rad io -b ro ad c a s ts  from 
abroad, and mainly the so -ca lled  "Keep the guns ready" slogan of i t s  
Secretary-General, N. Zachariadis, a f te r  the end of the c iv i l  war. The 
slogan meant th a t  the  coirmunist fo rces  should be abso lu te ly  ready to
s ta r t  the war again, a t  the f i r s t  opportunity.
126: The most notorious of the concentration canps was on the island 
of M akronissos where, by ex ten siv e  use of to r tu r e ,  i s o la t io n ,  and 
b lackm ail, the  d e ta in e es  were forced  to  sign  a statem ent denouncing 
communism. The m i n i s t e r  o f  n a t io n a l  d e fe n c e  a t  t h a t  tim e , P. 
Kanellopoulos, ca lled  th is  canp a "New Parthenon"; see Tsoukalas C ., The 
Greek Tragedy, op . c i t . , p . 133. The same m in is te r ,  in answer to  
c r itic ism  why the government was in s is tin g  on enforcing the in s t itu t io n
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of adm inistrative  banishment when there were courts fo r those who break 
the law, said:
"Democracy can not remain in d if fe re n t  v is -A -v is  even 
ty p ic a lly  non-active ccnmunists. Because even a ty p ica lly  
in a c tiv e  comnunist ( th a t i s ,  a communist who is  not
committing murder), although he might not ac t v io le n tly , 
nonetheless thinks v io le n tly . His whole cast of thought is  
not democratic or normal, i t  is  v io le n t. In consequence, 
the thought being v io le n t, i t  is  v ir tu a lly  an ac t and not 
a sinp le  thought".
See the Parliam entary Minutes, 21 February 1955, c ite d  in  Linardatos a . , 
op. c i t . , vo l. I I ,  p. 271; see a lso  Katephores G ., op. c i t . , p. 67.
127: See a lso  Dimitrakos D ., op. c i t . , p. 287: " . . . t h e  term 'S ta te  of 
the Right' came in to  use la te r ,  in the most negative sense imaginable. 
The S tate  of the Right (and i t  was not only of the Right, but of the 
Centre as well) i s ,  mainly, a creation  of the c iv i l  war, and so of those 
who triggered  i t " .
128: The accession of C. Karamanlis to  both the prem iership and the 
conservative camp's leadership, is  not yet well documented. Most of the 
sch o la rs  agree th a t  i t  came about la rg e ly  due to  royal favour in  
combination w ith  American in te r fe re n c e . As Queen F red e rica  w rote to  
General G. Marshal:
"W ith in  a  few h o u rs  my husband  a p p o in te d  to  th e  
p re m ie r s h ip  o f  G reece  a young , s e lf -m a d e  man from  
Macedonia. To help  him, he gave him a lso  the  r ig h t  to  
d isso lve parliam ent, and arrange fo r new e lec tio n s in case 
he fa ile d  to  get a  m ajority vote. Mr. Karamanlis, today 's 
Premier, had been a M inister —exceptionally  successfu l— 
in  Papagos' government. The country  f e l t  as i f  i t  had 
drunk chanpaigne. Within seven hours a new government was 
formed, sworn in and presented to  parliam ent".
C ited  in L inardatos a . , op . c i t . , v o l. IV, p . 384. For the  s p e c if ic  
reasons tha t led to  the sudden Karamanlis accession, see Linardatos a . , 
op . c i t . , v o l. IV, ch. 10, pp. 346-85; Roumbatis J . ,  op . c i t ♦ , pp. 
174-7; Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , pp. 138-9; Meynaud J . ,  
op . c i t . , p . 96; D im itrakos D ., op . c i t . , p . 327; Theotokis S .,  op . 
c i t . , pp. 144-5; Kanellopoulos P ., op. c i t . , pp. 135-7; W ittner L ., op. 
c i t . , pp. 271-2; Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , pp. 210-1; A liv izatos N ., 
o p . c i t ♦, pp. 242-51; M ark esin is  S . ,  "The Greek Crown and I t s  
M inisters", in Parliam entary A ffa irs , vo l. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1972-73, 
pp. 57-69; Katsoudas D ., "The co n stitu tio n a l framework", in Featherstone
K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), P o lit ic a l Change in Greece: Before and
A fter The Colonels, London: Crocm Helm, 1987, pp. 14-33 and the same 
a u th o r 's  "The co n serv a tiv e  movement and New Democracy: From p a s t to  
p resen t", ib id , pp. 85-111.
129: A party  pub lication  wrote a year la te r :
"Even though he [Karamanlis] could have stayed in o ff ic e  
f o r  13 more m on ths, he d id  n o t .  He o p te d  f o r  new
e le c tio n s , he alone against a l l  o ther p o l i t ic a l  le a d e rs ...
united  in one fro n t, the already known Democratic Canp...
Karamanlis d id  so, endangering almost everything with the 
1956 e l e c t i o n ,  because  he d eep ly  sensed  th e  a b so lu te
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n e c e s s i ty  fo r  c r e a t in g  a new p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  in  th e  
coun try , one th a t  would not be a ca rry -o v e r from the  
p ast" .
See Twelve Months of Karamanlis1 Government, Athens: ERE pub lica tion , 
1957 (in  Greek), p. 4.
130: See L in a rd a to s  a . , o p ♦ c i t . , v o l .  I l l ,  p . 96; and a ls o  
N iko lakopoulos E . , o p . c i t . , pp. 210-29. T h is e l e c t o r a l  law was 
described by the government as a "m ajority system with lim ited  m inority 
rep resen ta tio n " .
131: See Evert M., op. c i t . , p. 12.
132: Another Karamanlis biographer agrees as fa r  as the meaning of the 
terms "Radical" and "Union” , but argues th a t "National" meant th a t the 
new party  did  not obey foreign  in te re s ts . See Genevoix M., The Greece of 
Karamanlis, Athens: S id e ris , 1972 (in  Greek), p . 183.
133: See Loulis J . ,  "The Greek conservative movement in tra n s it io n : 
Fran paternalism  to  neo -libera lism ", in the New Liberalism : The Future 
of N on-C ollectivist In s t i tu t io n s  in Europe and the U .S ., Athens: Centre 
fo r  P o l i t ic a l  Research and In form ation , In te rn a tio n a l  Synposium, May 
1981, p. 14.
134: See Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , vo l. I l l ,  pp. 49-50.
»135: For th is  p resen ta tion  we sha ll heavily  re ly  upon Meynaud's work, 
op. c i t . , pp. 234-75, s ince, to  the a u th o r 's  knowledge, there  has been 
no o ther scho larly  analysis  of the p re -d ic ta to r ia l  conservative p a r t ie s . 
A ll and any new in fo rm ation  o r d a ta  th a t  may make t h e i r  appearance 
meanvrtule w ill , of course, be given due consideration.
136: See Roumbatis J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 177.
137: See Meynaud J . , op. c i t . , p. 234.
138: Before Karamanlis' resignation  in 1963 due to a disagreement with 
the king, the l a t t e r  sent him a le t t e r  beginning as follows: "Mr. Prime 
M inister, Seven years ago I se lec ted  you as the coun try 's  Premier, and 
both th is  se lec tio n  and my confidence in you personally  have been fu lly  
j u s t i f i e d " .  See Woodhouse C . , K aram anlis: The R e s to re r  o f Greek 
Democracy, Athens: Morphotiki E stia , 1982 (in  Greek), p. 189.
139: See Meynaud J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 239.
140: According to  C. K a llia s , a prominent figure  in the conservative 
camp d u rin g  th e  ERE e ra  (and a depu ty  a ls o  o f th e  p o s t - 1974 New 
Democracy p a rty ), there was not in tra -p a rty  democracy whatsoever. The 
only in s t i tu t io n  th a t came close  to functioning dem ocratically —where 
discussion was possib le  a t  le a s t— was the parliam entary group a t  i t s  
meetings. Interview  with the author, 4 Ju ly  1988.
141: See Meynaud J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 240. Karamanlis once sa id  b lu n tly  in 
an in te rv iew  he gave to  C. Schul tzb e rg er th a t  "Greeks do not have a 
democratic m entality . They need a very capable leader". See K artakis E ., 
C. Kararranlis' Epiqranmatic Phrases, Athens: Roes, 1986 (in  Greek), p. 
25.
142: See Meynaud J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 240.
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143: See Lendakis A ., op. c i t - , pp. 157-294. Most of EKOF's founding 
members co llab o ra ted  w ith  the  c o lo n e ls ' ju n ta , w hile o th e rs  openly 
attacked i t ;  most of the l a t t e r  belong today to the New Democracy party . 
What is  a lso  im portant to  no te  i s  th a t  —as Lendakis A ., op. c i t . . 
argues on h is  p. 13:
"When EKOF was founded, i t  managed to  absorb a good many 
stu d en ts  who had belonged to  ERE o r EREN [the  youth 
organisation of ERE], but they were by no means fa s c is ts  
and did not re a l ly  know what EXOF was a l l  about. Most of 
them la te r  abandoned EKOF, and o th e rs  openly denounced 
the organ isation".
144: Ib id , e sp ec ia lly  pp. 311-9 and p. 102.
145: I b id , pp. 103-10, where the  au tho r enumerates 54 p a ra - s ta te  
organisations. I t  is  noteworthy th a t following EDA's e le c to ra l triumph 
in  1958, when i t  p o lle d  24.45% of the  v o te , Karamanlis c a l le d  and 
presided over conferences with o f f ic ia ls  from KYP, the Security  Corps, 
and the army's secu rity  serv ices in order to e laborate the best method 
for combatting the L eft. One of the p a rtic ip a n ts  and la te r  e d ito r  of a 
ju n tis t  newspaper, S. Konstandopoulos, wrote:
"I remember th a t  a few days a f t e r  the  [1958] e le c t io n  
K aram an lis  i n v i t e d  some f r i e n d s  to  h i s  h o u se  in  
K if is s ia .  . . We were about te n  p eo p le : h ig h e r  p u b lic  
o f f i c i a l s ,  p o l i t i c i a n s  and  j o u r n a l i s t s .  A b ro a d  
conversation took p lace  about the  government’s p ro g ress .
Nobody had mentioned anyth ing  about the ccnmunist th rea t 
and the exceptionally  worrying e lec to ra l re su lts  u n til  Mr. 
K aram anlis acknow ledged th a t  t h i s  was a most se rio u s  
is s u e .. .  This conversation motivated Karamanlis to  se t  up 
an obscure committee o f d is tin g u ish e d  in te l le c tu a l s ,  in 
o rder to  study the  communist problem th e o re t ic a l ly  and 
p o l i t i c a l l y .  On th is  committee I  met fo r  the f i r s t  time 
to d a y 's  Prime M in is te r  G. Papadopoulos and had th e  
opportunity to  apprecia te  h is  thought".
From the  newspaper E le f th e ro s  Kosmos, 11 August 1968, c i t e d  in  
Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , p. 344, who adds:
"From th a t tim e onwards, the p a ra - s ta te  o rg a n isa tio n s  
g a ined  momentum; th ey  s t a r t e d  by o rg a n is in g  ' a n t i ­
dem onstrations’ during Centre Union or EDA demonstrations, 
and concluded with the orgy of the 1961 e lec tions and the 
murder of G. Lambrakis in Salonica in May 1963".
146: See Tsatsos C., The Unknown K arananlis, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 
1984 (in Greek), p. 91.
147: See Meynaud J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 244; and Kanellopoulos P ., op. c i t . , 
p. 172.
148: See Loulis J . , "The Greek conservative movement...", op. c i t . , p. 
15.
149: See above, footnote 128.
150: I t  cannot be a c c id e n ta l th a t ,  whereas there  is  no sc h o la r ly  
analysis for the conservative camp (Meynaud does not deal exclusively
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with th is  su b jec t), fourteen books have so fa r  been w ritten  in  Greek fo r 
C. Karamanlis on ly : Genevoix M., The Greece of K aram anlis, A thens: 
S ideris , 1972; Massip R ., Karamanlis: The Distinguished Greek, Athens:
S ideris , 1972?; Y iovannis C. (ed ), N ation-Leader K aram anlis, A thens: 
Yiovannis P ub lica tions, (supervised by P. A. Papadakis and the e d ito r ) ,  
1975; Lychnos G ., Nation-Leader Karamanlis, Athens: Yiovannis, 1977;
Markoyiannis C ., About C. Karamanlis and His D isastrous P o licy , Athens: 
au th o r 's  pub lica tion , 1977; Woodhouse C ., Karamanlis: The R estorer of 
Greek Democracy, A thens: M orphotiki E s t ia ,  1982; Tzermias P .,  The 
Karamanlis of th e  A n t i - D ic t a to r i a l  S t r u g g le , A thens: Roes, 1984; 
T satsos C ., The Unknown K aram anlis, A thens: Ekdotiki A thinon, 1984; 
Ginis J . ,  The "Other" Karamanlis, Athens: Nastos, 1986; K artakis E ., C. 
K aram an lis ' Epigram m atic P h ra s e s , A thens: R oes, 1986; E v ert M ., 
Karamanlis: The Reformer, Athens: a u th o r 's  pub lication , 1987; Lambrias 
P ., In the  Shadow o f a  G reat Man, Athens: M orphotiki E s t ia ,  1989; 
Tzerm ias P . ,  C. K a ram an lis ' P o l i t i c a l  T hought, A thens: E l l in ik i
Evroekdotiki, 1990; and Paraskevopou 1 os P ., Karamanlis during 1974-1985. 
Athens: F itrak is/O  Tipos A .E ., 1991.
151: See Dimitrakos D ., op. c i t . , p . 327.
152: See, fo r  example, some e x ce rp ts  from K aram anlis' b iography, 
published  and d is t r ib u te d  by the  Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice  in  sev e ra l 
fo re ign  languages in  May 1957, quoted in  Meynaud J . ,  op. c i t . , pp. 
246-7.
153: See Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , pp. 255-81. For adverse opinions 
see Woodhouse C ., op. c i t . , pp. 176-9; and V a rv its io tis  J . ,  R estoration 
of H isto rica l R e a l i t ie s , Athens: a u th o r 's  pub lica tion , 1986 (in  Greek), 
pp. 33-8. According to  the then prominent lib e ra l MP, C. M itso takis,
" . . . i t  i s  in d isp u ta b le  th a t  during  the  1961 e le c tio n s  
there was v io lence and fraud. I  do not know to  what extent 
t h i s  happened, b u t I  am su re  th a t  i t  d id  happen. In  
e f f e c t ,  t h i s  v io le n c e  and fraud  were ex e rc ised  not by 
Karamanlis bu t by th e  P a lace , which b e liev ed  th a t th is  
would play in to  the hands of both the ERE and the Centre 
U n ion ... The whole p la n , in  my op in ion , must have been 
elaborated in p a ra -s ta te  c i r c l e s . . . " .
See Dimitrakos D ., op. c i t . , pp. 452-3.
154: See Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 162.
155: Karamanlis in s is te d  th a t h is  government bore no re sp o n s ib ility  
fo r th is  event. I t  is  sa id  th a t ,  when he was informed about the murder, 
he exclaimed: "For God's sake, who governs th is  country?"; see Roumbatis 
J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 193.
156: For the e n t i r e  amendment programme see The C o n s titu tio n  of 
Greece, Athens: Pondiki P ub lica tions, 1987 (in  Greek), pp. 239-45. See 
also  a l e t te r  Karamanlis sent to  C. Tsatsos in 1966, where he wrote:
"I would su re ly  be naive i f  I  believed th a t the amendments 
alone would cure a l l  the d iseases in our country. But i t  
would d e f in ite ly  help  to  clean up and modernise our public  
l i f e  i f  there  were capable forces to  take advantage o f" .
See Tsatsos C ., op. c i t . , p. 176. Generally speaking, with the changes 
he envisaged he meant to  put some lim its  to  the throne’s in terven tion  in
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p o l i t i c s  on the  one hand, and to  the p e o p le 's  c iv i l  r ig h ts  (e .g . 
s tr ik e s )  on the o ther. According to  A liv izatos N ., op. c i t . , p . 547, 
K aram an lis ' c e n t r a l  aim was to  in c o rp o ra te  w ith in  th e  r e v is e d  
co n stitu tio n  the emergency le g is la tio n  from the time of the c iv i l  war.
157: See K artakis E ., op. c i t . , pp. 140-1, and Woodhouse C ., op. c i t . .
p. 222.
158: In th is  context i t  i s  in te re s tin g  th a t in  early  1962 the king 
to ld  army o ff ic e rs  in Salonica: "God united  us. I  belong to you and you 
belong to  me"; see Woodhouse C ., op. c i t . , p. 188. Much la te r ,  on 18 
December 1967, Karamanlis sa id  in an interview  with C. Schultzberger: 
"All G reece 's m isfo rtunes stem from the m istakes of the Throne." See 
Kartakis E ., op. c i t . , p. 31.
159: See Woodhouse C ., op. c i t . , p. 218.
160: F or d e t a i l s  s e e  K anel lo p o u lo s  P . ,  op ♦ c i t . , p . 173. 
Kanellopoulos, during the years of h is  ERE leadership , o ften  gave the 
inpression th a t he did  not a c tu a lly  mean what he said  and did. As he 
himself admitted, "Of course, my whole p o l i t ic a l  career, frcm the c iv i l  
war u n til  today, was more o r less a  deviation  frcm my deeper thoughts 
and p rin c ip les" ; ib id , p. 173.
161: As Loulis J .  s ta ted :
"One f a i l s  to  comprehend, fo r  example, why a p o l i t i c i a n  
l ik e  M aniadakis (M etaxas' M in is te r  o f S e c u rity )  was 
accepted w ith in  the  ERE ranks to g e th e r  w ith  a number of 
o th e r  e x tre m is ts  o f th e  R ig h t. Such groups b a s ic a l ly  
favoured an a ll-p o w e rfu l p a te r n a l i s t i c  s ta te  which would 
conduct the anti-communist campaign. They were xenophobic, 
p o p u l is t  and h a rd ly  looked fa v o u ra b ly  on free -m arke t 
economics".
See "The Greek c o n se rv a tiv e  m ovem ent...", op. c i t . , p. 16. See a lso  
Lendakis A., op. c i t . , p. 77.
162: For more d e ta i ls  see Meynaud J . , op. c i t . , pp. 255-6.
163: In fa c t, i t  remains unresolved u n til  today. At the time under 
discussion the issue triggered  a lo t of controversy. Seme of Karamanlis' 
p o l it ic a l  opponents argued th a t he had been chosen for the prem iership 
by the Americans, so le ly  to accept a so lu tion  fo r the Cypriot Problem 
th a t  was d e t r im e n ta l  to  G re e c e ; t h e i r  c h a rg e  h as  n e v e r  been  
substan tia ted . For the la te s t  exchanges on the subject see the a r t ic le s  
by G. Mavros, "Mr. A veroff's Zurich", and by E. Averoff, "The Zurich 
Agreement: Cost and advan tages", in the  newspaper To Vima, of 20 
November 1988 and 27 November 1988 respec tive ly  (in  Greek).
164: On 25 July  1985, U.S. Ambassador to  Greece B. Keeley, te s tify in g  
in the Senate 's Foreign A ffa irs  Subcommittee on European A ffa irs shed 
some in te re s tin g  l ig h t on the past:
"And I th in k  th a t  we m ight e s t a b l i s h  a base  fo r  a 
d i f f e r e n t  kind o f f r ie n d sh ip  and a d i f f e r e n t  r e la t io n ,  
b e in g  more equal a l l i e s  so to  sp eak , r a th e r  than  a 
c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n , which was the case during almost 
two decades, as regards our re la tio n s  to  Greece a f te r  the 
World War I I . . .  I  would l ik e  us to  proceed to  something
387
new and b e t te r ,  something we can l iv e  b e t te r  w ith  and 
something the Greeks can liv e  b e tte r  with as w ell".
Published in the newspaper To Pondiki, 5 June 1987.
165: See Evert M., op. c i t . , pp. 68-71, and K anellopoulos P .,  op. 
c i t . , pp. 146-8.
166: See Roussos G ., Modern H isto ry  of the  Greek N a tio n , Athens: 
E llin ik i Morphotiki E stia , 1975, seven v o ls , (in  Greek), vo l. VII, pp. 
545-6.
167: See G reece o v e r  th e  S ix  Y ears  1 9 5 5 -1 9 6 1 , A th e n s : ERE 
pub lication , 1963 (in  Greek), ch. 1, p. 5.
168: See Evert M., op. c i t . , pp. 81-2. We sh a ll not concern ourselves 
with the economy in d e ta il  here; see our analy sis  in section  2 .1 .1  of 
th is  chapter.
169: See Co-ordination M inister P. Papaligouras1 speech in parliam ent, 
on the r a t i f ic a t io n  of the Accession Agreement between Greece and the 
EEC, published in the newspaper Naftemboriki, no. 9802, 26 January 1962.
170: See P. Papal igouras speech, addressed to  the members of the Greek 
Chamber o f Commerce and I n d u s t r y  p u b l is h e d  in  th e  new spaper 
Naftemboriki, no. 9818, 14 February 1962.
171: See Katsoudas D ., "The Conservative Movement...", op. c i t . , p. 
90.
172: See Drakos R. G ., Industry in Greece, Athens: 1980, p. 73, c ited  
in Loulis J . ,  "The Greek conservative movement...", op. c i t . , p. 16.
173: See Meynaud J . , op. c i t . , pp. 261-9. A fter the party  had lo s t the 
1963 and 1964 e le c t io n s , parliam en t decided to  e s ta b l is h  a sp e c ia l 
com m ittee to  in v e s t ig a te  w hether some ERE M in is te r s  ( in c lu d in g  
K aram anlis) bo re  any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  damages to  th e  s t a t e  in  
connection with public works. The carm ittee f in a lly  decided to  send the 
case to the courts since, in i t s  view, there  was su ff ic ie n t ind ication  
th a t se rio u s  embezzlement had taken p la c e . N ev erth e less , the  George 
Papandreou government d ec la red  th a t  a l l  o ffences — if  any— had been 
cancelled by lapse of time.
174: Ib id , p. 261.
175: In  1971 Karamanlis d ec la red  th a t  not only had he taken no 
measures of rep re ss io n  and exclusion  of the  L e ft, but he a c tu a l ly  
reduced those already ex is tin g : "I found 4,498 imprisoned communists and 
when I l e f t  th e re  were 6 . . . " .  (See Woodhouse C ., op. c i t . , p . 221; 
V a rv its io tis  J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 12; and Genevoix M., op. c i t . , p. 225). 
Tsoukalas C. argues, without presenting concrete figu res, th a t thousands 
of people continued to be ex iled  in concentration camps u n til  the end of 
Karamanlis1 period, while A liv izatos N. (op. c i t . , p. 577) m aintains 
th a t  by 1963 th e re  where 1,100 p o l i t i c a l  d e ta in e e s  in  G reece. 
Unwittingly contracting  h is  party  leader, ERE M inister of the In te r io r  
T. Makris, said  in parliament on 5 December 1958: " . . . t h e  measures which 
have ex isted  fo r decades to preserve the coun try 's secu rity  have been 
c o n s titu tio n a lly  safeguarded". Concerning the  p o l i t i c a l  d e ta in e e s  in 
ex ile , he said  that they remained in e x ile  by choice, since a simple 
verbal declara tion  th a t they would " liv e  in obedience to  the law", would
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l e t  them go home. He charged EDA w ith  s h e l te r in g  in  i t s  ranks the  
su p p o r te rs  o f th e  outlaw ed  Communist P a r ty , and warned th a t  th e  
government would not abolish  the "secu rity  measures" against the L eft, 
but ra th e r enforce them more system atically  and extend them to  fellow - 
tra v e lle rs  as w ell. See Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , vo l. I l l ,  p. 377.
176: See P. Kanellopoulos, op. c i t . , p. 183.
177: E arly  e le c t io n s  were the  ru le  fo r  the  whole of th e  post-w ar 
period. The d ifference  in the case of the ERE is  tha t the l a t t e r  always 
formed one-party governments, whereas v ir tu a lly  a l l  governments before 
had been co a litio n s  ones. The only exception was the Greek R ally , which 
formed a o ne-party  government in  1952. N everthe less, when Marshal 
Papagos died, Karamanlis did not continue in government u n t i l  the end of 
the term, but opted fo r new e lec tio n s .
178: See Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , p. 213.
179: A c co rd in g  to  th e  1940 c e n s u s ,  th e  r u r a l  a r e a s ,  w here 
tra d itio n a lly  the right-w ing p a r t ie s  enjoyed g re a te r  p o p u la r i ty , were 
o v e r-rep resen ted  in  pa rliam en t. As a lread y  exp la ined , however, the  
in te rna l emigration th a t began in the e a rly  1950s, concentrated the main 
bulk of the coun try 's  population in the urban centres.
180: See Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , p. 213.
181: Ib id , pp. 75-6.
182: Ib id , pp. 77-8.
183: See Nikolakopoulos E . , op. c i t . , p . 224; and Meynaud J . ,  op. 
c i t . , p. 271.
184: I t  should be noted here tha t the increase in EDA's vote did not 
come a l l  o f a  sudden. I t  is  reasonab le  to  suppose th a t  i t  would be 
id e n tif ia b le , i f  to  a le sse r ex ten t, in the 1956 e lec tio n s i f  EDA had 
contested them by i t s e l f .  Furtherm ore, the  con tinual q u a rre ls  of the  
L iberal P a r ty 's  lead e rs  had d is i l lu s io n e d  many v o te rs  who th e re fo re  
opted for EDA in 1958. For more d e ta ils  see Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , 
vo l. I l l ,  pp. 320-5.
185: See Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , vo l. IV, p. 30; and Roumbatis J . ,  
op. c i t . , pp. 185-6.
186: The p re c is e  reasons fo r the  e a r ly  re s ig n a tio n  of K aram anlis' 
governm ent w ere n e v e r  e x p la in e d . T here  was o n ly  an o f f i c i a l  
announcement, saying th a t "The government, considering the in te rn a tio n a l 
s i tu a t io n ,  in com bination w ith  the  psychological c lim ate  w ith in  the  
c o u n try , has d ec id ed  to  s u g g e s t . . .  th e  im m ediate d is m is s a l  o f 
parliam ent", see the newspaper To Vima, 20 September 1961, quoted in 
Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , p. 257.
187: See Paraskevopoulos P .,  op. c i t . , p. 17. For the  P e r ic le s  
contingency plan, see Lendakis A., op. c i t . , pp. 46-8. The view th a t no 
violence ever ex is ted  and the 1961 e lec tio n s were f a i r ,  o r a t  le a s t ,  
th a t some i r r e g u la r i t i e s  d id  take p la c e , but not to  the e x te n t th a t 
ERE's opponents t ry  to  p resen t, is  supported by C. Woodhouse, (op. c i t . , 
pp. 175-9), where Karamanlis says th a t th is  "stupid plan" had been se t 
in motion by the " in te llig en ce  agencies" and he for one knew nothing 
about i t .  On the o ther hand, Kanellopoulos P ., (op. c i t . , pp. 152-3),
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admitted tha t there  "had been some violence on behalf of the ERE" —he 
estim ated th a t i t  increased the vote by 4%— but added th a t, "even i f  
the e lec tions had been a hundred per cent f a i r ,  the ERE would have won 
anyway". V a rv its io tis  I . ,  (op. c i t . , pp. 33-8), b a sica lly  agrees with 
K anellopoulos, but a lso  says th a t  the  P e r ic le s  contingency p lan  had 
noth ing  to  do w ith  the  e le c t io n s .  N ev erth e less , most h is to r ia n s  a re  
agreed th a t the P eric les  plan was se t in motion fo r the 1961 e le c tio n s ; 
the only question th a t is  debatable is  to  what extent i t  influenced the 
r e s u l t s .  C. M its o ta k is  a ls o  a c c e p ts  th a t  th e re  was v io le n c e  and 
e le c to ra l  fraud  in  1961, and adm its C entre Union r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  He 
argues tha t the e le c to ra l fraud was organised by the palace, and not by 
Karamanlis. See Dimitrakos D ., op. c i t . , pp. 452-3; see a lso  footnote 
153 above.
188: See Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 162.
189: Disagreement over a  s ta te  v i s i t  to  London by King Paul and Queen 
Frederika was only a p re te x t. In fa c t, Karamanlis wanted to  make some 
trenchant reforms of the c o n s t i tu t io n  (b as ica lly  to  lim it the power of 
the throne on the one hand, and people 's c iv i l  r ig h ts  on the o th e r) , in  
o rder to  be ab le  to  govern more e f f i c ie n t ly  and to  manage to  s te e r  
Greece towards fu ll  in d u s tr ia l development; see a lso  footnote 156 above.
190: Nevertheless, the king ca lled  G. Papandreou to  form a government, 
even though the l a t t e r 's  party  did not enjoy an absolute m ajority  in 
parliam ent. This k in g 's  decision  was severely c r i t ic is e d  by the ERE. See 
Kanellopoulos P ., op. c i t . , pp. 159-61.
191: EDA. did not present any candidates of i t s  own in 24 out of the 55 
e lec to ra l d i s t r i c t s ,  and so in d irec tly  supported the Centre Union. See 
Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , pp. 307-8.
192: Ib id , p. 230.
193: Many ERE le a d in g  members, and K anellopou lo s h im se lf , kept 
re p o rtin g  d i r e c t ly  to  him when he was in P a r is ,  and in  h is  r e p l ie s  
Karamanlis used to  express h is  opinions and to  give advice on various 
issues; see Woodhouse C ., op. c i t . , pp. 228-9.
194: See Loulis J . , "The Greek conservative movement...", op. c i t . , p. 
15.
195: See Meynaud J . , op. c i t , p. 271. A s tr ik in g  exception is  th a t of 
the four e lec to ra l d i s t r i c t s  in Crete where the ERE, due to  the long 
V enizelist tra d itio n , po lled  i t s  lowest percentages. On the o ther hand, 
in  o th e r  e le c to r a l  d i s t r i c t s  (a s , fo r  exam ple, Lakonia in  th e  
Peloponnese), the  ERE always p o lled  much h igher than i t s  n a tio n a l 
average; see Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t ♦, pp. 210-309.
196: According to  Janda K. (P o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s :  A Cross N ational 
Survey, The Free P re ss , New York 1980, pp. 1 9 ff) , th e re  a re  f iv e  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  m e a s u r in g  th e  d e g re e  o f  a p a r t y ' s  s t a b i l i t y /  
in s t i tu t io n a l i s a t io n :  ( i )  the  1 ife -d u ra tio n  of the p a rty , ( i i )  the  
impersonality of i t s  charac ter, ( i i i )  how frequently  i t  has changed i t s  
name, (iv) party  o rganisational con tinu ity , and (v) the s t a b i l i ty  or 
in s t a b i l i ty  of the p a r ty 's  pa rliam en tary  and e le c to ra l  s treng th . The 
la t t e r  is  measured by a mathematical formula devised by Janda him self. 
This ca lcu la tes the s ta b i l i ty  of a p a r ty 's  s treng th  on a 0-1 a x is , where 
the two end values show ab so lu te  s t a b i l i t y  (zero change), and the  
th e o re tic a l ly  g re a te s t  p o ss ib le  d ev ia tio n  from the average p a r ty 's
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s tre n g th . For th is  c a lc u la t io n ,  Janda adds the  a b so lu te  v a lu es of 
deviations from the p a r ty 's  average e le c to ra l streng th , he devides the 
sum by the  number of e le c t io n s  the  p a r ty  has co n tes ted  and, aga in , 
devides the  q u o tie n t by th e  p a r ty 's  average e le c to ra l  s tre n g th . The 
c lo ser to  zero the f in a l r e s u l t ,  the more in s t itu t io n a lis e d  the pa rty , 
and v ice  versa. The mathematical expression of th is  formula is :
S-l YJ ~ Y_|
K
Degree of p a rty  ( in ) s ta b i l i ty  = ------------------
Y
where E means sum, Yj the percentage of the vote the p a rty  po lled  in
each e le c t io n , Y the  p a r ty 's  average e le c to ra l  s tre n g th , and k  the
number of e lec tions the p a rty  has contested . In a more an a ly tica l way, 
the formula is  as follows:
|Yi-Y| + |Y ii-Y | + . . . + |Yn-Y|
K
Degree of p a rty  ( in ) s ta b i l i ty  = --------------------------------------
Y
197: See W ittner L ., op. c i t . , p. 298.
198: See Campbell J .  and Sherrard P ., op. c i t . , pp. 260-1.
199: According to  Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 118, 
20% of the c i t i e s '  a c tiv e  population were unemployed.
200: Ib id , p. 118.
201: See Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , v o l. IV, p. 140.
202: See Roufos R. ("Athenian"), op. c i t . , and Tsoukalas C., The Greek
Tragedy, op. c i t . , p. 169.
203: See Linardatos a . , op. c i t . , vo l. IV, p. 412.
204: See Tsoukalas C ., The Greek Tragedy, op. c i t . , pp. 167-8.
205: At that time, the Centre Union le a d e r 's  son, Andreas Papandreou,
was accused of having estab lished  a p a ra -m ilita ry  o rganisation  w ithin 
the army. The Prime M inister did  not have fu ll  confidence in h is  Defence 
M in iste r and asked him to  submit h is  re s ig n a tio n  so th a t  he could 
appoint another, more loyal to him, to  conduct the investiga tion  in to  
the m atter. For d e ta ils  see Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , ch. 6, pp. 
173-210.
206: Unfortunately, George Papandreou denounced the k in g 's  stance only 
when he lo st the royal favour.
207: S. Stephanopoulos had been Marshal Papagos' Vice-Premier in 1952. 
His 1965 government was supported by 152 MPs in parliam ent. For d e ta ils  
see Papadimitriou N ., op. c i t . , pp. 237-349.
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208: Papadimitriou N ., op. c i t . , pp. 14-7, presents twelve cases where 
minor s p l i ts  took place w ithin the Centre Union before the fa ta l  and 
d e f in ite  se rie s  of July-September 1965.
209: See Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , pp. 241-2.
210: On th is  m a tte r , see Woodhouse C ., The R ise and F a ll o f the  
Colonels, Athens: E llin ik i Evroekdotiki, 1982; K atris J . ,  The B irth  of 
Neo-fascism in Greece, Athens: P apazissis , 1974; Karagiorgas G ., From 
IDEA to  J u n ta , Athens: P a p a z is s is , 1975; Koussoulas D ., P o l i t ic a l  
R e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s :  1964-1974, A thens: E l l in ik i  E vroekdo tik i, 1988; 
Paraskevopoulos P ., 1963-1967: How We Ended to  the D ic ta to rsh ip , Athens: 
au tho r’s pub lication , 1974; and Grivas K ., Greece: 1940-1974, Athens: 
a u th o r 's  pub lication , 1974 (a l l  in Greek).
211: As W ittner L ., op. c i t . , has sa id :
"The extent of American re sp o n s ib ility  fo r the 1967 coup 
cannot be assessed  w ith  any e x a c titu d e , fo r the  reco rds 
and conversations leading to  the event are  s t i l l  shrowded 
in secrecy; nevertheless, i t  is  c le a r  tha t American policy  
provided a v i ta l  ingredient without vrtnch the coup could 
not have occurred" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
212: See Mouzelis a . . pp. 131-3 and a lso  Roufos R. ("Athenian"), op. 
c i t . , who argues th a t " . .  .th e  putch could almost be defined as a  move by 
the o f f ic e rs ' ' trad e -u n io n " '.
213: At th is  point le t  us s tre s s  once more tha t the c iv i l  war was won 
both by the right-w ing and the lib e ra l forces. George Papandreou, who as 
Premier a t the time fought the conrounists in Athens in  December 1944, 
was himself a staunch anti-conm unist. (He had described the Carmunist 
Party as "a party  of treason and crime", see Theotokis J . ,  op. c i t . , p. 
136). But a f te r  the c iv i l  war, the L iberal p a rtie s  were in o ff ic e  fo r 
only four years, and during tha t time they showed on the one hand, a 
tendency towards leniency and for healing  the wounds of the past and, on 
the o ther, whenever they did take anti-ccm nunist measures, i t  was only 
a f te r  enormous pressure (see some examples in Dimitrakos D ., op. c i t . , 
p . 312 and p. 360; and a lso  in Lendakis A ., op. c i t . , p. 396). The 
right-w ing forces, in co n tra s t, governed fo r a  to ta l of th ir te e n  years 
and, besides the c iv il-w ar le g is la tio n , created  and reinforced the so- 
ca lled  p a ra -s ta te  and p a ra -m ilita ry  organisations —in other words, the 
S ta te  of the  R igh t. They used e le c to ra l  v io lence  and fraud  in  the 
pursu it of th e ir  o v e rr id in g  ideology o f anti-comnunism. To a c e r ta in  
ex ten t, the Liberal forces and the Left must bear the re sp o n s ib ility  for 
the post-war regime. I t  need only be remembered that the Centre Union 
remained d iplom atically  inac tive  during the e lec to ra l violence and fraud 
of 1961, hoping thus to  rec e iv e  the  l e f t  v o te ; or th a t the outlawed 
Communist P a r ty 's  rad io  b roadcasts  from abroad sometimes gave the 
im pression  th a t  a r e v o lu t io n  was abou t to  e ru p t in  G reece (see  
A livizatos N ., op. c i t . , p. 523).
214: See Loulis J . ,  "The Greek conservative movement...", op. c i t . , 
pp. 8-9.
215: See Roufos R. ("Athenian"), op. c i t .
216: See Mouzelis a . , p. 131.
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CHAPTER TWO
1: A fter the re s to ra tio n  of democracy in Greece, the B ritish , Greek 
and Turkish Foreign M inisters met in Geneva to  reach an agreement on a 
cease fire  in Cyprus. However, on 14 August 1974, and fo r reasons th a t 
l i e  outside the scope of the present study, the conference came to  a 
deadlock, and Turkish troops were unleashed fo r a  second m jo r  a ttack  
against the island  (a venture th a t became known as A tt i la  I I ) .  The very 
same day Premier Karamanlis ordered the Greek A ir Force and Navy Chiefs 
of S ta ff to  send in c e rta in  u n its  to  repel the invaders. I t  was only 
then th a t the  l a t t e r  adm itted  th a t th e  armed fo rces were t o t a l ly  
inadequate, d iso rg a n ised , and unable to  f u l f i l l  any m ilita ry  mission 
w hatsoever. In  e f f e c t ,  Prem ier Karamanlis l a t e r  had to  withdraw the  
country from the m ilita ry  wing of NATO. For more d e ta ils  see P sicharis 
S ., The Seventy C ritic a l  Days, Athens: P apazissis , 1976 (in  Greek), pp. 
15-25.
2: See S tem  L ., The Wrong Horse: The P o li t ic s  of In tervention  and 
the  F a ilu re  of American Diplomacy, New York, 1977, p . 129; and a lso  
Psomiades H. J . ,  "Greece: Fran the co lonels ' ru le  to  democracy", in Herz 
J . H. (ed), From D ictatorsh ip  to  Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of 
A uthoritarianism  and T o ta li ta r ia n is m , W estport, CT: Greenwood P re ss , 
1982, ch. 11, pp. 252-3. As another author argues,
" . . . t h e  Greek m i l i t a r y 's  d e c is io n  to  withdraw from power 
in Ju ly  1974.. to h  l v g  involved a  combination of
both external fac to rs  (the d e te r io ra tio n  of the m il i ta ry 's  
Cyprus policy) and in te rna l ones (pressure from w ithin the 
m i l i t a r y  and t a c t i c a l  v o lu n te e r is m ) . The o v e r r id in g  
c o n s id e ra tio n  behind th ese  fa c to r s  was the  m i l i t a r y 's  
e f f o r t s  to  sa fe g u a rd  i t s  p r o f e s s io n a l  in te r e s t s "  ( in  
English o r ig in a lly ) .
See Danopoulos T . , W arriors and P o l i t ic ia n s  in  Modern G reece, Chapel 
H i l l :  Documentary P u b l ic a t io n s ,  1984, p . 129. (H en ce fo rth , a l l  
quotations are  in our own tra n s la tio n  from the o rig ina l Greek, unless 
otherwise s ta te d ) .
3: With the exception of Centre Union p o lit ic ia n  G. Mavros, the six  
p a rtic ip a tin g  c iv il ia n s  were rep resen ta tives  of the conservative Right. 
For more d e ta ils  about th a t meeting see P sicharis  S ., The Change Viewed 
Frcm Behind the Scenes, Athens: Papazissis , 1975 (in  Greek), Part V, pp. 
132-65, and a lso  Yiovannis C. (ed), Nation-Leader Karamanlis, Athens: 
1975, Yiovannis Publications, vo l. I ,  pp. 179-92.
4: See Psom iades H. J .  , "G reece: From th e  c o lo n e ls ' r u l e  to  
democracy", op. c i t . , p. 253.
5: For d e ta i ls ,  see P sicharis S ., The Change V iew ed..., op. c i t . , 
pp. 159-63 and espec ia lly  pp. 184-95, where the author c ite s  E. Averoff- 
T ositsas ' personal testimony; see a lso  Paraskevopoulos P ., Karamanlis 
between 1974 and 1985, Athens: Fy trak is , 1991 (in  Greek), pp. 24-7.
6: For th is  period of h is  l i f e ,  see Tzermias P ., The Karamanlis of 
the A nti-D icta to ria l S trugg le , Athens: Roes, 1984 (in  Greek).
7: See Diamandouros P. N ., "T ra n s itio n  to , and c o n so lid a tio n  o f , 
democratic p o l i t ic s  in Greece, 1974-1983: A te n ta tiv e  assessment", in
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West European P o l i t ic s , vo l. 7, April 1984, no. 2, pp. 50-71. The same 
author argues tha t Karamanlis
"...en joyed  an unquestioned appeal to  a wide spectrum of 
the population, which perceived him as a  deus ex machina
th a t could save the country from i t s  ex ternal c r i s i s  and
s te e r  i t  in the d irec tio n  of an uneventful 'norm alisation ' 
of p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  This won him the support of la rg e  
segments of the tra d itio n a l cen tre , while to  the ro y a lis t  
r ig h t  opposed to  the  m il i ta ry  regime he was c le a r ly  the  
le sse r of two unenviable options" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
Ib id , p. 55. See a lso  Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , p. 26.
8: For d e ta ils  on the formation and corposition  of the na tiona l-
unity  government see, among o thers, Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , pp. 
28-9; Yiovannis C. (ed ), op. c i t . , v o l. I ,  pp. 58-64; and Diamandouros 
P. N ., "Transition t o . . . " ,  op. c i t . , pp. 56-7.
9: See Diamandouros P. N ., ib id , p. 57.
10: A more comprehensive assessment of th is  question cannot be made 
as long as issues of Greek-Turkish re la tio n s  are  not to ta l ly  resolved.
11: O verall, 108,000 c iv i l  servants and o ther o f f ic ia ls  and employees 
had been dismissed, tran sfe rred , or otherwise d isc ip lin ed  by mid-January 
1975; see  Psom iades H. J . ,  "G reece: From th e  c o lo n e ls ' r u l e  to  
democracy", op. c i t . , p. 255.
12: See Karamanlis' announcement, c ite d  in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. 
c i t . , vo l. I ,  pp. 86-7.
13: As we saw in ch. 1, KKE was outlawed under Law 509/1947. This law 
was abolished by Karamanlis two months a f te r  he took over, namely on 23 
September 1974 under L eg isla tive  Decree 59. See Yiovannis C. (ed), op. 
c i t . , v o l. I ,  p. 278, and a lso  Lambrias P ., For Democracy, Athens: 
p riv a te ly  published by the author, 1977, pp. 23-9, where one can find  a 
concise but comprehensive presen ta tion  of measures taken by Karamanlis' 
n a tional-un ity  government during the f i r s t  two months a f te r  the f a l l  of 
the m ilita ry  junta.
14: See Woodhouse C. M., Karam anlis: R esto rer of Greek Democracy, 
Athens: Morphotiki E stia , 1982 (in  Greek), p. 285.
15: See Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , 1991, p. 47; a lso  Samatas M., 
Greek Bureaucratism : A System of S o c io p o li t ic a l  C o n tro l, Ph.D ., New 
School fo r Social Research, May 1986, pp. 277-83. On th is  m atter 
evidence was given in a press conference by George Mangakis, Secretary 
of Ju s tic e  in PASOK governments, 1982-84; see the d a ily  newspaper Ta 
Nea, 8 July  1989.
16: As the Defence M inister, E. Averoff confessed,
"From the f i r s t  moment I stepped in to  the Pentagon.. .  [the 
Greek M inistry of Defence] . . .o n  the evening of Ju ly  24,
1974, i t  became c le a r  to  me th a t  th e  governm ent was 
v i r tu a l ly  c ap tiv e  and th a t no th ing  could be done un less  
the Armed-Forces issue was se ttle d " .
See P sicharis S ., The Seventy C ritic a l Days, op. c i t . , p. 111.
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17: This major step  was taken on 11 August 1974. That day, " . . .  the 
National Unity Government's c a p tiv ity  was term inated". Ib id , p. 124.
18: Ib id , pp. 134-45. In dealing w ith the army in general, Karamanlis 
was imnensely helped by two of h is  co lleag u es who bo th  enjoyed the  
resp ec t and t r u s t  o f the  m il i ta r y .  One was E. A v ero ff-T o sitsa s  (a 
prom inent ERE member and e x - fo re ig n  m in is te r  in  th e  1955-1963 
governments) who, because of h is  e f fo r ts  during the d ic ta to rsh ip  to ccme 
to sane so rt of terms w ith the d ic ta to rs , was derogato rily  ca lled  "the 
bridge-maker". The o ther was S. Ghikas, who was a  r e t i r e d  army o f f ic e r , 
Armed Forces Honorary Chief of S ta ff , ex-m inister in Karamanlis1 p re­
coup governments, staunch an ti-cannun ist and, most inportan t, leader of 
the IDEA p ara -m ilita ry  o rganisation  in the Middle East during the ax is 
occupation of Greece. Last but not le a s t ,  Ghikas considered the 1967 
coup as " . . . a n  outcome of in su p erab le  n a tio n a l n e c e s s i ty , aimed a t  
preventing the country’s disappearance behind the iron cu rta in " . On E. 
A veroff’s r e la t io n s  and comm inication w ith  th e  d ic ta to r s h ip  see ex­
prem ier George R ail i s ’ Hours of R e sp o n sib ility , Athens: Evroekdotiki, 
1983 (in Greek), pp. 7-8; see a lso  the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 19 
June 1987, e s p e c ia l ly  pp. 26-7. On S. G hikas1 IDEA membership, see 
Psicharis S ., The Seventy C ritic a l Days, op. c i t . , pp. 129-30, and on 
h is  opinions about the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  see the p o l i t ic a l  review 
A nti, Period B’ , no. 6, 16 November 1974, pp. 5-6.
19: Quoted in  C logg R . , " K a ra m a n lis ’ c a u t io u s  s u c c e s s :  The 
background", in Government and Opposition, Sumner 1975, p. 340.
20: See Diamandouros P. N ., "T ran s itio n  t o . . . " ,  op. c i t . , p. 58. 
K aram an lis’ f e a r s  and h e s i t a t i o n  v is - c i-v is  th e  j u n t i s t s  seem in  
r e t r o s p e c t  l a r g e ly  j u s t i f i e d .  As he s a id  to  th e  Sunday Times 
correspondent:
"I want you to  know th a t o f a l l  pe rsons, I am the  most 
exposed to the wrath of the junta . And I have repeatedly 
had to  face  problems of personal s e c u r i ty  s in ce  I took 
over. For 20 n ig h ts  I  s le p t  in a caique (boat) to  avoid 
a s sa s s in a tio n . They t r ie d  to  k i l l  me severa l tim es" (in  
English o r ig in a lly ) .
(Quoted in Danopoulos T ., op. c i t ♦, p. 135). According to  the same 
au tho r, the  February 1975 a b o rtiv e  consp iracy  was the  fo u rth  such 
a ttenp t since the m ilita ry  relinquished i t s  power in Ju ly  1974 ( ib id , p. 
134). Furthermore, even during the ea rly  years of the s o c ia l is t  PASOK 
party  in o ffice  following the 1981 parliam entary e lec tio n s ,
"Two reported disturbances o r abortive  countercoups in the 
la s t  two years provide evidence tha t the Greek m ilita ry , 
though out of power, is  not a lto g e th e r  out of p o l i t i c s .
The f i r s t  d is tu rb an ce  occurred  on May 31, 1982 and the 
second one o c cu rred  F eb ruary  28, 1983" ( in  E n g lish
o r ig in a lly ) .
(Ib id , p. 147).
21: A fter the death sentences had been commuted there were widespread 
rumours that the government would f in a lly  grant amnesty to  the ju n tis ts .  
Karamanlis re jec ted  these accusations by s ta tin g  ca teg o rica lly : "...w hen 
we say l i f e  im prisonm ent we mean l i f e  im prisonm ent" ( c i t e d  in  
Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , 1991, p. 180).
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22: S e e  P so m ia d e s  H. J . , " G reece:  From t h e  c o l o n e l s '  r u l e  t o
democracy", op- c i t . , p . 265.
23: Composer Mikis T heodorakis, although a t  th a t time a staunch 
ccrrmunist and a  candidate of the United L eft, declared a few days before 
the e lec tio n s th a t they presented a choice between "Karamanlis o r the 
tanks" —" . . . s o  giving liv e ly  expression to what every democrat should 
be aware o f a f t e r  th e  c o l la p s e  o f th e  d i c t a to r s h ip " ,  a s  one of 
Karamanlis1 lieu tenan ts cormnented; see Lambrias P ., op. c i t . , p. 116.
24: Quoted in Yiovannis C. (ed ), op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  p. 294. According 
to  Raymond Aron, the  way in  which Karamanlis re s to re d  democracy is  
c h a ra c te r ise d  as a "m asterp iece of p o l i t i c a l  a r t " ;  see q u o ta tio n  in  
Lambrias P ., In the Shadow of a Great Man, Athens: Morphotiki E stia , 
1989 (in  Greek), p. 109.
25: E lec tion -speech  addressed  to  the  people of Athens c i te d  in 
Yiovannis C. (ed), op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  p. 496. On 30 September 1974, in 
h is  e lec tio n  adress to the people of Salonica, Karamanlis said :
"As you a lread y  know, I  came a month ago a t  a  dram atic 
moment. I came in  the  e lev en th  hour before  a n a tio n a l 
c a t a s t r o p h y .  I  cam e, p re p a re d  to  s h o u ld e r  g ra v e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  I  came, because  I f e l t  th a t  I was 
h is to r ic a l ly  indebted to  ccrne...".
Ib id , p. 259.
26: See M acridis R. C ., "E lec tio n s and p o l i t i c a l  modernization in 
Greece", in  Penniman H. R. (ed ), Greece a t  the  P o lls :  The N ational 
E lections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American E nterprise  
In s t i tu te  fo r Public Policy Research, 1981, pp. 12-3.
27: There was, of course, a d if fe re n t kind of pressure, namely tha t 
of the h is to r ic a l  conjuncture: the fea r of a m ilita ry  come back and the 
need to  p ro te c t  the  newly born democracy led many non-conservative  
people to  vote for Karamanlis; the rea l social d iv isions appeared la te r  
in  the 1977 e le c t io n , when ND lo s t  alm ost on e-fo u trh  of i t s  v o te , 
po llin g  41.84 per cen t, as against 54.37 per cent three years e a r l ie r .
28: See Psom iades H. J . ,  "G reece: From th e  c o lo n e ls ' r u l e  to  
democracy", op. c i t . , p. 260. See a lso  Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , 
1991, p. 91 and p. 100, where he a sse r ts  tha t "C. Karamanlis a t th a t 
period was expressing the calm force of democracy".
29: Karamanlis in s tru c te d  both h is  m in is te rs  and h is  MPs not to  
express themselves pub lic ly  e ith e r  fo r or against the issue. He did so 
fo r two purposes: to  d e p o l i t ic is e  the  is su e , and to  keep h is  p a rty  
together. See below in th is  chapter.
30: See V egleris P ., "Greek e lec to ra l law", in Penniman H. R. (ed ), 
op. c i t . , p. 38; see a lso  Psomiades H. J . , "Greece: From the co lonels ' 
ru le  to  democracy", op. c i t . , pp. 261-2. I t  is  noteworthy th a t the 
v a lid ity  of a l l  six  of these referendums had been generally  doubted by 
the public .
31: See h is  p re -e lec to ra l speech addressed to the people of Athens on 
15 November 1974, c ite d  in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  p. 495; 
see a lso  h is  te lev is io n  speech of 30 October 1974, where he explains why 
he had estab lished  the party  of New Democracy, ib id , pp. 410-5.
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32: See Diamandouros N. P . , "T ransition  t o — ", op. c i t . , p. 58.
33: For d e ta i l s  of the  1975 c o n s t i tu t io n  see The C o n s titu tio n  of 
Greece, Athens: Pondiki Pub lica tions, 7th ed itio n , 1989 (in  Greek).
34: See M acridis R. C ., Greek P o l i t ic s  a t  the  C rossroads: The 
S o c ia lis t Experiment, Athens: E llin ik i Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in  Greek), p. 
51.
35: Many years la te r ,  P. Kanellopoulos wrote:
"One day I read in the newspapers th a t he had formed New
Democracy. At the  tim e I was the  lead er of ERE and had
been the ERE leader fo r eleven consecutive years. Nobody 
ever informed me th a t ERE was to  be dissolved in  favour of 
a new party , namely the party  of New Democracy. I  must say 
tha t a t the time I  f e l t  personally  offended; I thought i t  
would have been b e tte r ,  i f  I  had been informed th a t a new 
party  was to be estab lished".
See Kanellopoulos P ., My L ife , Athens: Y ia lle l is  Pub lica tions, 1985 (in  
Greek), p. 197.
36: This proclamation is  c ite d  in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. c i t . , vo l. 
I ,  pp. 338-41, and a tran s la te d  version of i t  is  presented in  Appendix I
of my th e s i s .  (A ll fo llo w in g  e x c e rp ts  in  th e  te x t  a re  from t h i s
proclamation and the tran s la tio n s  are  mine). Another tra n s la te d  version 
can be found in Clogg R ., P a rtie s  and E lections in Greece: The Search 
for Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987, pp. 223-5.
37: See Yiovannis C. (ed), op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  pp. 338-41.
38: Ib id .
39: Ib id .
40: Ib id .
41: Ib id .
42: Ib id .
43: See h is  p re -e lec to ra l speech on 30 October 1974, in Yiovannis C. 
(ed), op. c i t . , vo l. I ,  pp. 408-15.
44: Ib id , p. 415.
45: I b id . N evertheless, f i f te e n  years l a t e r ,  Karamanlis p u b lic ly  
admitted tha t the Greeks had not seen any d ifference  between ERE and ND 
a t tha t time —see the d a ily  newspaper Messimvrini, 2 May 1989.
46: See Kanellopoulos P ., op. c i t . , p. 197.
47: See Macridis R. C ., "E lections and p o lit ic a l  m odern iza tion ..." , 
op. c i t . , p. 10.
48: For PASOK, see L yrin tz is C ., Between Socialism and Populism: The 
Rise of the Panhellenic S o c ia lis t Movement, Ph.D th es is , U niversity  of 
London, LSE, November 1983, e sp e c ia l ly  ch. 3, pp. 126-47; see a lso
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Spourdalakis M., PASOK: S truc tu re , In tra -p a rty  Crises and C entralised 
Power, Athens: Exantas, 1988 (in  Greek), espec ia lly  ch. 2, pp. 65-120.
49: This view was widespread and shared by the p o li t ic a l  opposition 
and supporters of New Democracy. The most inim ical c r it ic ism  came, as 
might be expected, from PASOK leader A. Papandreou who, a t  tim es, did 
not h e s ita te  to  id en tify  Karamanlis and h is  party  with the junta (see 
Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , 1991, p. 181). On the other hand, the view 
that ND was nothing more than ERE under another name can be found in, 
among o th e r s ,  K an e llo p o u lo s  P . ,  o p . c i t . , p . 197; T h eo to k is  S . ,  
P o lit ic a l  Reminisces, Athens: Eptalofos AVEE, 1986 (in  Greek), p. 245; 
and Bakoyiannis P ., Black and White, Athens: Kaktos, 1983 (in  Greek), p. 
31.
50: See Woodhouse C. M., op. c i t . , 1982, p. 284. This opinion is  a lso  
shared by Paraskevopoulos P ., op. c i t . , 1991, pp. 72-4.
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CHAPTER THREE
1: More sp e c if ic a lly , th ree  of them had run in the 1964 e lec tions as 
independents, eleven belonged to  the Centre Union (1964), one to EPEK 
(National Progressive Centre Union, 1952), one came from the Party of 
Progressive People (KP) and one from the Union of Peoples' P a rtie s  (ELK, 
1958); fo r  EPEK and ELK, see  ch. 1 above, T ab les 1 .2  and 1 .5  
respec tive ly .
2: To give ju s t one but s tr ik in g  example: in the F ir s t  D is tr ic t  of 
Piraeus, one of New Democracy' s candidates was Andreas Andrianopou 1 o s , 
aged 28 a t  the time, who was p a rtic ip a tin g  fo r the f i r s t  time and with 
15,500 p re fe re n c e  v o te s  was e le c te d  f i r s t  from among e ig h t o th e r  
can d id a tes . Being h im self a sc ion  of a well-known p o l i t i c a l  P iraeus 
family, he had inherited  the e lec to ra l c lie n te le  of h is  uncle, George 
Andrianopou 1 os, who had been consisten tly  e lected  to  parliam ent since 
1956 (in  th a t year with the People's Party, and th e re a fte r  —i .e .  in 
1958, 1961, 1963, and 1964— under the banner of ERE). The cases of the 
o th e r  37 "newcomers" a re  more o r le s s  s im i la r .  A more s p e c i f i c  
p resen tation  of the data  shown in Table I I I . l  should therefo re  be as 
follows:
Table I I I . l a :  ND Candidates' P o lit ic a l  Background 
fo r the 17 Nov. 1974 Election
Pre-couD p o l i t ic a l  a f f i l ia t io n number %
ERE 100 33.33
Other 17 05.67
Relative newcomers (P o litic a l he irs) 38 12.67
Absolute newcomers 145 48.33
Total 300 100.00
The above o ffe rs  a more accurate p ic tu re  of the ND candidates' previous 
p o lit ic a l  a f f i l ia t io n ,  and s t i l l  a t te s ts  to the fac t th a t the p a r ty 's  
p o lit ic a l  personnel had been renewed to a considerable ex ten t: almost 
ha lf were completely new to p o l i t ic s  and without any previous p o li t ic a l  
p a rtic ip a tio n .
3: In seme areas , e lec tio n s were held again on 20 April 1975, and 
s lig h tly  changed the d is tr ib u tio n  of parliam entary sea ts : New Democracy 
secured 216 se a ts , Centre Union/New Forces 61, PASOK 15 and the United 
Left 8.
4: As fa r  as these re la tiv e  newcomers are  concerned, Table I I I .3 a  
below (com piling d a ta  from Tables I I I . 2 and I I I .  3 above) p rovides 
fu rther evidence for our claim , namely that they are not so new as some 
scholars a s s e r t .  See fo r example Loulis J . C., "New Democracy: The new 
face of conservatism", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece a t  the P o lls: The 
N ational E le c tio n s  of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American 
E n te rp rise  I n s t i t u t e  fo r Public  P o licy  Research, 1981, p. 59. For a 
d iffe re n t consideration , see Karras E ., "New Democracy: The anatomy of 
a party", in the p o l i t ic a l  review A nti, Period B ', no. 42, 3 April 1976, 
(in  Greek), pp. 13-6. T herefore , our op tion  fo r  t r e a t in g  them as a 
separate category of re la tiv e  newcomers is ,  we th ink, ju s t if ie d .
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Table I I I .3 a :  A Corrparison between ND Candidates and MPs 
in the 1974 E lection
Previous p a rty  a f f i l ia t io n number of candidates number of MPs %
ERE 100 84 84.00
Other 17 12 70.59
Relative newcomers 38 30 78.95
Absolute newcomers 145 90 62.07
Total 300 216 72.00
Of a l l  the p a r ty 's  candidates, 84% of those who had been a f f i l ia te d  with 
ERE succeeded in g e ttin g  e lec ted , whereas only 62.07% of the absolute 
newcomers e n te re d  th e  p a r l ia m e n t.  C o n v erse ly , a lm ost 79% of th e  
cand idates who, in one way o r an o th e r, had in h e r ite d  an e le c to ra l  
c l i e n t e l e  were e le c te d  MPs, do ing  even b e t t e r  th an  p o l i t i c i a n s  
a f f i l ia te d  with o ther than ERE p a rtie s  and fa l l in g  only a l i t t l e  behind 
those d ire c tly  re la te d  to  the pre-coup ERE.
5: In the parliam entary group of the National Radical Union (ERE) 
a f t e r  the  1956 e le c t io n s , MPs a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  the  Greek R ally  p a rty  
constitu ted  the v a s t m a jo rity  (more than 70%), whereas the  newcomers 
am ounted to  o n ly  9.09% ; t h i s  com pares w ith  38.39% and 55.56% 
respec tive ly  fo r ND. See Table 1.3 in ch. 1 and Table I I I . 3 above.
6: S t i l l ,  th e  percen tage  of ERE's re p re se n ta tio n  w ith in  ND was 
re la tiv e ly  high (38.39%) but, as we sh a ll see below, has been decreasing 
s tead ily  ever since, and by today has become q u ite  in s ig n ific an t.
7: This l a s t  remark holds tru e  fo r  PASOK as w e ll, but th is  was 
mainly due to  the fac t tha t in 1974 PASOK had only f if te e n  MPs e lected . 
From these, e igh t entered parliam ent fo r the f i r s t  time (53.33%), three 
for the second (20.00%), and four fo r the th ird  time (26.67%). Aside 
from those who were e le c te d  fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e, a l l  had been Centre 
Union deputies before 1967 (46.57%). For d e ta i ls ,  see L yrin tz is C ., "The 
r i s e  of PASOK and the  emergence of a new p o l i t i c a l  p e rso n n el" , in  
Tzannatos Z. (ed), Socialism in Greece, London: Gower Publishing Company 
Ltd, 1986, pp. 114-29.
8: The case was sim ila r fo r PASOK in 1974, when the party  had only 
very few MPs e lected : two of i t s  deputies were between 35-44 (13.33%), 
seven between 45-54 (46.67%), fiv e  between 55-64 (33.33%) and one was 
over 65 years old (6.67%); th e ir  average age was 52 years. The s itu a tio n  
changed dram atically  a f te r  the 1977 e lec tio n , as is  c le a rly  shown in 
Table I I I . 5. I t  should be noted th a t in 1981 the PASOK parliam entary 
group was dominated —to the extent of 65 per cent— by MPs under 50 
years old. (Ib id . )
9: The EK/ND p arliam en ta ry  group included th ir ty -o n e  MPs who had 
contested pre-coup e lec tions under the banner of the Centre Union ( i .e .  
50.82%), and th i r t y  newcomers (o r 49.18%). Taking in to  account our 
d i s t i n c t io n  between r e l a t i v e  and a b s o lu te  newcomers (see  above, 
footnotes 2 and 4), twenty-two were rea l newcomers (36.07%), the re s t  
eight being re la tiv e  newcomers (13.11%).
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10: Between 1974 and today, s ix  n a tio n a l e le c tio n s  were h e ld  in 
Greece, namely: 20 Nov. 1977, 18 Oct. 1981, 2 June 1985, 18 June 1989 
(hereafte r c a lle d  1989A), 5 Nov. 1989 (hereafter 1989B), and 8 April
1990. (S h o r tly  a f t e r  th e  com pletion  o f th e  p re s e n t s tu d y , e a r ly  
e le c tio n s  were h e ld  on 10 Oct. 1993, which ND lo s t  and PASOK took 
o ff ic e ; fo r d e ta i ls  concerning the events that led to  ea rly  e lec tio n s
and th e ir  r e s u l t  see footnote 84 below, and footnote 130 to  ch. 5 .)
11: The June 1989 e le c t io n  re s u l te d  in  the  h ighest percen tage  of 
newcctners/ the lowest percentage of deputies previously a f f i l ia te d  with 
ND. T h is happened because  in  th e  p re v io u s  e le c t io n  o f 1985 th e  
e le c to ra te  was not given the chance to  cast th e ir  preference vote fo r a 
candidate, and was lim ited  to  vote sinp ly  for the party  as a  whole. The 
e le c to ra l l i s t s  and, most important, the order of the candidates w ithin 
them, were drawn up so le ly  by the party  leaderships. I t  seems then, tha t 
in the June 1989 e le c tio n  the voters opted for a d ra s tic  renewal w ithin 
parliam ent, a  trend  th a t can a lso  be id en tified  w ithin PASOK: 24% of i t s  
deputies were newcomers, 73% were a f f i l ia te d  with the party  previously , 
whereas 3% came from o ther p o l i t ic a l  groups.
12: Their re la t iv e ly  b ig  percentage in 1981 is  due to , f i r s t ,  the
d i s in te g r a t i o n  o f EK/ND and th e  a b so rp tio n  by ND o f many o f i t s
p o lit ic ia n s ;  and, second, to  the assim ila tion  by ND of the u ltra -R igh t 
which had po lled  almost 7% in the 1977 e lec tio n . In 1981, then, th ir te e n  
of the  ND d e p u tie s  had p rev io u s ly  been a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  the  Centre 
p a r t ie s , and fiv e  with the u ltra -R ig h t. In 1985, when the Union of the 
Democratic Centre EDIK (as EK/ND was renamed) was dissolved a lto g e th e r, 
ND's parliam entary group comprised seven p o lit ic ia n s  who had come from 
EDIK, and th ree  who had le f t  PASOK.
13: I t  is  in te re s tin g  to  note, for example, tha t the f i r s t  government 
formed by Karamanlis a f te r  the 1974 e lec tio n  comprised 35 m in iste rs  and 
deputy-m inisters: 23 (or 65.7%) were in the past a f f i l ia te d  w ith ERE, 
the re s t  12 (or 34.3%) being newcomers.
14: The average ages fo r the other major party , PASOK, fo r these six  
e le c tio n s  were 46.23, 47.74, 51.64, 50.29, 49.48 and 50.00 years
respec tive ly .
15: On 1 January 1981, Greece became the ten th  EEC member, and ever 
since there  has been represented in the European Parliament (EP) by 24 
deputies. E lections fo r the EP were held in 1981 (simultaneously with 
the  n a tio n a l e le c t io n ) ,  in  1984 (EP o n ly ), and in June 1989 (again 
simultaneously w ith  the  n a tio n a l e le c t io n ) .  In a l l  Greek p a r t i e s  the 
E u ro -c a n d id a te s  a re  a p p o in te d  by th e  le a d e rs h ip , and a re  e le c te d  
according to  the rank they hold in the party  e lec to ra l l i s t s  —th a t is ,  
without a preference vote frcm the individual vo ters . ND Euro-MPs belong 
to  the European People 's Party  since 1982.
16: The same is  true  fo r PASOK as w ell. In 1981 half of i t s  Euro-MPs 
were newcomers, and only  one came from the pre-coup C entre Union. 
Furthermore, the average age of PASOK's e lected  Euro-MPs —ten in 1981, 
ten  in  1984 and n ine  in  June 1989— was 48.6 , 54.6 and 51.8 years 
respec tive ly .
17: See among o th e rs  R ail is  G ., P o l i t ic a l  C onfessions: 1950-1989, 
Athens: P ro sk in io , 1990, ( in  Greek), p. 185, where he a s s e r ts :  "Of 
course, I  voted fo r the King. But I never to ld  anybody th a t I would do 
so". (Henceforth, a l l  quotations are in our own tran s la tio n  from the 
o r ig in a l  G reek, u n le s s  o th e rw ise  s t a t e d ) .  See a ls o  Theotokis S .,
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P o litic a l  Reminiscences, Athens: Eptalofos AVEE, 1986, (in  Greek), pp. 
241-55. I t  is  noteworthy th a t Theotokis, who had been a ND deputy in 
1974, resigned immediately a f te r  the referendum because of Karamanlis1 
handling of the monarchy issue.
18: We saw th a t almost 31% voted fo r the King, although the m ajority  
opted fo r a repub lic . Most scholars agree tha t the ro y a lis t  vote came 
e x c lu s iv e ly  from people  who had vo ted  fo r  ND in  the November 1974 
e l e c t i o n ;  s e e  L o u l is  J .  C ., "New D em ocracy: The new fa c e  o f 
conservatism", op. c i t . , p. 63; see a lso  Psomiades H. J . , "Greece: Fran 
the co lonels ' ru le  to  democracy", in Herz J .  H. (ed), Fran D icta torsh ip  
to  Democracy: Coping w ith  th e  L eg ac ies  o f A u th o r i ta r ia n is m  and 
T o ta lita rian ism , W estport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, ch. 11, p. 262; 
and Mavrogordatos G ., "The emerging party-system ", in Clogg R. (ed), 
Greece in the 1980s, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 92-3.
19: As he la te r  declared , he was forced to  do so by h is  a sso c ia tes , 
and m ainly by th e  then  v ic e -p re s id e n t E. A veroff; fo r  d e ta i l s ,  see 
R ail i s  G ., Hours o f R e s p o n s ib ili ty , A thens: E v ro ek d o tik i, 1983 (in  
Greek), pp. 270-1, where he s ta te s  th a t
"I b e lie v e  th a t  a l l  those who had c o llab o ra ted  w ith  the 
d ic ta to r s h ip  have r e a l ly  caused damage to  the  coun try , 
more so to  our camp, and th a t pub lic  opinion w ill respond 
negatively  i f  we include them in the party  l i s t s " .
See a lso  the same a u th o r 's  P o li t ic a l  Confessions, op. c i t . , pp. 211-3.
20: Such an incident occurred in parliam ent in November 1991, when 
some ND MPs branded as n a tio n a l t r a i t o r s  a l l  those who had fought 
against the Axis occupation under the banner of the left-w ing  National 
L ib e ra tio n  F ront (EAM); see  the  d a ily  newspaper Ta Nea, 30 November
1991.
21: The most prominent among them were C. M itsotakis, who was to
become the party  leader seven years la te r ;  and A. Kanellopoulos, who had 
been a p rofessor of economics, deputy of the pre-coup Centre Union, and, 
a f t e r  1974, an MP of EK/ND and EDIK. For a  comprehensive account of 
events tha t led to  EK/ND's d is in te g ra tio n  and absorption by ND of a good 
many of the l a t t e r ’s p o lit ic ia n s , see Diamandakos P ., From the Centre 
Union to New Democracy, Athens: E llin ik i Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in  Greek).
22: As already mentioned, there are  no relevan t data fo r th is  period. 
Nevertheless, using fo r our computations almost h a lf of the ERE MPs in 
1964 (ERE had 99 MPs e lec ted  in the 1964 e lec tio n  and our sample here is  
constitu ted  by those 49 ND MPs in 1974, who had a lso  been e lec ted  with 
ERE in 1964), we found th a t lawyers and doctors represented 61.23% and 
16.33% of ERE's parliam entary group respec tive ly  (see Table I I I . 11). The 
same holds true  fo r o ther Western European conservative p a r t ie s  as w ell; 
see for example Hartman J . , "Great B rita in " , in Raschke J . and K atsoulis 
H. (eds), Western European P o lit ic a l P a r ie s , Athens: P a r a t i r i t i s ,  1990 
(in Greek, 2 v o ls ) , vo l. 2, p. 222, where he argues:
"Businessm en o r  h ig h e r  p r iv a te  em ployees in  b u sin ess  
a d m in is tra tio n  and l ib e r a l  p r o f e s s io n a ls  p red o m in a te , 
making for almost h a lf  of the B ritish  conservative MPs in 
the House of Cannons [in 19741".
23: See Loulis J . C ., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", 
op. c i t . , p. 60.
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24: Ib id
25: This is  mainly due to  the fac t th a t the party  moved ideo log ically  
towards n eo -lib e ra l ism and the free-market economy, and so a ttra c te d  a 
good many s c h o la r s  and s u p p o r te rs  o f m arket l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  and 
disentanglement from s ta te  in te rference  in the economy. For d e ta i ls ,  see 
below, ch. 5.
26: P o s t-g rad u a tes  among PASOK’s Euro-MPs in  1981, 1984 and 1989 
accounted fo r 80, 40 and 44.44% respec tive ly .
27: I t  is  in te re s tin g  to  note th a t th is  fea tu re  holds true  a lso  fo r 
PASOK.
28: See th e  speech a d d re sse d  to  th e  p a r t y 's  f i r s t  P re lim inary  
C o n g ress  by ND D i r e c to r - G e n e r a l ,  G. M i s s a i l i d i s ,  "The p a r ty  
o rg a n isa tio n , way of fu n c tio n in g , h e ad q u a rte rs ' re p o r t  and fu tu re  
ob jec tives" , in 1st Prelim inary Congress of the Party: Minutes, vols 
A'+B', C halkidiki, 2-4 A pril 1977, New Democracy Publication (in  Greek). 
As Bakoyiannis P. re p o r ts  in  The Anatomy of Greek P o l i t i c s . Athens: 
P a p a z is s is , 1977 (in  G reek), p . 143, th is  committee comprised four 
law yers, two i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  two d o c to rs , two business managers, two 
a c to r s ,  one p r iv a te  tra d e -u n io n ise d  em ployee, one t r a d e -u n io n is e d  
farm er, one eng ineer, one jo u r n a l is t ,  one au th o r, one r e t i r e d  army 
general, one socia l worker and one former telecctrmuni cat ions employee. 
A ccording  to  J .  L o u lis  (se e  h i s  "New Democracy: The new fac e  o f 
conservatism", op. c i t . , p. 69), i t  included no MPs, and seven of i t s  
members formed the executive committee. Furthermore, according to the 
same author,
"The A d m in is tra tiv e  Corrm ittee 's a c tu a l power w ith in  the  
p a r ty  rem ained m in im al, p a r t i c u l a r l y  s in c e  th e  p a rty  
le a d e r s h ip  f a i l e d  to  p ro v id e  i t  w ith  th e  n e c e ssa ry  
leverage  v is -A -v is  the  e le c te d  p o l i t ic ia n s "  (in  E nglish 
o r ig in a lly ) .
Ib id .
29: The overwhelming m ajority  of PASOK's cen tra l committee members 
were p o l i t i c ia n s  a f f i l i a t e d  to  the  two b ig g es t a n ti - ju n ta  res is tan ce  
organ isations, so re f le c tin g  the dominant ro le  they had played in the 
c reation  of PASOK; fo r d e ta i ls  see L yrin tz is C ., Between Socialism and 
Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic S o c ia lis t Movement, Ph.D th e s is , 
U niversity of London, LSE, November 1983, p. 273.
30: Between 1986 and 1991, there  were th ree  national e lec tio n s , which 
brought changes th a t  were duly r e f le c te d  in the  com position of the  
cen tral committee.
31a: In th is  Table we present the occupational composition of PASOK's 
f i r s t  e lec ted  cen tra l committee (PASOK 1977) and that of ND (ND 1979); 
we a lso  present the da ta  re fe rr in g  to  ND's second cen tral committee as 
i t  appeared r ig h t a f te r  the second party  congress (ND 1986), as well as 
i t  came to  be a f te r  the th ree  consecutive e lec tio n s  in June and November 
1989 and April 1990 (ND-91A).
31b: In  column ND-91B we a ls o  g iv e  th e  d a ta  co n ce rn in g  th e
o c c u p a tio n a l  b ack g ro u n d  o f  th e  e l e c t e d  p r e s i d e n t s  o f  ND's 70 
departmental committees throughout the country. At the time of w riting ,
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the departmental -commit te e  e le c t io n s  a re  s t i l l  the most re c e n t (they  
were held in May and June 1991).
32: The p a r ty  s ta tu te s  drawn up a t  ND's f i r s t  congress in  1979, 
s tip u la ted  th a t the congress should be held every two years. A ctually , 
i t  took the party  seven years (u n til 1986) to hold i t s  second one, when 
i t  was decided th a t party  congresses should be held every th ree  years. 
Nevertheless, the th ird  congress is  s t i l l  to  be convened.
33: The Department of L arissa  was se lec ted  because both i t s  socia l 
and p o l i t ic a l  s t a t i s t i c s  (e .g .,  composition of i t s  population, labour 
d is tr ib u tio n , e le c tio n  re s u lts )  largely  r e f le c t  the national ones. The 
data of Table I I I .  17 a re  based on the answers to a questionnaire from 
158 p a r ty  members, random ly s e le c te d  — some of them were a ls o  
interviewed personally  by the author between January and June 1989. For 
more d e ta ils  on th is  fieldwork research, see ch. 6 below and Appendix 
V III.
34: The d i f f e r e n t  o c c u p a t io n a l  c o m p o s itio n  o f ND's h ig h e r  
(parliam en tary  and o th e r ) ,  m iddle, and lower members was d isce rn ib le  
s in ce  as e a r ly  as 1977, when the  f i r s t  P relim inary  Congress of the  
party  was held in Chalkidiki (frcm 2 to  4 April 1977). Given th a t the 
p a rtic ip a n ts  were m ostly  appoin ted  by h igher p a rty  o f f i c i a l s  and not 
e le c te d ,  s in c e  th e  p a r ty  had no t y e t developed i t s  g r a s s - r o o t s  
o rganisation , th e ir  occupational carposition  was markedly d if fe re n t frcm 
that of the f i r s t  e lec ted  cen tra l committee, formed two years la te r .  The 
data provided by ND (see 1st Prelim inary Congress of the Party: M inutes, 
op. c i t . , p. 3), r e fe r  to  1,033 of the 1,751 p a rtic ip a n ts  (percentages 
were computed fo r the to ta l  number of p a rtic ip a n ts ) :
Profession number %
Lawyers 230 13.14
Merchants 183 10.45
P riva te  B rp l. 92 05.25
Fanners 90 05.14
Businessmen 87 04.97
Pensioners 84 04.80
Doctors 70 04.00
Workers/Art i sans 65 03.71
Engineers 60 03.43
Autcm obilists (Taxi owners) 37 02.11
Economists 35 02.00
This obvious discordance between the g rass-roo ts and the higher party  
organs in terms of th e ir  respec tive  social and occupational backgrounds 
(which reappears a t  the second party  congress, i .e .  between the 1986 
elected  central-com m ittee members and the 1991 elected  presiden ts of the 
departmental committees), w ill be discussed in considerable d e ta il  in 
the next chapter.
35: A d e ta ile d  analysis of ND v o te rs ' sp ec ific  c h a ra c te r is tic s  (in 
terms of c la ss  id e n tif ic a tio n , sex, age, occupation, u rban/rural o rig in s  
e tc .)  is  in i t s e l f  a very d i f f ic u l t  task and would demand a separate  
study, e s p e c ia l ly  so as re le v a n t d a ta  a re  indeed sca rse  and hard  to  
obtain. In the r e s t  of th is  section  we sha ll mainly re ly  upon analyses 
made by the Centre of P o li t ic a l  Research and Information (see footnote 
82 below), based on e lec tio n  re s u lts  but a lso  opinion p o lls  conducted by 
th is  Centre.
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36: The data presented in Tables I I I .  20 and 21 are carpi led frcm the 
following Epikentra pub lica tions, a l l  special e lec tion  issues (and in 
Greek): no. 1, Mar.-Apr. 1978, pp. 12-21; no. 22, Sep.-Oct. 1981, pp. 
4-72; no. 44, May-Jun. 1985, pp. 4-71; no. 58, undated, pp. 5-59; no. 
60, Dec. 1989, pp. 6-63; and no. 62, Jun. 1990, pp. 11-90. See a lso  
Katsoudas D. K ., "Vote and ideology", in E pikentra, no. 65, March 1991 
(in  Greek), pp. 30-5.
37: Since the  d a ta  p resen ted  in  th is  s e c tio n  a re  incom plete and 
ra th e r sketchy, one cannot make d e ta iled  comparisons with o ther Western 
European p a r t i e s ;  i t  seems though f a i r  to  argue th a t as regards i t s  
social base, ND presents a f a i r ly  s im ila r p ic tu re  to  tha t of o ther major 
conservative p a rtie s  in Europe, as are  for example the Gaul l i s t  RPR in 
France, the CDU in Germany and the Conservatives in Great B rita in ; for 
these p a r tie s  see respec tive  chapters in Raschke J . and K atsoulis H. 
(eds), op. c i t .
38: By "current" we do not mean fac tion  or tendency w ithin the party . 
The term re fe rs  to  p o l i t ic a l  forces th a t have generally  been regarded as 
qu ite  separate in the Greek p o l i t ic a l  spectrum. So PASOK claimed i t s e l f  
to be the continuation of th ree  p o l i t ic a l  cu rren ts: the tra d itio n a l Left 
and EAM movement, the Centre Union, and the res is tan ce  struggle  against 
the junta; see L yrin tz is C ., Between Socialism and P o p u lism :..., op. 
c i t . , p. 289.
39: P o litic ia n s  previously a f f i l ia te d  with the Centre Union were not 
only alm ost n e g lig ib le , but came m ostly  from among those who had 
abandoned George Papandreou during the Ju ly  1965 c r i s i s  to  jo in  the so- 
ca lled  apostates group; they were immediately expelled frcm the Centre 
Union party  a t  th a t time.
40: To the question, "Which of the following forces, in your opinion, 
exerted any influence on the New Democracy party?" party  members were 
allowed to  choose more than one option.
41: The question was: "In your view, is  ND the h e ir  and descendant of 
the p re -d ic ta to rsh ip  ERE, or do you think i t  is  something new in Greek 
p o l i t ic s ? " .  I t  was a follow -up question  to  the  previous one (see 
footnote 40).
42: See Bakoyiannis P ., op. c i t . , p. 144, where the author a sse rts  
that
"In conclusion, i t  can be s tressed  th a t today 's [19773 New 
Democracy t y p i c a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e s  th e  in d is p e n s a b le  
instrument for Karamanlis to  exercise h is  power".
43: As another scholar argues,
"[Karamanlis] took steps to reconstruct the Right afresh , 
by founding ND. I th in k  the term fre sh  rec o n s tru c tio n  
(anadcmissi) is  co rrec t because ND, although a descendant 
of the tra d itio n a l Right, is  a complete inversion of i t .
I t s  p o l i t i c a l  p h ilo so p h y  and p r a c t i c e ,  i t s  r a d ic a l  
liberalism  (as the party  ca lled  i t ) ,  th a t is  i t s  lib e ra l 
c a p ita lism , is  more the philosophy of f re e  c a p i t a l i s t  
en te rp rise  and cap ita l accumulation ra th e r  than tha t of an 
a u th o r i ta r ia n  ru le  depending m ainly on coercion , as the 
Right had exercised during the f i r s t  post-war decades. ND 
s e e k s  to  be n a t i o n a l  p a r t y ,  n o t  n a t io n - m in d e d
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(e th n ik o fro n ) . I t  is  an ti-co irm un ist, but does not need 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  anti-com m unism . In  s h o r t ,  i t  has a 
modern bourgeois p o l i t ic a l  philosophy, more 're lax ed ' than 
the provocative stance of i t s  precursor".
See Elephandis A ., In  the  C o n s te lla tio n  of Populism , Athens: Pol i t  is  
Publications, 1991 (in  Greek), p. 281.
44: In the 1974 e lec tio n  for example, out of the 216 ND deputies, 79 
had been MPs a lso  before the d ic ta to rsh ip , so they may be considered to  
have re lie d  on patronage networks to  become e lected  again, ju s t lik e  
another 17 who were parliam ent airy candidates in the pre-coup period. On 
the o th er hand, those 30 ND depu ties we have designated  as r e la t iv e  
newcomers (see footnotes 2 and 4 above), belonged to  e stab lished  w ell- 
known p o l i t i c a l  fa m ilie s , and were th e re fo re  most probably  h e ir s  to  
p o lit ic a l  c lie n te le s . The remaining 90 newcomers owed th e ir  e lec tio n  to
the lan d s lid e  in favour of Karam anlis, under whose t ic k e t  they were
contesting th is  f i r s t  e lec tio n ; As A. Andrianopou1os admitted:
"Our camp has been fo r years developed through c e r ta in  
p o l i t i c a l  groupings and ' e l i t i s t '  c e n tr e s . . .  The popular 
base of the Right has been never given the chance to  have 
a say concerning i t s  pa rliam en tary  re p re se n ta tio n ; i t  
could not se le c t deputies. Let us not pretend: to  jo in  the 
party  l i s t s  o r to  get a p o l it ic a l  or adm in istrative  post, 
you should have con tacts. Me myself, who owe everything to 
K a ra m a n lis , i f  I had n o t had an u n c le  who was a
p o lit ic ia n , would Karamanlis have ever had the chance to 
know me, in  o r d e r  to  d e c id e  w h e th e r  I d e s e rv e  a
parliam entary seat?"
See h is  interview in Tahydromos, 10 December 1987, pp. 20-2.
45: According to  the f i r s t  party  s ta tu te s  (1979), the nomination of 
cand idates had been v i r tu a l ly  the exc lu sive  p r iv ile g e  of the  p a rty  
leader (see ND: Id eo lo g ica l P r in c ip le s -P a r tv  S ta tu te s , Athens: ND 
Publication, 1979, p. 30, A rtic le  17). According to the rev ised  party  
s ta tu te s  of 1986 (see New Democracy: Second Congress, M inutes, Salonica,
14-16 February 1986, Athens: ND Publication, 1986, pp. 250-1, A rtic le  
20), the procedure became as fo llow s: a f t e r  e le c tio n s  w ith in  each 
departmental committee, a l i s t  of candidates is  drawn up, consisting  of 
twice as many candidates as there  are  ava ilab le  parliam entary sea ts  in 
the Department concerned. This l i s t  is  sent to party  headquarters in 
Athens, where the executive carm ittee submits i t  to  a f i r s t  screening. 
F inally , the l i s t  reaches the party  leader, who then makes the f in a l 
decisions.
46: We choose th is  e lec tio n  because, as we have already mentioned, i t  
was then th a t the  h ig h es t percentage of newcomers entered parliament 
a f te r  1974; fo r the p a r tic u la r  reasons why th is  occurred, see footnote 
11 above.
47: During the f i r s t  party  congress, and before the e lec tio n  fo r the 
central committee, the vo ters were reminded tha t K aram nlis favoured the 
e lec tion  of c e rta in  party  members —who, of course, were voted in. See 
the p o lit ic a l  review A n ti, no. 125, Period B ', 12 May 1979, p. 16.
48: Since the c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n sh ip  between deputies and voters 
is  s t r i c t ly  personal, concrete data are  lacking. Nevertheless, from 
information acquired during our fieldwork research in the Department of
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L a r is s a  (se e  below ch . 6 ) ,  and from numerous r e p o r ts  in  v a r io u s  
newspapers, i t  seems f a i r  to  conclude th a t  ND d ep u ties  s t i l l  t r y  to  
c rea te  and use patronage networks to  maintain and enlarge th e ir  personal 
c lie n te le  and, there fo re , to  strengthen th e ir  position  w ithin the party  
by ensuring th e ir  re -e le c tio n .
49: In common speech th is  special serv ice offered  by the p o lit ic ia n  
to  the  v o te r  in  exchange fo r  the  l a t t e r ' s  vo te  is  c a lle d  r o u s f e t i . 
Documentation fo r th is  kind of exchange can be found, in te r  a lia , in the 
weekly newspaper To P o n d ik i, 6 October 1989, and e s p e c ia lly  in  the  
weekly newspaper To V im , 29 September 1991, where many such incidents 
a re  reported and well documented. Immediately a f te r  ND had taken o ff ic e  
in April 1990, the ro u sfe ti issue became so serious tha t a  New Democracy 
MP submitted a question  in  p a rliam en t, ask ing  the  government whether 
they were planning to  enforce c e rta in  measures against th is  phenomenon; 
see the da ily  newspaper E le fth ero ty p ia , 12 May 1990.
50: I t  i s  w o rth  n o t in g  t h a t  c l i e n t e l i s m  h as  been  s t r u c k  a 
considerable blow, e sp ec ia lly  a f te r  PASOK1 s r i s e  to  power in 1981. This 
consisted of PASOK (the overwhelming m ajority  of whose p o lit ic ia n s  did 
not re ly  on o r had no patronage netw orks), which from the s t a r t  had 
developed a w e ll-s truc tu red  g rass-ro o ts  o rganisation , introduced a l i s t  
system vhereby i t  was the party  th a t would decide who was going to stand 
as candidate fo r parliam ent:
"T h is  d ev e lopm en t may e x c lu d e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f 
c lien te lism  developing a t  the parliam entary leve l, but i t  
c rea tes the r is k  of reversion  to  what has been described 
as 'p a rty -d irec ted  patronage ', in which the party  machine 
becomes the main patron , d is tr ib u tin g  spo ils  and favours 
to  th e  p a r t y 's  f o l l o w e r s  and  c o n t r o l l i n g  p u b l i c  
appointments" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
See L yrin tzis C ., " The r is e  of PASOK...", op. c i t . , p. 126, and a lso  
the same au th o r 's  " P o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  in  p o s t- ju n ta  Greece: A case  of 
'bureaucratic  c lie n te lism '? " , in West European P o l i t ic s , vo l. 7, no. 2, 
April 1984, pp. 99-118. This phenomenon of "party -d irec ted  patronage" or 
"bureaucratic c lien te lism " a lso  occurred w ithin New Democracy a f te r  the 
l a t t e r  had developed a g rass-ro o ts  organisation , and we sha ll concern 
ourselves with i t  in d e ta il  in the next chapter.
51: There were very few p o lit ic ia n s  indeed in 1974 PASOK who had been 
e le c te d  w ith  the C entre Union in  1964, o r belonged to  e s ta b lis h e d  
p o lit ic a l  fam ilies. The overwhelming m ajority  were newcomers, who owed 
th e ir  e lec tion  mainly to  the r i s e  in th e ir  p a r ty 's  popular appeal, i t s  
o rganisation , and to the ch arism  of i t s  leader.
52: Today the f i r s t  two are  ND MPs. M itsotakis who has been party  
leader since September 1984, whereas Boutos changed sides in 1989 and 
has been a PASOK MP ever since, e lected  in the l a t t e r 's  s t a t e - l i s t .
53: E. A v e ro ff  and E. K e fa lo y ia n n is  have  b e q u e a th e d  t h e i r  
parliam entary sea ts  to th e ir  nephews, J . Averoff (e lection  of June 1989) 
and M. Kefaloyiannis (e lec tion  of April 1990) respec tive ly ; G. Stamatis 
and A. Taliadouros to th e ir  sons, D. Stamatis and S. Taliadouros (both 
since the June 1989 e le c tio n ) . A s tr ik in g  example of such "bequests" 
occurred in  the  Department of I l i a  in the Peloponnese, where s ix  
deputies are  e lec ted . In 1990, ND and PASOK secured three sea ts  each: ND 
elected  C. Kanellopoulou, daughter of A. Kanellopoulos, who was a lso  
e lected  with the p a r ty 's  s t a t e - l i s t ;  V. Kondoyiannopoulos (elected  since
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1974), son of N. Kondoyiannopoulos, who became a Greek Rally MP in 1952 
and an ERE one in 1963; and T. Stephanopoulos ( f i r s t  e lected  in 1974, 
lo s t  the 1977 and 1981 e le c tio n s  and s in ce  1985 he is  con tinuously  
e lec ted ), nephew of S. Stephanopoulos, who had been e lec ted  continuously 
since 1946 with various cen tre  p a r t ie s . On the PASOK side , not one MP 
inherited  the pariiam entary seat in th is  department.
54: F actions and tendencies should not be confused with p o l i t ic a l  
curren ts. The term "faction" re fe rs  to a group of party  members, MPs 
p a r t ic u la r ly ,  he ld  to g e th er by a c e r ta in  amount of o rg a n isa tio n a l 
d is c ip l in e ,  who seek to  fu r th e r  a broad range of p o l ic ie s  through 
conciously  o rganised  p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv i t y .  The term "tendency", on the 
other hand, re fe rs  to a tt i tu d e s  expressed by MPs or party  members inside 
and outside parliament about a  wide range of issues, a l l  of which share 
in a more o r le ss  coherent p o l i t i c a l  philosophy. In  th is  sense , a 
fa c tio n  may be viewed as an o rgan ised  tendency; see L y r in tz is  C ., 
Between Socialism and Populism:. ♦ ., op. c i t . , p. 461.
55: Volvi is  the name of a lake in the Department of Salonica, where 
30 members of th is  group held th e ir  f i r s t  public meeting, in June 1976.
56: This information was given to  the author during an interview  (in 
Larissa, 22 October 1988) with C. Beis, a  prominent member of the Volvi 
Movement in 1976 and ex-member of ND's local departmental conmittee. See 
a lso  "The Volvi Movement: Who is  a fra id  of the phantom of the lake", in 
the p o lit ic a l  review A n ti, Period B ', no. 120, 3 March 1979, pp. 14-9, 
(in Greek). Conversely, G. Rail is  considers the Volvi Movement as an 
u ltra-R igh t fac tio n , sinply  because an ex-member of i t  (G. Sour las  frcm 
the Department of Magnisia, Volos) was among A veroff's nominees fo r the 
e lec to ra l party  l i s t s  in 1981; see R a llis  G ., P o lit ic a l  Confessions, op. 
c i t . , p. 282 and footnote 19 above.
57: Most of the  movement' s members came from the  departm ents of 
Thessaly ( th a t is  from L a rissa , Volos, K ard itsa , and T r ik a la ) , and 
c e r ta in  departm en ts o f M acedonia (m ostly  S a lo n ic a  and K a te r in i) .  
According to another member of the movement,
"This was due not to some local p a r t ic u la r i ty , but to the 
fac t tha t there was not su ff ic ie n t communication a t tha t 
t im e  b e tw ee n  th e  v a r i o u s  b ra n c h e s  o f th e  p a r t y  
o rg a n is a t io n ,  s in c e  th e  l a t t e r  was no t y e t p ro p e r ly  
developed, i f  not lacking a ltogether" .
Interview with G. Katsaras, conducted by the author in K arditsa, 8 March 
1989.
58: In th is  f i r s t  congress, 850 ND members p a rtic ip a ted , representing  
42 Greek provinces. I t  was only then th a t New Democracy characterised  
the Volvi Movement as a "rid iculous issue", and announced tha t a l l  i t s  
members were expelled from the party . The congress was preceded in March 
1978 by a co n fe ren ce  in  S a lo n ic a  o f 300 r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  from 32 
provinces; a good many of thorn were members of various ND's departmental 
committees.
59: These groupings should be considered as tendencies revolving more 
around ce rta in  p o l it ic a l  p e rso n a litie s  and less around ideological or 
o ther, wider policy  issues. This is  to say tha t the underlying reasons 
fo r these  in tra -p a r ty  d iv is io n s  were p e r s o n a l is t ic /c l ie n te l is t ic ,  not 
based on any concrete, impersonal p rin c ip le s . G. R a llis  has claimed that 
when he was f ig h t in g  fo r  th e  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  a f t e r  K a ra n a n lis ’
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accession  to  the  P residency  in  1980, h is  r iv a l  cand idate  E. A veroff 
tr ie d  to  catch votes by promising governmental and o ther public posts to  
MPs, in case he was e lec ted . See R a llis  G ., Hours of R esponsib ility , op. 
c i t . , pp. 10-3.
60: C. Stephanopoulos was a  prominent p o l i t ic a l  figu re  of both ERE 
(he was e lected  in 1964) and New Democracy (elected  continuously in a l l  
e lec tions from 1974 u n til  August 1985, when he le f t  the party  to  form 
DIANA). He had held various m in is te r ia l posts in ND governments, and had 
carpeted twice fo r the party  leadership , the f i r s t  time in 1981 against 
Averoff, and the second time in 1984 against M itsotakis; in  both cases 
he was the runner-up . The la s t  post he held before leaving ND was th a t 
of the p a r ty 's  parliam entary spokesman.
61: In the June 1985 e lec tio n  PASOK po lled  45.58% of the vote and 
secured 161 parliam entary se a ts , whereas ND polled  40.85% for 126 se a ts . 
For d e ta i l s ,  see  Stephanopoulos C ., For an Open S o c ie ty , A thens: 
Efcopteia Pub lica tions, 1986 (in  Greek), and p a r tic u la r ly  Part I ,  "Why we 
have le f t  New Democracy", where the founding declara tion  of DIANA is  
a lso  given on pp. 11-59.
62: Three of them l e f t  DIANA again  and re tu rn ed  to  ND two years 
la te r .
63: See Stephanopoulos C ., op. c i t . , pp. 13-4.
64: Ib id , p. 18.
65: Ib id , pp. 45-56.
66: In 1981, a f te r  ND had lo s t the e le c tio n , R a llis  resigned as party  
le a d e r and A vero ff was e le c te d  to  th e  p o s i t io n  by th e  p a r t y 's  
parliam entary group, receiv ing  67 votes; Stephanopoulos and Boutos, who 
had also  contested th is  e lec tio n , received 37 and 12 votes respec tive ly . 
In 1984, th e re  was ano ther in t r a - p a r ty  e le c t io n  fo r the le a d e rsh ip , 
fought out between M itsotakis (who was f in a lly  e lected  with 71 votes) 
and Stephanopoulos (40 vo tes).
67: That th is  was indeed the case is  corroborated by the fac t tha t 
two of the MPs who joined DIANA had been parliam entary candidates of the 
u ltra - r ig h t ro y a lis t  reactionary  National Front in 1977, so would hardly 
id e n tify  w ith  the  renew al, m odern isation  and p rog ress DIANA declared 
i t s e l f  in favour o f. Moreover, th ree  o ther MPs who had joined DIANA le f t  
i t  again two years la te r  to  re tu rn  to ND: the time was coming fo r new 
elections and they wanted to  ensure th e ir  re tu rn  to  parliam ent.
68: In June 1989, Stephanopoulos topped the  vo te  in  the  Second 
D i s t r i c t  o f A thens, and DIANA secu red  one s e a t  in  th e  European 
P arliam en t as w e l l .  The p a r ty  d id  no t c o n te s t  th e  November 1989 
e le c tio n . In th a t  o f A pril 1990, i t  had one deputy e le c te d  in  the  
D is tr ic t of A ttik i (in  the Athens suburban a re a ), who la te r  joined New 
Democracy.
69: The PASOK organ isation  has often  been plagued by in te rnal turmoil 
and d is tre s s ;  fo r the ea rly  c r ise s  in 1975, see L yrin tzis C ., Between 
Socialism and Populism: . ♦ ♦, op. c i t . , pp. 148-98. What is  most s tr ik in g  
in PASOK's case is  the le a d e r 's  charisma and the powers vested in him, 
as well as the s tre n g th  and importance of the  p a r ty 's  o rg a n isa tio n : 
nobody vfrio has ever l e f t  PASOK managed to  get re -e lec ted . To c i te  only 
two recent examples; in the afterm ath of the 1985 e lec tion  two prominent
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PASOK p o l i t i c ia n s ,  G. A rsen is and A. T r i t s i s ,  both of whom had held  
governmental p o sts  in the  p a s t ,  were expelled  from the p a rty  fo r 
d iffe ren t reasons. They both founded new p a rtie s  to contest the 1989 
e lec tio n , the former leading the Greek S o c ia lis t Party (ESK) and the 
l a t t e r  the Greek Radical Movement (ERK). They both met w ith e lec to ra l 
f ia s c o . A fte r th e i r  d e fe a t, A rsen is re tu rn ed  to  PASOK and T r i t s i s  
succeeded in  g e tt in g  e le c te d  as C ity  Mayor of Athens w ith  the f u l l  
support of New Democracy.
70: That declara tion  is  given in Appendix V of th is  study.
71: The ND party  s ta tu te s , lik e  those of PASOK, do not allow the 
establishm ent and operating of fac tio n s . At the second Congress of ND's 
youth o rg an isa tio n  (ONNED) a r e s o lu tio n  was proposed by some of i t s  
members concerning the recognition and in s titu t io n a lis a t io n  of factions 
w ithin ONNED? the m ajority  of the congress p a rtic ip an ts  re je c ted  i t .  See 
Vamvakaris T ., "The lo s t chance", in the weekly review P o litik a  Themata, 
no. 857, 17 January 1992, p. 36. Nevertheless, the L iberal Forum was 
given verbal reco g n itio n  as a  fa c tio n  by the  ND lead er and prime 
m in ister, in a speech he adressed to parliam ent on 20 March 1992; i t  has 
yet to be so recognised by the o f f ic ia l  party  organisation .
72: See A n d ria n o p o u lo s1 in te r v ie w  w ith  th e  d a i l y  new spaper 
Kathim erini, 29 March 1992, p. 4. Andrianopoulos w itting ly  uses the more 
neutral term "tendency" instead of the term "faction", since the l a t t e r ,  
bearing  conno ta tions of fu tu re  d e fe c tio n  and c re a tio n  of a s p l in te r  
party , might provoke troublesome c r it ic ism  and ring  the alarm in the ND 
par ty-mechani sm.
73: See Kathim erini, 9 February 1992, p. 2.
74: See Kathim erini, 23 February 1992, p. 7.
75: See V a r v i t s i o t i s ' in te r v ie w  w ith  th e  d a i l y  new spaper
E lefthero typ ia , 20 December 1987, pp. 6-7; see a lso  M. E v ert's  interview  
with the weekly Epsilon, no. 59, 31 May 1992, pp. 36-41. As Bakoyiannis 
P ., The Anatomy of Greek P o l i t ic s , op. c i t . , p. 125, claim s,
"Ever s in c e  th e  e a r ly  y e a rs  a f t e r  th e  November 1974 
e lec tio n , two tendencies could be id en tified  w ithin ND’s 
parliam entary group: one con stitu ted  by the old ERE-party 
members, and the o ther by the newcomers".
According to another prominent ND member,
"There e x is t tendencies w ithin the ND ra n k s ... I believe 
th a t our p a rty  must not only  to le r a te ,  but take f u l l  
advantage of them".
See Kondoyiannopoulos' interview  with the daily  newspaper Ethnos, 27 
February 1990, p. 10. I t  i s  worth m entioning th a t a l l  th ese  lead ing  
members, who have acknowledged the existence of tendencies w ithin ND and 
favour th e ir  in s t i tu t io n a lis a t io n  and functioning w ithin the p a rty , did 
so only a f te r  Karamanlis withdrew from the p a rty  lead ersh ip  fo r  the 
Presidency of the Republic in May 1980.
76: See Varvi t s i o t  i s ' in te rv iew , op. c i t .  Another prom inent ND 
member, M. Evert, declares:
"I believe in Karamanliism, which does not only c o n s titu te
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a sim ple  p o l i t i c a l  o r id e o lo g ic a l  s ta n c e  bu t a ls o  a 
c e rta in  way of p o l i t ic a l  thought and action".
See Evert M., Nationa 1 Choices, Athens: a u th o r 's  publication , 1986 (in 
Greek), p. 13.
77: See ND: Ideological P rin c ip les-P a rtv  S ta tu te s , 1979, op. c i t ♦, p. 
12, and Appendix IV of th is  study, where a  tran s la ted  version of the 
p a rty 's  six  ideological p rin c ip le s  is  given (see a lso  Clogg R ., P a rtie s  
and Elections in Greece: The Search fo r Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & 
Co., 1987, pp. 225-8, where the author p resen ts a shortened and amended 
version of the o f f ic ia l  English tra n s la tio n  of Karananlis' whole speech 
in the f i r s t  congress of ND). I t  is  worth noting that ND's ideological 
p r in c ip le s  have f i r s t  p lace  ( ib id , pp. 7 -14), follow ed by the  p a rty  
s ta tu te s  (pp. 17-30). The same procedure was adhered to  a t  the second 
p a rty  congress in Salon ica  in  1986, when the  id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s  
underwent some change (a tra n s la te d  version of the l a t t e r  is  given in 
Appendix V I). We sh a ll  concern o u rse lv es  in much d e ta i l  w ith  th ese  
m atters in ch. 5, where we examine the p a r ty 's  ideology.
78: See L iapis M., For a Radical Renewal, Athens: E stia , 1987 (in  
Greek), p. 190; see a lso  Papaligouras A., Arguments of Doubt, Athens: 
Odysseas, 1986 (in  Greek), pp. 18-9. L iapis and Papaligouras a re  both ND 
MPs; the former is  C. Karamanlis' nephew and the l a t t e r  is  the son of P. 
Papaligouras, former ERE and ND MP, one o f the c lo s e s t  K aram anlis' 
colleagues.
79: There are  repo rts  concerning many such p o lit ic ia n s  in the d a ily  
press of the time. For a d e ta ile d  and we 11-documented p resen ta tion , see 
especially  To Pondiki, 16 June 1989 and Ta Nea, 23 May 1989, and 31 
October 1989.
80: See fo r exanple footnote 20 above.
81: As M itso tak is  h im self has d e c la re d , "I was, I  am, and I w ill  
always be a 1 ib e ra l". See New Democracy: A Liberal Leader, a Liberal 
Policy- Programme, Athens: ND Publication , 1985 (in  Greek), p. 3.
82: In 1976 the Centre fo r P o li t ic a l  Research and Information (KPEE) 
was created which, though not d ire c tly  re la te d  to New Democracy, mainly 
served as a think-tank and as a mechanism producing ideology for the 
party . The Centre’s id e n tity , operation , and influence, as well as the 
p o l i t i c a l  review  E piken tra  i t  p u b lish e s , w ill  be d iscussed  in ch. 5 
below.
83: Advocation and dissem ination of the so -called  neo -libera l ideas 
has provoked se r io u s  c r i t i c i s m  in s id e  th e  p a r ty ,  m ain ly  from i t s  
Karamanliist p o lit ic ia n s . M. L iapis w rites , "Neo-1 iberal ism, as well as 
any other ideological o ffshoot, . . .  l ie s  outside our o f f ic ia l  and firm  
id e o lo g ic a l l in e " ;  o p . c i t . , p . 191. A. P a p a lig o u ra s  adds, "The 
overwhelming m ajority  of our supporters remains loyal to  the founding 
declaration  of ND, and re je c ts  the inported neo-1 ib e ra lis t  jargon"; op. 
c i t . , p. 27. And a few days befo re  the  second ND congress (held  in 
Salonica, 14-16 February 1986), Paleokrasas warned:
" . . . a  congress's decision concerning ideological issues is  
out of the question. A p a r ty 's  ideology is  always s tab le  
and in d e l ib ly  woven w ith  i t s  v e ry  e x is te n c e . I f  th e  
c o n g re ss 's  m a jo rity  w ill  demand changes concerning ND's 
ideology, then i t  is  not ideology th a t w ill change but the
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party  i t s e l f ,  including i t s  name. I f ,  on the o ther hand, 
the congress 's m inority  w ill not agree with c e rta in  ND's 
ideological p r in c ip le s , then they should them selves move 
to  some other pa rty , i f  they so wish".
See h is  interview  with the d a ily  newspaper Mesimvrini, 21 January 1986,
p. 12.
84: At th is  point we should only b r ie f ly  re fe r  to  another sp lin te r  
party  tha t has been founded very recen tly , so i t  is  yet too risk y  to  try  
and  p r e s e n t  i t s  e x a c t  i d e n t i t y ,  i t s  i d e o l o g i c a l  and  o th e r  
c h a ra c te r is tic s  and e sp ec ia lly  i t s  fu tu re  course. The sp lin te r  party  of 
P o litic a l Spring {Poli t ik i  Anoixi, POLAN) was founded by A. Samaras, an 
ND deputy in the Department of M essinia, Peloponnese, since 1977 and 
fo re ign  m in is te r  in ND's post-1990 government. Due to a disagreement 
with the prime m in ister over the coun try 's  p o lic ie s  and re la tio n s  with 
the  Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Samaras —who kept an 
u l tra -n a t io n a l is t ic  stance— was dismissed on 23 April 1992. In October 
he resigned h is  parliam entary sea t and on 30 June 1993 he founded h is  
new party  and presented i t s  p o l i t ic a l  and ideological p rin c ip le s  a lb e it  
in a very general and vague manner (see POLAN's founding declara tion  in 
the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 1 Ju ly  1993, in Greek, pp. 6-7); the 
very next day another ND MP resigned in order to  jo in  the new p arty ; and 
two weeks la te r  A. Lendakis, an EDA member and deputy e lec ted  under the 
banner of the C oalition  of the Left and Progress (SYN, see below, ch. 5, 
sec tio n  5.1) a ls o  res igned  h is  p a rliam en ta ry  se a t to  jo in  POLAN. Tn 
early  September, two more ND deputies dec Jared th e ir  independency and 
joined POLAN; ND was le f t  w ith 150 MPs in parliam ent and p arty  leader 
M itsotakis asked fo r early  e lec tio n s  which were scheduled fo r October 
10, 1993 (fo r  th e i r  r e s u l t ,  see fo o tn o te  130 to  ch. 5 ). As regards 
POLAN, the only comrvent we can now make is  tha t although Samaras spoke 
o f " t r a n s g re s s io n " ,  o f a b reak  w ith  p e r s o n a l i s t i c  p o l i t i c s  and 
paleokommatismos in  g e n e ra l ,  he i n i t i a l l y  p ro je c te d  n a t io n a l i s t i c  
slogans; he him self created  a party  much in the same mould as i t  was the 
case in the p ast; and i t  was only post festum  th a t he t r ie d  to  v est h is  
a tte rp t  with an ideological cloak, no m atter how vague and oblique the 
la t te r  proved to  be.
85: As a ND 1986 cen tra l conmittee ex-member, N. D elipetros, has put
i t ,
"T oday 's l i b e r a l  dem o cra tic  camp r e p re s e n ts  a wide 
spectrum  of the  p o p u la tio n , from the o ld  r o y a l i s t s  to  
those who stand  somewhere near the  id eo lo g ica l borders 
with the L eft".
See P o litik a  Themata, no. 718, 20 January 1989, p . 9.
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CHAPTER FOUR
1: See L yrin tzis C ., Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the 
Panhellenic S o c ia lis t Movement, Ph.D th e s is , U niversity of London, LSE, 
November 1983, p. 194. (H enceforth, a l l  q u o ta tio n s  a re  in  our own 
tran s la tio n  from the o rig in a l Greek, unless otherwise s ta te d ) .
2: T his was o f f i c i a l l y  re c o g n ise d  by ND d i r e c to r - g e n e r a l  G. 
M issa ilid is  a t the prelim inary congress in 1977; see h is  speech "The 
party  organisation , way of functioning, headquarters' repo rt and fu tu re  
ob jec tives", in 1st Prelim inary Congress of the Party: M inutes, vols 
A'+Bf , C h a lk id ik i, 2-4 A pril 1977 (in  Greek), ND P u b lic a tio n , p . 30 
(hereafter 1977 Prelim inary Congress) .
3: As Paraskevopoulos P. observes, with reference to  the 1955-1963 
years:
"Karaman1iism  was th e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n tin u a t io n  o f th e  
v i c to r s  in  th e  c i v i l  war. C. K aram anlis founded a 
c e n tra l is e d , a u th o r i ta r ia n  and one-party  s t a te  of the  
Right on the ideological p rin c ip les  of anti-cannunism. His 
anti-ccfrmunism played in to  the hands of the p a ra -s ta te  of 
the u ltra -R igh t. When he rea lized  th is , i t  was re a lly  too 
la te . His disentanglement frcm the p a ra -s ta te  networks was 
accompanied by h is  complete p o l i t ic a l  defeat".
See h is  Karamanlis between 1974 and 1985, Athens: F y trak is , 1991 (in 
Greek), p. 5.
4: For a d e ta ile d  account of h is  a c tio n s  during  th a t  tim e see 
Tzermias P ., The Karamanlis of the A n ti-d ic ta to ria l S trugg le , Athens: 
Roes, 1984 (in Greek). I t  is  worth mentioning th a t in the course of the 
seven-year d ic ta to r s h ip  he expressed  h is  opin ion  p u b lic ly  only  f iv e  
times.
5: Ib id , p. 118.
6: Ib id , p. 35; see a lso  Woodhouse C. M., Karamanlis: R estorer of 
Greek Democracy, Athens: Morphotiki E stia , 1982 (in  Greek), p. 284.
7: See Katsoudas D ., "The ND congress and the Greek opposition: Sane 
useful conclusions", in the then bimonthly review Epikentra, no. 8, May- 
June 1979, pp. 50-5, (in  Greek).
8: Ib id , p. 54.
9: See Woodhouse C. M., op. c i t . , p. 291.
10: The d i f f i c u l t i e s  th e  Greek p rem ier met w ith  d u r in g  th e  
negotiations for the coun try 's  entry  in to  the EEC, were not noted a t 
that time. For a most recent p resen ta tion  of some of the l a t t e r ,  see the 
a r t ic le  "The sick man of Europe", in The Economist, vo l. 323, no. 7758, 
May 9 th -15 th , 1992, pp. 27-8; see a lso  T sardan id is C ., "The fo re ig n  
policy of ND, 1974-1981", in Nea Koinonioloqia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in 
Greek), pp. 120-31, and Verney S ., "Greece and the European Ccmnunity", 
in F eatherstone  K. and Katsoudas D. K. (ed s), P o l i t ic a l  Change in 
Greece: Before and A fter The Colonels, London and Sydney*. Croon Helm, 
1987, pp. 253-70.
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11: See R a l l i s  G ., P o l i t i c a l  C o n fe ss io n s : 1950-1989, A thens: 
Proskinio, 1990 (in  Greek), p. 204.
12: See Tzermias P ., op. c i t . , p. 24.
13: See K atsoudas D. K. , "The c o n s e rv a t iv e  movement and New 
Democracy: From past to  p resen t" , in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. 
(eds), op. c i t . , pp. 85-111.
14: C ited  in Bakoyiannis P ., Anatomy of Greek P o l i t i c s , Athens:
Papazissis, 1977 (in  Greek), p. 130.
15: I b i d , p . 131. The ND d i r e c to r - g e n e r a l  has c h a r a c te r i s e d  
Karamanlis as the "big boss" and "unique leader"; see M issa ilid is  G ., 
"The party  o rg a n is a tio n ..." , op. c i t . , p. 36.
16: See C. Karamanlis' Speeches and Statem ents, Ju ly  1974-May 1976, 
ND Publication (in  Greek), p. 166.
17: Although according to  Tzermias P . , [see h is  The P o li t ic a l  Thought 
of C. Karamanlis, Athens: E llin ik i Evroekdotiki, 1990 (in  Greek), pp.
15-30], the  r e je c t io n  of m essianism  l i e s  a t  the  ro o t of K aram anlis1
p o lit ic a l  thought, but th is  may be so only th e o re tic a lly . In p rac tic e , 
the reverse may be sa id  to  be tru e . In h is  e lec tio n  adress to the people 
of Athens on 15 November 1974, Karamanlis c le a r ly  s ta ted : " ...y o u  ca lled  
me h e re .. .  to  save the country". See a lso  footnote 25 to  ch. 2.
18: As Karamanlis sa id  on 12 June 1975, in a message to  the Greek 
people:
"However, beyond financ ia l p r io r i t i e s ,  Greece's immediate 
e n try  in to  th e  EEC i s  d i c t a t e d  by p o l i t i c a l ,  n o t to  
m ention n a tio n a l  n e c e s s i ty .  Because i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  
Greece, becoming an EEC member, re in fo rc e s  i t s  n a tio n a l 
sovereignty and safeguards i t s  democratic in s titu t io n s " .
See C. Karamanlis' Speeches and Statem ents, op. c i t . , pp. 299-300.
19: See M issa ilid is  G ., "The party  o rg a n is a tio n ..." , op. c i t . , p. 31, 
where he w rites:
"During th is  f i r s t  o rganisational period, the leader with 
h is  colleagues in stru c ted  and supervised the party  organs, 
determined th e ir  membership, th e ir  functioning, th e ir  area 
o r se c to r  of r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  t h e i r  ways and methods of 
a c tio n " .
20: These six  p rin c ip le s  a re  presented in Appendix IV of th is  study
(see a lso  footnote 77 to ch. 3); fo r a p resen ta tion  and analysis  of ND's
ideology in general, see below, ch. 5.
21: See 1977 P re lim in a ry  C o n g ress , o p . c i t . , pp . 22-3 , where 
Karamanlis adds:
" In  G r e e c e . . .  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  have  a lw ays been  
p e rso n a lis tic  and sh o r t- l iv e d . Not because th e i r  lead ers  
w ish e d  i t  s o ,  b u t  b e c a u s e  a p a r t y ' s  d e m o c r a t ic  
organisation is ,  ob jec tive ly , d i f f ic u l t  to  re a liz e  in our 
country. This in turn is  due to the fac t th a t, on the one
hand, we lack the appropriate tra d itio n  and, on the o ther,
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b e c a u se  th e  G reek tem peram ent does no t i n c l i n e  to  
c o lle c t iv e  e f f o r t s . . .  T herefo re , we w ill  have to  change 
our p o l i t i c a l  m en ta lity  i f  we r e a l ly  want dem ocratically 
o rgan ised  p a r t i e s  in  our c o u n try , p a r t i e s  which w i l l  
secure  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  as w ell as normal p o l i t i c a l  
developments".
22: See the statement by Dr. C. Zarkadas (he was a prominent member
of the Volvi Movement and ex-president of ND’s departmental corrmittee in 
K aterin i, Department of Imathia) in the d a ily  newspaper To Vima, 9 March 
1978, where he says:
"I re s ig n e d  when I was conv inced  th a t  the  so much 
advertised  ND's democratic organ isation  was only a smoke­
sc re e n , which se rv ed  u n id e n t i f i e d  e x p e d ie n c ie s ; th e  
p a r ty 's  d em o cra tic  o rg a n is a t io n  proved  im p o ssib le  to  
c rea te  from above".
23: See the newspaper To Vima, 3 March 1978.
24: This decision provoked c ritic ism  frcm seme party  members because, 
as they saw i t ,  i f  Karamanlis re a lly  cared about in tra -p a rty  democracy, 
he would have c a lle d  the  congress immediately a f te r  the  p re lim in a ry  
congress in 1977, and in th a t case there  would be su ff ic ie n t time for 
i t s  proper p reparation; see Papoutsakis C ., "ND's f i r s t  congress: The 
contradictions of a modernisation", in the p o l i t ic a l  review A n ti, Period 
B ', no. 125, 12 May 1979 (in  Greek), pp. 13-7.
25: See Katsoudas D. K ., "The conservative movement...", op. c i t . , p.
94.
26: See S tra tig is  S. (at the time a member of ND's adm in istra tive  
committee), "The ND s ta tu te s :  Democratic procedures w ithin the party" , 
in Epikentra, no. 8, May-June 1979 (in  Greek), p. 42.
27: I t  is  worth mentioning that although PASOK had developed a very 
w ell-struc tu red  organisation  much e a r l ie r ,  uncornparable by any standards 
to  ND's o n e , i t  d id  n o t h o ld  i t s  f i r s t  c o n g re s s  u n t i l  1984. 
Nevertheless, ND followed the general trend as th is  is  described by Karl 
von Beyme:
"O nly  r a r e l y  — one c a s e  was F ra n c e  d u r in g  th e  
Restoration— have Conservative p a r tie s  been the f i r s t  to 
emerge w ith a reco g n isab le  o rg an isa tio n . Generally, they 
have been the second party  to develop, the organisational 
response to  the  challenge  of L ibera lism  and Radicalism . 
Conservatism is  a movement to  defend positions which are 
th rea ten ed  or —as in  the French R evolution— a lread y  
lo s t" .  More s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  "In the  Federal Republic of 
Germany the  C h r is tia n  Democrats only developed in to  a 
membership p a rty  in  o p p o sitio n , when they were not in a 
p o s it io n  to  a l lo c a te  o f f ic e s  on the  n a tio n a l le v e l.  In 
I ta ly  the Democrazia C ristiana  has always p a rtic ip a ted  in 
th e  governm ent, bu t i t  had i t s  g r e a te s t  re c ru itm e n t 
successes in  1969/70, during  the  'h o t autum n', when i t s  
position  in the system appeared to  be in jeopardy ..."  (in  
English o r ig in a lly ) .
See von Beyme K ., P o lit ic a l  P a rtie s  in Western Democracies, New York: 
St. M artin 's Press, 1985, p. 46 and pp. 173-4.
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28: See S tra tig is  S ., op- c i t . , p. 41, who argues th a t the ro le  and 
importance of these p rin c ip le s  had been r ig h tly  ignored by the public a t 
that time, since pre-coup p a r tie s  a lso  had th e ir  organisational charters  
that always remained a dead le t t e r .
29: There is  no concrete information on the exact number and id en tity  
of the members of th is  corm ittee. However, i t  was presided over by two 
ND adm in istra tive-com m ittee  members (T. Louis and S. S tr a t ig is ) ,  who 
were a lso  lead ing  f ig u re s  of the  Centre fo r  P o l i t ic a l  Research and 
Inform ation (KPEE), the  l a t t e r  se rv ing  as a th in k -tan k  and as an 
apparatus for ideological propaganda for ND, though not d ire c tly  re la te d  
to the l a t te r ;  fo r d e ta ils  about th is  Centre, see ch. 5 below.
30: On the f i r s t  c h a rte r , remarks and amendmends proposed by ND's 
departm ental com m ittees, and fo r  i t s  f in a l  adopted version , see 1977 
Preliminary Congress, op. c i t . , pp. 77-103.
31: On katharevousa and denotiki (the popular, liv in g  language), as 
well as th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  e f f e c ts  and im p lica tio n s , see M ouzelis N ., 
Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1978, ch. 
8 , "On G reek  f o rm a l is m : P o l i t i c a l  and  c u l t u r a l  a s p e c t s  o f 
underdevelopment", pp. 134-48.
32: For example, the  terms "general assembly" and "a d m in is tra tiv e  
committee" a re  meant to  denote the p a rty  congress and the  c e n tra l  
ccmnittee respective ly .
33: See A rtic le  4.1a in 1977 Preliminary Congress, op. c i t . , p. 98.
34: A photocopy of ND's b a l lo t  paper fo r the  Second D is t r ic t  of 
Athens in  th e  1977 e le c t io n  i s  p re s e n te d  in  Appendix I l a ,  w ith  
Karamanlis' photograph se rv in g  as the  p a r ty 's  emblem. The new emblem 
(see Appendix l ib )  proposed by the f i r s t  ch arte r consisted  of a c irc le  
containing the cap ita l le t te r s  "ND" (standing fo r New Democracy) with a 
flaming torch between them.
35: See 1977 Prelim inary Congress, op. c i t . , pp. 78-80.
36: They were a sk in g  th e  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  to  e n t r u s t  lo c a l 
o rg an isa tio n s  and departm ental committees w ith  g re a te r  r ig h ts  and 
respons i b i l i t i e s .
37: Amendments here aimed a t  a g rea ter rep resen ta tion  on ND's highest 
committee of party  members from the provinces.
38: According to the proposed ch arte r, the party  parliam entarians, 
former and a c t iv e , were r a th e r  o v e r-rep resen ted  in r e la t io n  to  non­
p a r l i a m e n ta r ia n s ;  th e  amendments so u g h t th e  l a t t e r s '  b e t t e r  
represen tation  on the p a r ty 's  highest organ.
39: See S tra tig is  S ., op. c i t . , p. 43. Nonetheless, not one w ritten  
amendment was proposed on the party  le a d e r 's  power p o sitio n , nomination, 
e lec tio n , e tc . ;  see 1977 Prelim inary Congress, op. c i t . , p. 85.
40: See Loulis J . C ., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", 
in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece a t the P o lls: The National E lection of 
1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American E nterprise  In s t i tu te  fo r 
Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 72.
41: Ib id , p. 73, where he w rites:
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"E fforts to preserve such re la tio n sh ip s  ac tua lly  led seme 
MPs to  oppose the expansion of the party  organisations in 
t h e i r  e le c to r a l  d i s t r i c t s ,  in  th e  hope of r e t a in in g  
personal co n tro l over co n tac ts  w ith  p ro sp ec tiv e  v o te rs"
(in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
For additional evidence on such p rac tices  see a lso  section  4 in ch. 6 
below and footnote 81 to  th a t same chapter.
42: Ib id , p. 73.
43: As C. Stephanopoulos, a t  the  time p re s id e n t of the  S ta tu te s ' 
E laboration  Committee, d ec la red ; see New Democracy: F i r s t  Congress, 
M inutes, C h a lk id ik i, 5-7 May 1979 (in  Greek), ND P u b lic a tio n , p . 91 
(hereafter 1979 Congress) .
44: This point w ill  become more ev iden t in  the  fo llow ing c h ap te r, 
where we sh a ll examine the p a r ty 's  ideology. Suffice i t  to  mention here 
th a t, due to  several o f f ic ia l  party  statem ents concerning ideological 
issues, one was l e f t  with the impression th a t ND was standing over and
above p a rty  p o l i t i c s ,  s in c e  i t  o f te n  id e n t i f i e d  i t s  narrow  p a r ty
in te re s ts  w ith the broader national ones. As von Beyme K ., op. c i t . , p. 
13, observes,
" . . . t h e  very word 'p a r ty ',  deriv ing  from the Latin pars, 
o r 'p a r t ' ,  suggests th a t  a dem ocratic p a rty  can never 
claim to  represent the whole, however much i t  may s tre s s  
the general in te re s t in i t s  propaganda or even develop a 
ten d e n cy  to  se e  i t s e l f  a s  th e  'n a t u r a l  p a r ty  o f 
government'" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
45: See Id e o lo g ic a l  P r in c ip le s  and P a r ty  S t a t u t e s , A thens: ND 
publication , June 1979 (in  Greek), p. 20, A rtic le  4.2 (h ereafte r 1979 
S ta tu te s ) .
46: Ib id , pp. 18-9, A rtic le  3.1.
47: Ib id , pp. 19-20, A rtic le  4.1 and 2.
48: Ib id , pp. 22-5, A r t ic le s  7 and 8. Conversely, in the  PASOK 
s ta tu te s  i t  is  s ta ted  unequivocally th a t "The cen tra l ccnm ttee  is  the 
movement’s h ig h es t organ between c o n g re sse s ..." . See PASOK's s ta tu te s  
(A rticle  61), c ite d  in Bakoyiannis P ., op. c i t . , pp. 323-39.
49: According to  A rtic le  7.2 of the 1979 party  s ta tu te s  (see 1979 
S ta tu te s , op. c i t . , p. 22), a l l  the afore-mentioned members p a r tic ip a te
on the adm inistrative committee ex of f i c io.
50: Ibid , A rtic le  8 .3 , pp. 24-5.
51: Ibid , A rtic le  12.1, p. 27.
52: Ibid, A rtic les  7.6 and 8.1, pp. 23 and 24 respective ly
53: Ib id , A rtic le  11, pp. 26-7.
54: Ibid, A rtic le  11.3 and 4, p.. 27.
55: Ibid , A rtic le  5.2, p. 21.
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56: Ib id . A rtic le  37 of the C onstitu tion  re fe rs  to the formation of a 
government and the duties of the President of the Republic. However, in 
the fourth  paragraph of th is  A rtic le , there  is  a d irec t reference to  the 
procedures fo r leadership of a  party : " . . . i f  the party  has no leader or 
rep resen ta tive , or i f  the p a r ty 's  leader or represen ta tive  has not been 
e lected  to  parliam ent, the President of the Republic gives the mandate 
to  the person proposed to  him by the p a r ty 's  parliam entary g ro u p ..." . 
See The C o n s titu tio n  of G reece, Athens: Pondiki P u b lic a tio n s , 7th 
Edition, 1987 (in  Greek), p. 75.
57: See 1979 S ta tu te s , op. c i t . . A rtic le  17, p. 30.
58: Ib id , A rtic le  6, pp. 21-2. According to  th is  A rtic le , the v ice - 
p re s id e n t should not be a member of government when the  p a rty  i s  in 
o ff ice . As C. Stephanopoulos had argued, by having a v ice-p residen t, New 
Democracy tr ie d  to follcw the West-European trend, as th is  m anifests in 
the German Social Democratic P arty  (SPD), and the I t a l i a n  C h ris tia n  
Democratic Party (DC), where the prem iership and the party  presidency 
are  not held by the same person; and he has s ta te d  that
" . . . t h e  [ND] party  needs a v ice -p residen t, a p restig ious 
member of i t s  pa rliam en tary  group, f re e  of governmental 
b u rd e n s , to  d e v o te  h im s e lf  w h o le h e a r te d ly  to  th e  
development of the p a r ty 's  organ isation".
See 1979 C o n g ress , o p . c i t . , pp. 92-3 . N e v e r th e le s s , the  v ic e -  
p res id en tia l p osition  remained vacant a t  a l l  times.
59: I b id , p . 11. There was, however, c r i t ic is m  concerning the 
e lec tion  of c e r ta in  p a rty  d e le g a te s , because in some departm ents the 
local deputies had crudely in te rfe red  to  ensure the e lec tio n  of th e ir  
personal prot&g&s; see Papoutsakis C ., op. c i t . , p. 16.
60: See M is s a il id is  G. (ND d ire c to r -g e n e ra l) ,  "ND h ead q u a rte rs ' 
report and suggestions on organisational issues", in 1979 Congress, op. 
c i t . , p. 36. For a comprehensive p re se n ta tio n  of ND's —as well as 
ONNED's— membership (and r a t io  between members and voters) since i t s  
c reation , see Appendix I I I .
61: See Katsoudas D. K ., "The conservative movement...", op. c i t . , p. 
99, where he observes:
"Whatever the shortcom ings, the  f i r s t  ND congress was a 
h i s to r ic  occasion fo r i t  was the f i r s t  (and dem ocratic) 
congress ever of a Greek non-conmunist party" (in English 
o r ig in a lly ) .
I t  should a lso  be noted that the actual organisation of the Chalkidiki 
congress was e n tru s te d , not to  p a rty  o f f i c i a l s ,  but to p ro fess io n a l 
conference organisers; see Clogg R ., P a rtie s  and Elections in Greece: 
The Search for Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987, p. 161.
62: The overwhelming m ajority  of ND supporters (contrary to the case 
with PASOK), must be considered as having been to ta l ly  unfam iliar with 
these issues of p o l it ic a l  behaviour, since th e ir  only chance of ge tting  
together informally was a t  p re -e lec to ra l party  demonst ra t  ions.
63: For more d e ta i l s  on th is  e le c t io n , see R a ll is  G. , Hours of 
R esponsib ility , Athens: Evroekdotiki, 1983 (in  Greek), pp. 7-15.
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64: During th is  tim e, 14 reg io n a l congresses were h e ld . The most 
im portant was a sp e c ia l ad-hoc congress he ld  in Athens (27-28 June 
1981), four months before the general e lec tio n ; i t  was meant to serve 
mainly as a u n ify in g  fa c to r  fo r  ND members and su p p o rte rs , sh o r tly  
before the e le c to ra l f ig h t. For a b r ie f  account on th is  event, and fo r a 
p re se n ta tio n  of th e  most im p o rtan t speeches a d re sse d  to  th e  1250 
p a rtic ip a tin g  delegates, see the newspaper Vradini (daily  a t  tha t tim e), 
29 June 1981 (in  Greek), pp. 5-7.
65: See Katsoudas D. K ., "The conservative movement. . . " ,  op. c i t . , p. 
1 0 0 .
66: See Diamandakos P . ,  From the  Centre Union to  New Democracy, 
Athens: E llin ik i Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in  Greek), pp. 155-6.
67: Ib id , pp. 112-7.
68: On 7 December 1981, R a llis  asked ND's deputies to  reconfirm th e ir  
t r u s t  in him by a vo te  of confidence. Out of 112 d e p u tie s , 61 voted 
a g a in s t, 41 fo r ,  n ine  c a s t  b lanks and one vo te  was in v a lid . R a ll is  
resigned and on 9 December E. Averoff, C. Stephanopoulos and J . Boutos 
contested the e lec tio n  fo r the new party  leader: Averoff was given 67 
votes, Stephanopoulos 32, and Boutos 12.
69: As he b i t t e r ly  declared a f te r  he had lo s t the vote of confidence:
"I was r ig h t  to  ask fo r  i t .  Now, they [the ND depu ties] 
w ill do well to find  a new leader th a t su its  them b e tte r" .
See the d a ily  newspaper Ethnos, 8 December 1981 (in Greek), p. 12, and 
a lso  R a llis  G ., P o li t ic a l  Confessions: 1950-1989, op. c i t . , pp. 277-89.
70: See G. Voukelatos1 interview  with Ethnos, 3 November 1981, pp.
16-7. As D. Papaspyrou, former Speaker of Parliament, has put i t ,
"There was no com m unication w ith  th e  p a r ty  b a s e . . .  I 
believe tha t we were not a l l  system atically  organised —in 
con trast to PASOK".
See h is  interview  with Ethnos, 26 October 1981, pp. 12-3; and according 
to the ex-Secretary of Shipping and Trade, J .  F ik io ris ,
" ...a lth o u g h  ND has developed i t s  democratic organisation 
by tak in g  more w orthw hile and rem arkable s tep s  than any 
o th e r p a r ty , i t  has not managed to  e s ta b l is h  a proper 
conrrnunication w ith the party  base".
See h is  interview  with Ethnos, 31 October 1981, pp. 12-3 (a ll  in Greek).
71: See Diamandakos P ., op. c i t . , p. 156; a lso  G. S tephanakis ' 
interview with Ethnos, 2 November 1981, pp. 12-3, where he sta ted :
"Although New Democracy was a bourgeois party  in which the 
parliam entary group played the dominant ro le , i t  e lected  
d e le g a te s  and o rgans to  i t s  c o n g re ss  which, in  tu rn , 
e lected  an adm in istra tive  c a im itte e ... but the la t t e r  has 
only acted as a rubber-stamp o rg a n ..." .
72: See G. V oukelatos' in te rv iew  w ith  E thnos, 3 November 1981,
o p .c i t . , pp. 16-7.
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73: See R a l l i s  G ., Hours o f  R e s p o n s ib i l i ty , op. c i t . , pp. 116-7.
74: See for example footnote 28 to  ch. 1.
75: See R a llis  G ., Hours of R esponsib ility , op. c i t . , p. 143.
76: See (parts of) A veroff’s speech addressed to the adm inistrative 
committee on 16 December 1983, as published in Ethnos, 17 December 1983.
77: According to K. Bourdara, a prominent member of th is  committee,
"ND has become th e  on ly  p a r ty  where women have an 
o rg a n isa tio n a l group of th e i r  own, and not o u ts id e  i t  
through separate  s a t e l l i t e  women's unions".
See her interview  with the weekly period ica l Eikones, no. 396, 3 June 
1992, pp. 47-8 . The o th e r  m ajor p a r ty ,  PASOK, had no women's 
o rganisation , but had created  the Women's Union of Greece (EGE), which 
was separate frcm the party  and was presided over by Papandreou's wife 
Margaret.
78: See P e r ip h e ra l  O rg a n is a tio n  R e g u la tio n  (KPO), A thens: ND 
Publication, June 1983 (in  Greek), p. 5; the f i r s t  ND's KPO, which had 
been applied u n til  then, was elaborated  by the p a rty 's  f i r s t  congress 
in May 1979.
79: The question here was: "Concerning ND's g rass-roo ts o rganisation , 
is  there, in your view, any marked d ifference  between the 1974-81 period 
(when the party  was in government) and th a t frcm 1981 u n til  today ( i .e .  
1989)? I f  yes/scme, was i t  th a t (a) during 1974-81 i t  was v ir tu a lly  non­
ex is ten t and only a f t e r  1981 became a n e c e ss ity  fo r coun terbalancing  
PASOK's power? or (b) did i t  simply became b e tte r  a f te r  1981?" For the 
reasons why the Department of L arissa had been chosen, see footnote 34 
to ch. 3.
80: See Macrides' interview  with Epikentra, no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983 
(in Greek), pp. 64-6.
81: See Katsoudas D. K ., "The conservative movement. . . " ,  op. c i t . , p. 
100. A veroff's con tribu tion  to  the developnent of ND's organisation was 
o f f ic ia l ly  acknowledged by M itsotakis him self during the second party  
congress; see h is  speech ad ressed  to  the  p a rty  d e le g a te s , in New 
Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, Thessaloniki: 14-16 February 1986 
(in Greek), ND Publication , pp. 37-8, (hereafte r 1986 Congress).
82: In the 1984 Euro-elect ion, New Democracy polled 38.05% of the 
vo te , compared to  35.86% and 31.53% in the  1981 n a tio n a l and Euro- 
e le c tio n  r e s p e c t iv e ly  ( th e  n a tio n a l  and E u ro -e le c t ions were h e ld  
sim ultaneously  in October 1981); PASOK's re sp e c tiv e  percen tages a re  
41.58% (Euro-1984), 48.06% (national 1981), and 40.29% (Euro-1981) of 
the vote.
83: See L e t's  Reconstruct Together, Athens: ND Publication, December 
1984 (in  Greek), p . 35. On 11 October 1985, four months befo re  the 
second congress, an in te rn a l  p a rty  e le c tio n  was held  fo r p o l i t i c a l -  
council membership (most of the p a r ty 's  leading deputies chose not to 
stand for i t ) ;  th is  new council comprised ex of f ic i o  the p residen t, ND's 
p a r lia m e n ta ry  spokesman (A. K an e llo p o u lo s), and the parliam en tary  
group's secretary-general (A. T sa ld a ris ), as well as six  MPs, e lected  by 
ND's parliam entary group (these were A. Samaras, J . Kefaloyiannis, N.
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K litos, S. Kouvelas, G. Sourlas, and G. T z itz ik o s ta s ) ; see the da ily  
newspaper Kathim erini, 12 October 1985. A fter ND' second congress th is  
organ was abolished; as C. M itsotakis has put i t ,
"I think th a t the ex istence of the p o l i t ic a l  council must 
be l e f t  to  the p re s id e n t 's  d isc re tio n , since we a l l  agree 
tha t i t  is  merely a consultory organ".
See h is  speech ad ressed  to  ND's parliam en ta ry  group, pub lished  in 
M esiiwrini, 6 February 1986.
84: This was e n ti t le d  "A New Proposal fo r Freedom", and a tran s la ted  
version is  given in Appendix V of th is  study.
85: In June 1985, ND po lled  40.85% of the vote and had 126 deputies 
e lected , whereas PASOK secured 45.82% of the vote and 161 parliam entary 
seats .
86: Stephanopoulos l e f t  the party  on 24 August 1985; the very same
day M itsotakis resigned, to  be re -e lec ted  five  days la te r  (82 deputies 
voted fo r  him, 37 c a s t  b lanks and one vo te  was in v a lid ) ;  when, on 6 
September 1985 Stephanopoulos announced the foundation of DIANA, nine ND 
deputies le f t  the party  to  jo in  Stephanopoulos1 sp lin te r  group.
87: See 1986 Congress, p. 13.
88: Ib id , p. 13.
89: Ib id , pp. 14-8 and a lso  newspaper V radin i, 29 January 1986, p.
16.
90: See Papoutsakis C ., op. c i t . , p. 14.
91: See 1986 Congress, pp. 156-76.
92: See the speech by A. Bratakos ("Party s ta tu te s " ) , addressed to 
the party  delegates, ib id , p. 141.
93: See in te rv iew s of Dimas S ., Papakonstantinou M., Samaras A ., 
S o u flias  G ., T z itz ik o s ta s  G. and H atzin iko laou  P. w ith  the d a ily  
newspaper M esim v rin i, 21 Jan u ary  1986, pp. 12-3 ( fo r  Dimas and 
Papakonstantinou), and 22 January 1986, pp. 12-3 (for the r e s t ) .
94: From th e  v e ry  b e g in n in g  in d e e d , se e  A r t i c l e  2: "B a s ic
o rg a n is a t io n a l  and o p e ra t io n a l  p r in c ip le s " ,  in ND: Id e o lo g ic a l  
P rincip les and Party S ta tu te s , Athens: ND Publication , 1986 (in  Greek), 
pp. 11-2 (hereafte r 1986 S ta tu te s ).
95: See Bratakos A., "Party s ta tu te s " , op. c i t . , p. 144.
96: See 1986 S ta tu te s , A rtic le  2.b, p. 12.
97: Ib id , A rtic les  7 and 8, p. 15.
98: A h e te ro c itizen  is  someone whose permanent residence is  in one 
p lace but who is  r e g is te re d  fo r vo tin g  in ano ther. (For example, 
according to the 5 April 1981 census, 3,027,331 people were liv ing  in 
the Greater Athens and Piraeus area, whereas only 1,827,430 —or ju st 
over 60%— were e n ti t le d  to  vote th e re ). Such people are  urged by a l l
the Greek p a r t ie s  to  go to  the  p lace  where they a re  re g is te re d  fo r
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voting when an e le c tio n  takes place; to  help them do th is ,  most p a rtie s  
o ffe r  financia l a id  (bus, railw ay, a irp lane  t ic k e ts , e tc . ) .  For some 
p e c u lia r  reason , n e i th e r  ND nor PASOK have ever d isc lo sed  re le v an t 
inform ation on th i s  s u b je c t ,  a lthough both p a r t ie s  consider these  
h e te ro c itiz en s ' m obilisa tion  and voting  c ruc ia l in a l l  e lec tio n s —most 
esp ec ia lly  in na tional ones— and have se t up special o ffice s  to  deal 
exclusively  with th is  issue (see a lso  Figure 4 .I I I ) .
99: See 1986 S ta tu te s , a r t i c le  9, pp. 15-6.
100: Ib id , A rtic le  10.1, p. 16.
101: 300 re p re s e n ta t iv e s  in  a l l ,  as was the  case under the 1979 
s ta tu te s . A new prov ision  —see A rtic le  10.1, I I ,  and I I I ,  ib id , pp. 
16-7— s t ip u la te s  th a t  i f  th e re  a re  one, two o r th ree  parliam en tary  
se a ts  a v a ila b le  to  a  c e r ta in  departm ent, the  re sp ec tiv e  departmental 
committee sends two, th re e  o r four d e le g a te s  re s p e c tiv e ly  ( i . e  one 
e x tra ); i f  there  a re  four, fiv e  or s ix  se a ts , the ccmnittee sends six , 
seven or eight ( i .e .  two more); and, la s t ly ,  i f  there a re  over six  sea ts  
a v a i la b le , the  commitee sends ten  o r more d e leg a tes  to  the  congress 
( i .e .  th ree more). Consequently, there is  a much higher represen tation  
o f th e  p a r t y 's  g r a s s - r o o t s  (and more g e n e r a l ly  o f th e  non­
p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s  v is - A -v is  th e  p a rlia m e n ta ria n s)  compared to  th a t 
estab lished  by the 1979 s ta tu te s .
102: Ib id , A rtic le  10. ti, 0, i ,  and ia , p. 17. According to the most 
re c e n t  d a ta  a v a i la b le  (December 1991), ND c la im s 70 departm ental 
committees throughout the  coun try , whereas a t  the time of the  1986 
congress the pa rty  had only 62 (see Appendix I I I ) .
103: Ib id , A rtic le  11, pp. 17-8.
104: Ib id , A rtic le  12, p. 18.
105: Ib id , A rtic le  16.1, p. 22.
106: Candidates fo r  the  c e n tra l  committee a re  re g is te re d  in th ree  
d i f f e r e n t  l i s t s :  th e  f i r s t  and seco n d  l i s t s  co m p rise  ND non­
parliam entarians, the former those from the Greater Athens and Piraeus 
area, and the l a t t e r  those from the provinces. The th ird  l i s t  comprises 
candidates from the p a r ty 's  parliam entary group. The f i r s t  25 members 
from each l i s t  (in  terms of preference votes) are  e lected  to the cen tra l 
conmittee; ib id . A rtic le  15, pp. 20-2.
107: I b id , A r t ic le  15.4 and 16, pp. 22-3; a l l  f iv e  members of the 
c e n tra l d is c ip l in a ry  council a re  n o n -p arliam en ta rian s, and the same 
h o ld s  fo r  th e  d e p a rtm e n ta l c o u n te rp a r ts  (which c o n s is t  of th re e  
members). See a lso  Inner Regulation of the Central Conmittee, Athens: 
ND's p rin t-o u t fo r in te rn a l party  c irc u la tio n , 28 April 1986 (in  Greek), 
au tho r' s reco rds.
108: See 1986 S ta tu te s , A rtic le s  17-18, 24-26 and 30, pp. 23-5, 28-9 
and 31-2 re s p e c tiv e ly . See a lso  Bratakos A ., "Party  S ta tu te s " , 1986 
Congress, pp. 145-6, and Inner Regulation of the Executive Conmittee, 
Athens: ND's p rin t-o u t fo r in te rnal p a rty  c irc u la tio n , 28 April 1986 (in 
Greek), au tho r' s reco rd s .
109: See 1986 S ta tu te s , A rtic le s  21-23, pp. 27-8. For more d e ta ils ,  
see the new Peripheral Organisation R egulation, Athens: ND Publication,
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26 March 1987 (in Greek), which amended the previous one (of June 1983, 
see footnote 78 to th is  chap ter).
110: See 1986 S ta tu te s , A rtic le  13, pp. 18-9. The national conference 
is  a new in s t i tu t io n ,  not provided fo r  under the 1979 s t a tu te s .  I t  
c o n s is t s  of th e  ND d e p u t ie s ,  th e  c e n tra l-c o m m itte e  members, th e  
p re s id e n ts  of ND's departm ental a d m in is tra tiv e  com nittees and i t s  
occupational o rganisations, the ONNED executive-canni t te e  members, and 
the presiden ts of ONNED' s departmental carm ittees. A national conference 
aims mainly a t " . . .p o l i t i c a l  and organisational b rie fin g  on the p a r ty 's  
a c t iv i t ie s ,  and a lso  the l a t t e r s 1 best possib le  co-ordination"; ib id . 
See a lso  Bratakos A., "Party s ta tu te s " , in 1986 Congress, op. c i t . , pp. 
146-8.
I l l :  See 1986 S ta tu te s , A rtic le  14.1, p. 19.
112: See Bratakos A., "Party s ta tu te s " , in 1986 Congress, op. c i t . , p.
146.
113: See 1986 S ta tu te s , op. c i t . , A rtic le  14.2-3, p. 20; according to  
the same A rtic le , the p a r ty 's  parliam entary group alone cannot e le c t but 
only disapprove of a p a r tic u la r  p residen t; ib id . A rtic le  14.4, p. 20. 
See a lso  Special R egulation  fo r  the  E le c tio n  of the Party P res id en t, 
Athens: ND's p rin t-o u t fo r in te rnal party  c irc u la tio n , 28 April 1986 (ip 
Greek), au th o r 's  records. According to th is  regu lation  (A rtic le  12.7, 
ib id ) , ND's parliam entary group alone may e le c t the presiden t only in 
the case of A rtic le  37.4 of the Greek C onstitu tion ; see footnote 56 to  
th is  chapter.
114: See Bratakos A., "Party s ta tu te s " , in 1986 Congress, op. c i t , p.
147.
115: See 1986 S ta tu te s , op. c i t . . A rtic le  19, p. 25, and a lso  Inner 
Regulation of ND's P arliam entary  Group, Athens: ND's p r in t-o u t  fo r  
in ternal party  c irc u la tio n , 28 April 1986 (in  Greek), au th o r 's  records, 
A rtic le  21.
116: See Bratakos A., "Party s ta tu te s " , in 1986 Congress, op. c i t , p. 
149.
117: See 1986 S ta tu te s , op. c i t . , A r t ic le  2 0 .1 .A, pp. 25-6. (The 
S ta te - l is t  consists of 12 candidates fo r each party , who are  not voted 
in by a p reference-cross v o te ; in s te a d , th e i r  e le c tio n  to  parliam en t 
depends, on the one hand, on th e ir  p a r ty 's  e le c to ra l performance a t  the 
national level and, on the o ther, on the rank they hold in the party  
l i s t .  The same is  true  fo r Euro-candidates; see a lso  footnote 15 to  ch.
3).
118: Ib id , A rtic le  20.B .or, pp. 26-7.
119: See C. M itso takis' speech to ND's parliam entary group and the 
deputies ' reac tions, published in the newspaper Mesimvrini, 6 February 
1986, pp. 16-7.
120: Ib id .
121: The question was as follows: "As you know, the f in a l nomination 
of ND cand idates fo r parliam en t is  e x c lu s iv e ly  the party  p re s id e n t 's  
re sp o n sib ility . Do you p e rso n a lly  agree w ith  th is  procedure? I f  n o t, 
what is  your personal suggestion?"
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122: During our fieldw ork  re sea rch  in  L a rissa  in  1989, the  1986 
s ta tu te s  were, of cou rse , in  o p e ra tio n . However, th e re  had been no 
general e lec tion  since June 1985, and so the rank -and -file  members had 
not yet experienced the new procedures fo r  drawing up ND's cand idate  
l i s t s ;  in f a c t ,  a l l  re le v a n t d ec is io n s  were s t i l l  taken a t  p a rty  
headquarters in Athens.
123: Such an instance, among o thers , occurred in the Department of 
Larissa sho rtly  before the June 1989 e lec tio n ; the second and fourth 
cand idates (in  terms of p re fe ren ce  v o tes) on the  e le c to r a l  l i s t  the 
departm ental committee sen t to  p a rty  h ead q u arte rs , were not f in a l ly  
included, in  favour of the  s ix th  and seventh . This r e s u l te d  in  the 
resignation  of a l l  members of ND's local conmittee in Elassona (fourth  
b iggest town in  the  Department of L a r i s s a ) . In the  Department of 
Salonica, members of ONNED occupied the ND cen tra l o ff ic e s  to  p ro te s t 
the  leadersh ip  d ec is io n  to  exclude from the  e le c to ra l  l i s t  c e r ta in  
candidates the departm ent's assembly had e lec ted  among the f i r s t .  See 
the newspapers E le f th e r ia , 24 April 1989, and E le fth e ro ty p ia , 19 May 
1989.
124: For more d e ta i l s  concerning the  s e c r e ta r ia t s  and the  sp e c ia l 
o ff ice s , see the newspaper Mesimvrini. 26 May 1986, pp. 12-3.
125: Athens (a f te r  1978), and Salonica and Piraeus (a f te r  1975) had 
always e lected  mayors supported e ith e r  by PASOK alone, o r by an ad-hoc 
PASOK/Left a llian c e ; ND's success becomes more important i f  we remember 
th a t  Stephanopoulos' s p l in te r  p a r ty , DIANA —and to  a le sse r  ex ten t, 
u l t r a - r ig h t is t  groups as w ell— supported i t s  own candidates during the 
October 1986 municipal e le c tio n .
126: See Katsoudas D. K ., "Youth and New Democracy: Q uestions and 
perspectives", in Epikentra, no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983, pp. 50-5. These 
remarks were reconfirm ed by S. Mavros during  an in te rv iew  w ith  the  
author in Athens, 23 March 1988; a t th a t time Mavros was responsib le  for 
the provincial o rganisation , and from 1989 u n til  1991 he was p residen t 
of ONNED.
127: For e lec to ra l re s u lts  since 1974 see the newspapers Ethnos, 20 
March 1988, and Pondiki, 23 March 1990; relevant information was a lso  
acquired  during  C. H a tz id ak is ' and V. K avalos' in te rv iew s w ith  the 
a u th o r , on 23 March 1988, when bo th  were le a d in g  ONNED members, 
responsible a t the time fo r the u n iv e rs itie s  and the higher technical 
schools respective ly .
128: See Katsoudas D. K ., "The conservative movement. . . " ,  op. c i t . , 
pp. 107-8; a lso  the speech adressed to ND's second na tional conference 
by the p a r ty 's  d ire c to r-g e n e ra l B ratakos A ., "P re se n ta tio n  of ND’s 
programme of a c tio n " , A thens, 2 October 1988 (in  G reek), a u th o r 's  
records, p. 2.
129: For more d e ta i l s  and inform ation  concerning the  trad e -u n io n  
movement in Greece see, among o thers , Katsanevas T ., Trade Unions in 
Greece: An A nalysis of F ac to rs  Determ ining th e i r  Growth and P resen t 
S truc tu re , Athens: National Centre for Social Research, 1984; Katephores 
G. and Tzannatos Z ., "Trade unions in Greece: 1949-81 and 1981-83", in 
Tzannatos Z. (ed), Socialism in Greece, Vermont, USA: Gower Publishing 
Company Ltd, 1986, pp. 130-41; F ak io las R. , " In te r e s t  groups: An 
overview", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), op. c i t . , pp. 
174-88; and Mavrogordatos G ., Between Pityokam ptes and P ro k ru s te s :
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Professional Organisations in Today's Greece, Athens: Odysseas, 1988 (in  
Greek).
130: By and large, the th ree  main trade-union organisations (GSEE for 
wage-eam ers, ADEDY for sa la ried  c iv il  employees, and PASEGES for the 
farmers)
" ...d o  not id en tify  with some p a r tic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  party .
They a re  a l l  connected w ith a l l  of the  p a r t i e s ,  since  
th e i r  ro le  has been reduced to  the  b a ttleg ro u n d  where 
various organised groups —contro lled  and d irec ted  by the 
respective p o l i t ic a l  p a r tie s— challenge each o ther".
See Mavrogordatos G ., "Social p rereq u isites  fo r c o a litio n  governments", 
in  a publication of the H ellenic Society of P o lit ic a l Science, E lections 
and P a rtie s  in the 1980s: Developments and Perspectives of the P o lit ic a l  
System, Athens: Themelio, 1990 (in  Greek), p. 124.
131: See K afetzis T . , "ND 1974-1987: The embryo tha t became a giant 
and the 'challenge of p o l i t i c s '" ,  in the p o l i t ic a l  review Anti, Period 
B1, no. 357, 9 October 1987 (in  Greek), pp. 33-5. ND's membership 
d e n s ity  in 1992 (1 :7 .7  o r 13%) resem bles much th a t of the  B r i t i s h  
Conservative Party in 1974 (12%) and the I ta l ia n  Democrazia C ristiana  in 
1983 (11.2%); see von Beyme K ., op. c i t . , Table 3 .4 , pp. 184-5.
132: Since ND resumed o ff ic e  in April 1990, no important governmental 
decision has been taken by one of the higher party  organs. As a r e s u l t ,  
several major b i l l s  and law-decrees submitted in  parliament have been 
f ie rc e ly  opposed by ND deputies themselves, and a lso  by various o ther 
branches of the party  organisation  —p a rtic u la rly  so by DAKE and ND's 
trade-unionised members.
133: This in fo rm a tio n  was d is c lo s e d  d u rin d  an in te rv ie w  of C. 
G eorgosoulis (then se c re ta ry -g e n e ra l of the departmental committee in 
Larissa) with the author in L arissa, 30 November 1988.
134: See the interview  of V. Goutsis (responsible fo r ND's financia l 
a f f a i r s )  w ith the  newspaper Ta Nea, 18 May 1992, p. 15. Since 1984 
p o li t ic a l  p a rtie s  in Greece are  subsidised by the s ta te  and are  obliged 
to make public and d e ta ile d  financial statements every year; however, 
they do so in a p a r t ic u la r ly  vague and inconsistent manner. For more 
d e ta i ls ,  see D rettak is M., "P o litic a l p a r t ie s ' financing", in Ta Nea, 5, 
6 and 7 Ju ly  1993 (in  G reek), who argues th a t s t a te  funds amount to  
alm ost h a lf  of both ND's and PASOK's to ta l  income (45.4 and 45.3% 
re sp ec tiv e ly ).
135: The data presented here are compiled on the basis of the answers 
from 158 rank-and-file  party  members, interviewed by the author in the 
Department of L a rissa  in 1989. The s p e c if ic  q uestion  was "In your 
opinion, which, i f  any, is /a re  the most important problem(s) your local 
o rg an isa tio n  is  fac in g  a t  the  moment?" In terv iew ees were allow ed to  
mention more than one problem; for more d e ta ils  see ch. 6 and Appendix 
V III.
136: This is  b est expressed  by a comparison of the  occupational 
backgroung of high-ranking (includ ing  MPs) and ra n k -a n d -f ile  members. 
Not su rp rising ly , ND re c ru its  the former among the so c ia lly  higher and 
b e t t e r - p a id  o c c u p a tio n a l c a te g o r ie s  (such as  law yers, d o c to r s ,  
engineers, e tc .) ,  whereas the la t te r  present a p ic tu re  of a more evenly 
balanced and rep resen ta tive  occupational background; see Tables I I I . 11,
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12 and 16, compared to  Table I I I .  17, footnote 32 to ch. 3 and a lso  the
diagram presented in Figure 6.1 in ch. 6 below.
137: See fo o tn o te  50 to  ch. 3. What should be noted h e re , i s  th a t
during the f i r s t  years of the PASOK government, i t s  organised base has
made qu ite  extensive use of th is  a b i l i ty ;  according to  Spourdalakis M., 
PASOK: S tru c tu re , In tr a -p a r ty  C rises and C e n tra lise d  Power, Athens: 
Exantas, 1988 (in  Greek), pp. 314-5,
" . . . t h e  Greek S ta te  has ex p e rien c ed  perh ap s th e  most 
ex ten siv e  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  mass appointm ents ever in  i t s  
e n t i r e  e x i s t e n c e .  . . . b e i n g  a member o f  a PASOK 
p r o f e s s io n a l  o r g a n i s a t io n  became th e  g u a ra n te e  fo r  
secu ring  a job. . . .o n ly  PASOK members enjoyed a p u b lic  
appointment. . .  .PASOK did not h e s ita te  to in s t i tu t io n a l is e  
th is  p rac tice  by transforming the 'S o lid a r ity  O ffice ' in to  
an employment-securing agency".
138: Many such instances can be id en tif ie d , by sirtply going through 
the daily  press a f te r  April 1990. One of the most recent and remarkable 
exam ples was r e p o r te d  by ND's M in is te r  o f  P u b l ic  O rd e r , T. 
Anagnostopoulos, in an interview  with the weekly newspaper To Vima, 17 
May 1992. When asked how he intended to  cope with a good many ro u sfe ti 
requests that had swarmed in to  h is  o ff ic e , he said:
"A ll and everybody who v o ted  fo r  New Democracy were 
expecting  something in re tu rn : one to  be employed as a 
d i r e c to r ,  ano ther to  become a h igher c iv i l  s e rv a n t, a 
th ird  to  see h is  daughter appointed in some p u b lic -sec to r 
job, and y e t ano ther to  be assigned  w ith  a public-w orks 
c o n tra c t. I s  th e re  nobody who voted fo r  ND sim ply fo r  
id eo lo g ica l reasons? I f  I  were to  deal w ith  a l l  th i s  
nonsense, I  would not be ab le  to  do the  job I am here  
fo r" .
139: On the contrary , they fie rc e ly  deny such a lleg a tio n s : each time 
PASOK and ND formed a government, they reassured loudly the people tha t 
they would enforce im partia l, non-discrim inatory p o lic ie s , and th a t a l l  
public appointments would be made on the basis  of examinations open to 
everybody, with only m e rito c ra tic  and never p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i a  
taken in to  f in a l account.
140: Let us r e c a l l  th a t  New Democracy was led by C. Karam anlis 
(October 1974-May 1980), G. R a llis  (May 1980-December 1981), E. Averoff 
(December 1981-September 1984), and C. M itsotakis (September 1984 u n til  
October 1993).
141: For these po in ts , see also  Papathanassiou C ., "Party leaders and 
th e ir  successors", in the da ily  newspaper Ta Nea, 19 February 1992, p. 
6. I t  should be added here that Karamanlis' charisma cannot be sa id  to 
consist of p o p u lis tic  elements whatsoever, lik e  th a t, fo r example, of A. 
Papandreou in Greece or Peron in Argentina; Karamanlis' fa th e r-f ig u re  
- l ik e  p e rso n a lity  resem bles more th a t of De G aulle in  France and 
Adenauer in post-war West Germany.
142: As Clogg R ., op. c i t . , p. 159, w rites ,
"The parliam entary group [under Karamanlis' leadership] of 
ND scarcely  acted as a co llec tiv e  organ. During the f i r s t  
two years a f t e r  the  1974 e le c t io n s , i t  had only  seven
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m eetings, w ith  Karamanlis h im self being p resen t a t  only 
five  of them. Moreover, the meetings scarcely re su lted  in 
a dialogue between the party  leader and the parliam entary 
party" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
143: The q uestion  was "In your op in ion , what were ND's g re a te s t  
ach ievem ents w h ile  th e  p a r ty  was (a) in  governm ent? and (b) in  
opposition?", and the 158 party  members of the sample were allowed to 
give more than one rep ly . For th e ir  answers on ND's achievements in the 
opposition, see below in th is  chapter.
144: See Tsatsos C ., The Unknown Karamanlis, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 
1984 (in Greek), p. 91.
145: The fac t th a t everybody in ND, including Karamanlis him self, f e l t  
c e r ta in  A veroff would win the  e le c tio n  fo r  the leadership  (as Rail is  
c le a r ly  im plies in h is  book Hours of R e sp o n s ib ili ty , op. c i t . , pp. 
7-15), and R a ll i s 1 su rp rising  and very narrow v ic to ry  (88 votes to 84) 
resu lted  in Averoff refusing  to  co-operate with R a llis  in any way during 
the l a t t e r 's  seventeen months as party  leader and premier. Averoff could 
never accept h is  defea t, and ceaselessly  opposed and undermined R a llis , 
causing the l a t t e r  to remark b i t te r ly :
"I am expected to  lead ND to e le c to ra l v ic to ry  while being 
challenged by my p o l i t ic a l  opponent [A. Papandreou] and, 
a t  the same time, attacked from behind as well as from a l l  
s id e s" .
Ib id , p. 278.
146: Since the major issue a t  the time was the forthcoming e lec tio n  
and the an tic ip a ted  r i s e  of PASOK, R a llis  consulted exclusively  with the 
council of m in iste rs  and with ND's parliam entary group, and not with the 
higher non-parliamentary party  organs, which continued to  play a nominal 
ro le .
147: See A rtic le  53.1 in The C onstitu tion  of Greece, op. c i t . , p. 103; 
i t  is  worth mentioning that the 1977-1981 Greek parliament was the f i r s t  
such assembly to  achieve the com pletion of the whole fou r-year term 
since 1946.
148: On these events, see footnote 68 to th is  chapter.
149: Today, Andreas Papandreou is  the only, and perhaps the la s t Greek 
p o l i t i c a l  leader who may be compared to  Karamanlis in  terms of h is  
ch arism atic  p e rs o n a li ty  and the  a ll-p o w erfu l p o s itio n  he has always 
enjoyed in  PASOK — d e s p i te  th e  f u l l  and e f f e c t iv e  o rg a n is a t io n a l  
development of h is  p a rty . On h is  powers and sp ec ia l p o s it io n , see 
Spourdalakis M., op. c i t . , pp. 123-64.
150: See Clogg R ., op. c i t . , p. 165.
151: See Diamandakos P ., op . c i t . , p . 184. ND's tu rn  to  the r ig h t  
under A v e ro ff 's  lead ersh ip  became very  pronounced during  the 1982 
municipal e lec tio n , when the party  supported, or even co-operated w ith, 
several ju n tis t  candidates. In Piraeus in p a rtic u la r , ND chose not to 
nominate a cand idate  of i t s  own (although i t  d id  so fo r Athens and 
Salonica), and so le f t  i t s  supporters the choice of voting e ith e r  for 
th e  r e s p e c t iv e  c a n d id a te s  o f PASOK and th e  L e f t ,  o r  f o r  th e
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"independent" S k y lits is , who had been appointed mayor of Piraeus by the 
co lone ls’ junta; ib id , p. 217.
152: For ND p a r t ic ip a t io n  in such cerem onies, and speeches by i t s  
deputies and members in memory of the c iv i l  war, see the da ily  newspaper 
Ethnos of 5 December 1982, of 22 November and 4 December 1983; fo r ND's 
withdrawal from the parliam ent chamber, see Ethnos, 18 August 1982.
153: See Bakoyiannis P ., Black and White, Athens: Kaktos, 1983 (in
Greek), p. 33. Paul Bakoyiannis was the son-in-law of today 's ND leader
C. M itsotakis and from November 1985 u n til  October 1987 h is  p o l i t ic a l  
counsellor; in June 1989 he was e lected  MP for ND in the Department of
Evrytania, and four months la te r ,  on 26 September 1989, assassina ted  in
Athens by the so -called  "17 November" t e r r o r i s t  organisation.
154: See Diamandakos P ., op. c i t . , p. 148, saying tha t the second 
party  congress w ill c e rta in ly  be held exactly  as s tip u la ted  by the 1979 
s ta tu te s . See a lso  Clogg R ., op. c i t . , p. 165, where the author gives an 
example of A veroff's contempt of the higher party  organs and in te rn a l 
party  democracy,
"...when he summarily expelled an MP from the party  [who 
had openly c a lle d  fo r  a p a rty  conference to  d iscu ss the  
lead ersh ip  issue] w ith  a despatch  worthy of Papandreou 
himself" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
155: See Clogg R ., op. c i t . ,  pp. 165-6; see a lso  footnote 82 to  th is  
chap ter.
156: Like the prev ious in te rn a l  p a rty  e le c tio n  fo r the leadership , 
th is  one too was not fought on id eo lo g ica l is su e s . Most ND d e p u tie s
voted for M itsotakis less because he belonged to  the lib e ra l camp, but
because of h is  formidable p o l i t ic a l  s k i l l s ;  they considered him the only 
man capable of defeating Papandreou and leading th e ir  party  to  power in 
th e  fo rthcom ing  1985 n a t io n a l  e le c t io n .  See a ls o  Papandreou A. , 
Democracy a t Gunpoint, Athens: K aranassis, 1974 (in Greek), p. 37, where 
he wrote:
"This t a l l  and ru th le s s  Cretan is  my Number One enemy,
who has woven the threads of our tragedy —Mr. Constantine
M itso tak is".
When M itsotakis became the ND leader, Papandreou did not h e s i ta te  to 
publicly  c a ll  him E phialtes —the name of the t r a i to r  who betrayed the 
Greeks to the Persians a t the pass of Thermopylae in 480 B .C .; see Clogg 
R ., op. c i t , p. 170.
157: Both the fac ts  and reasons fo r, during and a f te r  the Ju ly  1965 
p o lit ic a l  c r i s is  tha t led to  th is  la rge-sca le  defection and the eventual 
imposition of the m ilita ry  d ica to rsh ip  a re  s t i l l  shrouded in uncerta in ty  
(for a b rie f  p resen ta tion , see section  3.2 in ch. 1). For more d e ta i l s ,  
see (a ll works in Greek): Diamandopoulos T ., M itsotakis C.: A P o li t ic a l  
B iography, (Vol. 2: 1961-1974: From the  " re le n tle s s  struggle" to  the 
d ic ta to r s h ip ) ,  Athens: P a p a z is s is , 1989; Papandreou A ., op. c i t . ; 
Papadimitriou N ., From the Centre Union to Apostasy, Athens: Roes, 1986; 
Paraskevopoulos P . ,  George Papandreou , A thens: Typos, 1988; and 
Leondaritis G. A., Between the Twc Extremes: The Course of the Centre, 
1946-1967, Athens: E s tia , 1992. S u ffice  i t  to  mention here  th a t ,  
regardless of where the tru th  may l ie ,  C. M itsotakis has ever since been 
stigm atised as the p o lit ic ia n  ch ie fly  responsible for these events.
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158: Nevertheless, M itso tak is’ position  was not a ffec ted ; immediately 
a f te r  the e lec tio n  he resigned the leadership , and was re -e lec ted  qu ite  
e a s ily  a t  the expense of Stephanopoulos, who le f t  ND and, together with 
ano ther n ine ND d ep u ties  formed the  Democratic Renewal (DIANA.) ; see 
Clogg R ., op. c i t . , p. 169.
159: In the  June and November 1989 e le c t io n s ,  ND emerged c le a r ly  
v ic to r io u s  bu t d id  no t manage to  se c u re  an a b s o lu te  m a jo r i ty  in
parliam ent; in consequence, a f te r  the June 1989 e lec tio n  i t  formed a
c o a litio n  government with the A lliance of the Left and Progress (SYN, 
which consisted  mainly of the Communist Party of Greece and the Euro- 
conm unists' s p l in te r  group, the  Greek L eft —EAR, as th i s  Cornmunist
P arty  of the  I n te r io r  has been renamed). A fte r the  November 1989
e lec tio n  ND, PASOK and SYN supported a national unity  government which 
co n s is ted  of p o l i t i c a l l y  n e u tr a l ,  non-parliam en tarian  tec h n o c ra ts . 
F ina lly , in April 1990 ND secured 151 of the 300 seats in parliam ent, 
and cou ld  form a o n e -p a r ty  governm ent. On th e  ND-SYN c o a l i t i o n  
governm ent, which was th e  outcome of a n y th in g  b u t id e o lo g ic a l  
convergence, see below, ch. 5.
160: The question was: "In terms of in te rnal democratic procedures in 
the decision-making process, do you think th a t the ND leadership d if fe r s  
from th a t of the o ther p a r t ie s , and, i f  yes, in what way?"
161: A. Papandreou was a lso  e le c te d  by h is  p a r ty ’s rank and f i l e  
during PASOK's second congress in 1990, though not in a secre t b a llo t 
but viva voce.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1: Quoted in  L oulis J .  C ., "The Greek conserva tive  movement in  
t r a n s i t i o n :  From p a te rn a l is m  to  n e o -1 ib e ra l is m " , in  th e  The New 
Liberalism; The Future of N on-C ollectivist In s ti tu tio n s  in Europe and 
the  U .S ., Athens: C entre fo r  P o l i t ic a l  Research and Inform ation , 
In ternational Symposium, May 1981, p. 17. (Henceforth, a l l  quotations 
a re  in our own tra n s la tio n  from the o rig in a l Greek, unless otherwise 
s ta te d ) .
2: See Lcanverdos J . , "'A new proposal fo r freedom': The Liberal face 
of ND", in Epikentra, no. 43, March-April 1985 (in  Greek), pp. 44-50.
3: The term "ideo log ification" of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  was f i r s t  used by 
Loulis J . C. in h is  "ND and ideology: How the b a tt le  of ideas was lo s t ,  
and how i t  can be won", in Epikentra, no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983 (in  Greek), 
pp. 25-34, where he argues th a t
"ND's e l e c t o r a l  g a in s  w ere n o t an outcom e o f any 
predominance of the  l ib e r a l  ideas over s o c ia l i s t  ones 
—and, u n fo rtu n a te ly , th is  p o in t has never been q u ite  
u n d e r s to o d  by th e  p a r t y . . .  So , th e  i d e o l o g i c a l  
predom inance of th e  L e ft d u r in g  th e  1974-1981 y e a rs  
f in a lly  became i t s  absolute domination over the Right in 
1981".
4: As we have already discussed in ch. 2 (section  2 .2 ), e laboration  
and v o tin g  on the  9 June 1975 C o n s titu tio n  was the  work o f the  New 
Democracy party  exclusively ; while there  was a PASOK amendmend to  i t  in 
1986, th is  concerned only the special powers vested in the p residen t. 
For a very d e ta iled  and comprehensive p resen ta tion  of numerous issues 
re la te d  to the C onstitu tion  (Karamanlis* 1963 reform proposal, the 1975 
C onstitu tion , the amendmends proposed —but not voted in— by PASOK and 
the  Communist P a rty , and the  reform ed 1986 C o n s titu tio n ) , see The 
C onstitu tion of Greece, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1987 (in  Greek).
5: As the co n stitu tio n  i s ,  fo r the most p a rt , very sim ila r to  the 
1949 West German one (with the notable exception of the p a rt dealing 
with the powers of the p residen t, where the Gaul l i s t  influence of the 
F if th  French Republic is  m anifest), fo r these special A rtic les  see a lso  
Hrbek R . , " P a t te rn s  o f th e  West German p o l ic y  and p u b lic  p o l ic y  
s t r a te g ie s :  Experiences and p ro sp e c ts" , in The New L iberalism : The 
Future of N o n -C o llec tiv is t I n s t i tu t io n s  in Europe and the  U .S ., op. 
c i t . , pp. 247-68.
6: See Clogg R ., P a r t ie s  and E lec tio n s  in Greece: The Search fo r 
Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987, pp. 63 and 155.
7: Id e o lo g ic a l  v ag u en ess , s t ro n g ly  re m in is c e n t o f ERE, was 
noticeable immediately. In a  p re -e lec tio n  adress to  the people of Athens 
Karamanlis had said  on 27 October 1963:
"ERE is  a new p a rty , an outcome of n a tio n a l n e c e ss ity , 
because the people have been try ing  to  get r id  of the old 
p o l it ic a l  formations. ERE has responded to  these popular 
a s p ira t io n s , because i t  is  not a p a rty  of the R ight,
Centre or L eft, but a  party  of progress."
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See the p o li t ic a l  review A n ti, Period B ', no. 82, 15 October 1977 (in  
Greek), p. 4.
8: For a l l  these p o in ts , see Appendix I .
9: See The C onstitu tion  of Greece, op. c i t . , mainly A rtic le s  4, 5, 
17.1 and 106.2, pp. 164-221.
10: Ib id , A rtic le  106.1, p. 220.
11: See K allias  C. M, ND*s Ideology, Athens: au th o r 's  pub lication , 
March 1976 (in  Greek), p. 5; see a lso  the same au th o r 's  New Democracy: 
I t s  P o l i t ic a l  Outlook and i t s  P o s itio n  in  the  P o l i t ic a l  Spectrum, 
Athens: ND P u b lic a tio n , Ju ly  1977, and a lso  h is  Radical L ib e ra lism , 
Athens: ND Publication , 1980 (both in Greek).
12: See Loulis J . C ., "The Greek conservative movement. . . " ,  op. c i t . , 
p. 19? for a  d e ta ile d  discussion  of ND's economic p o lic ie s  see below in 
th is  chapter.
13: See 1st Prelim inary Congress of the Party: Minutes, vols A'+B', 
C h a lk id ik i,  2-4 A p ril  1977 ( in  G reek ), ND P u b l ic a t io n ,  pp. 21-8 
(hereafter 1977 Prelim inary Congress)? a l l  quotations in the preceding 
paragraph a re  frcm Karamanlis' adress a t  tha t congress.
14: See New Democracy: F ir s t  Congress, Minutes, C halkidiki, 5-7 May 
1979 (in  Greek), ND Publication , pp. 16-23 (hereafte r 1979 Congress) ; 
here again, a l l  quotations a re  from Karamanlis' speech to  th a t congress.
15: Here we concern ourselves only with Karamanlis' m jo r  arguments? 
for a d e ta iled  p resen ta tion , see Appendix IV in th is  study (which gives 
a t ra n s la te d  v e rs io n  of K aram anlis' speech, r e f e r r in g  only to  ND's 
ideo log ica l p r in c ip le s ) .  By and la rg e , the  p a r ts  of K aram anlis' two 
speeches (to  the prelim inary and to  the f i r s t  congress) th a t re fe r  to 
ND's ideology are  almost id e n tic a l. The only change —of ra th e r minor 
importance— is  the  o rd er o f the  s ix  p r in c ip le s :  whereas the p a r ty 's  
b e lie f  in the peaceful coexistence of peoples was placed la s t  in 1977, 
i t  was put second in 1979.
16: See K atsoudas D. K. , "The c o n s e rv a tiv e  movement and New 
Democracy: From past to  p resen t" , in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. 
(ed s), P o l i t ic a l  Change in  Greece: Before and A fte r The C o lo n els , 
London: Croom Helm, 1987, p . 97. A ccording  to  K atsoudas, t h i s  
charac te risa tion  re fe rs  to  the 1977 ideological p rincip les?  but since no 
major changes were made in 1979, we think i t s  use here ju s t if ie d .
17: Ib id , p. 99 ,and a lso  1979 Congress, op. c i t . , p. 23.
18: See Loulis J .  C ., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", 
in Penniman H. R. (ed ), Greece a t the P o lls: The National E lections of 
1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American E nterprise  In s t i tu te  for 
P u b lic  P o lic y  R esearch , 1981, p . 62? see  a ls o  th e  same a u th o r 's  
"Liberalism in ND's p o l i t i c a l  philosophy: An a n a ly s is  of K aram anlis' 
speech", in Epikentra, no. 8, May-June 1979 (in  Greek), pp. 29-40.
19: For the so -ca lled  Karam anliist p o l i t ic a l  legacy, see section  4.3 
in ch. 3? see a lso  footnote 76 to  ch. 3.
20: See Loulis J .  C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", 
op. c i t . , p. 61, and a lso  footnote 44 to  ch. 4 above. When Karamanlis
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was s t i l l  the head of ND, m jo r  c r itic ism  came only from the opposition, 
who refused to  le t  him and ND monopolise nation-mindedness again, as he 
had done when leading ERE before the 1967 coup.
21: See Loulis J .  C ., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. c i t . . 
p . 20. N otw ithstanding the  obvious s im i la r i t i e s  w ith the  re sp e c tiv e  
n a tio n a lis t ic  doctrines of ERE, which —together with passionate a n t i ­
communism— had served as the p a rty ’s ideological cloak a t  the time, the 
reason why Karamanlis exalted  these ideas in the period a f te r  1974 was 
not, we th ink, because he meant to  enforce a policy  based on means of 
domination ensuring exclusive and au th o rita rian  p o li t ic a l  con tro l; h is  
emphasis was probably due ra th e r  to  the f r ic t io n  caused by h is  own dual 
ro le  as both party  and nation  leader (for th is  po in t, see section  2 in 
ch. 3). A fter a l l ,  Karamanlis personally  m y  well have wished to  stay  
above and beyond p a r ty -p o lit ic a l  squabbles? New Democracy c e r ta in ly  did 
not.
22: For example, one f a i l s  to  understand how and to  what e x te n t 
exactly  ND was unlike o ther p a r tie s  —say the Union of the Democratic 
C entre (EDIK) o r the  P a rty  of Democratic Socialism  (KODISO, o r even 
PASOK, a t  le a s t during i t s  term in o ff ic e  (when i t  was in opposition, i t  
f ie rc e ly  opposed the coun try 's  en try  in to  the EEC).
23: See L iapis M., For a Radical Renewal. Athens: E stia , 1987 (in  
Greek), p. 190.
24: See K allias C. M, ND's Ideology, op. c i t . , p. 84.
25: T h is view  was e x p re ssed  by m in is te r  o f c o -o rd in a t io n ,  P. 
Papaligouras on 16 November 1975, and i t  is  quoted in Loulis J . C ., "The 
Greek conservative m o v e m e n t . , op. c i t . , p. 20.
26: Speech of the  m in is te r  of n a tio n a l defence, E. A veroff, in 
P atras, published in the d a ily  newspaper Kathim erini, 24 April 1977; see 
a lso  h is  interview  w ith the  d a ily  newspaper Apoaevm atini, 15 October 
1977 (quo ted  in  L o u lis  J .  C. , "New Democracy: The new fa c e  of 
conservatism", op. c i t . , p. 60).
27: Quoted in  Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or lib e ra lism : 
E volution of ND's ideology", pp. 215-30, in  L iberalism  in  Greece: 
L ibera l Theory and P ra c tic e  in Greek Society  and P o l i t i c s , (papers 
presented in an In te rna tiona l S c ie n tif ic  Assembly organised in Delphi by 
the F riedrich  Naumann Foundation, September 1990), Athens: E s tia , 1991 
(in  Greek).
28: See K allias C. M., ND's Ideology, op. c i t . , p. 18. I t  is  a lso  
im portant to  note th a t ND's p o l i t i c a l  p la tfo rm  fo r the 1974 e lec tio n  
e x p lic it ly  s ta ted  that "personal w ell-being depends on s ta te  measures 
and not on the development of p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e " ;  see Katsoudas D. K ., 
"Conservatism and/or liberalism : . . . " ,  op. c i t . , p. 216.
29: See, fo r  exam ple, K atsoudas D. K. , "C onservatism  a n d /o r  
liberalism : . . . " ,  op. c i t . , pp. 225-7.
30: See N. Papadim atos' speech in  the p re lim inary  congress, "Seme 
fu n c tio n a l  and o rg a n is a t io n a l  problem s of th e  p a r ty " ,  in  1977 
Prelim inary Congress, op. c i t . , pp. 96-7.
31: See V. P o ly d o ra s ' sp eech  in  th e  p r e l im in a r y  c o n g re s s ,  
"Dissemination of ND's ideological p rin c ip le s" , ib id , pp. 101-4; a lso  D.
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Sioufas' speech, "Organisational e f fo r ts  and dissem ination of ideology", 
ib id , pp. 104-9.
32: See C. L ask a ris ' speech in  the  f i r s t  congress , "ND and the  
working people", in 1979 Congress, op. c i t . , pp. 133-42.
33: See Kolmer C ., "The Greek economy a t  a c ru c ia l tu rn ing-poin t: 
P o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  v e rsu s  s o c ia l  a s p i r a t io n s " ,  in  The New 
Liberalism: The Future of N on-C ollectiv ist In s ti tu tio n s  in Europe and 
the U .S ., op. c i t . , pp. 285-314.
34: See E vert M ., K aram anlis: The R eform er, A thens: a u th o r 's  
p u b l ic a t io n ,  1987 ( in  G reek ), pp . 131-60; K atsoudas D. K ., "The 
conserva tive  m ovem ent...", op. c i t . , p . 92; and L oulis J .  C ., "New 
Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. c i t . , pp. 65-6.
35: See Kolmer C ., "The Greek econom y...", op. c i t . , p. 295, where he 
claims tha t "In actual fa c t, however, public  expenditure in Greece is  
much g r e a t e r  th a n  th e  o f f i c i a l  f i g u r e s  i n d ic a t e "  ( in  E n g lis h  
o r ig in a lly ) . According to Loulis J .  C ., "New Democracy: The new face of 
conservatism", op. c i t . , p. 66, public  expenditure reached 60 per cent 
of GNP in 1981.
36: See Vaitsos K. and Y iann itsis T ., Technological Transformation 
and Economic Development, Athens: Gutenberg, 1987 (in  Greek), p. 51.
37: For the  "sociomania o f the R ig h t" , see Lampsas J .  , The Greek 
Nomenclature: The P riv ileged of Power, Athens: Roes, 1985, pp. 103-8, 
and a lso  ND-PASOK: Two P a r t ie s ,  Two Programmes, Two Ways of L if e , 
Athens: Centre of P o lit ic a l  Research and Information, 1981, pp. 22-6; 
fo r a defense of these  p o l ic ie s ,  see Papaligouras A ., Arguments of 
Doubt, Athens: Odysseas, 1986, pp. 11-9 (a l l  in Greek).
38: See Karamanlis1 speech to the f i r s t  congress, in 1979 Congress, 
op. c i t . , pp. 20-1.
39: See Evert M., in Nea P ore ia , 16 June 1980 (in Greek), quoted in 
C h r i s t id i s  C ., "How l ib e r a l  i s  ND's economic p o l ic y ? " ,  in  Nea 
K oinonio log ia , no. 5, Spring 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 112-8. See a lso  
Averoff E. , Change: Yes, PASOK: No, The B ait of the  "Green Change", 
Athens: a u th o r 's  p u b lic a tio n , 1981 (in  G reek), and e s p e c ia l ly  the  
chapter "What is  le f t  fo r n a tio n a lisa tio n ?" , pp. 53-6.
40: The data presented in Table V .l a re  compiled from Kolmer C ., "The 
Greek economy...", op. c i t . , p. 298, and from Georgiou A. P ., "Fourteen 
—not seven— years of socialism  in Greece", in P o lit ik i  Epopteia, no. 
138, October 1988 (in  Greek), p. 20.
41: See Kolmer C ., "The Greek economy...", op. c i t . , p. 300. At th is  
po in t i t  should be s tre s se d  th a t one should not be l e f t  w ith  the  
impression tha t the expansion of the s ta te  secto r happened during th a t 
spec ific  period and expressed a  d e lib e ra te  policy  of the ND government; 
on the contrary , s ta te  in tervention  in  general and n a tio n a lisa tio n s  in 
p a rtic u la r  s ta r te d  as early  as 1830 and spanned over a very long period 
(on these poin ts see Mouzelis' analyses in h is  Modem Greece: Facets of 
Underdeve 1 opment, London: Macmillan, 1978, 2nd ed ition : 1979). As fa r  as 
ND is  concerned, i t  enforced the same p o lic ie s  but in an ad-hoc manner, 
responding to p o lit ic a l  as well as to  economic reasons; the former re fe r  
to the th rea t posed to ND by the rad ica l i sa t ion of broad popular masses 
a f t e r  1974 (see  ch. 2 ab o v e), and th e  l a t t e r  to  th e  i n a b i l i t y /
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unwillingness of the p riv a te  secto r to  step  in and take the lead, as we 
shall see below in th is  section .
42: See Kolmer C ., "Why the a tta c k  against expansion of the s ta te  
sector has in te n s if ie d . The painfu l r e a l i ty " ,  in Epikentra, no. 20, May- 
June 1981 (in  Greek), pp. 21-3.
43: For a l l  these p o in ts , see C h ris tid is  C ., "How lib e ra l is  ND's 
economic policy?", op. c i t . , p. 115.
44: See Loulis J .  C ., in The Athenian, February 1984, p. 14, quoted 
in  K atsoudas D. K ., "The m edia: The s t a t e  and b ro a d c a s t in g " , in  
Feathers tone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), op. c i t . , pp. 189-213; see 
a lso  Loulis J . C ., "The Greek conservative movement. . . " ,  op. c i t . , p. 
23, where he argues tha t
" . . . s t a t e  c o n tro l of the  ra d io  and te le v is io n  networks 
r e s t r i c te d  the  f re e  flow o f ideas on the  airw aves, and 
i n e v i t a b l y  r e i n f o r c e d  th e  te n d e n c y  to  c r e a t e  a 
'p e r s o n a l i t y  c u l t '  a ro u n d  th e  le a d e r "  ( in  E n g lish  
o r ig in a lly ) .
45: According to  Kolmer C ., "The Greek economy...", op. c i t . , p. 309, 
" . . .  the  hidden economy g en era te s  a  to ta l  income equal to  25% of the  
gross national product a t fac to r cost" (in  English o r ig in a lly ) .
46: All th is  information is  taken from a study by Kolmer C., Tsoris 
N ., and C h r is t id is  C ., T ackling the  C oun try 's  Economic Problem: The 
Supply Side. Athens: Centre of P o li t ic a l  Research and Information, 1980 
(in  Greek), quoted in  L ou lis J .  C. , "New Democracy: The new face  of 
conservatism", op. c i t . , p. 67, where i t  is  argued that
" . . . t h e  study a lso  observed th a t  lack of investm ent was 
due (among o ther reasons) to  ND's unstable economic policy 
and to  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s '  c a u t io n  a f t e r  a p o l ic y  which 
encouraged w id esp read  n a t io n a l i s a t io n s "  ( in  E n g lish  
o r ig in a lly ) .
47: See R a ll is ' interview  with the newspaper V radini, 13 July 1981 
(reprin ted  and d is tr ib u te d  by ND in the same month, au th o r 's  records).
48: This phrase was used by ND founding member and one of Karartanlis' 
c lo sest colleagues P. Lambrias; see h is  "Mid-way between", in Epikentra, 
no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983 (in  Greek), pp. 22-4.
49: Let us r e c a l l  th e  same phenomenon ta k in g  p la c e  under th e  
government of ERE; see section  2 .2 .3  in ch. 1, and a lso  footnotes 169 
and 170 to tha t same chapter.
50: See D elipetros N ., "Ideological obsolescence of Liberalism ", in 
P o litik a  Themata, 18 November 1983 (in  Greek), p. 9, quoted in Lampsas 
J . , op. c i t . , pp. 104-5.
51: See section  2.2 .3  in ch. 1 above, and espec ia lly  footnote 164 to 
that chapter.
52: See The P o lit ic a l Views of C. Karamanlis. From h is  Speeches and 
Statements, Ju ly  1974-May 1976, Athens: ND Publication, 1977 (in  Greek), 
p. 23.
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53: See K artakis E . , C. Karamanlis* Epigrammatic P h ra se s , A thens: 
Roes, 1986 (in  Greek), p. 104. For a d e ta iled  account of U.S. po licy  
vis-& -vis Greece, Turkey and Cyprus from an American poin t of view, see 
S tem s M. (U.S. ambassador in Greece, 1981-1985), Entangled A llie s : U.S. 
Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, Athens: Pondiki Pub lica tions, 
1992 (in Greek).
54: Quoted in Nea Koinonioloqia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in  Greek), p. 
117.
55: See The P o lit ic a l  Views of C. Karamanlis, op. c i t . , p. 23, and 
a lso  Evert M., Karamanlis: The Reformer, op. c i t . , pp. 105-6.
56: See B i ts io s  D ., m in is te r  o f fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  in  th e  f i r s t  
(1974-1977) ND government, Beyond the Borders: 1974-1977, Athens: E stia , 
1983 (in  Greek) p. 139.
57: For a d e ta i l e d  accoun t on th e se  is s u e s  and e v e n ts ,  see  
Koufoudakis V ., "Greek foreign policy  1945-1985: Seeking independence in 
an interdependent world -  Problems and prospects", in Featherstone K. 
and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), op. c i t . , pp. 230-52 (and p a r t ic u la r ly  pp. 
235-40, where the au tho r r e f e r s  to  the  ND 1974-81 e ra ) .  See a lso  
T sa rd a n id is  C ., "The fo re ig n  p o lic y  o f ND, 1974-1981", in  Nea 
Koinonioloqia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 120-31; fo r an inside  
carment, see B its io s D ., op. c i t .
58: P o litic a l re la tio n s  with the then six-member EEC had s ta r te d  on 8 
June 1959, when G reece became th e  f i r s t  c o u n try  to  a p p ly  f o r  an 
A ssocia tion  Agreement, which was f in a l ly  signed in Athens two years 
la te r  (9 July  1961). This agreement, seen by the government as "a way to 
defuse the in te rnal and external communist danger", came in to  e ffe c t on 
1 November 1962, and provided fo r a ten-year tra n s itio n a l period before 
fu l 1-membership s ta tu s ,  w hile the Greek economy attem pted to  reach a 
level acceptable by EEC standards. Due to  the m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip , the 
Association Agreement was suspended, to be reactiva ted  in December 1974; 
see Verney S ., "Greece and the European Community", in Featherstone K. 
and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), op. c i t . , pp. 253-70, and a lso  section  2 .2 .3  
in ch. 1.
59: See Papandreou's opening speech to  the 1977 parliam ent, quoted in 
L y r in tz is  C. , Between S o c ia lism  and Populism : The R ise  o f th e  
Panhellenic S o c ia lis t Movement, Ph.D th e s is , U niversity of London, LSE, 
November 1983, p. 214.
60: Quoted in B its io s D ., op. c i t . , p. 123.
61: Quoted in K artakis E ., op. c i t . , pp. 105-6. In 1982, ND's Euro- 
parliam entary group o f f ic ia l ly  joined the European Parliam ent's European 
People's Party, a federation  of the Christian-dem ocratic p a r tie s  of the 
European Community; see Giannakou-Koutsikou M., "ND as a p a rtn er in a 
fed e ra tio n  of European p a r t ie s " ,  in New Democracy: Second Congress, 
Minutes, Thessaloniki: 14-16 February 1986 (in  Greek), ND P ublication , 
pp. 189-93, and a lso  Efstathopoulos S ., "Euro-elections and the European 
p o lit ic a l  groupings", in Epikentra, no. 38, May-June 1984 (in  Greek), 
pp. 61-75.
62: For most of these arguments, see Tsardanidis C ., op. c i t . , pp. 
129-30, where he says that
"K aram anlis —aid e d  by h is  c o u n s e l lo r  Ambassador P.
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M o l y v i a t i s ,  a n d  a l s o  by  t h e  A m b a s s a d o r s  V. 
Theododoropoulos and J .  T zoun is , bo th  e x p e r ts  o f the  
M inistry of Foreign A ffa irs , together with the m in iste rs 
E. A v e ro ff , G. R a l l i s ,  D. B i t s io s  and, l a s t l y ,  C. 
M itso tak is— can be sa id  to  be the  predom inant, i f  not 
exclusive, cen tre  of power as regards decision-making in 
foreign po licy ."
I t  should be added here th a t when PASOK took o ffice  in October 1981, and 
during i t s  whole seven-year period in power, premier Papandreou followed 
ex ac tly  K aram anlis’ p ra c t ic e s  concerning decision-m aking in  fo re ig n  
policy ; the same holds a lso  tru e  fo r M itso takis, since ND returned to  
o ff ice  in April 1990. For the l a t t e r 's  c ritic ism s on sec re t diplomacy, 
s e e  P apadopou lou  S . ,  "ND's p o s i t i o n s  on G reek f o r e ig n  p o lic y  
(1981-1988)", in Nea Koinonioloqia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 
132-40.
63: On these p o in ts , see sections 3.2 and 4 in ch. 4.
64: See C h ris tid is  C ., "How lib e ra l is  ND's economic po licy?", op. 
c i t . , p. 116.
65: See Loverdos J . ,  "The s a c r ile g io u s  m an ifesto" , in  the  monthly 
review F lash , no. 1, A pril 1992 (in  Greek), p. 33.
66: Eventually, the e lec tio n  was held four months e a r l ie r ,  on 2 June 
1985, on the grounds th a t the new parliam ent would be e n ti t le d  to  modify 
c e r ta in  c lau se s  of the  1975 C o n s titu tio n  (more s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  those 
r e f e r r in g  to  th e  s p e c ia l  powers v e s te d  to  th e  P re s id e n t  of th e  
Republic).
67: For a l l  th is  inform ation, see Loverdos J . ,  "Facing the e lec tio n s: 
The e le c to r a l  s t r a te g y  o f New Democracy", in  E p ik e n tra , no. 43, 
March-April 1985 (in  Greek), pp. 4-7.
68: Ib id .
69: See Markou L ., "KPEE: An ' ideology-plant of the R ig h t'" , in the 
p o l it ic a l  review A nti, Period B ', no. 58, 13 November 1976 (in  Greek),
pp. 8-10.
70: See P. S tra to s ' interview  with the p o lit ic a l  review P o li t ik i  
Epopteia, no. 114, July-August 1986 (in  Greek), pp. 3-7.
71: See in tro d u c tio n  to  The New L iberalism : The Future  of Non- 
C o lle c tiv is t In s ti tu tio n s  in Europe and the U .S ., op. c i t . , pp. v i i -  
v i i i .
72: See Clogg R ., op. c i t . , p. 170. I t  should be remembered th a t T. 
Louis, the KPEE f i r s t  p residen t, was ND's d irec to r-genera l and la te r  a 
member of i t s  f i r s t  adm in istrative committee; the same holds tru e  for 
another KPEE founding member, S. S tra tig is  (see a lso  footnote 29 to  ch.
4 ) . M oreover, s e v e r a l  o th e r  KPEE members w ere p ro m in e n t non­
p a r 1iam entary  ND o f f i c i a l s  l ik e ,  f o r  exam ple, L. K yriakopou los 
(technical advisor to  the prime m in is te r); P. S tra to s , KPEE's second 
p re s id en t ( i n d u s t r i a l i s t ,  r e la t iv e  of ND's m in is te r  of in d u s try , C. 
S tra to s); S. Marketos (secretary-general of the m in istry  of h e a lth ); and 
J . Loulis, KPEE's research manager (ND's s c ie n t if ic  counsello r).
73: Ib id , p. 158.
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74: For the Liberal Forum fac tion  and i t s  ideological doc trines, see 
section  4.3 in ch. 3.
75: A t r a n s la te d  v e rs io n  o f th e  m an ife s to  "A New Proposal fo r  
Freedom" is  given in Appendix V of th is  study. (All excerpts in the tex t 
a re  from t h i s  m a n ife s to , and th e  t r a n s la t i o n  i s  m ine). A nother 
tran s la ted  version can be found in Clogg R ., op. c i t . , pp. 228-33.
76: As already discussed, th is  was only p a rtly  true ; as Clogg R ., op. 
c i t . , p . 167, a rg u e s , "...PA SO K 's conduct in  t h i s  re s p e c t  was 
e sse n tia lly  the mirror-image of th a t of the unreconstructed Right during 
the 1950s and ea rly  1960s” (in  English o r ig in a lly ) , and a lso  of th a t of 
ND during i t s  post-1974 terms in o ff ic e .
77: I t  is  worth m entioning th a t  th i s  was the  f i r s t  time th a t  ND 
advocated equality  of chances instead of equality  of re s u l ts ,  a fac t 
th a t in the  p a s t had caused g re a t confusion concerning the  p a r ty 's  
ideological id e n tity , namely whether ND was a cen tre -rig h t or a  so c ia l-  
democratic party ; see Katsoudas D. K ., "Conservatism and/or liberalism : 
. . . " ,  op. c i t . , p. 228.
78: L et us r e c a l l  a t  t h i s  p o in t  th a t  t h i s  d e f in i t i o n  o f ND's 
radicalism  —o rig in a tin g  from Karamanlis' speech to the 1979 congress— 
had caused considerable confusion among prominent ND members, and led 
one of them to  argue tha t
"although ND is  n o t, a t  le a s t  u n t i l  now, a s o c ia l i s t
p a r ty ,  i t  does no t h e s i t a t e  to  adopt and implement
s o c i a l i s t  m easures when th e s e  a re  u s e fu l ,  devoid  o f 
adverse consequences, and a p p lic a b le  to  th e  n a tio n a l  
economy";
see section  2.1 above, and footnote 28 to  th is  chapter.
79: See Lcmverdos J . , "'A new proposal fo r freedom': The lib e ra l face
of ND", op. c i t . , p. 44, who argues that
"When, on 3 February 1985, ND p re s id en t C. M itso tak is  
announced to the Greek people the ideological declara tion  
"A New Proposal fo r Freedom", very few indeed rea lized  the 
sp ec ific  irrportance of th is  fa c t. We were not dealing here 
with a s inp le  c la r if ic a t io n  of ND's ideology, but a c tu a lly  
f a c e - to - f a c e  w ith  a l i b e r a l  id e o lo g ic a l  r e v o lu t io n ,  
s im i la r  to  th o se  in  th e  U .S ., in  B r i ta in ,  and o th e r  
Western countries during the la s t  few years."
See a lso  C h r is t id is  C. , "ND's id eo lo g ica l d e c la ra tio n : An in sp ired  
tex t" , in E pikentra, no. 43, March-April 1985 (in Greek), pp. 51-7.
80: See Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or liberalism : . . . " ,  op.
c i t . , p. 227.
81: See Clogg R ., op. c i t . , and a lso  Appendix l i e ,  which shows the
back cover of a  party-propaganda le a f le t ,  d is tr ib u te d  sho rtly  before the
June 1985 e lec tio n .
82: See New Democracy: A Liberal Leader, a Liberal Po 1 icv-Prograirme, 
Athens: ND Publication (election  brochure, au th o r 's  records), 1985 (in 
Greek), p. 3, where M itsotakis declares: "I was, I am, and I w ill always 
be a L iberal"; the same brochure s tressed  h is  family connection with the
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great lib e ra l leader E. Venizelos on both h is  p a ren ts ' s id e s , and a lso  
h is  own personal c a re e r  as a  prom inent c e n t r i s t  p o l i t i c i a n  from 1946 
u n til  1967.
83: For a p resen ta tion  of ND's economic programme, see Meletakos P ., 
"ND's economic programme: P rio r iry  fo r Greece", in E pikentra , no. 43, 
March-April 1985 ( in  G reek), pp. 34-8, and ND P arliam en tary  Group 
(Office of Economic S tu d ie s ) , Inform ation  B u lle tin : Developments and 
Perspectives of the Greek Economy, Athens: ND Publication , March 1986 
(in  Greek). For rec o g n itio n  of p a s t  m istakes, see fo r  in s tan c e  ND 
Election Committee, General Guidance fo r the Speeches of MPs and Party 
O ff ic ia ls , Athens: ND Publication , May 1985 (in  Greek), pp. 14-5, where 
party  speakers a re  asked to  s tre s s
"ND's fu tu re  p u rsu its  ra th e r than past events. Of course, 
re fe re n c e  sho u ld  be made to  ND's p a s t  governm ental 
achievements, but a t  the same time i t  should be emphasised 
tha t ND has lea rn t from i t s  m istakes".
84: See Lcmverdos J . , "'A new proposal fo r freedom': The lib e ra l  face 
of ND”, op. c i t . , p. 48.
85: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. c i t . , p. 
101; Katsoudas had succeded L oulis as d i r e c to r  of KPEE's re sea rch  
departm ent, and in  th i s  case  h is  in form ation  is  based on d a ta  from 
opinion p o lls  ca rried  out by KPEE and published in E pikentra , no. 44, 
May-June 1985 (in  Greek), p. 26.
86: See Loulis J .  C ., "Causes and p a tte rn s  of the 1985 e lec tio n s  in
Greece: F i r s t  co n c lu sio n s" , in E p ik e n tra , no. 44, May-June 1985 (in  
Greek), pp. 4-29.
87: See L o u lis  J .  C. and Loverdos J . ,  "New Democracy and th e  
e lec tions: Prelim inary considerations", ib id , p. 62.
88: For more d e ta ils  on the c rea tion  of DIANA and i t s  c r i t is is m  of 
ND, see section  4.3 in ch. 3.
89: See C h ris tid is  C ., "How lib e ra l is  ND's economic po licy?", op. 
c i t . , p. 117, and a lso  Katsoudas D. K ., "The conservative movement...",
op. c i t . , p. 102, where he argues th a t
"The very  s tro n g  b e l ie f  of the  rank and f i l e  in  v ic to ry
made them prone to  the discovery of scapegoats soon a f te r
the 1985 e lec tio n  defeat. 'Excessive' lib e ra lism  was sa id
to  be the problem by those who had never read the opinion
p o lls  which id e n t i f ie d  the  problem as ND's c r e d ib i l i ty ,  
though i t s  id ea s  c e r t a i n l y  appeared  a t t r a c t i v e "  ( in  
English o r ig in a lly ) .
In an a ttenp t to appease and re -u n ite  the g rea tly  disappointed and angry 
party  base, the ND leadership claimed th a t the 1985 e le c tio n  had been 
marred by fraud and v io le n ce , but i t  never managed to  prove th is  
a llega tion .
90: See M itso takis' speech in the second congress, in New Democracy: 
Second Congress, Minutes, Thessaloniki: 14-16 February 1986 (in  Greek), 
ND Publication, pp. 36-74.
91: Ib id , p. 57; see a lso  Evert M. , N ational C hoices, Athens:
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au th o r 's  pub lication , 1986 (in  Greek), p. 19, where he argues tha t
"p lac ing  the  e p ith e t  ' l i b e r a l '  in f ro n t of the  p a r ty 's  
t i t l e  has been b a s i c a l ly  c o r r e c t ,  bu t i t  has been a 
mistake not to  s tre s s  the p o l i t ic a l  and social dimension 
of libera lism ."
92: See M itsotakis'speech in the second congress, in New Democracy: 
Second Congress, Minutes, op. c i t , p. 67.
93: See ND: Id e o lo g ic a l  P r in c ip le s - P a r ty  S t a t u t e s , A thens: ND 
Publication , 1979 (in  Greek), pp. 7-14; see a lso  footnote 77 to  ch. 3.
94: See Katsoudas D. K ., "The conservative movement...", op. c i t . , p. 
102, and C h r is t id is  C ., "How l ib e r a l  is  ND's economic p o lic y ?" , op. 
c i t . , p. 117.
95: For a l l  these p o in ts , see Lambrias P ., "The issue of ideology", 
in New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, op. c i t , p. 103.
96: A tran s la te d  version of ND's ideological p rin c ip les  as they were 
sa n c tio n e d  by th e  second c o n g ress  in  F ebruary  1986 — th a t  i s ,  a 
t r a n s la te d  but shortened  v e rs io n  of Lambrias' speech, "The issu e  of 
ideology", op. c i t . , pp. 100-8, and a lso  ND: Ideological P rinc ip les and 
Party S ta tu te s , Athens: ND Publication , 1986 (in  Greek), pp. 3-8— is  
presented in Appendix VI. (All following excerpts in the tex t are  from 
th is  speech and the tran s la tio n s  a re  mine).
97: A fter the 1986 congress, e igh t separate s e c re ta r ia ts  and eight 
special o ff ic e s  were estab lished ; the se c re ta r ia t  in charge of the party  
programme was headed by the ND deputy G. Souflias (for d e ta ils  on these 
issues see section  3.3 in ch. 4).
98: The s e c re ta r ia t  fo r po licy  proposals elaborated and published the 
following (a ll  in Greek, by ND in Athens): ND: Policy Proposals fo r the 
Farmers, A pril 1987; ND: P o licy  P roposals fo r S p o rt, May 1987; ND: 
Policy Proposals fo r the Economy, June 1987; ND: Policy Proposals for 
Shipping, September 1987; ND: P o licy  Proposals fo r N ational H ea lth , 
October 1987; ND: P o licy  P roposals fo r the C iv il Serv ice  and Local 
Government, December 1987; ND: Policy Proposals fo r Tourism, May 1988; 
and ND: Policy Proposals fo r Education, February 1989.
99: See ND: Policy Proposals fo r the Economy, op. c i t . ; i t  is  a lso  
important to note th a t ND po licy  proposals on a l l  issues were based on 
th e  P ro p o s it io n  o f ND's G eneral P o lic y  Programme, e lab o ra ted  and 
submitted by the programme ccrrmittee to  the second party  congress for 
d isc u ss io n  and approval (T h essa lo n ik i, February 1986, in Greek, ND's 
p rin t-o u t fo r in te rn a l party  c irc u la tio n , au th o r 's  records), where (p. 
I) i t  is  s ta ted :
"This plan —a f te r  i t s  d iscussion, eventual amendments and 
f in a l  approval by the  second congress— w ill  become the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a r t e r  o f ND's p o l ic i e s  co n cern in g  
n a tio n a l and p u b lic  l i f e ,  th e  economy and th e  s o c ia l  
o rgan isation  and formation. I t  w il l , therefore , become the 
g e n e ra l p o l ic y  programme of our p a r ty ,  on which a l l  
s p e c ia l  governm ental programmes w il l  be b ased , being 
consisten t with i t  and with whatever s itu a tio n  p reva ils  a t 
the tim e."
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100: See ND: P o lic y  P roposa ls fo r  th e Economy, op. c i t . , pp. 5 -9 .
101: Ib id , pp. 7-8. 
102: Ib id , pp. 10-1. 
103: Ib id , p. 11. 
104: Ib id , p. 12. 
105: Ib id , pp. 48-9.
106: See Katsoudas D. K ., "Conservatism and/or liberalism : , op.
c i t . , pp. 229-30.
107: See M itso tak is ' interview  in Epikentra, no. 55, December 1987 (in  
Greek), pp. 6-7; see a lso  the o f f ic ia l  p a rty  brochure, L e t 's  Share Seme 
Thoughts Together, Athens: ND Publication (au th o r's  records), November- 
December 1988 (in  Greek), where i t  is  s ta te d  th a t "ND is  not the same 
today as i t  was", and sim ila r arguments a re  presented.
108: During the  days of th is  government, parliam ent unanimously 
approved a b i l l  abolishing a l l  social d iscrim ination  o rig in a tin g  from 
the c iv il  war; ND leader C. M itsotakis acknowledged pub lic ly  th a t i t  had 
been a grave m istake for ND to  withdraw from parliam ent in August 1982 
in boycott of the recognition of the National Resistance movement that 
was voted in by only PASOK and the Left during A veroff's leadership; see 
foo tno te  152 to  ch. 4 and the  newspaper Ta Nea, 31 August 1989 (in  
Greek), p. 12.
109: See Evert M., National Choices, op. c i t . , p. 5, and pp. 19-20; 
the same views a re  shared by ND deputy P. Sari i s ,  in h is  Ideology and 
New P o l i t ic s , Athens: P o litik a  Themata Publications, 1985 (in  Greek). 
See a lso  Tsouderou V., "Social liberalism : Searching for new so lu tions" , 
in the newspaper Kathim erini, 8 November 1987, p. 4; and H atzigakis S ., 
"Social l ib e ra lism : The so lu tio n  to  our p o l i t i c a l  deadlock", in  the 
newspaper K athim erini, 6 December 1987, p. 4, (both in Greek).
110: Most prom inent among them a re  Papaligouras A ., Arguments of 
Doubt, op. c i t ♦ , and Liapis M., For a Radical Renewal, op. c i t .
I l l :  See A ndrianopoulos A ., Change o f V e c to r , A thens: E l l i n ik i  
Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in Greek), p. 107; fo r a very d e ta iled  p resen ta tion  
of neo -libera l p o sitio n s , and for a c r i t iq u e  of ND in tha t respec t, see 
a lso  the same a u th o r 's  The Triumph of Democratic C ap ita lism , Athens: 
L ibro, 1988, and This I s  L ib e ra lism , Athens: L ibro, 1988 (both in 
Greek).
112: See Kanellopoulos A., For A New Ethos in P o l i t ic s , Athens: ND
Publication, June 1988 (in  Greek), p. 11.
113: More sp e c if ic a lly , ND has a t times been seen as a l ib e ra l ,  and a t 
o ther times as a n eo -libera l party ; although the more numerous l ib e ra ls  
accepted s ta te  in terven tion  in the economy, they fa iled  to define when 
and how, so giving the impression th a t th is  was to  be decided ad hoc fo r 
each case s e p a ra te ly ; the  n e o - l ib e ra ls ,  on the  o th er hand, who were 
advocating the tene ts  of c la ss ic a l liberalism , demanded tha t the s ta te  
should not exceed i t s  ro le  of night-watchman.
114: See Hrbek R ., "P a tte rn s  of the  West German p o licy  and p u b lic
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p o l ic y  s t r a t e g ie s :  E xperiences and p ro sp ects" , op. c i t . , p.  255.
115: See Mouzelis N ., "Neo-liberalism  and development: R ea litie s  and 
myths", in  the weekly newspaper To Vima, 6 September 1987 (in  Greek), 
pp. 30-1. This a r t i c l e  caused prominent ND member A. Andrianopoulos to 
argue th a t,
"This tim e, w ithout p re te n se s , w ith  h is to r ic a l knowledge 
and consideration  of a l l  re la tiv e  information, i t  is  s ta te  
in te rven tion  as such th a t is  to blame, and not the qua lity  
of i t s  functioning".
See h is  " ’N e o -lib e ra lism ' and c a p ita lism : Development w ithout the 
s ta te " , in  To Vima, 20 September 1987, p. 45, and a lso  Mouzelis' rep ly , 
"How useful is  s ta te  in tervention?", in To Vima, 25 October 1987, p. 12. 
On the re la tio n  between s ta te  and market in general, and in the Greek 
case in p a r t ic u la r ,  see a lso  N. Mouzelis' following a r t ic le s  (a ll  in To 
Vima, and a l l  in  Greek): "Unemployment and s t a te  in te rv e n tio n " , 5 
February 1989, p. 10; "The end of the T hatcherite  m iracle", 11 February 
1990, p. 24; "Greece m arginalised: Who is  to  blame?", 30 December 1990, 
pp. 6-7; " In s ti tu tio n s  and p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re" , 23 August 1992, pp. 10-1; 
and "The fu tu re  belongs to  the m odernisers", 30 August 1992, pp. 8-9.
116: The question was "Which of the following party  labels would you 
choose to  id en tify  ND today?", and the party  members were allowed to 
give more than one answer; a l l  following Tables in th is  section  compile 
data from research  in the Department of L arissa, a few months before the 
June 1989 e le c tio n . For more d e ta i ls ,  see ch. 6 and Appendix V III.
117: As we have already seen when examining the p a r ty 's  organ isation , 
the  rank and f i l e  never considered  the  e la b o ra tio n  of id eo lo g ica l 
p rin c ip le s  one of ND’s g rea te s t achievements, whether the party  was in 
o ff ice  or in opposition (see Tables TV.5 and TV.6 in ch. 4).
118: Let us re c a ll  th a t —as ND i t s e l f  o f f ic ia l ly  acknowledged— one 
of the reasons fo r loosing the 1985 e lec tio n , was the p a r ty 's  fa i lu re  to  
e luc ida te  i t s  l ib e ra l ideology and to  s tre s s  the social welfare side  of 
i t s  progranme; see above, section  3.2 and footnote 91 to th is  chapter.
119: When C. S tephanopoulos l e f t  th e  p a r ty  to  form DIANA in  
September 1985, he became the  f i r s t  to  accuse ND of abandoning the 
working people; fo r d e ta i ls  see section  4.3 in ch. 3. On the other hand, 
although PASOK leader, A. Papandreou has always denied tha t PASOK was 
rep resen ting  a  p a r t ic u la r  c la ss , he did s ta te  th a t i t
"embraces a l l  n o n -p riv ileg ed  Greeks: farm ers, w orkers, 
employees, craftsm en , the youth, a l l  who a re  su b jec t to  
odious e x p lo ita tio n  by modern monopoly c a p ita l , local as 
well as foreign" (in  English o rig in a lly ) .
See the d a ily  newspaper A th inaik i, 29 October 1975, quoted in L yrin tzis 
C ., op. c i t . , p. 220.
120: For a d e ta ile d  account of the p re -e lec tio n  period, and for a l l  
events th a t led to  the formation of the ND-SYN co a litio n  government, see 
The P o li t ic a l  Year 1989, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1989 (in  Greek), 
pp. 11-55. I t  should be noted th a t alm ost th ree  years befo re  the 
form ation of t h i s  c o a l i t io n  government, the  two p o l i t i c a l  camps had 
u n o ff ic ia lly  converged: i t  was during the 1986 municipal e lec tio n , when 
for the f i r s t  time since 1974 ND candidates M. Evert, S. Kouvelas, and
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A. Andrianopoulos won in the three biggest c i t ie s  (Athens, Salonica and 
P iraeus r e s p e c t iv e ly ) ; in  each case  th is  happened during  the  second 
round, when a considerable p a rt of the comminist vo ters switched to  the 
respective  ND candidate, instead of the PASOK one, as they had always 
done befo re  in  such cases . As an a n a ly s t wrote concerning the  1986 
e lec tion :
" . . .b o th  the  l ib e ra l  conserva tive  camp, as w ell as the 
KKE, did  convince us th a t they have got r id  of a  double- 
faced syndrome: the  form er, of anti-communism, . . . t h e  
l a t t e r  of the la ten t fea r th a t the Right may sometime come 
back in to  pow er... Messrs Evert and Andrianopoulos, both 
of them advocating renewal, ...managed to  give th e ir  party  
a new image th a t has been favourably accepted well beyond 
p a r ty - p o l i t i c a l  co n fin es. This becomes ev iden t from the 
secound-round e lec tio n  re s u l ts ,  where seme 16 per cent of 
the  communist v o te rs  voted not fo r  PASOK, but fo r  the 
candidates of i t s  r iv a l party . I t  is  hardly necessary to  
mention th a t the blank, and invalidated  b a llo t papers, and 
the absten tions, a l l  meant approval of ND."
The a r t i c l e  was w r it te n  by a sp e c ia l e le c tio n  a n a ly s t ,  who remained 
anonymous, "KKE: F ir s t  signs of a new face", in E pikentra, no. 51-52, 
Autumn 1986 (in  Greek), pp. 40-1, and a lso  the same a u th o r 's  "Municipal 
e lec tions 1986", ib id , pp. 5-10.
121: Without g e ttin g  in to  much d e ta i l ,  i t  should be noted th a t the 
June 1989 e le c t io n  was fought m ainly over the  issu e  of an economic 
scandal, concerning the i l le g a l  a c t iv i t ie s  of a  p riv a te  bank and i t s  
owner. I t  was not w ithout e f f e c t  on PASOK, because some of i t s  most 
prominent m em b ers , including Andreas Papandreou him self, were charged 
with personal re sp o n s ib ility  fo r f i r s t  c reating  and fo s te rin g , and then 
concealing th is  case, with embezzlement of huge amounts of money, and 
with having accepted b ribes. The ND/SYN parliam entary m ajority  f in a l ly  
sent five  PASOK members to  the Special Supreme Court: A. Papandreou, A. 
K outsogiorgas (form er m in is te r  to  the  prime m in is te r ) ,  D. Tsovolas 
(former m in iste r of finance), G. Petsos (former m in ister of industry ), 
and P. R oum eliotis (former m in is te r  of n a tio n a l economy). The t r i a l  
s ta r te d  in March 1990 and ended in December of the same year, and in the 
course of i t  Koutsogiorgas died in the court room; Roumeliotis had been 
e lected  a  Euro-MP and was never t r ie d , Tsovolas and Petsos were given in 
minor sentences (found g u ilty  not of bribery  or embezzlement, but of 
m inor b u r e a u c r a t ic  m isdeeds of th e  c i v i l  s e rv ic e s  under t h e i r  
supervision), whereas Papandreou was declared innocent and c leared  of 
a l l  charges.
122: See Karamanlis' speech to ND's parliam entary group, made on 30 
September 1977, one month befo re  the  October 1977 na tional e le c tio n ; 
quoted in the p o l i t ic a l  review A nti, Period B ', no. 82, 15 October 1977 
( in Greek), p. 4.
123: See D e lip e tro s  N ., "A p o l i t i c a l  and e th ic a l  d e v ia tio n " , in 
P o litik a  Themata, no. 749, 6 October 1989 (in Greek), pp. 8-9. See a lso  
the e d ito r ia l  of a pro-ND d a ily  newspaper, E leftheros Typos, 4 September 
1989 ( in  G reek ), p . 5, where i t  i s  s im i la r ly  a rgued  th a t  " th e  
coex istence  of ND and SYN w ith in  th e  T z a n n e ta k is ' governm ent was 
necessary  to  n e u tr a l i s e  PASOK and, of course, the s p e c if ic  e le c t io n  
r e s u l t" .
124: For th ese  p o in ts  and fo r the  I t a l ia n  model in g e n e ra l, see
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Berlinguer E ., H isto rica l Conroranise, Athens: Themelio, 1977 (in  Greek). 
See a lso  Gundle S ., "The PCI and the h is to r ic  compromise", in New Left 
Review, no. 163, May-June 1987, pp. 27-35, and Abse T . , "A rep ly  to  
Gundle", in New Left Review, no. 163, May-June 1987, pp. 36-8.
125: See Efthymiou P . ,  "The 'c o rd ia l  understand ing1 is  se r io u s ly  
te s ted " , in  the weekly newspaper To Vima, 1 October 1989 (in  Greek), p. 
13. For a l e f t i s t  view on the Greek model of h is to r ic  compromise see 
Androulakis M., Meta, Athens: Nea Synora, 1992 (in  Greek), and F i l in is  
C., "The causes of a sp ira l course: A rep ly  to  Androulakis", in the d a ily  
newspaper E le fth e ro ty p ia , 20 December 1992 (in  Greek), p. 22.
126: For a much more d e ta i le d  a n a ly s is  and p re se n ta tio n  of these  
po in ts , see Mouzelis N ., "Will ND and SYN co llabora te  in the fu ture?", 
in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 1 October 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 12-3. 
For adversary views, see Veltsos G ., "Sophistry", in the d a ily  newspaper 
Ta Nea, 7 October 1989, p. 38, and a lso  Georgoulas C ., " In te r - c la s s  
investiga tions and th eo re tic a l inconsistencies", in the weekly newspaper 
I Epochi, 8 October 1989, p. 10 (both in Greek).
127: See V a rv its io tis ' interview  with the d a ily  newspaper Kathim erini, 
3 September 1989 (in  Greek), p. 4.
128: See Diamandouros N. P .,  "The European v is io n  and the Greek 
dilerrmas", in E pikentra, no. 64, December 1990 (in  Greek), p. 26.
129: For the 5 November 1989 e lec tio n  and the events th a t u ltim ately  
led  to  the  form ation of Z o lo ta s ' n a tio n a l u n ity  government, see The 
P o l i t ic a l  Year 1989, op. c i t . , pp. 61-250. For the  8 A pril 1990 
e lec tio n , see The 8 April 1990 E lec tion , Athens: Pondiki Publications, 
1990 (in  G reek); fo r  ND's e le c to ra l  performance in  a l l  n a tio n a l and 
European e lec tio n s since 1974, see Appendix VII to th is  study.
130: No proper assessment of th is  is  as yet possib le , since a t  the 
time of w riting  the party  has been in o ff ic e  again fo r only th ree  years. 
In the p a s t, both ND and PASOK remained in o ff ice  for two consecutive 
terms, and a government po licy  is  best judged a t  the end of the ru lin g  
p a r ty 's  second term. Moreover, ND did not manage to stay  in o ff ic e  for 
the whole term ; r iv en  by in te rn a l  squabbles over i t s  p r iv a t is a t io n  
programme on the one hand and over a telephone-tapping scandal on the 
o ther, ND was struck  the f in a l blow from w ithin i t s  own ranks, namely by 
A. Samaras, who having res ig n ed  from both h is  governmental p o st and 
parliam entary sea t (due to  a disagreem ent w ith  prem ier C. M itso tak is  
over the coun try 's  p o lic ie s  and re la tio n s  with the Former Yugoslavian 
Republic of Macedonia), and having founded POLAN (P o litic a l Spring), he 
caused the defection  of two more ND deputies in early  September 1993, 
and th is  led to  ND's loss of parliam entary m ajority and early  e lec tions 
held one month la te r  (for these events see a lso  footnote 84 to ch. 3). 
Let us only add here for the record, tha t PASOK won the 10 Oct. 1993 
e le c t io n , p o llin g  alm ost 47 per cen t of the vo te  and e le c t in g  170 
deputies; ND moved once again to  the opposition benches (39.3 per cent 
of the  v o te , 111 s e a ts  in  p a rliam e n t); Samaras' newly formed POLAN 
appeared as the th ird  pa rty , po lling  almost 5 per cent of the vote and 
e lec tin g  10 deputies. (KKE fought th is  e lec tio n  alone, i t  po lled  l i t t l e  
more than 4.5 per cent of the vote and e lected  9 deputies, whereas SYN 
p o lle d  a mere 2.94 p e r  c en t and so f a i l e d  to  ga in  p a r lia m e n ta ry  
re p re s e n ta t io n .)  S h o rtly  a f t e r  ND's e le c to ra l  d e fe a t, C. M itso tak is  
res igned  and new in tr a -p a r ty  e le c tio n s  fo r the  ND lead ersh ip  were 
scheduled fo r early  November 1993.
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131: I t  should be mentioned tha t EAS was sold only a f te r  i t s  employees 
had re je c te d  the government proposal th a t some of them should be 
dism issed so as to  allow  the  e n te rp r is e  to  make a p r o f i t .  KPEE and 
Liberal-Forum member C. C h ris tid is  wrote a t the time:
"The argument tha t is  continuously being re ite ra te d  by the 
m in iste rs in charge to  EAS employees on s tr ik e  is  th is :  
a c c e p t  m easu res  d e s ig n e d  to  make EAS p r o f i t a b l e  
(d ism issals, e tc . ) ,  otherwise we must s e l l  i t .  This makes 
a  bogy out of p r iv a tis a tio n , lik e  the one we use to scare 
naughty c h ild ren  i f  they d o n 't  e a t th e i r  food. So ND is  
pe rh ap s th e  on ly  ’ l i b e r a l ’ p a r ty  in  the  w orld th a t  
considers measures aimed a t  the lib e ra lisa tio n  of society  
to  need the help of the devi 1."
See C h ris tid is  C ., "The bogy", in the d a ily  newspaper Ta Nea, 8 August 
1992 (in  Greek), p. 10; see a lso  Vourloumis P ., "Why is  p r iv a tis a tio n  
fa ilin g ? " , in Epikentra, no. 67, September 1991 (in Greek), pp. 28-30, 
who argues th a t " . . .n e g a t iv e  re a c tio n  to  p r iv a t i s a t io n . . .  comes less 
from th e  s o c i a l i s t  o p p o s it io n  th an  from w ith in  th e  ranks o f th e  
government i t s e l f " .
132: See Kolmer C., "Pseudo-liberal ism", in Epikentra, no. 65, March 
1991 (in  Greek), pp. 40-2, who notes th a t an tic ipa ted  public expenses in 
the 1990 budget went up by 25 per cen t, and reached seme 50 per cent of 
the GNP, which was "an a ll- tim e  record".
133: See Papalexopoulos T ., former p re s id en t of the A ssociation of 
Greek In dustries (SEV), "Economic and currency u n ifica tio n  and Greece",
in E p ik e n tra , no. 64, December 1990 (in  Greek), p . 67. For s im ila r
argum ents, see a lso  B itro s  G. K ., "From economic c r i s i s  towards the  
c r i s i s  of economic policy?", ib id , pp. 44-52, who w rites th a t " . . . i n  
general, the government was more lib e ra l in theory and in i t s  verbal 
po st-e lec tio n  declara tions, than i t  has been in p rac tice" .
134: C. C h ris tid is  believes the l a t t e r .  See "The bogy", op. c i t . , 
where he argues:
" I t  is  therefore evident, tha t ND has no rig h t to appeal
to  l ib e ra lism . U nfo rtunate ly , the  problem is  not one of
’communication', as party  o f f ic ia ls  seem to suggest, but a 
c le a r ly  s tru c tu ra l one —in o ther words i t  re fe rs  to  the 
c rea tio n , nature, and functioning of th is  party ."
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CHAPTER SIX
1: A ll data  in th is  section  a re  frcm the 1981 population census, see 
The Real Population  of Greece According to  the 5 A pril 1981 Census, 
Athens: National Service of S ta t i s t ic s  of Greece, 1982 (in  Greek). The 
1991 census has not yet been published, but the f i r s t  u n o ffic ia l data 
show th a t the population of the Department has exceeded the 1981 number 
and reached th a t  of 265,783 ( th a t  i s ,  4 .5  per cent in c rease  in  ten  
y e a rs) .
2: Thessaly was annexed to  Greece in 1881; the ch i f l i k  system then 
prevalent in  ag ric u ltu re  did  not allow for high productiv ity  u n til  1917, 
when
"Venizelos passed a se r ie s  of decrees on land reform which 
were to  become the legal basis  fo r the break-up of the big 
e s ta te s  and the extensive land d is tr ib u tio n  which followed 
th e  in f lu x  o f re fu g e e s  from A sia  Minor in  1922" ( in  
English o r ig in a lly ) ;
(see M ouzelis N ., Modern Greece: F acets of Underdevelopment, London: 
Macmillan, December 1979, pp. 18-9. h e re a f te r ,  a l l  quotes a re  my 
t r a n s la t io n  from the  o r ig in a l  Greek, un less  o therw ise  s ta te d .)  Seven 
years e a r l ie r ,  on 6 March 1910, the peasants had gathered in a small 
v illa g e  in  the eparchy of L arissa  —a t K ile le r , today ca lled  Kypseli— 
and rose against the b ig  landowners, demanding land re d is tr ib u tio n  and 
holdings of th e ir  own. The rev o lt ended in a massacre, but p rec ip ita te d  
events th a t u ltim ate ly  led to  Venizelos' land reform. For a  d e ta iled  
account on these issues, see Karanikolas G. D ., K ile le r , Athens: Grairmi, 
1975 (in  Greek).
3: For example in the Department of L arissa, the average per-acre  
productiv ity  of wheat is  5 per cent higher than th a t of the th ree  o ther 
departments in Thessaly together (K arditsa, T rikala and Magnesia), and 
as much as 50 per cent higher than the country 's average.
4: Between 1940 and 1981, the  popu lation  of L a rissa  more than 
t r ip le d ;  in  1940 th e re  were 32,686 in h a b ita n ts ;  in  1951, 43,225; in 
1961, 56,010; in 1971, 72,332 and in 1981 102,048 (and in 1991, 108,237, 
according to  the yet unpublished data of the 1991 population census). In 
1928 L arissa was the s ix teen th  biggest urban cen tre , in 1940 the ten th , 
in 1951 and in 1961 th e  seventh , in 1971 the s ix th ,  and in  1981 the 
f i f th .  Moreover, the Department of L arissa is  the only one in Thessaly, 
and among the five  in Greece generally  (the other four being A ttika , 
Salonica, Imathia and H eraklion), which has seen a continuous population 
growth since 1961. I t  should a lso  be mentioned here th a t the L arissa- 
da ily  newspaper E le f th e r ia , founded in 1922, remains the biggest local 
d a ily  in Greece. F in a n c ia lly  independent and p o l i t i c a l l y  n e u tr a l ,  i t  
employs 76 people and i t  s e l ls  15,000 copies da ily  (which compares well 
w ith Ta Nea, the b ig g es t Athens d a ily  newspaper, which s e l l s  80,000 
copies a day). For more d e ta ils  about L a rissa 's  local d a ily  see Marinou 
E ., "The newspaper 'E le f th e r ia 1: 'The Times' of L arissa", in the weekly 
Epsilon, no. 48, 8 March 1992 (in  Greek), pp. 56-61.
5: The data for the country as a whole are frcm 1986 Labour Force 
Census, Athens: N ational Serv ice  of S t a t i s t i c s  of Greece, 1987 (in  
Greek); the data  fo r the Department of L arissa are  from 5 April 1981 
Census R esults: Population and Households, Athens: National Service of 
S ta t is t ic s  of Greece, 1990 (in  Greek), vo l. V, no. 7: Thessaly.
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6: The nearest harbour to L arissa is  that of Volos, c ap ita l of the 
Department of Magnesia, which links Greece with Syria and the Middle 
East and has g rea tly  contributed to  the in d u stria l development of Volos.
7: According to  K aranikolas G. D ., op . c i t . , pp. 157-8, sh o r tly  
before the ru ra l uprising  in 1910,
"The landowners were the  supreme p a rty  n o tab les , and by 
se rio u s  th re a ts  in case of d isobedience m anipulated the 
peasan t vo te  as they wished. Those who dared to  vo te  
contrary to  th e ir  m aster’s w ill had to  reckon with being 
ousted from the chi f l i k ,  barred frcm a l l  other chi f l i ks  in 
the  a rea  because of the  landowners' t r u s t ,  and ev ic ted  
from th e ir  houses as the most len ient consequences... The 
peasan t could r e ly  on nobody's h e lp , s ince  the d ep u ty 's  
in te r e s t  lay  in  f a i th fu l  obedience to  the w ill of the
local landowner-party notable".
For a d e ta ile d  account on the c h i f l i k  system and the  s tandard  and 
conditions of liv in g  in  L a rissa  be fo re  the  annexation of T hessaly to  
Greece in 1881, see Pharmakidis E. G ., L arissa , Volos: Paraskevopoulos 
Publications, 1926 (in  Greek).
8: However, no prominent Greek p o lit ic ia n s  came frcm the Department 
of Larissa in e ith e r  the inter-w ar o r the post-war years. The best-known 
p o lit ic a l  figure  from the area was the lawyer C. Rodopoulos, who chaired 
the Greek parliam ent fo r ten consecutive years, frcm 16 Nov. 1953 u n til
15 Dec. 1963. (He was f i r s t  e le c te d  in 1935 under the banner o f the
Greek Radical P a rty , and u n fa i l in g ly  e le c te d  th e re a f te r  u n t i l  1964, 
e ith e r  as a Greek Rally or an ERE member.) Other deputies included the 
landowners G. P h ilip p id is  (Popular Party  MP in 1935 and 1946), and N. 
Baltatzis-M avrogordatos (Popular Party  MP in 1935, 1936 and 1946) ? see 
R eg is te r of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens: Greek 
Parliament Publication , 1977 (in  Greek).
9: For the creation  of EDA see footnote 109 to ch. 1; fo r the most 
serious consequences caused by the c iv i l  war, see ch. 1, and for a more 
de ta iled  bibliography concerning the c iv i l  war, see footnotes 35, 36 and 
37 to ch. 1. EDA fa ile d  to  have an MP elected  from the Department of 
L a rissa  in only two cases: in  the  1952 e le c tio n  (mainly due to  the
special m ajority  e le c to ra l system), and in 1974 a f te r  the f a l l  of the
junta (due to  the landslide fo r C. Karamanlis and h is  ND p a rty ).
10: The th ree  People's Party deputies were the lawyers C. Rodopoulos, 
J . Kyrozis, and A. N ikolaidis; fo r a d e ta iled  account of the 5 March
1950 e le c t i o n ,  see  N iko lakopou los E . , P a r t ie s  and P a rlia m e n ta ry  
E lec tio n s in Greece: 1946-1964, Athens: N ational Centre fo r Social 
Research, 1985 (in  Greek), pp. 156-73 and 394-421.
11: Both EDA and the Greek Rally were formed in August 1951, on the
1st and 6th respec tive ly ; a l l  five  Greek Rally deputies were, again,
lawyers: A. A p o s to lid is , G. K akayiannis, D. Koutsimpos, and the  ex- 
People's Party deputies J . Kyrozis and C. Rodopoulos. For the 9 Sep.
1951 e lec tio n , see Nikolakopoulos E ., op. c i t . , pp. 174-91 and 422-47.
12: The four Greek Rally MPs in 1952 were the lawyers G. Kakayiannis, 
V. K a ra b ilia s , C. Rodopoulos, and the  doctor N. Rapt i s .  In  1956, 
K aram anlis' ERE secured seven of the fou rteen  se a ts  in the  L a rissa -  
Magnesia Department with the e lec tio n  of five lawyers (A. A postolidis, 
S. E f s t r a t i a d i s , G. K akayiannis, N. M itrou, and C. Rodopoulos), one
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doctor (N. Papageorgiou, who had been e lec ted  on a lib e ra l tic k e t in 
1950), and one re t ire d  m ilita ry  o f f ic e r  (D. I a t r id is ) .
13: For a d e ta iled  account of the establishm ent of ERE, see section  
2.2 .2  in ch. 1 of th is  study.
14: The Department of L arissa  was not inmune from the e lec to ra l fraud 
and violence that marred the 1961 national e lec tio n . According to  D. 
Psathas, president of ND’s local ccnm ittee in Tymavos in 1989, sho rtly  
before po llin g  day he him self, together with various o ther then EREN 
(the ERE youth organisation) members, threatened the people in v illa g e s  
th a t  they would come to  harm u n less  they vo ted  fo r  ERE by using  the  
already marked b a llo ts  they were being given. (Interview  with the author 
in L arissa, 17 March 1989.)
15: I t  is  ind icative  of the streng th  of the c l i e n te l i s t i c  system tha t 
C. Granmatidis, who had been e lec ted  continuously with ERE frcm 1958 
onwards, was e lected  ju s t as promptly in 1964, although he had meanwhile 
changed sides to the Centre Union. As we sh a ll see below, he did almost 
the same thing again a f te r  the re s to ra tio n  of democracy: in 1974 he was 
e lected  under the banner of the Centre Union/New Forces (EK/ND), and in 
1977 with New Democracy.
16: As a then Centre Union deputy , T. K ardaras a t te s te d  th a t S. 
E fstra tiad es had b lun tly  to ld  him th a t "he leans exlusively  on h is local 
barons to  guarantee h is  p o l i t ic a l  fu tu re" . See T. Kardaras' interview  
with the monthly review Stiqmes (local L arissa e d itio n ), no. 31, April 
1989 (in  Greek), pp. 27-34.
17: In the  1977 e le c t io n ,  ND p o lle d  a poor 36.90 p er cent in the 
Department of L arissa, as opposed to  41.84 per cent nationwide; th is  
happened because the u l tr a - r ig h t  National Camp (which polled  a 6.82 per 
cent nationwide and had five  MPs elected) received a spectacular 10.31 
per cent of the votes in the Department, i . e .  i t s  16th best performance 
among the country 's 56 e le c to ra l d i s t r i c t s .
18: For a l l  th ese  rea so n s , the  Department of L a rissa  has been 
se le c te d  to  conduct our f ie ld w o rk  r e s e a rc h ,  th a t  took p la c e  from 
September 1988 u n til  Ju ly  1989. More p rec ise ly , the views and a tt i tu d e s  
of the rank-and-file  party  members th a t a re  presented below re fe r  to  a 
simple random sample of 5 per cent of the party  members in the c ity  of 
Larissa together with those of another 21 (out of 50) members in the 
v illa g e  of Kalohori (a predominantly ru ra l area with 996 inhabitan ts in 
the  eparchy of L a r is s a ) ;  fo r  more d e ta i l s  concerning the way th is  
fieldwork research was conducted, see footnote 28 below.
19: C. Rodopoulos who, as we have a lre a d y  seen , was the  most 
prominent p o l it ic a l  figure  in the area during the postwar years, had 
died during the 1967-1974 d ic ta to rsh ip .
20: In the  November 1974 e le c t io n , the Centre Union/New Forces 
(EK/ND) party  secured two parliam entary sea ts  and e lected  the well-known 
C. Grammatidis (see footnote 15 above), and the d e n tis t D. Kardaras, who 
had a lso  been a Centre Union MP in 1963 and 1964. PASOK secured one seat 
with the doctor J . F loros, who was a newcomer to  p o l i t ic s .
21: See C. H ouliaras' interview  with the author, 18 Jan. 1989 (in  
Greek), Lar i s s a , au tho r' s reco rd s.
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22: I t  is  in te re s tin g  th a t C. Grairmatidis was e lected  as the most 
popular of the four ND deputies judging by h is  11,128 preference votes; 
see 20 November 1977 E lection R esu lts , M inistry of the In te r io r , Athens 
1979 (in  Greek), vo l. I ,  pp. 38-9; see a lso  footnote 15 above.
23: For more d e ta ils  concerning the Volvi Movement, see section  4.3 
in ch. 3.
24: This was a lso  corroborated by leading L arissa party  figures in 
interview s w ith the author; among thou, A. Kondonassios, responsible for 
the trade  unions, K. Voyiatzi-Maritzou, parliam entary candidate fo r the 
June 1989 e le c tio n , C. H ouliaras, f i r s t  president of ND's departmental 
committee in L arissa , and D. Psathas, president of ND's local committee 
in Tymavos, to  mention but a few. For one reason or another none of 
them ever jo ined  the  Volvi Movement, but a l l  of them were in to ta l  
agreement w ith the Movement's demands. See th e i r  in terv iew s w ith  the 
author, a l l  conducted in L arissa on 15 and 19 Dec. 1988, 18 Jan. 1989, 
and 17 March 1989 respec tive ly  (a ll  in Greek), au th o r 's  records.
25: See K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou’s interview  with the author, 19 Dec. 1988 
( in  G reek), a u th o r 's  rec o rd s . As the  same cand idate  sa id  in another 
interview: "Although I 'd  been a pa rty  a c t iv is t  since 1981, I took up 
o f f i c i a l  p a r ty  membership in  1985 because I considered  i t  only a 
form ality"; see her interview  with the local monthly Stigmes, no. 33, 
June 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 26-7.
26: In  the  June 1989 e le c t io n , ND received  75,910 vo tes in  the 
D epartm ent o f L a r is s a ,  a  m em ber-voter r a t i o  o f 1 :1 0 .8 , th a t  i s  
co nsiderab ly  lower than i t s  a lle g e d  n a tio n a l average of 1 :7 .7 . See 
section  3.3 in ch. 4).
27: The number of members was given to  the author by the presiden ts 
of each lo ca l committee. This is  the  reason why many numbers in the 
Table a re  rounded; not one p residen t knew exactly  how many members were 
reg is te red  a t  the time (not to  mention how many were men and how many 
women). The reason they could not be more prec ise  was e ith e r  because no 
records were kept, or —most cormonly— because nobody ever troubled to 
update any e x is tin g  f i le s .  As the then secre tary  of the departmental 
adm in istra tive  committee, the lawyer C. Georgosoulis, admitted,
"The number of the reg is te red  members the party  claims in 
the  a re a  is  f i c t i t i o u s ;  u su a lly , new members appear in 
the  l i s t s  sh o r t ly  befo re  lo ca l in tr a -p a r ty  e le c t io n s , 
because candidates re c ru it  th e ir  re la tiv e s , acquaintances 
and friends to vote for than; a f te r  the e lec tion  is  over, 
most of these new members f a l l  by the wayside, having no 
o ther p a r ty -p o lit ic a l  in te re s ts " .
See h is  interview  with the author in L arissa, 30 Nov. 1988 (in Greek), 
au th o r 's  records.
28: I n i t i a l ly ,  the fieldwork research had planned drawing a 5 per 
cent sim ple random sample from the p a r ty  membership in  L a rissa  (241 
in te rv ie w e es ) , and 100 p er cen t of the  p a rty  members in  Kalohori 
(according  to  i t s  TE p re s id e n t, D. Exarhos, the  o rg an isa tio n  th e re  
numbered 50 members). I t  was agreed th a t the in terv iew s would be 
conducted face-to -face  w ith the author. Eventually, though, only the 18 
members from the c ity  cen tre  were chosen randomly, and only these 18 
interview s were conducted as agreed (the remaining 45 were never held, 
because the party  o f f ic ia ls  did not permit the author to continue, on
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the  grounds th a t  the  June 1989 e le c t io n  was c lo se  and p a rty  members 
should not be d is tu rb ed ). Due to  the absolute lack and/or the ou t-o f- 
d a te  p a rty  rec o rd s , the  local-com m ittee p re s id e n ts  d i s t r ib u te d  the 
questionnaires themselves, assuring the author they would do th e ir  best 
to  choose members in such a way as to  provide a  rep resen ta tive  p ic tu re  
of th e ir  local o rganisation . To what extent they succeeded cannot be 
assessed, the more so since very few of than returned a l l  the completed 
questionnaires; the m ajority returned fewer than received or even none 
a t  a l l .  (T ab le  V I. 4a below x - ra y s ,  so to  speak , t h i s  f ie ld w o rk  
re se a rc h .) I t  is  therefo re  obvious, th a t th is  fieldwork research  cannot 
claim s c ie n t if ic  p rec ision . N evertheless, i t  provides us with useful and 
im portan t in s id e  in fo rm a tio n , and so h e lp s  us a c q u ire  a b e t t e r  
understanding of the s tru c tu re  and functioning of ND's o rganisation  a t 
the local le v e l .
Table VI.4a: ND Organisation in L arissa  and Kalohori in 1989: Number of 
Questionnaires D istribu ted  and Returned
Ques t  i onnai res Questionnaires
Number of D istribu ted  to Returned to
Local Committee (TE) in: Members TE Presidents the author
Philippoupolis 480 24 24
Neapolis 400 20 20
Anthoupolis 300 15 None
Ag. Konstantinos 600 30 20
Pyrovolika 127 6 3
Hippocrates 233 12 3
Averoff 108 6 6
Ag. Georgios 230 10 None
Ambelokipoi 198 10 7
Nea Smyrni 175 9 6
Neraida 209 10 9
40 Martyres 270 14 14
Haravghi 238 12 7
Centre 1260 63 18
Total 4828 241 137
TE of Kalohori 50 50 21
Sum to ta l 4878 291 158
29: See, fo r exanple, Tables I I I .18 and 19 in ch . 3. Nevertheless,
a l l  fourteen p residen ts of the local conmittees in L arissa as a lso  the 
one in Kalohori, were men. (H ereafter, a l l  Tables in the tex t represent 
data re su ltin g  from my own research —Sep. 1988 u n til  Ju l. 1989— unless 
otherwise s ta te d .)
30: See the local review Thessalikes Epiloqes (a monthly pub lication  
of the d a ily  E le f th e r ia ) , no. 35, August 1989 (in  Greek), p. 15, where 
i t  i s  a ls o  no ted  th a t  d u rin g  th e  1987 and 1988 summer f e s t i v a l s  
organised by ONNED, i t  was mainly e ld e rly  members and supporters who 
attended ra th e r than the younger generation.
31: On the  o th e r  hand, i t  is  noteworthy th a t  a t  the  time th is  
fieldwork research took p lace, the president and the secre tary  of ND's 
departm ental committee in L a rissa  were both law yers, and the  v ic e -  
p re s id en t was a d o c to r. Moreover, out of the th ree  MPs a t  the  time 
(Souflias, E fs tra tia d is  and K atsaros), two were c iv i l  engineers, and one 
lawyer.
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32: I t  should be a lso  added th a t 15 out of the 137 members in L arissa 
(10.95 per cent) were old-age pensioners, whereas there was not one in 
the organisation  of Kalohori. (Let us a lso  note here th a t in Table V I.7 
a s  w ell a s  in  th e  d iagram  o f F ig u re  6 .1 , " s a la r ie d  p ro fe s s io n s "  
re p re se n t sa la ry -an d  w age-earners, whereas " l ib e ra l  professions" the 
self-em ployed.)
33: Another fac t th a t can explain th is  d if fe re n tia tio n  in Kalohori is  
tha t only 21 members answered the questionnaires, although the local TE 
presiden t claimed th a t there  were 50 reg is te red  members. I t  may then be 
assumed th a t those 21 members were the  most co n sc ien tio u s and a c t iv e  
ones, and not some who had joined the party  la te r ,  due to  p e rso n a lis tic  
u t i l i t a r i a n  reasons or wider speculation .
34: As th e re  a re  no r e le v a n t  d a ta  co n ce rn in g  e i t h e r  th e  Greek 
population in general, or ran k -an d -file  members of o ther p a r t ie s , one 
cannot make comparisons concerning the degree of p o l i t ic is a t io n  of ND 
members in L arissa . N evertheless, there  is  a widespread b e lie f  th a t the 
members of the communist pa rty  (KKE) as well as those of PASOK are  much 
more engaged a lso  in o rgan isations lik e  the trade unions, ag ric u ltu ra l 
c o -o p e ra tiv e s , and p ro fe s s io n a l a sso c ia tio n s  — in o th e r  words, th a t 
th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s  are  not lim ited  to the ranks of th e ir  pa rty .
35: I t  is  worth noting th a t while 14.6 per cent of the rank and f i l e  
in L arissa joined the party  in order to  help i t s  o rganisational growth 
and development, not one member d id  so in Kalohori; i t  seems th a t the 
organisation  there  had been created  and formed well before th is  happened 
in  the  c i ty  o f L a r is s a , which ex p la in s  why the  average p a rty -ag e  in  
Kalohori exceeded th a t  in  L a ris sa  by th ree  years (9 .7  years to  6.65 
years resp ec tiv e ly , see Table V I.8 above).
36: This point was a lso  made by K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou, ND parliam entary 
cand idate  fo r  the  June 1989 e le c t io n ,  during  an in te rv iew  w ith  the 
author in L arissa , 19 Dec. 1988 (in  Greek), au th o r 's  records.
37: According to  the party  s ta tu te s , a new member has the r ig h t to 
vo te  —or to  be a can d id a te— only  a f t e r  s ix  months from the day of 
re g is tra tio n ; see A rtic le  5 .1 .a (Rights and Obligations of Members), in 
ND: Ideological P rinc ip les and Party S ta tu te s , Athens: ND Publication, 
1986 (in  Greek), p. 13, and a lso  footnote 27 above. Moreover, several 
p re s id e n ts  o f ND lo ca l committees in  L a rissa  adm itted  th a t only a 
percentage of the members in th e ir  organisations were ac tiv e . G. Bohoris 
(P h ilip p o u p o lis  TE) sa id  th a t  le s s  than h a lf  of the 480 re g is te re d  
members a re  r e a l l y  i n te r e s te d  and a c t iv e ;  G. P apan iko laou  (Ag. 
Konstantinos TE), said  tha t almost h a lf (40%—45%) of the 600 members 
were in ac tiv e , whereas C. Z a fir is  (Ag. Georgios TE) claimed tha t only 5% 
of the  230 rank and f i l e  th e re  a b s ta in ed  from loca l o rg a n isa tio n a l 
a c t iv i t ie s .  (Nevertheless, the f i r s t  returned a l l ,  and the second part 
of the d is tr ib u te d  questionnaires, while the th ird  returned none a t a l l ,  
as shown in Table VI.4a in  footnote 28 above).
38: Party members were asked to name the most important issues th e ir  
local organisation  had d ea lt with during the past year (tha t i s ,  twelve 
months before the 18 June 1989 e le c tio n ) , and were allowed to  give more 
than one answer.
39: We have already discussed th is  term when examining the general 
record and performance of the National Radical Union (ERE, see section  
2 .2 .6  in  ch . 1 ). S u f f ic e  i t  to  add h e re  th a t  paleokommat i sm os, 
v o u lefto k ra tia  (deputocracy), and ro u sfe ti complement each other i f  they
450
a re  not a c tu a l ly  synonymous, and have c h a r a c te r is e d  a l l  p re-1967  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  ecxept the  coirmunist ones. In the  f i r s t  few years 
a f t e r  1974, th e se  phenomena were much le s s  marked though s t i l l  
d is s e rn ib le  w ith in  ND ranks; PASOK managed to  d is so c ia te  i t s e l f  from 
then to  a  considerable ex tent by a spectacular renewal of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  
personnel and, m ainly, by developing a w e ll-s tru c tu re d  and m il i ta n t  
m ass-organisation.
40: The lo c a l o rg a n is a t io n s  in  L a r is s a  a p a r t ,  ONNED too  fa c e s  
economic sh o rtag es . As M. Kondonassiou-Tsigani (ONNED p re s id e n t in 
Larissa) sa id , "The surrmer fe s tiv a l we organised in September 1988 in 
Larissa ended with a financ ia l d e f ic i t ,  and ONNED is  s t i l l  having to 
ra ise  funds to pay for i t " ;  see her interview with the author, 3 Dec. 
1988, and a lso  Thessalikes Epiloqes, no. 35, August 1989, p. 15 (both in 
Greek).
41: These remarks have been corroborated by numerous discussions with 
various TE p residen ts, but a lso  with other higher party  o f f ic ia ls  in 
L arissa. J . Bohoris, president of the Philippoupolis TE, to ld  the author 
(interview  of 29 Nov. 1988):
"A lth o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  480 m em bers r e g i s t e r e d  in  
P h ilip p o u p o lis  TE, most of them a re  le s s  than lukewarm.
They are  farmers and th e ir  m entality  is  to ta l ly  d iffe ren t 
from, for example, th a t of workers, who ra l ly  more ea s ily  
and are  generally  acquain ted  w ith o rg a n isa tio n a l is su e s .
A lso, women members a tte n d  o rg an isa tio n a l m eetings very 
seldom, because th ey  f e a r  t h e i r  husbands, who deep ly  
m istrust local-o rgan isation  meetings and a c t iv i t ie s .  I t ' s  
very d i f f ic u l t  fo r us to m obilise our members, even when 
the  co st [ t ic k e ts ,  accomodation, e tc .]  is  pa id  by the 
p a rty " .
For more d e ta ils  on the pers istence  of c l ie n te l i s t ic  p rac tices  prim arily  
responsible fo r n eu tra lis in g  the local organisations in the eparchies 
and for the general ind ifference of the rank and f i l e ,  see section  4 
below in th is  chapter.
42: Party members were asked whether they were s a t i s f i e d  w ith the 
a c t i v i t i e s  of th e i r  loca l o rg a n isa tio n , and i f  n o t, what more they 
expected. The f i r s t  p a rt of the question was a closed one, requ iring  
e ith e r  "yes", or "in p a rt" , o r "no" fo r an answer; the second was open, 
and members could l i s t  more than one expectation.
43: The question was "In terms of in ternal democratic procedures in 
the decision-making process, do you think that ND's leadership d if fe r s  
from tha t of the o ther p a rtie s?  I f  y es/in  p a rt, in what way?"
44: The question was "Which, in your view, are  the most important 
reasons th a t exp la in  ND's appeal to  the  v o te rs? " , and more than one 
answer was accepted.
45: For these poin ts in general, and for rousfe ti in p a r tic u la r , see 
section 4.2 in ch. 3, and footnotes 48 and 49 to the same chapter.
46: The sp ec ific  question ND rank and f i l e  were asked was: "In the 
p re -d ic ta to r ia l period, when somebody wanted to get something important 
from the s ta te  (e .g .,  to  find  a job, to get a loan, to avoid lengthy 
b u rea u c ra tic  red  tape , e t c . ) ,  he would most probably ask i t  as a 
personal favour from h is  local deputy in exchange for h is  vote. Has th is
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also  been the case, (a) from 1974 u n til  1981? and (b) from 1981 u n til  
today?” .
47: We shou ld  a ls o  n o te  a t  t h i s  p o in t  th a t  th e re  i s  ag a in  a 
r e la t iv e ly  high p ercen tage  of the  rank and f i l e  who gave no answer 
concerning the  e x is te n c e  of c l i e n t e l i s t i c  r e la t io n s  during  PASOK's 
period in o ff ic e  (30 members or 18.99 per cent, see Table VI. 19 in  the 
te x t) ;  a l l  in a l l ,  there  a re  22 members who gave no answer for e ith e r  
period. Table VI. 18a below presen ts the age and party-age d is tr ib u tio n  
of the "don’t  knows" fo r 1974-1981, fo r 1981-1989, and a lso  fo r both 
periods (a ll  numbers re fe r  to  members, L stands for L arissa and K fo r 
Kalohori).
Table VI. 18a: Age and Party-Age D istribu tion  of Members in L arissa and 
Kalohori (who gave no answer concerning the existence of 
c l i e n te l i s t i c  re la tio n s , see footnote 46 above)
ND
Period
PASOK
Period
Both
Periods
ND
Period
PASOK
Period
Both
Periods
Age L K L K L K Party age L K L K L K
Under 35 6 — 5 — 3 — 0-4 years 21 19 — 15 —
35-44 8 3 8 2 5 2 5-8 years 7 3 5 2 2 2
45-54 12 8 — 7 — 9-12 years 2 2 — 2
55-64 7 5 — 5 — 13-15 years 5 — 2 — 1
65-over 1 2
No answer 1
Total 35 3 28 2 20 2 Total 35 3 28 2 20 2
Since during both periods most party  members were of an age to have some 
knowledge of p o l i t ic s  and everyday l i f e ,  they should have been able to 
give some answer. (At the time of the fieldwork research the m ajority  
of them were between 35 and 54 years o ld , which means tha t even during 
ND’s f i r s t  period in o ff ic e  they were between 20 and 39). On the o ther 
hand, the la rg e  m a jo rity  of them re g is te re d  in the p a rty  only a f t e r  
1985, and might not have been much acquainted with such issues before 
th a t .  We th ink  the  second exp lana tion  is  much le ss  l ik e ly  than the 
f i r s t ,  since p a tro n -c lien t re la tio n s  and ro u sfe ti requests are  everyday 
e x p e rie n c e s  in  Greek p o l i t i c s ;  c o n se q u e n tly , and a t  th e  r i s k  of 
overgeneralisation , we believe  that most of these members simply refused 
to give a d e f in ite  answer concerning th is  sen sitiv e  and, most o ften , 
s t r i c t ly  personal issue.
48: I t  is  s ig n i f ic a n t  to  note th a t the g rea t m ajo rity  of p a rty  
members in Kalohori, who liv e  in a sm aller and less a liena ted  society  
than th e ir  urban counterparts in L arissa, do not h e s ita te  to acknowledge 
that c l ien te l ism charac terised  the f i r s t  period of ND in o ff ice  (71.43 
per cent in K alohori, compared to  only 28.47 per cent in  L a r is s a ) ;  
moreover, 66.67 per cent in Kalohori believe tha t nothing has changed in 
th is  respect since 1974, compared to only 16.79 per cent in L arissa.
49: For the phenomenon of "bureaucratic cl ien te l ism" see footnote 50 
to ch. 3, and a lso  footnote 137 to  ch. 4.
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50: This system was used only fo r the June 1985 national e lec tio n , 
when the e le c to ra l l i s t s  of PASOK and ND were drawn up so le ly  by the 
party  leaderships. In the Department of L arissa, ND polled  39.21 per 
cent of the vote and secured th ree  out of the eight sea ts  a llo te d  fo r 
the whole area; the f i r s t ,  second, and th ird  candidates on the party  
l i s t  were sen t to  parliam ent (S o u flia s , K atsaros, and E f s t r a t ia d i s  
re sp ec tiv e ly ) .
51: The question "Do you think th a t the ab o litio n  of the preference- 
cross has contributed to  the promotion of p o l i t ic a l  m orality  and, in a 
broader s e n s e t o  the coun try 's  p o l i t ic a l  p rac tices?" was a closed one, 
followed by an open " If  y es /in  p a r t , why?", or " If  no, why not?".
52: As we have already discussed (see section  3.3 in ch. 4), p a rty - 
d ire c te d  patronage c h a ra c te r ise d  a lso  ND's o rganised  base a f t e r  the  
party  resumed o ff ice  in 1990. The only d ifference  with PASOK's record in 
th is  respect was th a t in ND i t  was not only the party  organisation  tha t 
performed th is  o f f ic e ,  but a lso  c e r ta in  se n io r p a rty  n o tab les  and 
d e p u tie s , whose personal c l ie n te le s  assu red  them of some degree of 
autonomy towards both the leadership and the organised party  base, as we 
shall see below.
53: The q uestions asked read  as fo llow s: "As you know, the  f in a l  
nomination of ND cand idates fo r  parliam ent i s  e x c lu s iv e ly  the  p a rty  
p re s id e n t's  re sp o n sib ility . Do you personally  agree with th is  procedure? 
I f  not, what is  your personal suggestion?" According to  the revised  1986 
party  s ta tu te s  (see ND: Ideological P rinc ip les and Party S ta tu te s , op. 
c i t . , A r t ic le  20, pp. 25-7 ), "The ND p re s id e n t f in a l ly  s e le c ts  the 
candidates and forms the  e le c to ra l  l i s t s ,  b a s ic a lly  from among those 
proposed by the departmental assem blies". Nevertheless, as no e lec tions 
had been held between 1986 and the time of the fieldwork research , th is  
sp ec ific  provision had never been enforced (see a lso  footnotes 122 and 
123 to ch. 4).
54: For more d e ta i l s  on these  is su e s , see se c tio n  4.1 in ch. 3, 
Tables I I I . 22 and 23. For an an a ly tica l p resen ta tion  of th e ir  answers, 
see Appendix V III.
55: See a lso  section 4 in ch. 4, Tables IV.5 and 6. For an an a ly tica l 
presen tation  of th e ir  answers, see Appendix V III.
56: For the e laboration  of the 1985 ideological manifesto see section  
3.1 in ch. 5.
57: The question (a closed one) was as follows: "Have you personally  
read the id eo lo g ica l d e c la ra tio n  of the  p a rty  'A New Proposal fo r 
Freedom' of 3 Feb. 1985?"
58: Party members were asked "Which of the  fo llow ing p a r ty - la b e ls  
would you choose to id en tify  ND today?", and were allowed to give more 
than one.
59: This is  e x p lic i t ly  s ta ted  in the p a r ty 's  1986 revised s ta tu te s :  
" I t  is  a popular party , a party  of the people as an e n tity , and not a 
party  representing  a ce rta in  c la ss  or dependent on a p a r tic u la r  in te re s t  
group". See ND: Ideological P rincip les and Party S ta tu te s , op. c i t . , pp. 
3-8, and Appendix VI of th is  study (see a lso  footnote 96 to ch. 5).
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60: The party  members were asked whether they thought ND represented 
a social c la ss  or c la sses , and in case of an affirm ative answer they 
were fu rth er asked to  name which one(s) in p a rtic u la r .
61: The q u estio n  read  as fo llow s: "As you know, ND f ig h ts  fo r 
liberalism , where the free  market economy is  dominant. Would you expect 
some kind of d i r e c t , personal b e n e fit, i f  ND resumed o ffice?  I f  yes, of 
what kind?" (the underlin ings were mine).
62: See M. Kondonassiou-Tsigani's interview  with the author, 3 Dec. 
1988. The same v iew s w ere s h a re d  by K. V o y ia tz i-M a n tz o u , ND 
parliam entary candidate fo r the June 1989 e lec tio n . See her interview  
w ith  the  au th o r, 19 Dec. 1988 (both in te rv iew s in Greek, a u th o r 's  
records). For the inportance of "material in cen tives . .. as an inducement 
to  jo in  a p a r ty "  see  v . Beyme K. , P o l i t i c a l  P a r t ie s  in  W estern 
Democracies, New York: S t. M artin 's  P ress, 1985, pp. 172-3.
63: When ND lo s t i t s  f i r s t  e lec tio n  in 1981, i t s  MPs replaced the 
leader, G. Rail i s ,  with E. Averoff. When Averoff, in turn , lo s t ND the 
1984 Euro-elect ion, C. M itsotakis became the new leader. In 1985, when 
ND lo st the national e lec tio n  again, i t s  leader kept h is post, not only 
because he had held i t  fo r only a few months, but a lso  because there was 
no one of su ff ic ie n t s ta tu re  le f t  to  succeed him. This meant tha t when 
a f te r  the p a r ty 's  next defeat he asked for a vote of confidence, he got 
i t  ra th e r e a s ily  (see a lso  footnote 86 to  ch. 4). But when ND lo s t the 
10 Oct. 1993 e le c tio n s , M itsotakis could no longer remain to  the party  
leadership and he resigned (fo r the events tha t led to th is  e lec tio n , 
see footnote 84 to  ch. 3 and footnote 130 to  ch. 5).
64: I t  should be mentioned a t th is  point tha t E. Groussopoulos was a 
former EKOF member when he was a student in Salonica in the mid-1960s 
(for th is  organ isation  see section  2 .2 .2 . (b) ( i i )  in ch. 1 above and a lso  
footnote 143 to  the same chapter). For more d e ta ils  on the composition 
of th is  special e lec tio n  conmittee and the members heading each secto r 
see K alessis A ., "New Democracy in L arissa: The b e ll for the f in a l round 
has rung", in the monthly local review Thessalikes Epiloqes, no. 28, 
January 1989 (in Greek), pp. 17-9.
65: The four deputies were A. T sa ldaris , A. Xarhas, C. Simeoforidis 
and A. E fs tra tiad is?  there  were no sp ec ific  c r i t e r i a  for th is  corrmittee 
to reach i t s  decisions, but the applicant had to submit a curriculum 
v ita e ,  and in seme cases there  was an oral examination concerning h is /  
her knowledge of ND's p o l i t ic a l  programme and broader personal p o l it ic a l  
ambitions.
66: See Y iourm etak is A. , "ND lo c a l  o rg a n is a t io n :  48 p o l i t i c a l  
executives 'reco rd ' themselves w aiting for th is  'recording ' to pay o ff" , 
in the local monthly review Stiqmes, no. 29, February 1989 (in  Greek),
pp. 16-8.
67: Ib id .
68: According to  the presiden t of the LO of Tyrnavos, D. Psathas, 
th is  was the most im portant reason th a t the in s t i tu t io n  of p o l it ic a l  
executives eventually  fa ile d ; see h is  interview  with the author, 17 Mar. 
1989 (in  Greek), a u th o r 's  records.
69: For these po in ts see a lso  the (unsigned) a r t ic le  "ND in L arissa: 
The p ro je c t of p o l i t i c a l  execu tives d id  not work", in T hessa likes 
Epiloqes, no. 29, February 1989 (in Greek), p. 7.
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70: For more d e ta i l s  on the  com position and fu n c tio n in g  of th is  
assembly, see section  3.3 in ch. 4).
71: See the  loca l d a ily  newspaper E le f th e r ia , 24 A pril 1989 (in  
Greek).
72: See ND: Id eo lo g ica l P r in c ip le s  and P arty  S ta tu te s , op. c i t . , 
A rtic le  20.B.OT, pp. 26-7.
73: The f i r s t  seven cand idates in  the  Department o f L a rissa  were 
(with the vo tes they received in b rackets): N. Mairmonas (425), G. Bisbais 
(331), V. Voyiatzi-M antzou (297), C. K arayiannis (275), J .  S o tir io u  
(225), J . Papadimopoulos (218), and D. Fakis (217).
74: G. B isbas had become famous fo r  breaking the s ta te -c o n tro lle d  
te le v is io n  monopoly in December 1988, by s e t t in g  up a s a te l l i te -T V  
antenna in Livadi, tha t received and transm itted  two foreign s a t e l l i t e  
programmes over a radius of almost 50 kms; see h is  interview  with A. 
K alessis, "Livadi in the s a t e l l i t e  e ra" , in Thessalikes Epiloqes, no. 
28, January 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 29-31.
75: Concerning the lawyer J . Papadimopoulos, who was chosen fo r the 
c a n d id a te s ' l i s t ,  i t  shou ld  be n o ted  th a t  he had been a p p o in te d  
secre tary  to  the M inister of A griculture under the d ic ta to rsh ip , and had 
a lso  been appointed mayor of L arissa a t  tha t same time; h is  inclusion  in 
the l i s t  was intended to syphon votes from the u l tr a - r ig h t ,  which was 
figh ting  the e lec tio n  independently. In the end, he was not e lec ted  to  
the House, but succeeded in the  subsequent e le c tio n  (November 1989), 
mainly because A. E fs tra tia d is  had meanvrtiile r e t ire d  frcxn p o l i t ic s  and 
—as i t  was widely rumoured— bequeathed Papadimopoulos h is  p o l i t ic a l  
c lie n te le .
76: B isbas' declara tion  was published on the front page of the local 
weekly newspaper Hora, no. 8, 29 May 1989 (in Greek). I t  should be added 
here th a t the ND president d id  not v io la te  the party  s ta tu te s  when he 
decided to  exclude these two candidates in favour of another two who had 
equally  been voted fo r by the  rank and f i l e .  When he made s im ila r  
d e c is io n s  in o th e r departm ents (Ioannina, Im athia, S a lon ica , Chios, 
Serres, Xanthi, K asto ria ), he caused resignations there too, storms of 
p ro te s t and demonst r a t  ions. In only one case, namely in the Department 
of Lakonia in the Peloponnese, was the c an d id a te -lis t proposed by the 
rank and f i l e  to ta l ly  disregarded and a ccnpletely  d iffe re n t one drawn 
up by the p residen t. Not even then were the party  s ta tu te s  v io la ted , 
because they s tip u la te  tha t the f in a l choice should be made by the party  
le a d e r  s e l e c t i n g  " b a s i c a l l y  from  among th o s e  p ro p o se d  by th e  
departmental assemblies" (see footnote 72 above). Nevertheless, in a l l  
these cases, the declared w ill of the g rass-roo ts was being se t a side , 
and in tra -p a rty  democracy badly wounded.
77: When ND's candidate-1 i s t  was o f f ic ia l ly  announced, most of the 
p o l i t ic a l  executives e ith e r  withdrew of th e ir  own accord or put in much 
fewer appearances, since i t  was obvious they would not now be included 
in the party  l i s t .
78: See K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou's interview  with the author, 19 Dec. 1988 
(in Greek), au th o r 's  records.
79: In  h is  p u b l ic  a d d r e s s ,  M i ts o ta k i s  m ain ly  a n a ly s e d  ND's 
governmental programme for ag ric u ltu re , as the area of Thessaly is  a 
centre  fo r farming and c a tt le - ra is in g . Although the party  had mobilised
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members and supporters a lso  from places o ther than Thessaly (a p rac tice  
tha t was a lso  followed by PASOK, because these r a l l ie s  were te lev ised , 
so both p a r t ie s  were try in g  to  impress the  e le c to ra te  n a tio n w id e), 
ob jective and neu tra l observers a tte s te d  th a t ND's 1989 ra l ly  was the 
biggest ever held in L arissa , much bigger than tha t of 1985, and bigger 
than even PASOK's. On M itso tak is ' speech and the r a l ly ,  see the weekly 
local newspaper Hora, no. 8, 29 May 1989 (in  Greek), p. 8 and pp. 17-8.
80: According to  the  s t a tu te s ,  50 members c o n s t i tu te  the  minimum 
number necessary fo r the establishm ent of a separate local organisation ; 
see ND: Ideological P rinc ip les and Party S ta tu te s , op. c i t . , A rtic le  
2 1 .2 , p . 27, and P e r ip h e ra l  O rg a n is a tio n  R e g u la tio n , A thens: ND 
Publication , 26 March 1987 (in  Greek), A rtic le  6 .2 , p. 4.
81: Two of the most recent such instances were reported to  the author 
by M. K ondonassiou -T sigan i (ONNED p r e s id e n t  in  L a r i s s a ) ,  namely 
co n ce rn in g  th e  v i l l a g e s  o f Myra and Qmorphohori, where no lo c a l  
o rg a n isa tio n s  were ever s e t  up. This inform ation  was v e r i f ie d  by ND 
candidate K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou (see th e ir  interviews with the author, 3 
and 19 Dec. 1988 r e s p e c t iv e ly ) .  C. H ouliaras ( f i r s t  e le c te d  as NODE 
president in L arissa  in 1975, who nevertheless withdrew from ND in 1981) 
said  th a t the party  organisation  in  the Department of L arissa has qu ite  
o ften  su ffe re d  from p ra c t ic e s  of th i s  kind ever s ince  1975 (see h is  
interview  with the author, 18 Jan. 1989).
82: The re-em ergence of t r a d i t io n a l  p ra c tic e s  and c l i e n t e l i s t i c  
p o l i t i c s  in  the  Department of L a rissa  sh o r t ly  before  the  June 1989 
e lec tio n , was due a lso  to  the fac t th a t the PASOK government, which had 
introduced the lis t-sy stem  (th a t was supposed to  have been permanent, 
and designed to  e lim in a te  c l i e n t e l i s t i c  r e la t io n s ) ,  fo r reasons tha t 
were never explained had chosen to  rev e rt to  the system of preference- 
cross voting  (on these two d iffe re n t systems see footnotes 11, 15 and 50 
to ch. 3 and footnote 117 to ch. 4). In consequence, try ing  to  secure as 
many preference-crosses as they could, ND candidates qu ite  frequently  
by-passed the party  organ isation  and estab lished  personal contact with 
v o te rs . PASOK p o l i t i c i a n s ,  fo r  th e i r  p a r t ,  a lso  became r a th e r  more 
suscep tib le  to c lien te lism , a lb e it  to a much lesse r ex ten t, given tha t 
PASOK was b e tte r  and more s t r i c t l y  organised and, a t lea s t a t  the local 
leve l, the party  apparatus always had the upper hand.
83: See K. Voyiatzi-M antzou's interview  with the author, op. c i t .
84: Concerning the example of the eparchy of Elassona, i t  is  worth 
mentioning th a t Fakis a f te r  h is  defeat was not returned to  the party  
l i s t  fo r the November 1989 and April 1990 e lec tio n s , in favour of Bisbas 
who, nevertheless, fa ile d  both times.
85: In  1974 and in  1977, S o u f l ia s  re c e iv e d  11,146 and 10,838 
preference votes respec tive ly  and was e lected  second (a f te r  the ex-ERE 
deputy S. E fs tra tia d is  in the former case, who received 13,555 votes, 
and C. Grarrmatidis, in the l a t t e r ,  who received 11,108 vo tes). In 1981, 
he received 18,176 votes and was e lected  f i r s t  (fa r  ahead of the second, 
N. K atsaros, who rece iv ed  8,998 v o te s ) ;  and in  1985 he was e le c te d  
w ithout p re fe ren ce  v o te s , p o s itio n e d  in  f i r s t  p lace  in  the  p a r ty 's  
candidate l i s t  in the Department of L arissa.
86: For a d e ta iled  p resen ta tion  of the functioning of th is  corrmittee 
and of ND's governmental policy  proposals, see section  3.2 in ch. 5.
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87: In 1981, Katsaros was e lected  second a f te r  Souflias, and in 1985 
he was positioned  second (again behind Souflias) in the party  l i s t .
88: Apart frcxn the local o rganisations, Katsaros enjoyed the support 
of several re lig io u s  organisations in L arissa. In order to catch as many 
vo tes as p o s s ib le , he employed a p o p u l is t ic a l ly  s im p lis tic  p o l i t ic a l  
d isc o u rse , not h e s i ta t in g  to  endorse almost everyone 's demands and 
ex p ec ta tio n s . Under the re tro g re s s iv e  and outmoded lead ersh ip  of E. 
Averoff he p a rtic ip a te d  in ceremonies organised to  conmemorate a l l  those 
"slaughtered by caimunist rebels" during the c iv il  war (for these events 
see section  4 in ch. 4 and footnote 152 to the same chapter), whereas 
only a few years la te r  we find  him among the f i r s t  five  ND deputies who 
followed the modem, neo -libera l C. M itsotakis and pu tting  forward h is  
candidacy fo r the party  leadership. On a l l  these points see Yiourmetakis 
A ., "N. K atsaros versus G. S o u flia s : The f i r s t  round completed, the  
second w ill be more in te res tin g " , in Stiqmes, no. 34, July 1989, pp. 
14-6, and Apostolopoulou M. , "N. K atsaros: M orality , consistency and 
c o n tin u ity  in the  p o l i t i c a l  a rena" , in  T hessalikes E p iloqes, 1989 
Election Special Issue, 11 June 1989, pp. 24-5 (both in Greek).
89: I t  goes without saying tha t in a p o l it ic a l  system characterised  
by cl ien te l ism, a governmental post means considerable power because i t  
involves control over the se lec tiv e  d is tr ib u tio n  of spo ils  to vo ters and 
supporters —and so makes fo r a la rger p o l it ic a l  c lie n te le  and, more 
often  than not, the incumbent's re -e lec tio n .
90: As already mentioned, in the afterm ath of the June 1989 e lec tio n  
a sh o rt-liv ed  c o a litio n  government was formed between ND and the l e f t -  
wing SYN (fo r  a b r ie f  p re se n ta tio n  of the events th a t  follow ed th is  
e lec tion  see section  5.1 in ch. 5), and new e lec tions were to  be held 
again  in  November of the  same year. From June to  November the  p re ­
e le c tio n  c lim ate  p e r s is te d ,  and so d id  the personal co n flic t between 
S o u flias  and K atsaros —which, furtherm ore, came r ig h t  out in to  the 
open. U ntil the  o f f i c i a l  announcement of the f in a l  r e s u l ts  in  the 
Department of L arissa, i t  was widely believed th a t Katsaros had received 
more votes than Souflias and was e lected  f i r s t .  This rumour, o rig in a tin g  
from ND's departm en ta l com m ittee in  L a r is s a ,  became news and was 
announced as such by the  rad io  s ta t io n s ,  whereupon K atsaros made a 
public statement to  thank the people for th e ir  support and confidence 
in h is  person. When in due course the mistake was acknowledged, Souflias 
made a sta tem ent in h is  tu rn , and expressed h is  d isg u s t w ith  such 
d e lib e ra te  and u n e th ica l m is-inform at ion. A s e r ie s  of sta tem ents and 
counter-statem ents were made by the two p o lit ic ia n s , because Katsaros 
took S ouflias ' denunciation personally  and made a public reply , and so 
did Souflias again, thus revealing  a long-lived mutual enmity that dated 
back to 1981. For a d e ta iled  account of these events, see Yiourmetakis 
A ., "N. K atsaros versus G. S o u f l i a s : . . . " ,  op . c i t . , and a lso  the 
unsigned a r t i c le  "Crusades and crusaders: For L a rissa 's  ND, the e lec tio n  
was not fo r the p a rty  but fo r  the cand idates on ly", in T hessa likes 
Epiloqes, no. 33, June 1989 (in  Greek), pp. 8-9.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
1: Concerning ND’s foundation in 1974, one m y  point to  s im ila r it ie s  
with p a rtie s  created  in o ther countries th a t emerged a t  about the same 
time frcm the ru le  by d ic ta to r ia l  regimes —for example the Spanish UCD 
(Democratic C entre P arty ) o r  the  Portuguese Democratic Centre (CDS). 
Nevertheless, the UCD "...w as an ideo log ica lly  heterogeneous federation  
of L ib e ra ls , C h r is tia n  Democrats and former Franco supporters w ith a 
strong o rien ta tio n  to  le a d e r p e rs o n a l i t ie s "  and " i t  d is in te g ra te d  in 
1982” (in English o r ig in a lly ) ;  see von Beyme K ., P o lit ic a l P a rtie s  in 
Western Democracies, New York: S t. M artin 's Press, 1985, p. 57. As fa r  
as New Democracy is  concerned we agree with Macridis th a t ND "was, a t 
le a s t  in i t s  in ce p tio n , a r e p l ic a  of the  Union fo r the  New Republic 
founded by C harles de G aulle when he re tu rn ed  to  French p o l i t i c s  in  
1958" (in  E nglish  o r ig in a l ly ) ;  see M acridis R. C ., "E lec tio n s and 
p o lit ic a l  modernization in Greece", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece a t 
the  P o lls : The N ational E le c tio n s  of 1974 and 1977, Washington and 
London: American E nterprise  I n s t i tu te  fo r Public Policy Research, 1981, 
p. 10. (Henceforth, a l l  quotations are  frcm English-language te x ts ) .
2: On the B r i t i s h  C onservatives see Hartman J . ,  "Great B r i ta in " , 
vo l. 2, in Raschke J .  and K atsoulis H. (eds), Western European P o lit ic a l  
P a r t ie s , 2 vo ls, Athens: P a r a t i r i t i s ,  1990 (in  Greek), pp. 219-35.
3: The reason why PASOK po lled  b e tte r  in semi -urban and ru ra l areas 
was tha t one of i t s  most important reforms while in government was the 
e s ta b lish m e n t o f a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e ra tiv e s , which r e v i t a l i s e d  the  
agrarian  secto r; see K ario tis  T. C., "The r i s e  and f a l l  of the green 
sun", in  K a r io t i s  T. C. ( e d ) , The Greek S o c i a l i s t  E xperim ent: 
Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989, New York: P e lla  Publishing Company, In c ., 
1992, pp. 11-33.
4: As there a re  no re levan t data  av a ilab le , these tendencies cannot 
ye t be su b s ta n tia te d . N ev erth e less , s im ila r  tren d s concerning b e tte r  
po lling  in ru ra l than urban areas, and a g rea ter appeal to  the upper 
than the lower c la s s e s  a re  found in o th e r West European conservative 
p a r tie s ;  see, fo r example, Medhurst K ., "Spanish Conservative P o li t ic s " , 
in Layton-Henry Z. (ed ), Conservative P o lit ic s  in Western Europe, New 
York: S t. M a rtin 's  P re ss , 1982, ch. 12. For p r iv a te /p u b lic  s e c to r  
occupation as a so c io -p o litic a l cleavage a ffec tin g  e le c to ra l behaviour, 
see Raschke J . and K atsoulis H. (eds), op. c i t . , vo l. 1, pp. 456-62.
5: During i t s  ea rly  years ND was a cl ien te l i s t i c  party , but not on 
the sc a le  of the  C h ris tia n  Democrats in Southern I t a ly ;  fo r th is  
p a r t ic u la r  form of p a rty  o rg a n is a tio n , see C aciag li M., "The mass 
c lie n te lis m  p a rty  and c o n se rv a tiv e  p o l i t i c s :  C h ris tia n  Democracy in 
Southern I ta ly " , in Layton-Henry Z. (ed), op. c i t . , ch. 7.
6: At the same time ERE made use of a host of s ta te  and p a ra -s ta te  
o rg a n isa tio n s , to  e n su re  th e  e x c lu s io n  of i t s  opponents from any 
p o lit ic a l  p a rtic ip a tio n  whatsoever, to intim idate the e le c to ra te , and so 
secure i t s  vote; i f  a l l  these means proved in su ff ic ie n t, the party  did 
not h e s ita te  to  re so r t to  e le c to ra l violence and fraud (for d e ta i ls  see 
ch. 1). A ll these  p ra c t ic e s  were inheren t fe a tu re s  of the  post-w ar 
so c io -p o litic a l regime u n til  1967; the new regime estab lished  in 1974 by 
ND never once reso rted  to  them.
7: In th is  respec t, the sp e c ific  course of ND resembles th a t of the 
French RPR which, w ithin a decade (1975-1986), "transformed i t s e l f  frcm
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a party  dominated by the o ld  Gaul l i s t  guard (UDR) in to  a mass party", 
and a lso  th a t of the German CDU between 1962 and 1971; fo r these po in ts , 
see Raschke J . and K atsoulis H. (eds), op. c i t  ♦, vol. 1, pp. 322-3 and 
374-5 respec tive ly .
8: This discrepancy between a th e o re t ic a l ly  fu l ly  developed p a rty  
organisational s tru c tu re , and poor ( i f  any) respect for i t  in p rac tic e , 
can a lso  be found in B ritish  p o l i t ic s :
" . . .a n d  even a f t e r  they had come to  accept the  p a rty  
congress as a v a lu ab le  instrum ent i t  took the B r i t is h  
C o n se rv a tiv e s  a long tim e to  tra n s fo rm  th i s  from a 
conveyor b e l t  fo r  the  le a d e rs ' wishes in to  an organ of 
democratic w ill fo rm a tio n ... Even the C onservative Party  
no longer follows B alfou r's  famous bon mot tha t on policy 
he would sooner co n su lt h is  v a le t  than a C onservative 
Party Conference. Though the Party Conference has not yet 
developed in to  a policy-making body the discussions are  of 
some importance fo r the guidelines of p o l i t ic s .  Since 1967 
there  have been formal reso lu tions a f te r  the debates, and 
since 1965 the Conservative Party leader has tended to be 
p resen t the  whole tim e and not appear only fo r a  f in a l  
speech to the delegates."
See von Beyme K ., op. c i t . , pp. 233 and 364.
9*. For th e se  p o in ts  see  L y r in tz i s  C. , Between S o c ia lism  and 
Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic S o c ia lis t Movement, Ph.D th e s is , 
U n iv e r s i ty  o f London, LSE, November 1983, e s p e c i a l l y  c h . 4, 
"Organisation and Leadership", pp. 148-98.
10: In th is  respec t, i t  seems th a t Karamanlis followed de G aulle 's 
e a r l ie r  example when founding the RPF in 1947:
"He did not want to found a party  but a rassemblement, a 
movement th a t Frenchmen frcm a l l  walks of l i f e  could join 
and th a t  would no t r e p re s e n t  a c o a l i t i o n  of s p e c ia l  
in te re s ts  or an ideological family but the whole nation".
See Lauber V ., "Change and c o n tin u ity  in  French conservatism  sin ce  
1944", in  G irv in  B. ( e d ) ,  The T ra n s fo rm a tio n  o f C ontem porary 
Conservatism, London: SAGE Pub lica tions, 1988, pp. 35-54.
11: This fe a r  of dogma in  g e n e ra l, o r even of a se t  of s p e c if ic  
p rin c ip le s , has always been a c h a ra c te r is tic  of conservative p a r tie s ;  
with respect to the B ritish  case, i t  has been argued (see von Beyme K ., 
op. c i t . , p. 50) tha t
"P re c ise ly  because they were le s s  bound to  a prograirme 
th a n  th e  L i b e r a l s . . .  o r  th e  S o c i a l i s t s . . .  th e  
Conservatives have o ften  proved free r and more flex ib le  in 
a d a p t in g  new ite m s  u n d e r p o l i t i c a l  c h a l le n g e  from 
opponents and p ro te s t movements. They have been sk ilfu l in 
combining a new lin e  with the 'na tiona l tra d itio n ' which 
they maintained th a t they were —n atu ra lly , as i t  were— 
re p re s e n tin g .  A d iag ram m atic  r e p r e s e n ta t i o n  o f th e  
p ositions of B ritish  p a r t ie s  showed that the Conservative 
Party has had much stronger fluc tuations in i t s  prograirme 
than the Labour P a rty " .
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12: Karamanlis' personal au th o rity  w ithin ND can be compared to  tha t 
of Konrad Adenauer's w ithin the German CDU. As Franz Meyers (M inister- 
P residen t of North-Rhine W estfa lia ) dec la red  a t  the  CDU's n a tio n a l 
congress in 1958, "The name of the Federal Chancellor is  our programme"; 
c ite d  in Grande E . , "Neoconservatism  w ithout neoconservatives? The 
renaissance and transform ation of contemporary German conservatism", in 
Girvin B. (ed), op. c i t . , pp. 54-77.
13: See G irv in  B ., " In tro d u c tio n : V a r ie t ie s  of conservatism ", in 
Girvin B. (ed ), op. c i t . , pp. 1-12.
14: For the  re sp e c tiv e  developments in  the  U.K. see Peele  G ., 
"B ritish  conservatism: Ideological change and e lec to ra l uncerta in ty", in 
Girvin B ., op. c i t . , pp. 13-34.
15: I t  should be reca lled  a t th is  po in t th a t the comnunist p a rty  was 
outlawed in  1947; fo r  more d e ta i l s  of the  even ts th a t  led  to  the  
imposition of th is  "police democracy" regime and the establishm ent of 
the so -called  S ta te  of the Right, see ch. 1 and p a rtic u la rly  section  
2 . 1 . 2 .
16: On the concept of incorporation (and on those of c l ien te l ism and 
populism as modes of p o l i t ic a l  inclusion ), see Mouzelis N ., P o li t ic s  in 
the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism  and Late In d u s tr ia lis a tio n  in 
the Balkans and Latin America, London: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 73-94.
17: For a d e ta i le d  e la b o ra tio n  of th is  p o in t, see M ouzelis N. , 
"C ontinuities and d isc o n tin u itie s  in  Greek p o l i t i c s :  From E le f th e r io s  
V en ize lo s to  A ndreas P apand reou", in  Les Temps Modernes, Athens: 
Exantas, 1986 (in  Greek), pp. 149-162.
18: This close a f f i l ia t io n  with the monarchy most probably explains 
why d u rin g  th e  e a r ly  1960s —when c e r t a in  p o l i t i c a l  developments 
a ffec tin g  the re la tio n sh ip  between the ERE and EK party  leaderships and 
the  King reached  a d ead lo ck — K aram anlis chose to  w ithdraw  from 
p o l i t i c s ,  whereas G. Papandreou c lashed  w ith  the  King, and w ith  the 
in s titu tio n  of the monarchy as such. For more d e ta ils  see section  3 in 
ch. 1.
19: For the ro le  of the s ta te  as a powerful and omnipresent e n ti ty , 
as the chief agent tha t took the lead in the country 's course towards 
c a p i ta l is t  development, and i t s  predominance over c iv i l  s o c ie ty , see 
Mouzelis N ., "Capitalism  and the development of the Greek s ta te " , in
Scase R. (ed), The S ta te  in Western Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1980,
pp. 241-73.
20: For a d e ta i l e d  a n a ly s is  on th e  r i s e  of the  1967 m i l i t a r y  
d ic t a to r s h ip  in  G reece, see  M ouzelis N. , P o l i t i c s  in  th e  Semi- 
Periphery. . . , op. c i t . , pp. 134-45.
21: On a u th o r i ta r ia n  conservatism , see G irvin  B ., " In tro d u c tio n : 
V arie ties of conservatism", in Girvin B. (ed), op. c i t . , pp. 1-12.
22: A d e ta i le d  account of the t r a n s i t io n  to  and c o n so lid a tio n  of
democratic in s titu tio n s  a f te r  1974 and the sp ec ific  social and p o l i t ic a l  
features of the new regime is  presented in ch. 2 of th is  study.
23: By th is , we do not mean th a t i t  was an ou trigh t a u th o rita rian  
regime. In a parliam entary democracy of the Western European kind (say 
the B ritish  democracy), i t  is  not a t a l l  ille g itim a te  for the premier to
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enjoy a c e rta in  degree of autonomy v is -a -v is  h is  party  and parliam ent, 
the  more so as he was e le c te d  to  h is  p o s t. However, the  Greek case 
p re se n ts  the  p e c u l ia r i ty  th a t ,  whereas in West European p a r t ie s  the  
power of the leader is  se riously  lim ited by strongly in s titu tio n a lis e d  
organisational procedures and by the p a r ty 's  various governing bodies 
and assem blies , th e i r  Greek c o u n te rp a rts  have never developed the  
respective  mechanisms th a t would guarantee even a minimum control over 
th e ir  leaders ' ac tions . Consequently, w ithin such a prim e-m inisterial 
democracy, i t  is  l e f t  to  the  p re m ie r 's  d is c re t io n  whether to  govern 
dem ocratically o r by employing re p re ss iv e  and a u th o r i ta r ia n  methods. 
Even a f te r  1975 a l l  Greek prem iers, and p a rtic u la rly  PASCK leader A. 
Papandreou, in  t o t a l  d is r e g a r d  of e i t h e r  p a r ty  r e g u la t io n s  o r  
parliam en ta ry  procedures, have o ccasio n a lly  indulged in au th o rita rian  
measures in order to  get things done the way they wished.
24: See Mavrogordatos G ., "The emerging party  system", in Clogg R. 
(ed), Greece in the 1980s, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 70-94.
25: By th e  term  " in te g r a t iv e  p o l i t i c a l  fo rce "  (as opposed to  
incorporative or in c lu s io n i s t ) i s  meant a p a rty  th a t  draws p o l i t i c a l  
su p p o r t, and in tro d u c e s  th e  p o p u la r  m asses to  p o l i t i c s ,  th rough  
impersonal, modem and autonomous means —as fo r example the elaboration  
of id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s  and the  c re a tio n  of a we 11-s tru c tu re d  and 
e f f i c i e n t  mass o r g a n i s a t i o n .  By c o n t r a s t ,  th e  d e s ig n a t io n  of 
in c lu s io n i s t  o r in c o rp o ra t iv e  a p p lie s  to  a p a r ty  r a th e r  p o o rly  
organised, which r e l ie s  more on p e rso n a lis tic  and dependent means (e.g . 
c l ie n te l is m  and /o r populism) in  o rder to  r a l l y  mass support. For a 
d e ta iled  elaboration  of in c lu sio n is t/in co rp o ra tiv e  and in teg ra tiv e  means 
o f p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l ,  s e e  M o u ze lis  N . , P o l i t i c s  in  th e  Semi- 
Periphery. . . , op. c i t . , pp. 73-94.
26: For a very d e ta ile d  account of these poin ts and fo r an an a ly tica l 
exam ination of the  course of the  c o u n try 's  economic developmental 
p ro cess , see M ouzelis N ., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, 
London: Macmillan, 1978.
27: For a complete and d e ta i le d  documentation of these  p o in ts  see 
Mouzelis N ., P o lit ic s  in the Sem i-Periphery.. . , op. c i t .
28: These po in ts a l l  apply to  the bourgeois p a r t ie s . The communists 
have had always a concrete ideology in Greece, as everywhere e lse , and 
th e  KKE c r e a te d  and d e v e lo p e d  a huge , b u t c l a n d e s t i n e ,  mass 
organ isation , since being banned fo r 27 years (from 1947 u n til  1974) 
th is  was the only way to  keep the party  a liv e . This highly inpersonal, 
bureaucratic  and m ilita n t o rganisation  was free  to  act in the open a f te r  
1974, and was quantatively  and q u a lita tiv e ly  beyond comparison with that 
of any o ther party .
29: Populism has not been a c h a ra c te r is tic  feature  of the Greek post­
war p o l i t i c a l  c u ltu re . However, to g e th er w ith c lie n te lis m  i t  is  a 
fea tu re  of the tra d itio n a l re la tio n s  of p o l i t ic a l  domination, and has 
been extensively  used in c o u n tr ie s  of L atin  America (which e x h ib it a 
s im ila r development to Greece in terms of early  parliam entarism  and la te  
in d u s tr ia lis a tio n  —on th is  point see Mouzelis N ., P o lit ic s  in the Semi- 
Peri phery. . . , op. c i t . ) fo r drawing people in to  p o l i t ic s  in a dependent, 
v e r t i c a l ,  and heteronomous manner. On c lie n te lis m  and populism as 
constituen t p a rts  of the tra d itio n a l "underdog" p o lit ic a l  cu ltu re  see 
Mouzelis N ., " In s titu tio n s  and p o li t ic a l  cu ltu re" , and h is  "The fu ture  
belongs to  the m odernisers", both (in  Greek) in the newspaper To Vima, 
of 23 and 30 August 1992 respec tive ly .
30: See Mavrogordatos G., op. c i t . , pp. 75-6.
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APPENDIX I
Proclamation of Prime M inister Constantine Karamanlis on the Foundation 
of the P o lit ic a l  Front of "New Democracy"
28 September 1974
The g re a t  is su e  o f ou r tim e i s  dem ocracy. Everybody t a lk s  of 
democracy but few understand i t ,  and even fewer have the w ill and the 
a b i l i ty  to  put i t  in to  p rac tice .
Of the 140 countries th a t e x is t in the world, only 19 have a true
democracy. This in d ic a te s  th a t  th is  m arvellous and d e l ic a te  form of 
government is  d i f f ic u l t  to  implement, and tha t i t  presupposes special 
circumstances without which i t  cannot flower and bear f r u i t .
A ll peoples would wish to  have democracy, but only those have i t  
who, apart frcm an awareness of i t s  advantages, a lso  respect the terms 
of i t s  functioning.
Modern Greece is  one of the  modern c o u n trie s  th a t  have adopted 
democracy as i t s  system of government. This was n a tu ra l, fo r democracy 
was born in  Greece. However, our modern democracy has functioned  
im perfec tly  and w ith  frequen t and long in te r ru p tio n s . One a f t e r  the
other there have been coups, revolu tions, d ic ta to rsh ip s , changes in the
system of government, c iv i l  wars. The country 's periods of democratic 
government on the other hand were few and short, b right in te rv a ls  in the 
turbulent h is to ry  of modern Greece.
I f  democracy has not functioned smoothly in Greece, th is  was due to 
the fac t th a t the preconditions fo r i t s  existence were m issing or could 
not be created . These conditions a re  a mild p o l it ic a l  clim ate, peaceable
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p o l i t i c a l  m o res , and  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a d a p te d  to  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
circumstances of our country.
The Greeks have had a t a s te  of a l l  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n s ,  such a 
b i t t e r  ta s te , th a t new e rro rs  and mistakes are  unforgiveable. We are  
a lread y  e n te r in g  on a new p e rio d  o f our n a tio n a l l i f e ,  and i t  is  
incumbent upon u s , w ith  the  experience of the  p a s t ,  to  c re a te  the  
necessary conditions so th a t , a t  la s t ,  achieve a healthy and la s tin g  
democracy.
I f  we do not take advantage of th is  unique opportunity, we sha ll in 
vain seek another in the fu tu re . The f i r s t  phase is ,  however, already 
being negotiated with good prospects.
What has happened in Greece w ith  the  help  of the people over the 
p a st two months t r u ly  borders on a p o l i t i c a l  m irac le , because the 
tra n s itio n  from d ic ta to rsh ip  to  freedom took place in pain less fashion, 
although many had expected bloodshed and in ternecine s t r i f e .  Many also  
be lieved  th a t  the  d ism an tlin g  of the  mechanism of tyranny and the 
process of the re tu rn  to  democracy would be slow and pa in fu l. But th is  
a lso  took place w ithin these two months.
This important work, which has been completed quickly and thoroughly 
does not, however, mean th a t the problem of Greek democracy has been 
fu lly  resolved once and for a l l .  Dangers w ill always remain. I t  w ill be 
necessary both to be v ig ila n t ,  and to r a l ly  the people in to  powerful 
p o l it ic a l  formations, ab le  to  p ro tec t democracy not only from communism 
and fascism, but a lso  frcm the causes th a t occasioned i t s  downfall in 
the p ast.
With th is  p rec ise  national ob jec tive  in view, I have considered i t  
my duty to  c rea te  a broad and v i ta l  p o l i t ic a l  front —"Nea Dimokratia" .
"New Democracy" is  rooted in the b e lie f  —acquired through b i t t e r  
experience by the o lder generation and strongly  f e l t  by the younger— 
tha t a new p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  is  necessary for the surv ival, the progress
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and the su ccess  o f  G reece. I t  i s  founded on our exp erien ce  o f  th e  p a st
and envisions a b e tte r  and more ce rta in  fu tu re .
The "New Democracy" fron t is  composed of sound and experienced, but 
a lso  of new progressive and rad ical p o l i t ic a l  forces, harnessed towards 
the same end: to  re a liz e  the Nea Dimokratia concept in Greece, —to  give 
the country a new democracy.
"New Democracy" is  the p o l it ic a l  fron t tha t id e n tif ie s  the nation  
with the people, the motherland with i t s  inhab itan ts, the s ta te  with i t s  
c it iz e n s , national independence with popular sovereignty, progress with 
the  coirmon good, p o l i t i c a l  freedom w ith  the ru le  of law and so c ia l 
ju s tic e .
"New Democracy" is  the system whereby the few and the named give a 
lead instead of engaging in demagogy, represent instead of oppress and,
in the f in a l an a ly sis , serve the many and nameless.
"New Democracy" is  the movement th a t se lec ts  and preserves frcm the 
past only th a t which time has shown to  be true  and usefu l. And i t  w ill 
continue to go forward with large, bold, but a t the same time sure steps 
towards new and con tinually  developing circumstances.
"New Democracy" is  the p o lit ic a l  fron t that ignores the d isputes and 
schisms of the p a s t, which have so te r r ib ly  riven our country, and is  
o rien ted  towards broader and more powerful forms of national un ity .
The "New Democracy" fron t seeks the co-operation of the Greek people 
and, in p a r t ic u la r , of the younger generation, for the re a liz a tio n  of 
i t s  ob jec tives, and i t  promises:
That i t  w ill always and exclusively serve the true  in te re s ts  of 
the nation , which a re  to  be found over and beyond the misleading labels 
of Right, Centre and L eft.
That i t  w ill always consider a l l  Greeks not only as equal before 
the law, but with the same equality  of r ig h ts  to l i f e 's  opportun ities
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and in the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  th a t a re  opened up by p o l i t ic a l ,  economic, and 
social l i f e .
That i t  w i l l  d ev o te  a l l  i t s  pow ers, th e  e x p e r ie n c e , th e  
knowledge, and the enthusiasm of i t s  o lder and younger cadres to  the 
rap id  development of Greece in  a l l  sec to rs .
-  That the  economic freedom in  which "New Democracy" b e liev e s  
cannot exclude the widening of the  economic s e c to r  c o n tro lle d  by the  
s ta te ;  and th a t individual in i t i a t iv e  cannot be ju s t if ie d  without the 
p a r a l l e l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  th e  b ro a d e r  p o p u la r  c l a s s e s  in  th e  
d is t r ib u t io n  of the  n a tio n a l p roduct. Every c i t iz e n  of th is  country  
should be both a worker fo r and a  p a rtic ip a n t in economic p ro sperity , 
and should feel assured of h is  fu tu re  and the fu ture  of h is  ch ild ren .
That i t  w ill be con tinually  renewed by the younger forces of the 
country , which i t  co n sid ers  always to  be p r iv ile g e d , because they 
express more d ire c tly  the pulse of our time.
That i t  w il l , not only in times of surplus but a lso  of d e f ic i t  
in n a tio n a l w ea lth , in v e s t  in  e d u c a tio n , t r a in in g  and s c i e n t i f i c  
research, fo r i t  believes th a t i t  is  s p ir i tu a l  and cu ltu ra l values th a t 
in the long run w ill determine the fa te  of the Greek Nation.
That i t  w ill not flin c h  from e ffo r t  and sa c r if ic e  in order to 
make Greece strong and unassa ilab le . With modernised armed forces the 
independence of Greece w ill be strengthened. She w ill be respected by 
a l l ,  w ith o u t th e  need fo r  p r o te c to r s  o th e r  than  th e  c o l l e c t iv e  
organisations in which she w ill p a r tic ip a te  of her own free  w ill ,  and in 
accordance with the permanent in te re s ts  of Hellenism, in which the fa te  
of Cyprus is  included.
That i t  w i l l  f ig h t  fo r  th e  f u l l  and t o t a l  sa fe g u a rd in g  of 
popular sovereign ty  and th a t ,  towards th is  end, i t  w ill  aim a t  the  
harmonisation of the governmental system with the conditions of Greek 
re a li ty .
465
"New Democracy" believes tha t Greece is  not only e n ti t le d  to , but 
can a ssu re , the  d is tin g u ish e d  p lace  and the happiness of her people 
w ith in  th e  Europe to  which she be longs i f  she m o b ilis e s  a l l  h e r 
a b i l i t i e s ,  and i f  she makes use of a l l  the v ir tu e s  of her people.
Irresp ec tiv e  of her s iz e , Greece with her in te lle c tu a l he ritag e , the 
b r ill ia n c e  of Hellenism, together w ith the liv e lin e ss  of her people, can 
contribu te  p o l i t ic a l ly ,  morally and c u ltu ra lly  to the re a liz a tio n  of the 
idea of a united  Europe.
A fundamental precondition, however, fo r a l l  th is  is  the rooting  in 
our country of a genuine and up-to -date  democracy. Towards th is  end the 
great fron t of "New Democracy" is  to ta l ly  and unequivocally dedicated.
I in v ite  a l l  those who share my anxiety about, and hopes fo r, the 
fu tu re , and who bum with the d esire  fo r a p o lit ic a l  re b ir th , to e n lis t  
on our side . Addressing myself e sp ec ia lly  to  the young, I in v ite  them to 
become the vanguard in th is  s o r t ie  of national reconstruction . For a 
proud and happy Greece!
Constantine Karamanlis
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A P P E N D IX  I I . a
N D 's  b a l l o t  ( N o v e m b e r  1977 e l e c t i o n )  i n  t h e  S e c o n d  D i s t r i c t  o f  A t h e n s .  
T h e  p o r t r a i t  o f  K a r a m a n l i s  s e r v e d  a s  t h e  p a r t y ' s  e m b le m  f r o m  1974
un til 1979.
N E A  A H M O K P A T  I A
X Y N A Y A I M O I  
B'  A 0  H N f l  N
BAPBITXIflTHX l f lA N N H X  t o G MiXtioSoo 
BOYKEAATOX T EO PriO X  toG K uwttczvt i voo 
BPETTAKOX A H M H T PIO X  toG Acuvifia 
AABAKHX IO A N N H X  toG Aikoiou 
A A A A K O Y P A X  r E O P N O X  too Anpqvpioo 
KAMTIOYAAKHX N IK O A A O X  too  I-m,p.'5uvo<; 
K A PA O A N A X H X  N IK O A A O X  toG Anpryrpioo 
KAPATZAX X A PH X  toG Qto<p<ivoo<;
KO PA X A H X  BAXIAEIOX toG ’luavvoo  
KO YTHOAPH A IN A  B aoiX tioo
KPATXAX A n O X T O A O X  toG rtopY*o«
KPIKOX A O A N A X IO X  toG ' l o a w o o  
A A IK A P H X  K O N X T A N TIN O X  ToG rcupy.'oo  
M I K P O n O Y A O I  N IK O A A O X  to o  *AXcC<iv6poo 
M n E P N IT IA X  r iA N A r iO T H X  Too ' luavvoo 
M PIOYX M nOY KEAX T EO PriOX TOO M.xanX 
r iA f lA A A K H X  IT Y A 1A N O X  to o  ItoGpoo 
n A P IA K flN X T A N T IN O Y  TEO PriOX toG KuvcrTavrivoo 
r iA r iA N IK O A A O Y  XPHXTOX toO B aa.X cioo
r i A r i A P P H r o n o Y A O i  k o n x t a n t i n o x  too ' I u Gwou
n O A Y A O P A X  B Y P O N  toG TccjpyJoo 
XIXMANHX AH M H TPIO X  toG 'Ap.oTtiSoo 
ITE<t>ANIAHI K O N I T A N T I N O X  toG I tc^ ovoo 
TXAAAAPHX A O A N A X IO X  too KuvaravTivoo 
TXOYKANTAX A O A N A X IO X  toG rtupYiow 
<t>OY<t>AX ZHXHX toG rccjpY'ou 
<t>YXXAX XPHXTOX toG ’luavvoo 
XPYXHX E Y IT A O IO X  toG ’EppavoonA
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A P P E N D IX  I I . b
N D 's  n e w  e m b le m  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  1 9 7 9  c o n g r e s s .  ( F r o n t  
c o v e r  o f  N D : I d e o l o g i c a l  j ^ i n c i p l e s  a n d  P a r t y  S t a t u t e s ,  A t h e n s :  N D  
P u b l i c a t i o n ,  J u n e  1 9 7 9 ) .  ^ ^
i i 
• :  • *;
IAEOAOFIKEZ APXEZ
i . . .
❖
KATAZTATIKO
UT*!
A P P E N D IX  I I . c
T h e  p r e f i x  l i b e r a l  ( p h i l e l e f t h e r i ) h a s  b e e n  a d d e d  t o  t h e  p a r t y ' s  n a m e .  
( B a c k  c o v e r  o f  a  p a r t y - p r o p a g a n d a  l e a f l e t  d i s t r i b u t e d  s h o r t l y  b e f o r e  t h e  
J u n e  1 9 8 5  e l e c t i o n . )
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APPENDIX I I I
ND MEMBERSHIP FROM 1974 UNTIL EARLY 1992
Year
Local 
Oraanisations
Departmental 
O raanisations
Professional 
O raanisations
Party
Members
Ratio 
Voters /Members
1974 unavailable unav. unav. unav. unav.
1975 40 50 unav. unav. unav.
1977 150 51 8 20,000 107.3
1979 380 62 25 150,000 unav.
1980 unav. 62 25 150,000 unav.
1981 500 62 25 150,000 13.6
1983 2,000 unav. unav. 220,000 unav.
1986 3,000 62 200 200,000 unav.
1988 3,300 66 unav. unav. unav.
1992 3,500 70 106 400,000 7 .7 ta)
Note ( a ) ; The 1992 ra t io  (7 .7 , or 13%) is  the quotient between the
3,087,348 people who voted for ND in 1990 and the 400,000 ND 
members in ea rly  1992.
A more d e ta iled  p resen ta tion  of the p a r ty 's  membership is  as shown 
below:
1975
Departmental Ccnmittees: 50 
Local Organisations: 40
Autumn 1976
Department of Women's Voluntary Work-Offer
300 members (of which 25: leading party  members)
(Provisional) Departmental Corrmittees: 100 approx.
Preliminary Congress 1977
Departmental Conmittees: 51 
Local Organisations: 150
Professional O rganisations: 8 with 3,500 members 
Delegates: 1751 (155 women)
Members: 20,000
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F ir s t  Congress 1979
Departmental Carmittees: 62 
Local O rganisations: 380 
Professional Organisations: 25 
Delegates: 816 
Members: 150,000
6 December 1980: Peripheral Congress, Athens, H ilton 
Delegates: 1700
27-28 June 1981: Ad-hoc Congress, Athens 
Delegates: 1250
Local O rganisations: 500 (but inac tive , according to  ND's leadership)
December 1983
Local O rganisations: over 2000 
New members: 70,000 (=over 220,000)
Second Congress, 1986
Departmental Carm ittees: 62
Local O rganisations: 3,000
Professional O rganisations (EKO): 200 approx.
Members: 200,000
Delegates: almost 1,000
Second National Conference, October 1988
Departmental Carm ittees: 66 
Local Organisations: 3,300
December 1991
Departmental Corrmittees: 70 
Local O rganisations: 3,500 approx.
Professional Organisations (EKO): 106 
Members: 400,000 (e lec t 23,000 party  o f f ic ia ls )
ONNED's (New Democracy's Youth O rgan isa tion , founded in la te  1975) 
o rganisational development, is  as follows:
1977
Local O ffices: 97 
O ffices in Europe: 32
O ffic ia l Newspaper: Dimokratiki Protoporia (Democratic Vanguard) 
U niversity  Newspaper: O Spoudastis (The Student)
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1978
Formulation of i t s  f i r s t  charter 
Local O ffices: 150 approx.
1979
Local O ffices: 220 of which 15 were problem atic, according to ONNED1 s 
leadership (Athens: 70, Provinces: 150)
1981
Local O ffices: 200 approx.
1986
Local O ffices: 470 (Athens: 170, Provinces: 300) 
Members: 50,000
March 1987
ONNED's F i r s t  Congress (From th is  time onwards, ONNED's president is  
e lected  by the youth organisation  i t s e l f  and not appointed by the party  
president as p rev io u s ly .)
April 1989
Members: 80,000 approx.
January 1992
ONNED's Second Congress 
Elected ONNED o f f ic ia ls :  20,000
Departmental Carmittees: 62 (Athens: 34, Provinces: 28)
Local o ff ice s : 427 (Athens: 71, Provinces: 356)
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APPENDIX IV
ND's Ideological Principles-1979 
Drawn up by ND President C. Karamanlis, and 
sanctioned by the p a r ty 's  F i r s t  Congress in C halkidiki, 5-7 May 1979.
1. ND believes in the national id e a l . I t  recognises and accepts th a t the 
nation remains the natu ra l framework of the in d iv id u a l's  l i f e .  No person 
and no p a r ty  can c o n s id e r  i t s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  w orthy , in  m o ra l, 
p o l it ic a l  o r c u ltu ra l terms, to  function outside the national framework.
National awareness is  awareness of a mission. I t  in sp ires the people 
and urges them to  s tr iv e  fo r th e ir  coun try 's  progress and independence, 
and to  p ro tec t her even by sa c r if ic in g  th e ir  liv e s .
ND is  insp ired  by and follows the example of the b r i l l i a n t  c u ltu ra l 
prototypes created  by Greek c iv i l is a t io n  in ages past. The essence of 
i t s  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy i s  Greek, and i t  combines healthy tra d itio n  
with the best th a t modem thought has to  o ffe r .
ND c o n s id e rs  i t s  p rim ary  o b l ig a t io n  as sa fe g u a rd in g  n a t io n a l  
independence and the coun try 's  t e r r i to r i a l  in te g rity . I t  believes th a t 
the Greek nation can continue on i t s  h is to r ic  course and develop i t s  
n a tu ra l c u ltu re  only  when i t  i s  f r e e ,  independent, and sovereign , 
because n a tio n a l independence is  a p re re q u is i te  fo r democracy. Of 
course, th e re  have been and th e re  a re  independent c o u n tr ie s  w ithout 
democracy, but there  have never been, and n e ither w ill there ever be, 
democratic countries without na tional independence.
2. ND believes in the peaceful coexistence of peoples. I t  condemns any 
v io le n t and a u th o r i t a r i a n  a c t ;  any k ind  of in te r v e n t io n  in  o th e r  
c o u n tr ie s ' in te rn a l  a f f a i r s ,  and i t  u n co n d itio n a lly  favours Greece's 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t io n s  t h a t  aim  a t  
s a fe g u a rd in g  w orld  p e ac e . N o n e th e le s s , i t  a ls o  h o ld s th a t  th e se
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organisations should be given the a u th o r i ty  to  enforce sa n c tio n s , so 
tha t they can defend the in te rnational order e ffe c tiv e ly .
ND b e liev e s  th a t  no people seeks war. That is  why i t  considers 
national and p o li t ic a l  freedom a basic fac to r fo r the establishm ent of 
world-wide peace, because only when people a re  free  can they express 
t h e i r  d e s i r e  fo r  p e a c e , and so in f lu e n c e  th e  p o l ic i e s  of t h e i r  
respective  governments.
ND b e liev e s  th a t  G reece 's  p lace  l i e s  w ith  the Western world w ith 
which she has long been connec ted  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  econom ically  and 
d e fe n s iv e ly . She stands fo r  the  same id e a ls , and she has the  same 
p o li t ic a l  philosophy as a l l  the democratic countries th a t make up the 
W estern w orld. This s ta n c e , though, has never p revented  Greece from 
developing friend ly  re la tio n s  with a l l  peoples, and espec ia lly  with her 
neighbours and the Arab world. Greece fu rthers the idea of m u lti-s ta te  
co-operation in the Balkans as of benefit to  the in te re s ts  of the Balkan 
peoples and preserving the peace in th a t area.
ND has so u g h t, and has succeeded in  a c h ie v in g , th e  o rg a n ic  
in teg ra tion  of Greece in the European Carmunity, because i t  believes in 
the  id ea l of a United Europe and wishes to  c o n tr ib u te  towards i t s  
re a liz a tio n . At the same time ND believes tha t Greece as a member of the 
Community, w h ile  p re s e rv in g  h er n a tio n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  w i l l  
acce le ra te  her economic and c u ltu ra l  development; w ill  safeguard  her 
democratic in s t i tu t io n s ;  w ill re in fo rce  her national independence; and 
th a t  she w ill  have a say, not only in her own fo rtu n e s , but in  the 
fu ture  course of Europe, since she w ill influence Commnity reso lu tions 
through her vote.
3. ND b e lie v e s  in Parliam entary  Democracy, th a t  i s ,  in  a m il i ta n t  
democracy, and not one th a t  is  pa ra ly sed ; in  a democracy capable of 
e ffe c tiv e ly  defending freedom and the progress of the social whole; in a
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democracy th a t  combines freedom w ith  o rd e r , and o rder w ith  so c ia l 
ju s tic e . There can be no freedom without order, ju s t as there  can be no 
order without soc ia l ju s tic e .
ND does not accept th a t there  can be economic and social ob jectives 
fo r the re a liz a tio n  of which democratic freedoms are worth sa c r if ic in g . 
No objective  is  more sacred than the c i t iz e n 's  r ig h t to  decide h is /h e r  
own fu ture. N evertheless, ND equally denies the abuse of freedom tha t 
undermines democracy and f in a lly  leads to  i t s  d is in teg ra tio n . Democracy 
presupposes a free  and se lf -d is c ip lin e d  c it iz e n , since democracy is  not 
imposed; i t  is  a way of l i f e ,  and i t  must be rea lized  in the c it iz e n s ' 
everyday e x is te n c e . I t  presupposes re sp e c t fo r  the p rin c ip le s  of the 
m ajority and of law. I f  today democracy is  a t r is k , i t  is  mainly due to 
the abuse of th a t freedom th a t democracy so generously o ffe rs  to every 
c itiz e n .
ND stands against a l l  forms of to ta lita r ia n ism . I t  stands against 
Communism, because Communism co n sid ers  the  a b o li t io n  of democracy a 
p re req u is ite  fo r the implementation of i t s  own programme; and because i t  
denies the sa n c tity  of the individual since i t  deprives him —along with 
a l l  o th e r freedoms— of the  joy and hope of personal c r e a t iv i ty .  ND 
stands equally  against a l l  forms of d ic ta to rsh ip ; because ty rann ies, in 
addition to doing away with freedom, usually  lead to d isa s te r  through 
adventurism.
ND r e je c t s  the  theory  of a p a rty  re p re se n tin g  a c la s s ,  as th is  
re su lts  in national d is in te g ra tio n . ND does not represent the in te re s ts  
of a p a r tic u la r  c la ss . I t  represen ts a l l  who follow i t ,  and who come 
from a l l  c lasses of the Greek people, and fo r a l l  of whom i t  is  working.
Free from dogmatism and mess i an ism, ND maintains the p o s s ib il i ty  of 
adopting the best so lu tions a t  any time, even the most rad ica l ones, 
when these are  d ic ta te d  by the national in te re s t .  That is  why there  is  
no place fo r ND in the absurd and m isleading Right-Centre-Left f ic t io n .
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This a rb itra ry  c la s s if ic a tio n  has only one e ssen tia l d is tin c tio n : the 
separation of p a r tie s  in to  democratic and to ta l i ta r ia n .  The d ifferences 
among most democratic p a r t ie s  are  e ith e r  in sig n ifican t or a r t i f i c i a l ,  
d ic ta ted  by a need to  ju s t ify  th e ir  presence in the p o l i t ic a l  arena. 
Also th e ir  d iffe rences, where they do e x is t ,  a re  re s tr ic te d  mainly to 
the  degree of s t a t e  in te rv e n tio n  which in  i t s e l f ,  however, they  a l l  
accept in p rin c ip le .
4. ND s tr iv e s  fo r socia l ju s t ic e , believ ing  tha t democracy cannot be 
estab lished , and cannot function normally, without social ju s tic e .
ND considers a l l  Greeks equal not only before the law, but a lso  with 
regard to the opportun ities opened up by p o l i t ic a l ,  economic, and social 
l i f e .  Each c it iz e n  should partake of the national product in proportion 
to  h is  c o n tr ib u t io n  to  i t s  c r e a t io n .  I f  democracy i s  to  have an 
e s s e n t ia l  m eaning, th en  each  c i t i z e n  shou ld  be f r e e  from fu tu r e  
uncertain ty  by securing permanent enployment, f a i r  pay fo r h is  work, and 
fu ll  assurance of h is  own and h is  c h ild ren 's  fu ture.
When a people cannot enjoy so c ia l ju s t ic e  w ith in  a dem ocratic 
regime, confidence in the democratic ideal is  shaken. Then to ta l i ta r ia n  
movements w ith  th e i r  propaganda t ry  to  convince the people th a t  by 
sa c r if ic in g  th e ir  freedom they w ill gain some Never-never-Land. But the 
ab o litio n  of th e ir  freedom w ill never be rewarded by a b e tte r  standard 
of liv in g ; on the contrary , deprivation w ill be added to  slavery since, 
as has been proved in p ra c tic e , to ta l i ta r ia n  regimes are  economically 
underdeveloped compared with democratic ones. Moreover, when people are  
a t  th e  mercy of an a u th o r i t a r i a n  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  th ey  lo se  a l l  
p o s s ib il i ty  of demanding respect for th e ir  r ig h ts  through free  c r itic ism  
and trade-union a c t iv i ty .
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5. ND believes in a free  democratic economy, because i t  can bring about 
a steady improvement in the peop le 's  l iv in g  standards, as experience has 
shown. A p re re q u is i te  fo r  the  development of a f re e  economy i s  the  
continuous strengthening of the buying capacity  of large segments of the 
population, given th a t mass-product ion presupposes mass-consunption. I t  
ac tu a lly  happens in Western economies th a t the buying capacity  of the 
population r is e s  fa s te r  than i t s  production, and tha t th is  is  the basic  
cause of in f la tio n . In f la tio n  is  mainly an outcome of over-consumption, 
and th is  is  why i t  cannot be r e s t r ic te d  without the understanding and 
co-operation of a l l  c it iz e n s . ND believes th a t economic freedom cannot 
be unlim ited. I t  must combine personal with socia l in te re s t ,  and i t  is  
ex ac tly  th is  eq u ilib riu m , th a t  the  p a r ty 's  economic philosophy is  
s tr iv in g  fo r.
Economic development is  not an end in i t s e l f ,  but a p re re q u is ite  and 
a means fo r social progress. C erta in ly , the happiness of human beings is  
not increased by a  continuous accumulation of m aterial goods. On the 
other hand, the ceaseless p u rsu it of m ateria l p rosperity  is ,  by i t s  very 
nature, in sa tiab le ; i t  is  one of the unhealthy symptoms of our time, and 
has caused the m u lti- la te ra l c r i s i s  which is  evident in the developed 
c o u n tr ie s . I f  i t  i s  not counterbalanced  by o th e r , m orally  h igher 
ob jec tives, modem so c ie tie s  w ill never be able to  live  free  of anxiety . 
Man's happiness depends more on the q u a lity  of l i f e  than on m aterial 
w ealth . This does not mean, of cou rse , th a t e f f o r t s  towards b e t te r  
standards of liv ing  for our people should be diminished, e sp ec ia lly  with 
regard to  the poorer social c la sses . These e ffo r ts  must not neglect the 
q u a lita tiv e  element, however.
The economic philosophy of ND is  o rien ted  towards economic systems 
p re v a ilin g  in  those dem ocratic c o u n tr ie s  of Europe w ith  which our 
economy is  c lo se ly  linked . ND b e lie v e s  in th e  c re a tiv e  zeal of the 
individual whose productiv ity  m u ltip lie s  by the in tensive use of h i s /
477
her a b i l i t i e s .  However, i t  a lso  believes th a t, ju s t as anarchy abolishes 
freedom, so do excesses in free  competition th reaten  the foundations not 
only of a c o u n try 's  economic, but a lso  of i t s  so c ia l l i f e .  For th is  
re a so n , ND m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  s t a t e  shou ld  in te rv e n e  and balance 
economic and social a n tith e se s ; i t  should reduce in eq u a litie s  and step  
in to  replace p riv a te  in i t ia t iv e ,  whenever economic and social reasons 
d ic ta te  such a course.
6. ND believes in the  c o u n try 's  c u l tu ra l  p o te n t i a l . P o l i t ic a l  a c tio n  
should not be confined to  dealing only with ordinary everyday problems. 
I t  sh o u ld  c r e a t e  th e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t io n s  fo r  th e  c o n tin u o u s  
in te l le c tu a l  development and the  c u ltu ra l  b r i l l ia n c e  of the  n a tio n . 
Education and, more generally , the care of our youth, co n s titu te  the 
means of th is  long-term  p o lic y . Education shapes free  and democratic 
people, capable of con tribu ting  to  the country 's progress. ND believes 
th a t in te lle c tu a l and c u ltu ra l values w ill g rea tly  help the country to 
fin d  i t s  p lace  in in te rn a tio n a l  so c ie ty  in  more permanent and more 
e lev a ted  fash io n . The dynamism of the  Greek c iv i l i s a t io n  has proved 
i t s e l f  through the ages. The enthusiasm and the adequate education of 
the young generation is  expected to  c rea te  a prospering Greece a t home 
and an in te l le c tu a lly  b r i l l i a n t  one abroad.
Our en try  in the European Comnunity opens fo r us new perspectives in 
th is  respec t. More sp e c if ic a lly , i t  o ffe rs  great chances to  our youth 
fo r personal w e ll-b e in g . But above a l l ,  i t  o f fe r s  them an id e a l: to  
p a rtic ip a te  in the crusade for a United Europe, and through the l a t te r  
to the transform ation of modern l i f e .  Marxist or fa sc is t  theories are  
outmoded arid do not o ffe r  id ea ls . They have been tes ted  in r e a l i ty  and 
have been seen to  lead  to  r e s u l t s  opposite  from those they claim ed. 
Those who in s i s t  on adhering  to  them a re  n o t, as they may th in k , 
progressive, but backward.
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APPENDIX V
C onstantine M itso ta k is ; A New Proposal fo r  Freedom, 3 February 1985.
At i t s  Chalkidiki Congress in 1979, New Democracy determined th a t 
the ideological framework th a t c o n stitu te s  rad ica l libe ra lism  is  f a i th  
in the idea of the nation , fa i th  in  parliam entary democracy, f a i th  in 
the  f re e  dem ocratic economy, f a i th  in  so c ia l  ju s t ic e ,  f a i t h  in  the  
peaceful coexistence of peop les, and f a i th  in  the  c o u n try 's  c u l tu r a l  
p o te n tia l. New Democracy is ,  and always w ill be, unequivocally caim itted  
to  these p rin c ip le s .
New Democracy is  an up-to-date  progressive p arty , one th a t continues 
to  d ev e lo p . I t  f e e l s  th e  need today  to  p ro c la im  i t s  id e o lo g ic a l  
p r io r i t ie s .  ND pledges to  the Greek people th a t i t s  f i r s t  ob jec tive  is  
the  s tren g th en in g  o f dem ocracy and th e  b roaden ing  o f freedom . ND 
u n d e rta k e s , b e fo re  a l l  G reeks, th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  freedom to  
c o n s t i tu te  the  o v e rrid in g  p r in c ip le  of every one of i t s  id e o lo g ic a l 
position , of a l l  i t s  p o l i t ic a l  a c tiv ity . I t s  rad ica l l ib e ra l proposal 
fo r the Greece of tomorrow, the Greece of the tw en ty -firs t century , is  
above a l l  a new proposal fo r freedom.
At the  C halk id ik i Congress the founder o f ND, em phasising th e  
sign ificance of freedom, declared: "ND does not accept th a t there  can be 
economic and social ob jec tives for the re a liz a tio n  of which democratic 
freedoms are  worth sa c r if ic in g " . At the prelim inary congress of ND i t s  
founder emphasised again: "No objective is  more sacred than the r ig h t  of 
the c it iz e n  to  decide h is  fu ture  for him self".
The ideological id e n tity  of ND, i t s  lib e ra l p rin c ip le s , c o n s titu te  
the su rest guarantee th a t i t  is  the standard bearer of renewal in  our 
country. And the need fo r th is  renewal becomes d a ily  more urgent as the 
country is  regressing . The rap id  swelling of an already overblown public
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secto r w ith low p roductiv ity  has had as fo r i t s  economic consequences 
high in f la tio n , increased  unemployment, g re a te r  bureaucracy, h eav ie r 
taxation , and a  growing foreign  debt which lead us to g rea te r economic 
dependence. I t  a lso  has as a  p o l i t i c a l  consequence an unprecedented 
arrogance of power. The time has come to  stop th is  decline . The country 
needs l ib e ra l so lu tio n s , revolving around freedom and man, based on the 
p rin c ip le s  of equality  of r ig h ts  and m eritocracy, a  p o l i t ic a l  framework 
th a t encourages dialogue, moderation, to lerance, consensus, and which 
w ill  g ive young people the  chance to  develop th e i r  a b i l i t i e s  and to  
c rea te  a new, modem, and open society .
1. Greater Freedom
Freedom e x is ts  when man's oppression of man, of each one of us, has 
become so weak th a t i t  is  non-ex isten t. Such oppression can be exercised 
by in d iv id u a ls , but c h ie f ly  i t  i s  e x erc ised  by the  s t a te  and i t s  
mechanisms. The ob liga tion  of the s ta te  is  to  p ro tec t the people and 
th e i r  freedoms from the  a rb i t r a r in e s s  of o th e r  people. Who, however, 
w ill p ro tec t the people and th e ir  freedoms from the a rb itra r in e s s  of the 
s ta te ?  This question is  e sp ec ia lly  c r i t i c a l  fo r every L iberal. In the 
f in a l an a ly sis , an a rb itra ry  s ta te  is  much stronger, and consequently 
much more dangerous, than iso la ted  ind iv iduals . The experience of the 
tw entieth  century has shown th a t wherever the s ta te  has been d e ified  and 
has become omnipotent, where the doctrine  "the in te re s ts  of the s ta te  
above a l l  e lse" has p revailed  —as in f a s c is t ,  n a tio n a l-so c ia lis t  and 
conmunist system s— th e re  in d iv id u a l freedoms were abolished and the 
people led unavoidably towards to ta lita r ia n ism .
In our own country during the la s t  few years we have been w itness to 
an e s p e c ia l ly  d is tu rb in g  phenomenon: th e  growth of a c e n tr a l is e d , 
bureaucratic  and a r b i t r a r y  s t a t e ,  which e a s i ly  passes in to  the  t ig h t  
control of the government party  and becomes a means fo r the perpetuation
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of i t s  power p o s it io n . This expansion of the  s ta te ,  the  in creased  
arrogance of those who enjoy i t ,  is  fed by the r u le r s ’ passion fo r more 
and more perm anent power —which power le a d s  unavo idab ly  to  th e  
weakening and m arginalisation  of every Greek c itiz e n , and f in a lly  to  the 
refusal of the p a rty -s ta te  to  accept the Greek as an independent and 
autonomous personality . Our country, however, has no need o f, nor does 
i t  m iss such a  s t a te .  On th e  c o n tra ry , i t  has a need fo r f r e e r  and 
consequently responsible c itiz e n s .
ND re je c ts  the s ta te  w ith all-pow erful executive power. I t  wants a  
com petent s t a t e ,  sm a lle r  in  e x te n t  and c o n tro l le d  by d em o cra tic  
le g a lity .
I t  wants:
-The machinery of the s ta te  to  be to ta l ly  divorced from th a t of the 
ru lin g  party .
-Reduction of s ta te  expansion, p a r tic u la r ly  in  the economy.
-Ju s tic e  to  be tru ly  independent and ab le , unequivocally and bold ly , 
to  guarantee the conduct of p o l i t ic a l  power w ithin the framework of the 
c o n stitu tio n .
-Parliament resto red  to  i t s  highest mission —and not marginal as i t  
is  today— so as to  c o n s t i tu te  a  c re d ib le  means of c o n tro l over the  
r u le r s ,  and a ls o  a  s u b s ta n t ia l  f a c to r  in  the  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f the  
country.
-The means of mass caimunication fu lly  freed, independent, open to  
d issen ting  views, and in the serv ice of ob jec tive ly  informing the Greek 
people, so th a t they not remind us of the present p i t i fu l  s itu a tio n .
-Independent and u n fe tte re d  tra d e  unionism  as a p ro te c to r  o f the  
in te re s ts  of the working people instead  of being lackeys of a p o l i t ic a l  
party .
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2. L iberal P r in c ip le s
ND's new proposal fo r  freedom i s  based on u n a lte ra b le  l ib e r a l  
p rin c ip le s:
-F o r ND th e  o v e r r id in g  id e a l  d i r e c t i n g  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  p a th  i s  
freedom. ND condemns the denial and undermining of freedom in the name 
of o ther, supposedly higher values. Freedom c e r ta in ly  cannot stand on 
i t s  own, and must coex ist w ith o ther important values such as equality  
of o p p o rtu n ity , so c ia l ju s t ic e  and o rd e r . But fo r  ND freedom is  not 
simply a means to a  g rea te r end; i t  is  i t s e l f  the highest p o l i t ic a l  aim.
-At the heart of the l ib e ra l system is  nan. Society is  not a r e a l i ty  
independent of man; soc ia l in s t itu t io n s  and the s ta te  e x is t to  serve 
man, not the o ther way round.
ND is  s tr iv in g  fo r soc ia l ju s tic e  to p revail in our motherland. As 
was emphasised a t  the  C halk id ik i Congress, "ND considers a l l  Greeks 
equal not only before the law, but a lso  with regard to  the opportun ities 
opened up by p o l i t ic a l ,  economic, and social l i f e .  Each c it iz e n  should 
partake of the national product in proportion to  h is  con tribu tion  to  i t s  
c reation". ND aims a t  the widest possib le  d is tr ib u tio n  of wealth, so 
th a t those who a re  econom ically the  weakest may be helped . The r e ­
d is t r ib u t io n  of income is  a  means fo r  the  p ro te c tio n  of the  weak, 
without th is  harming the economic development th a t is  a  precondition fo r 
the p rosperity  of us a l l .  Social ju s tic e  in th is  sense —and not seme 
u topian  e q u a lity  o f income— is  unbreakably linked  w ith  l ib e ra lism . 
Because libe ra lism  is  the foe of every p riv ileg e , and seeks the ju s t 
recognition of every p erson 's  a b i l i t i e s .
-ND believes in the ru le  of ju s tic e , in the implementation of the 
C o n stitu tio n  and of th e  laws p ro te c tin g  the  ind iv idua l and p o l i t ic a l  
rig h ts  of c it iz e n s . Every government must serve the s ta te  of ju s tic e  and 
co n stitu tio n a l order and thus every Greek, not only those favoured by 
th e  p a r ty  th a t  g o v e rn s . In  th e  ju s t  s t a t e ,  th e  h ig h e s t  judge o f
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differences between the c itiz e n s  and the s ta te  are  the laws, the force 
of which no party  or government expediency can annul. The legal s ta te  is  
based on the  c le a r  d i s t in c t io n  of powers, on the  leg itim acy  o f the  
p u b lic  a d m in is t r a t io n .  I t s  o b je c t iv e  i s  th e  l ib e r a t i o n  from and 
pro tec tion  against any party  or trade-union a rb itra r in e s s , the assurance 
of respect fo r and serv ice o f the c it iz e n .
-ND b e liev e s  th a t  freedom is  assu red  through o rder —an o rd e r , 
however, th a t " is  not the mother but the daughter of freedom", an order 
fo r, and not aga in st, freedom. This order is  not based on force , but on 
the ru le  of law, with laws th a t a re  c le a r , ju s t ,  enforceable and few in 
number. Thus the law, instead  of tyrannising  the c itiz e n , l ib e ra te s  him.
-Within the framework of our democratic co n stitu tio n , the p o l i t ic a l  
m ino rity 's  c r itiq u e  of a l ib e ra l government is  necessary, and dialogue 
is  a precondition for i t s  decisions. The e lected  government has the 
r ig h t  to  r u le .  No o rgan ised  in te r e s t  can be allowed to  p reven t a 
dem o cra tic  governm ent from e n fo rc in g  i t s  programme. The op p o site  
co n stitu te s  a denial of democracy.
-Free economy and personal property both c o n s titu te  the so il  where 
the seed of p o l i t ic a l  freedom grows, where the in d iv id u a l's  autonomy and 
independence from s t a t e  power is  m ain tained , where the  m a te ria l and 
cu ltu ra l progress of a l l ,  and p a r tic u la r ly  of the working people, is  
a ssu red . Wherever the  f re e  economy and p r iv a te  ownership have been 
abolished, i t  is  p rec ise ly  where an omnipotent s ta te  has been created , 
c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s  have been v io la ted , society  has withered and economic 
development has been obstructed .
-A free  economy is  democratic since i t  is  imbued throughout by the 
sovere ign ty  of in d iv id u a l cho ice , f re e  of the  im position  of s t a te  
bureaucracy and s ta te  monopolies. A free  economy, which operates without 
s t a t e  d i s t o r t i o n s  and fa v o u rs , knows n o th in g  of p r iv i l e g e ,  nor
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p ro te c tio n  of i n t e r e s t s ,  n o r o b s ta c le s  to  th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  
objectives of each indiv idual.
-New libera lism  is  not the undilu ted libe ra lism  of the la s t  century. 
The s ta te  has an im portant ro le  to  p lay  in  the  economic s e c to r :  in  
assuring and in encouraging com petition, guarding against every kind of 
monopoly, providing incentives fo r economic development, and o ffe rin g  
pro tection  to  the weak.
-ND b e liev e s  th a t  freedom re q u ire s  p ro p e rty , fo r property assures 
freedom. Property is  not an end in i t s e l f ,  but a  means fo r the ensuring 
and development of human lib e r ty . Ownership of property vouchsafes the 
c itiz e n  the necessary "private  area" of a c t iv i ty ,  where he can develop 
h is  personality , can express h is  socia l independence, can exercise  h is  
professional a c t iv i t ie s ,  and cast o ff  economic in secu rity . ND believes 
that every Greek should have property  and should not be penalised  on 
account of i t .  P roperty  i s  the  n a tu ra l  f r u i t  of th e  work of the  
labou re r, the  p easan t, the  p ro fe ss io n a l man, every man. This i s  why 
property-ow nership  is  not a s in ,  but on the  co n tra ry  p a r t  of m an's 
s tr iv in g . Property, e sp ec ia lly  when i t  is  spread widely, is  therefo re  a 
mechanism fo r the lib e ra tio n  of nan.
-ND proceeds from the  b a s ic  p r in c ip le  th a t  the  r a i s in g  o f the  
qua lity  of l i f e  and the p ro tec tion  of the environment should be valued 
as a r ig h t  o f a l l  c i t i z e n s .  Those who d estro y  the  environm ent, in  
essence v io la te  one of the  b a s ic  r ig h ts  of man, th a t  of l iv in g  in  
h e a lth . For th is  reason ND w ill  p ro te c t  the  environment from every 
i l le g a l i ty ,  irre sp ec tiv e  of whatever specia l in te re s ts  may be a ffec ted  
by th is  p o lic y . Another o b je c tiv e  of ND is  the  c re a tio n  of b e t t e r  
conditions fo r the Greek people to  employ th e ir  le isu re  time.
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3. NDfs  P o l i t i c a l  I d e n t ity
ND is  the standard bearer of th a t lib e ra l renewal which the country 
needs, because i t  is  both rad ica l and lib e ra l —rad ical because i t  aims 
a t  the daring m odernisation of our p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and socia l l i f e  
with the year 2000 in view, lib e ra l because i t  goes about th is  renewal 
by ensuring  g re a te r  freedom, more emphasis on the in d iv id u a l, and 
g rea ter confidence in the Greek and h is  a b i l i t i e s .
ND d i f f e r s  from a co n serv a tiv e  p a r ty  because i t  does not fe a r  
change.
The lib e ra l choice i s  progressive par excellence  because:
-Progressive is  he who does not sub ject man to  superseded dogmas and 
outworn s h ib b o le th s ,  and who r e a l i z e s  th a t  beh ind  th e  facad e  o f 
s o c ia l is t  experimentation of "change", rea l change is  excluded.
-Progressive is  he who seeks to  l ib e ra te  the c rea tiv e  streng ths of 
men and women, to  e n ric h  th e  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of choice, to  r i d  the  
individual of both s ta te  c e n tra lis a tio n  and of the blank conformity th a t 
re s u lts  from everybody embracing a sing le  b e lie f .
-P ro g re s s iv e  i s  he who acco rd s  h i s  fe llo w  human b e in g s  t h e i r  
autonomy and re sp o n s ib ility ; and above a l l ,  progressive is  he who can 
com bine th e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  change w ith  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  H yper­
revo lu tionaries are  coun ter-revo lu tionaries.
-P ro g re ss iv e  i s  he who b e liev e s  in  the  wider co -o p e ra tio n  and 
brotherhood of man, who b e lie v e s  th a t  a  United Europe i s  the  b e s t 
framework fo r  such c o -o p e ra t io n  amongst th e  dem ocracies o f our 
continent.
ND is  the party  of dialogue, of moderation, of the middle way and of 
fa irn ess . From i t s  p rin c ip le s  and b e lie fs  stem the re jec tio n  of every 
extremism, every dogma, every messianic understanding, as a lso  i t s  f a i th  
in a clim ate of moderation and in democratic dialogue. ND re je c ts  the 
devaluation of public  l i f e ,  the p o l i t ic a l  animosity and fanaticism , the 
d iv is ion  of Greeks in to  "us" and "them" on the basis of c la ss  and party  
c r i te r ia .
When ND comes to  power i t  w ill  not o p e ra te  as a  d e s tro y e r . I t s  
ob jec tive  w ill be to bu ild , not to  p u ll down. Whatever e x is ts  today th a t 
is  co rrect i t  w ill not overthrow, but w ill improve on and lead i t  to  
ca rp le te  fu lfillm en t. For th is  reason i t  w ill not appear as a revenger 
but as a  c o n c i l ia to r .  There i s  room in  our country  fo r  a l l  of u s , 
whatever our ideological b e lie f ;  and the s ta te  does not belong to  seme 
more than to  o thers , but to a l l  Greeks equally .
To c o n f r o n t  th e  m ost c r i t i c a l  p ro b le m s  o f  th e  c o u n t r y  
—unemployment, in f la tio n , in to le rab le  taxa tion , s ta te  bureaucracy, and 
the vast external debt— c a l ls  fo r g re a te r , not le s s , economic freedom? 
fo r more confidence in every Greek and in  h is  a b i l i t i e s ;  fo r diminished 
emphasis on inpersonal s ta te  bureaucracies and the ru le  of a p riv ileged  
ru lin g  caste . I t  is  only i f  we lib e ra te  the crea tiveness , the genius of 
the Greek, th a t we sha ll emerge from the c r i s i s ,  th a t we can succeed in 
the economic revival of our country.
The time has come to  give p r io r i ty  to  the Greek c itiz e n  and not to  
the pa rty  s ta te .  We can have popular sovereignty and progress too, only 
i f  i t  i s  the  Greek c i t iz e n  who takes the  many d e c is io n s  and not the  
p riv ileged  who enjoy s ta te  power. ND's ob jec tive  is  a socie ty  th a t does 
not se rve  a b s tra c t  t o t a l i t i e s ,  but c a re s  fo r  each of the  people who 
compose i t .  The c e n tre  o f our w orld  i s  n o t an im personal s t a t e  
apparatus, but men —free  men, who without le t  o r hindrance observe, 
choose, decide and c rea te .
The ob jective  of a lib e ra l government is  not to  inpose from above 
some "enlightened" p ro to type  on a c i t iz e n ry  unable to  re fu s e . I t s  
ob jec tive  i s ,  ra th e r , to  ensure the preconditions tha t w ill allow the 
Greeks themselves, without inpediment, to  c rea te  the society  they want, 
so th a t they themselves may shape th e ir  own fu tu re  and th a t of th e ir  
ch ild ren .
This is  the new proposal fo r freedom th a t  we make to  the  Greek 
people.
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APPENDIX VI
ND's I d e o lo g ic a l P r in c ip le s -1 9 8 6
The id eo lo g ica l p r in c ip le s ,  drawn up d e f in i te ly  by ND's founder C. 
K aram anlis and s a n c tio n e d  unanim ously  by th e  F i r s t  C ongress in  
Chalkidiki in May 1979, c o n s titu te  an in te lle c tu a l h e ritag e , a source of 
combative in sp ira tio n  and a  ccnpass fo r our s ta b le  o rien ta tio n . Party 
President C. M itsotakis has declared in h is  February m anifesto "A New 
Proposal fo r Freedom" th a t ND does, and w ill always, adhere to  these 
basic p rin c ip le s .
(From the in troduction  to  the Ideological D eclaration 
a t  the Second Congress, Salonica, 14-16 February 1986)
ND's Real P o lit ic a l Id e n tity
ND is  a democratic and modem, popular and s o c ia l , rad ica l and l ib e r a l , 
European and national p o l i t ic a l  party .
- I t  is  a democratic p a rty , because i t  believes in democracy in  i t s  
c le a re s t sense and to  i t s  f u l le s t  functioning —in a m ilita n t democracy 
and not one th a t is  paralysed? in a democracy th a t knows how to  p ro tec t 
i t s e l f ,  and th a t renews the coun try 's  p o l i t ic a l  personnel continuously 
and m e r i to c r a t ic a l ly .  I t  b e l ie v e s  in  a democracy th a t  g u a ra n te e s  
parliam en tarism  and popu lar so v e re ig n ty , and th a t  i s  in te g ra te d  by 
respecting  the c it iz e n  and h is  p a rtic ip a tio n  in social l i f e .  ND is  the 
only p o l i t i c a l  camp in  Greece th a t  rep re se n ts  p r in c ip le s  ra th e r than 
persons, and functions with fu ll  respect to  pure in tra -p a rty  democracy.
- I t  i s  a modern p a r ty , because i t  corresponds to  the  needs and 
concerns of our time? because i t  seeks fo r so lu tions th a t w ill ensure 
the  c o u n try 's  prosperous course  now and in  the  fu tu re ; because i t
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d isreg a rd s  outmoded th e o r ie s , dogmas and la b e ls  w ith  .which o th e rs  
preserve the passions of the p a s t; because ND's s tru c tu re  and philosophy 
renders i t  always open to  new ideas; because i t  gives p r io r iry  to  our 
youth, an tic ip a tin g  th e ir  fu tu re  zea l, enthusiasm and s e n s it iv ity .
- I t  is  a popular party , a  p a rty  of the people as an e n tity , and not 
a p a rty  re p re se n tin g  a c e r ta in  c la s s  o r dependent on a  p a r t ic u la r  
in te re s t group. I t  wants the people to  be sovereign a t  a l l  times, and 
not only an occasional judge during e lec tio n s. ND o rig in a tes  from the 
people, works fo r the people, and id e n tif ie s  with the people.
- I t  is  a  social pa rty , because i t  considers economic development not 
as an end in  i t s e l f ,  but as the  most r e a l i s t i c  means towards the  
re a liz a tio n  of socia l ju s tic e . ND considers a l l  Greeks equal not only 
b e fo re  th e  law, bu t a ls o  b e fo re  th e  o p p o r tu n it ie s  opened up by 
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and so c ia l  l i f e .  I t  b e liev e s  th a t  each c i t iz e n  
should partake of the national product in proportion to  h is  con tribu tion  
to  i t s  c rea tion . I t  believes th a t the s ta te  has to  f u l l f i l l  a socia l 
mission; i t  has to  o ffe r re a l medical care, rea l education, adequate 
insurance, f a i r ly  paid employment, comfortable housing, and sa tis fa c to ry  
standards of liv in g  to  every c it iz e n .
- I t  i s  a  ra d ic a l  p a r ty . Free from dogmatic b ia s , ND rese rv e s  the  
p o s s ib il i ty  of adopting the best so lu tions, even the most rad ica l ones, 
vihen these a re  d ic ta te d  by the in te re s ts  of the nation and the people. 
With regard to  social-economic p o lic ie s  in p a rtic u la r , radicalism  means 
the s t a t e 's  ob liga tion  and a b i l i ty  to intervene and balance economic and 
social an tith e se s , to  reduce in eq u a litie s , and to  stand in fo r p riv a te  
in i t ia t iv e  wherever the l a t t e r  does not respond, or whenever economic 
and social reasons d ic ta te  such a course.
- I t  is  a l ib e r a l  p a r ty . I t  den ies th a t th e re  can be so c ia l and 
economic ob jec tives fo r the achievement of which democratic freedoms are  
worth s a c r i f ic in g .  I t  seeks to  r e in s ta te  the  f re e  economy in  i t s
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dominant ro le  in  production, to  safeguard f a i r  com petition, to  combat 
monopolies, to  a b o lish  p re ro g a tiv e s  (o ften  c re a te d  by th e  s t a t e 's  
thoughtless in te rven tion ), and everything th a t has proved to  cause mal­
functioning in  the economy to  the detrim ent of the people.
ND's r a d ic a l  l ib e r a l i s m  c o n s id e rs  a c t iv e  and autonomous lo ca l 
government, unburdened by the  t ig h t contro l of the p a rty , an elementary 
aspect of democracy. I t  be lieves in economic d ecen tra lisa tio n  and in a 
healthy trade-union movement, not fo r  th e  sake of b u rea u c ra tic  over­
i n f l a t i o n ,  bu t fo r  th e  advance o f th e  c r e a t iv e  d r iv e  o f p o p u la r  
p a rtic ip a tio n .
- I t  i s  a European p a r ty .  ND, w ith  i t s  fo u n d er 's  in s p ira t io n  and 
p res tig e , has accomplished a  g rea t h is to r ic  achievement: G reece's en try  
in to  Europe as an equal p a rtn e r. R esisting  a l l  fo recasts of doom from 
those who now take fu l l  advantage of th is  p o lic y 's  b e n e fits , ND has a  
permanent and long-term pro-European po licy . I t  believes in the ideal of 
Europe's p o l i t ic a l  u n if ic a tio n , and i t  t r ie s  to  the best of i t s  a b i l i ty  
to  c o n tr ib u te  to  th is  end. I t  co n sid ers  th a t  the  human va lu es and 
c iv i l is a t io n  th a t o r ig in a te d  in  our country  w il l  su rv ive  in  a  U nited 
Europe, and th a t th e re  w il l  be a h ea lth y  balance between th e  two 
opposing b lo c s ' dangerous antagonism . For our youth, in p a r t i c u la r ,  
Europe not only o ffe rs  wide career perspectives, but a lso  provides them 
with a new Mecrali Idea : to  con tribu te  to  the c rea tion  of a  b e tte r  world, 
and in so doing to  honour our Greek cu ltu re  and our h is to ry .
-F in a lly , ND is  in p a r tic u la r  a national party . I t  is  imbued with 
the v i t a l  awareness th a t  demands the  c o n tin u a tio n  of the  n a t io n 's  
h i s to r ic  course as th e  h ig h e s t of m issions. The n a tio n  rem ains the  
natural framework of individual and soc ia l l i f e .  No party  can conceive 
of i t s e l f  as ex is tin g  ou tside  the national framework, and th is  is  why 
every G reek 's supreme duty  i s  to  be ready to  make any s a c r i f i c e  to  
defend the country 's na tional independence and t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r i ty .
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Our entry  in to  the democratic family of Europe guarantees our national 
sovereignty, and a ls o  th e  p re se rv a tio n  of our n a tio n a l c h a ra c te r  and 
c iv i l i s a t i o n .  But being  in  Europe, we must g ive every a s s is ta n c e  to  
g rea te r Hellenism, provide the p o s s ib il i ty  fo r Greek cu ltu re  to  shine, 
and to  con tribu te  d ec is iv e ly  to  the establishm ent of universal peace, 
respect and co-operation among a l l  peoples.
We must c re a te  th e  p reco n d itio n s  fo r  our people to  advance w ith 
optimism and self-confidence towards the tw en ty -firs t century.
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APPENDIX VII
ND's E le c to r a l Performance
Year E lection Number of Votes % of Votes No. of Seats % of Seats
1974 national 2,669,133 54,37 216 72.00
1977 national 2,146,365 41.84 172 57.33
1981 national 2,033,584 35.86 115 38.33
1981 European 1,686,976 31.53 8 33.33
1984 European 2,266,568 38.05 9 37.50
1985 national 2,599,949 40.85 126 42.00
1989® national 2,885,548 44.25 145 48.33
1989® European 2,647,215 40.45 10 41.67
1989b national 3,093,055 46.19 148 49.33
1990 national 3,088,137 46.89 151 50.33
Note: (a): Both national and Euro-elect ions were held sim ultaneously on 
18 June 1989.
(b): National e le c tio n , held  on 5 November 1989.
According to  K. Janda’s form ulation (see footnote 196 to ch. 1), the 
degree of ND's s t a b i l i t y / i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n ,  in  n a tio n a l e lec tio n s 
only, is  as follows:
S 1 YJ -  Y |
K
Degree of p a rty  ( in ) s ta b i l i ty  = ------------------- = 0 .0 9  (ERE's one was 0.12)
Y
I f  we a ls o  take  in to  account the  p a r ty 's  European reco rd , then the  
degree of ( i n ) s t a b i l i t y / i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  becomes 0.086; in  both 
cases, ND's degree of s t a b i l i ty  is  considerably high. The degrees of 
s t a b i l i t y  fo r  th e  o th e r  m ajor p a r ty ,  PASOK, a re  0 .26  and 0 .19  
respec tive ly .
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APPENDIX V III
Party Members* Questionnaire, Views and A ttitudes in the Department of 
L arissa (City of L arissa and v illa g e  of Kalohori)
Question 1: Sex.
L arissa Kalohori Total
Sex number % number % number %
Male........................................................ 92 67.15 18 85.71 110 69.62
Female.................................................... 45 32.85 3 14.29 48 30.38
Question 2: What kind of education did  you receive?
Education
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
None........................................................ 2 01.46 — ----- 2 01.27
Primary school.................................... 46 33.57 6 28.57 52 32.91
Nine-year conpulsory educa tion .. . 24 17.52 6 28.57 30 18.99
High school.......................................... 39 28.47 5 23.81 44 27.85
Higher technical school.................. 12 08.76 3 14.29 15 09.49
U niversity ............................................ 11 08.03 1 04.76 12 07.59
Postgraduate s tu d ie s ........................ 3 02.19 — ----- 3 01.90
Question 3: What is  the year of your b irth ?
Age
Bom before 1930.................. .
Bom between 1930 and 1945. 
Bom between 1945 and 1960. 
Bom a f te r  1960.................... .
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
12 08.76 — ----- 12 07.59
59 43.06 5 23.81 64 40.51
53 38.69 16 76.19 69 43.67
13 09.49 — ----- 13 08.23
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Q uestion 4 : What i s  your p resen t occupation?
Occupation
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Lawyers............................ — ------------- — ------------- — -------------
Doctors............................ 1 .73 — ------------- 1 .63
Engineers..---- ------------ 4 02.92 . —  . 4 02.53
Ship1g /Industry ............ 1 .73 — ------------- 1 .63
Businessmen.................... 10 07.30 — ------------- 10 06.33
Merchants.................... 1 .73 1 04.76 2 01.27
Landowners...................... — ------------- — ------------- — -------------
Farmers............................ 9 06.57 12 57.15 21 13.29
High Rank Enrp................ 2 01.46 — ------------- 2 01.27
Middle/Lower Eftp.......... 45 32.84 1 04.76 46 29.11
Workers............................ 19 13.87 1 04.76 20 12.66
Univ. P ro f...................... 1 .73 — ------------- 1 .63
Teachers.......................... 1 .73 — ------------- 1 .63
Students.......................... 2 01.46 — ------------- 2 01.27
A rtisans.......................... 5 03.65 — ------------- 5 03.16
M ilita ry .......................... 2 01.46 — ------------- 2 01.27
M iscellaneous................ 3 02.19 — ------------- 3 01.90
Housewives...................... 21 15.33 2 09.53 23 14.56
No data/unemployed----- 10 07.30 4 19.04 14 08.86
T o ta l................................ 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
SALARIED PROF................ 71 51.82 2 09.53 73 46.20
LIBERAL PROF.................. 35 25.55 13 61.90 48 30.38
HOUSEWIVES...................... 21 15.33 2 09.53 23 14.56
NO DATA/UNEMPLOYED----- 10 07.30 4 19.04 14 08.86
TOTAL................................ 137 100.00 21 100.00 158 100.00
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Q uestion 5 : Are you a  member o f  a  trad e un ion , fe d e r a tio n  or  o th er
o rg a n isa tio n ?
Other union membership
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Yes.......................................................... 57 41.61 14 66.67 71 44.94
80 58.39 7 33.33 87 55.06
I f  ves, which? 
Trade union.......................................... 30 21.90 1 04.76 31 19.62
A gricultural un ion /co-opera tion .. 9 06.57 9 42.86 18 11.39
Employers’ federat ion ...................... — ----------- — ----------- — -----------
Professional a sso c ia tio n ................ 15 10.95 4 19.05 19 12.03
Non-professional a sso c ia tio n ........ 15 10.95 — ----------- 15 09.49
Question 6: In what year d id  you jo in  New Democracy?
Year of recristra tion
Larissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Before 1977..........................................
Between 1977 and 1981......................
Between 1981 and 1985......................
A fter 1985............................................
22 16.06 
6 04.38 
57 41.60 
52 37.96
5 23.81 
8 38.09 
8 38.09
27 17.09 
14 08.86 
65 41.14 
52 32.91
Question 7: Have you ever beloncred t 
youth organisations)?
Other party  membership
:o any o ther
Larissa 
number %
p a rtie s  (or
Kalohori 
number %
to  th e ir
Total 
number %
Yes..........................................................
No............................................................
5 03.65 
132 96.35 21 100.00
5 03.16 
153 96.84
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Question 8: What were the most important fac to rs impelling you to  jo in  
ND?
Reasons fo r io in ina  ND
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Family ideological 
id e n tif ic a tio n .................................... 67 48.91 8 38.09 75 47.47
Personal ideological 
id e n tif ic a tio n .................................... 85 62.04 9 42.86 94 59.49
C. Karamanlis’ personal a p p e a l... 36 26.28 5 23.81 41 25.95
Personal q u a lity  of party  
o f f ic ia ls  and depu ties.................... 13 09.49 2 09.52 15 09.49
Organisational development 
of ND...................................................... 20 14.60 — ----- 20 12.66
Counterbalancing PASOK's 
o rganisational performance............ 7 05.11 1 04.76 8 05.06
Influence of friends and/ 
or r e la t iv e s ........................................ 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
Other........................................................ 8 05.84 — ----- 8 05.06
Question 9: Do you reg u la rly  a ttend  the meetings a t  your local 
organisation?
L arissa Kalohori Total
R eaularity  of D articiD ation number % number % number %
Yes.......................................................... 117 85.40 9 42.86 126 79.75
No............................................................ 20 14.60 12 57.14 32 20.25
I f  yes, how o ften ?
Oice a week or more.......................... 47 34.30 — ----- 47 29.75
Once a fo r tn ig h t................................ 26 18.98 2 09.52 28 17.72
Once a  month........................................ 34 24.82 5 23.81 39 24.68
Every th ree  months or le s s ............ 10 07.30 2 09.52 12 07.60
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Q uestion  10: Are you s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e a c t i v i t i e s  o f  your lo c a l
o rg a n isa tio n ?
A ttitudes towards the o raan isa tion
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
S a tis f ie d .............................................. 79 57.66 7 33.33 86 54.43
P artly  s a t i s f ie d ................................ 49 35.77 10 47.62 59 37.34
D issa tis f ie d ____ _____.-..-.____. . . 9 06.57 4 19.05 13 08.23
I f  not s a t is f ie d , what would you hope to  see?
More information and b rie fin g s  on 
p o l i t ic a l  and ideological issues 
to  rank -and -file  members................ 21 15.33 2 09.52 23 14.56
More e f f ic ie n t  a c t iv i ty  and l iv e l i ­
ness of the local o rg a n isa tio n ... 32 23.36 3 14.29 35 22.15
Renewal of p a r ty -o f f ic ia ls ,  
g rea te r professionalism .................. 11 08.03 2 09.52 13 08.23
Brphasis on democratic p rin c ip le s  
and m eritocracy instead  of nepotism 14 10.22 1 04.76 15 09.49
Other...................................................... 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
Question 11: Which were, in your view, the most inportant issues th a t 
your local o rganisation  d ea lt with during the past year?
Local o raan isa tion  a c t iv i t ie s
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Information and b rie f in g  of the 
party  members on ND's p o l i t ic a l  
programme.............................................. 58 42.34 1 04.76 59 37.34
Organisational issues (communica­
tion /co -o rd ina tion , e ffic ien cy , 
new members' r e g is tr a t io n ) ............ 60 43.80 2 09.52 62 39.24
Financial campaign of the p a r ty . . 50 36.50 1 04.76 51 32.28
B riefing on the present 
p o l i t ic a l  s i tu a t io n .......................... 34 24.82 1 04.76 35 22.15
Talks and public  meetings on 
local issues (ag ricu ltu re , 
labour, e t c . ) ...................................... 22 16.06 5 23.81 27 17.09
Dissemination and propaganda 
(inform people about ND's p o l i t ic a l  
programme, a t t r a c t  new v o te rs ) . . . 36 26.28 2 09.52 38 24.05
Other...................................................... 6 04.38 3 14.29 9 05.70
None/Don't know.................................. 11 08.03 8 38.09 19 12.03
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Question 121 In your opinion, Which, i f  any, is /a re  the most inportant
problem(s) your local organisation  is  facing a t  the moment?
Problems of the local o raan isa tion
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Poor camfunication between base 
and higher party  organs.................. 16 11.68 5 23.81 21 13.29
Lack o f  p rofessional p a rty - 
o ff ic ia ls ,  renewal in  g enera l----- 23 16.79 1 04.76 24 15.19
Lack of d isc ip lin ed  and p o l i t i ­
c a lly  educated p a rty  members........ 14 10.22 9 42.86 23 14.56
Lack of in te rnal democratic 
procedures, personal antagonisms, 
neDotism, and paleokormatismos.. . 18 13.14 — — — 18 11.39
Financial problems............................ 72 52.55 2 09.52 74 46.84
General in a c tiv ity / in e f f ic ie n c y .. 14 10.22 3 14.29 17 10.76
D iff ic u ltie s  in a t t r a c t in g  and 
reg is te rin g  new members.................. 9 06.57 2 09.52 11 06.96
Other...................................................... 5 03.65 — ------------- 5 03.16
None/Don't know.................................. 31 22.63 4 19.05 35 22.15
Question 13: As you know, the f in a l nomination of ND candidates fo r 
parliam ent is  exclusively  the party  p re s id e n t 's  
re sp o n s ib ility . Do you personally  agree with th is  
procedure? I f  no t, what is  your personal suggestion?
Candidates' nomination L arissa Kalohori Total
so le ly  by the p arty  leader number % number % number %
Yes.......................................................... 52 37.96 6 28.57 58 36.71
No............................................................ 85 62.04 15 71.43 100 63.29
I f  no, what would you personally  p re fe r?
(a) Exclusive re sp o n s ib ility  by 
the p a r ty 's  g rass-roo ts  
o rgan isation ........................................ 14 10.22 4 19.05 18 11.39
(b) Formation of the e le c to ra l 
l i s t s  by in tra -p a rty  e lec tio n s  
p rio r to the p re s id e n t 's  
decision ................................................ 71 51.82 11 52.38 82 51.90
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Question 14: Do you think th a t the a b o litio n  of the preference-cross has 
contributed to  the promotion of p o l it ic a l  m orality  and, in 
a broader sense, to  the coun try 's p o l i t ic a l  p rac tices?
Yes. . . . . . . .
No................
In p a r t -----
Don't know.
Larissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
19 13.87 6 28.57 25 15.82
102 74.45 12 57.14 114 72.15
10 07.30 — ----- 10 06.33
6 04.38 3 14.29 9 05.70
I f  y e s/in  p a r t , why?
Personal favours a re  not 
as caimon as in the p a s t ................ 8 05.84 2 09.52 10 06.33
In tra -p a rty  democracy is  streng­
thened and in s t i tu t io n a l is e d ........ 9 06.57 — ------------- 9 05.70
The p o l i t ic a l  strugg le  has been 
improved and ra tio n a lis e d .............. 10 07.30 4 19.05 14 08.86
Other...................................................... 5 03.65 — ------------- 5 03.16
I f  no, why not?
The leader has become 
omnipotent............................................ 45 32.85 6 28.57 51 32.28
Voters a re  not free  to  se le c t 
the candidate of th e ir  choice----- 71 51.82 7 33.33 78 49.37
Deputies have no freedom of 
opinion, do not care  about 
th e ir  v o te rs ........................................ 46 33.57 2 09.52 48 30.38
C lientelism  (ro u sfe ti)  has been 
in s titu tio n a lis e d  by the pro­
fessional and other organisations 
of the party  in government............ 34 24.82 1 04.76 35 22.15
Other...................................................... 7 05.11 — ------------- 7 04.43
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Question 15: In the p re -d ic ta to r ia l  period , when somebody wanted to  get 
something important from the s ta te  (e .g .,  to  find  a  job, 
to  get a  loan, to  avoid lengthy bureaucratic  red  tape, 
e t c . ) ,  he would most probably ask i t  as a personal favour 
from h is  local deputy in  exchange fo r h is  vote. Has th is  
a lso  been the case,
—  (A) from 1974 u n til  1981?
Was there c lien te lism ?
L arissa  
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Yes.......................................................... 39 28.47 15 71.43 54 34.18
No............................................................ 9 06.57 1 04.76 10 06.33
In p a r t .................................................. 54 39.41 2 09.52 56 35.44
Don't know............................................ 35 25.55 3 14.29 38 24.05
I f  y e s/in  p a r t ,  to  w h a t ex ten t?
The same as befo re ............................ 23 16.79 14 66.67 37 23.42
A s h if t  to  some degree of 
m eritocracy, and the ra tio n a ­
lis a tio n  of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e ............ 62 45.25 2 09.52 64 40.50
Other...................................................... 8 05.84 1 04.76 9 05.70
I f  no, what has happened instead?
Rousfeti was abolished, in 
favour of m eritocracy...................... 7 05.11 1 04.76 8 05.06
Other...................................................... 2 01.46 — ----- 2 01.27
— (B) from 1981 u n til  nowadays?
Was there c lien te lism ?
L arissa  
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Yes.......................................................... 52 37.96 17 80.96 69 43.67
No............................................................ 47 34.30 2 09.52 49 31.01
In p a r t .................................................. 10 07.30 — ----- 10 06.33
Don't know............................................ 28 20.44 2 09.52 30 18.99
I f  y e s/in  p a r t ,  to  what extent?
The same as befo re ............................ 44 32.12 17 80.96 61 38.61
A s h if t  to  seme degree of 
m eritocracy, and the ra tio n a ­
l is a tio n  of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e ............ 12 08.76 _____ 12 07.60
Other...................................................... 6 04.38 --- ----- 6 03.79
I f  no, what has happened instead?
Rousfeti was in s titu tio n a lis e d  
by PASOK's local and o ther 
o rgan isa tions................................
Other................................................
46 33.57 2 09.52 48 30.38
1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
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Question 16: Do you think th a t ND's p o l i t ic a l  programme has been 
su ff ic ie n tly  dissem inated, explained and understood?
Dissemination of ND's proaranme
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Yes.......................................................... 53 38.69 8 38.09 61 38.61
In p a r t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 44.52 5 23.81 66 41.77
No............................................................ 18 13.14 5 23.81 23 14.56
Don't know............................................ 5 03.65 3 14.29 8 05.06
I f  no/in  p a r t ,  what do you think a re  the reasons fo r th is ?
Leadership in e ffic ien cy .................. 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
P a r ty -o ff ic ia ls ' in e ffic ien c y ----- 24 17.52 — ----- 24 15.19
O rganisational in e ffic ien cy .......... 18 13.14 2 09.52 20 12.66
Lack of appropriate  propaganda 
(e .g ., te lev is io n  and radio  
broadcasts) .......................................... 60 43.79 6 28.57 66 41.77
Other...................................................... 9 06.57 2 09.52 11 06.96
Question 17: Have you personally  read the ideological declara tion  of the 
party  "A New Proposal fo r Freedom", of 3 Feb. 1985?
Acquaintance with ND's ideoloav
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Yes.......................................................... 60 43.79 9 42.86 69 43.67
In p a r t .................................................. 34 24.82 4 19.05 38 24.05
No............................................................ 43 31.39 8 38.09 51 32.28
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Question 18; Which, in your view, a re  the roost inportant reasons th a t 
explain ND's appeal to  the voters?
Reasons fo r ND's voter-appeal
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
P o litic a l /economic programme........ 63 45.98 — ----- 63 39.87
Ideology................................................ 66 48.17 1 04.76 67 42.41
Leadershi p. .  ^ . 35 25.55 2 09.52 37 23.42
A c tiv itie s  of ND deputies 
in th e ir  co n stitu en c ies .................. 22 16.06 1 04.76 23 14.56
O rganisation........................................ 25 18.25 1 04.76 26 16.46
R e liab ility /sen se  of responsi­
b i l i ty ,  ND's option fo r tran ­
q u il i ty ,  order and secu rity , 
ant i -extremi sm.................................... 64 46.71 14 66.67 79 50.00
Other...................................................... 10 07.30 4 19.05 14 08.86
Question 19: In terros of in te rna l democratic procedures in  the decision­
making process, do you think tha t ND's leadership d if fe r s  
from th a t of the o ther p a rtie s?
A ttitudes towards the leadership
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Yes.......................................................... 110 80.29 7 33.33 117 74.05
In p a r t .................................................. 17 12.41 3 14.29 20 12.66
No............................................................ 8 05.84 9 42.86 17 10.76
Don't know............................................ 2 01.46 2 09.52 4 02.53
I f  ves/in p a rt , in what wav?
I t  is  characterised  by serious­
ness and re sp o n s ib ility , decent 
performance, d ign ity  and m orality , 
tra d itio n , log ic , p re s tig e  
and q u a lity .......................................... 83 60.58 2 09.52 85 53.80
I t  is  dem ocratically e lec ted , 
i t s  options can be questioned, 
i t  is  not au ta rch ic .......................... 49 35.77 7 33.33 56 35.44
Other...................................................... 8 05.84 1 04.76 9 05.70
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Question 20: In your opinion, what were ND's g rea tes t achievements while 
the p a rty  was (a) in government? and (b) in opposition?
 (A) in government:
ND's g rea tes t achievement 
(1974-1981)
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
R estoration of democracy................ 96 70.07 7 33.33 103 65.19
EEC e n try .............................................. 97 70.80 11 52.38 108 68.35
L egalisation of the Ccmnunist 
Party  of Greece (KKE)...................... 33 24.09 3 14.29 36 22.78
National re c o n c ilia tio n .................. 67 48.90 2 09.52 69 43.67
Democratic o rgan isation  of
the p a rty .............................................. 39 28.47 5 23.81 44 27.85
Governmental p o lic ie s  (so c ia l, 
economic, e t c . ) .................................. 41 29.93 2 09.52 43 27.22
The f i r s t  party  congress
in 1979.................................................. 17 12.41 — ----- 17 10.76
Other...................................................... 4 02.92 — ----- 4 02.53
—  (B) in  opposition :
ND's g rea te s t achievement 
(1981-1989)
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Decent, calm and constructive  
opposition and performance 
in parliam ent...................................... 69 50.36 8 38.09 77 48.73
Democratic organ isation
of the p a r ty ........................................ 61 44.52 5 23.81 66 41.77
The second party  congress 
in 1986.................................................. 24 17.52 — ----- 24 15.19
Staooth tra n s it io n  in the 
party  leadersh ip ................................ 35 25.55 — ----- 35 22.15
The v ic to ry  over PASQK in the 
1986 municipal e le c tio n s ........ . 76 55.47 8 38.09 84 53.16
ND's po litical/econom ic 
programme.............................................. 50 36.50 — ----- 50 31.65
Other...................................................... 5 03.65 1 04.76 6 03.89
None/Don't know.................................. 4 02.92 1 04.76 5 03.16
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Question 21: Why do you think ND lo s t the 1981 and the 1985 
parliam entary e lections?
 (A) ND lo s t the 1981 e lec tio n  because:
Continuous 7-year government, 
lo ts  of mistakes * .
Lack of strong leadersh ip ..............
Lack of a  convincing programme 
and ideology........................................
Lack of an e ffe c tiv e  
o rgan isa tion ........................................
PASOK's strong leadersh ip ..............
PASOK's programme and premise 
fo r change............................................
PASCK's e ffe c tiv e  o rg a n isa tio n ...
Other......................................................
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
71 51.82 4 19.09 75 47.47
19 13.87 5 23.81 24 15.19
16 11.68 2 09.52 18 11.39
35 25.55 4 19.09 39 24.68
14 10.22 2 09.52 16 10.13
67 48.90 6 28.57 73 46.20
35 25.55 3 14.29 38 24.05
10 07.30 ____ _____— 10 06.33
 (B) ND lo s t the 1985 e lec tio n  because:
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Time-credit to  PASOK in  order 
to  accomplish i t s  programme.......... 90 65.69 5 23.81 95 60.13
Lack of strong leadersh ip .............. 9 06.57 3 14.29 12 07.60
Lack of convincing programme........ 11 08.03 2 09.52 13 08.23
Lack of an e ffe c tiv e  
o rgan isation ........................................ 19 13.87 3 14.29 22 13.92
Psychological in tim idation 
of the e le c to ra te  by PASOK............ 52 37.96 5 23.81 57 36.08
ND lead ersh ip 's  handling of the 
"p residen tia l e lection" a f f a i r . . . 15 10.95 2 09.52 17 10.76
People were not convinced th a t 
ND was ready to  govern.................... 16 11.68 3 14.29 19 12.03
Other...................................................... 9 06.57 1 04.76 10 06.33
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Question 22: Concerning ND's g rass-ro o ts  o rgan isation , is  th e re , in  your 
view, any marked d iffe rence  between the 1974-81 period 
(when the p a rty  was in government) and tha t fran  1981 u n til  
today ( i .e .  1989)?
Was there a  d ifference?
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Yes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 85.40 18 85.71 135 85 .44
Sane........................................................ 12 08.76 — ----- 12 07.60
No............................................................ 3 02.19 — ----- 3 01 .90
Don’t  knew............................................. 5 03.65 3 14.29 8 05.06
I f  yes/some, was i t  th a t :
(a) D ifference in 1974-81 was 
v ir tu a lly  non-ex isten t; a f te r  1981 
i t  became necessary to  counter­
balance PASOK and the party  was 
e ffe c tiv e ly  organised...................... 92 67.15 15 71.43 107 67.72
(b) I t  siirply became b e tte r  
a f te r  1981............................................. 17 12.41 2 09.52 19 12.03
Other....................................................... 20 14.60 1 04.76 21 13.29
Question 23: Are there  any so c ia l c lasses th a t you would say ND mainly 
represents?
ND and c la ss  rep resen ta tion
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
44 32.12 3 14.29 47 29.75
No............................................................ 83 60.58 18 85.71 101 63.92
Don't know............................................. 10 07.30 — ----- 10 06.33
I f  yes, which one(s)?
Middle c la s s ........................................ 29 21.17 3 14.29 32 20.25
Upper-middle c la s s ............................ 16 11.68 1 04.76 17 10.76
Upper-class bourgeoisie .................. 13 09.49 — ----- 13 08.23
Other...................................................... 4 02.92 — ----- 4 02.53
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Question 24: Which of the following p a rty -lab e ls  vrould you choose to  
id en tify  ND today?
ND desianated as:
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Conservative p a r ty ............................ 17 12.41 — ----- 17 10.76
Social-dem ocratic p a rty .................. 1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
Christian-dem ocratic p a rty ............ 10 07.30 3 14.29 13 8.23
Liberal p a rty ...................................... 87 63.50 9 42.86 96 60.76
N eo-liberal p a rty .............................. 23 16.79 — ----- 23 14.56
Centre p a rty ........................................ 5 03.65 1 04.76 6 03.79
C entre-right p a rty ............................ 31 22.63 10 47.62 41 25.95
Popular p a rty ...................................... 6 04.38 — ----- 6 03.79
Other...................................................... 6 04.38 — ----- 6 03.79
Question 25: Which of the following fo rces, in your opinion, exerted any 
influence on the New Democracy party?
Impact of p o l i t ic a l  cu rren ts
L arissa 
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Venizelism............................................ 10 07.30 — ----- 10 06.33
Popular p a rty ...................................... 6 04.38 1 04.76 7 04.43
Greek Rally P arty .............................. 11 08.03 — ----- 11 06.96
National Radical Union.................... 24 17.52 — ----- 24 15.19
Centre Union (pre-1967).................. 9 06.57 1 04.76 10 06.33
A nti-d ic ta to rsh ip  re s is ta n c e ........ 1 .73 — ----- 1 .63
C. Karamanlis1 personal a p p e a l... 102 74.45 20 95.24 122 77.22
Other...................................................... 10 07.30 — ----- 10 06.33
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Question 26: In your view, is  ND the h e ir  and descendant of the pre­
d ic ta to rsh ip  ERE, o r do you think i t  is  something new in 
Greek p o lit ic s ?
ND's re la tio n sh ip  to  ERE
L arissa  
number %
Kalohori 
number %
Total 
number %
Heir and descendent of ERE............ 21 15.33 1 04.76 22 13.93
A new p o l i t ic a l  f o r c e . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 81.02 20 95.24 131 82.91
Other...................................................... 5 03.65 — ----- 5 03.16
Question 27: As you know, ND f ig h ts  fo r libe ra lism , where the free
market economy is  dominant. Would you expect some kind of 
d i r e c t , personal b enefit i f  ND resumed o ffice?
Members' personal expectations
Yes..........................................................
No............................................................
I f  yes, of what kind?
Economic b e n e f i t ................................
Social b e n e f it ....................................
Other......................................................
L arissa Kalohori Total
number % number % number %
89 64.96 10 47.62 99 62.66
48 35.04 11 52.38 59 37.34
44 32.12 5 23.81 49 31.01
70 51.09 5 23.81 75 47.47
13 09.49 — ----- 13 08.23
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
This l i s t  contains the names of ND parliam entarians and p a rty  members 
but a lso  o ther prominent supporters and sympathisers who provided useful 
information on a  wide range of issues concerning the party  in the 
Department of L arissa . Special reference is  made to  most of than in 
c e rta in  p a rts  of th is  study, but there  a re  a lso  a  few who a re  mentioned 
only h e re , s in c e  th e i r  c o n tr ib u tio n  to  our b e t te r  understand ing  and 
explanation of ND in the Department of L arissa was of a more general 
kind.
Beis K. : a g r ic u l tu ra l is t ,  ex-member of ND's departmental
ccnm ittee, a lso  ex-member of the Volvi 
movement.
Bohoris J .
Exarhos D.
Georgosoulis C.
Grivas T.
Hatzigeorgiou E.
Houliaras C.
Katsaras G.
Katsaros N. 
Kondonassios A.
Kondonassiou-Tsigani M. 
Korakaki M.
Papanikolaou G.
Psathas D.
Souflias G. 
Voyiatzi-Mantzou K.
: shop-keeper (groceries and confectionery), 
p residen t of ND's local ccnmittee of 
Philippoupolis.
: p residen t of the local community of Kalohori 
since 1986, a lso  presiden t of the local ND 
ccnm ittee.
: lawyer, secre tary  of ND's Depaptmental 
Committee.
: trade-unionised railway employee, p residen t of 
ND's local committee of Anthoupolis.
: doctor, prominent local ND sympathiser and 
supporter, but not d ire c tly  involved in 
p o l i t ic s .
: doctor, ex-president of ND's departmental 
committee and ex-party member.
: a g r ic u ltu ra l is t  and merchant (chem icals),ex­
party  member (of ND in the Department of 
K ard itsa), ex-member of the Volvi movement.
: lawyer, ND deputy since 1981.
: pensioner, responsible of ND's trade-union 
department.
: housewife, p residen t of ONNED.
: midwife, p residen t of the trade-unionised 
midwives of ND.
: merchant (e le c tr ic  equipment), presiden t of 
ND's local committee of Ag. Konstantinos.
: notary, p residen t of the local committee of 
Tymavos and member of ND's cen tra l committee.
: c iv i l  engineer, ND deputy since 1974.
: teacher, responsib le  of ND's women department 
and parliam entary candidate in the June 1989 
e lec tio n .
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APPENDIX IX 
Maps
Map 1: P o li t ic a l  Regions and Departments (Ncmes) of Modem Greece.
(Source: Social and Economic A tla s , Athens: National Centre of 
Social Research, 1965).
Map 2: Region of Thessaly, i t s  Departments and th e ir  C ap ita ls .
Map 3: Department of L arissa , i t s  Eparchies and th e ir  C ap ita ls .
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M a p  1 :  P o l i t i c a l  R e g i o n s  a n d  i 
D e p a r t m e n t s  ( N c m e s )  
o f  M o d e m  G r e e c e .
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